Good Shepherd Evangelical MissionPrivate Limited, Formerly known as "The Siloam Evangelical Mission Private Limited" v. Meenakshi Achi

Vs.1.VR.M.Meenakshisundaram Chettiar2.Muthulakshmi Achi.. Respondents/Respondents/PlaintiffsAppeals against the common Judgement and Decree dated 29.4.2011made in Application Nos.2357 and 5193 of 2010 in C.S.No.83 of 1965and Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of 2000.For Appellant :Mr.P.S.Raman, Senior Advocate for M/s.V.RamakrishnanFor Respondents:Mr.K.Ravifor M/s.Rugan & Aryafor 1st respondent in OSA Nos.186 and 187 of 2011Mr.S.Raghavanfor 4th respondent in OSA Nos.186 and 187 of 2011M/s.M.Sriram andRamesh Venkatachalapathyfor 7th respondent in OSA Nos.186 and 187 of 2011Mr.Rahul Balajifor M/s.Satish Parasaranfor 27th respondentin OSA Nos.186 and 187 of 2011Ms.P.Rajarajeswarifor 62nd respondent in OSA Nos.186 and 187 of 2011J U D G M E N TP.JYOTHIMANI, J.These appeals arise from a common order dated 29.4.2011 passed bya learned Single Judge in Application Nos.2357 and 5193 of 2010 inC.S.No.83 of 1965 and Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of2000. While appellant filed Application Nos.2357 and 5193 of 2010 inC.S.No.83 of 1965 for impleading itself, namely Good ShepherdEvangelical Mission Private Limited, formerly known as "The SiloamEvangelical Mission Private Limited", as the 64th defendant in thesuit stated above and to implead or substitute the appellant either https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in the place of Andiappan (7th defendant) or VR.M.Meenakshi SundaramChettiar (25th defendant) or M.Veerappan (26th defendant) respectively,Application No.5301 of 2010 in C.S.No.686 of 2000 has been filed bythe appellant, which was arrayed as 10th defendant in the said suit,to transpose it as the third plaintiff in C.S.No.686 of 2000. Allthe applications came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge,against which the present appeals are filed.2.1. Originally, the land property called Edamallapatti land inPratiyur, Trichy comprising of 77.39 Acres belonged to one LateT.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, who is stated to have sold a portionof the said property in the year 1960 to one Andiappan (7th defendantin C.S.No.83 of 1965) under a registered sale deed. The saidT.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar died on 18.8.1964, leaving behind himhis widow – CT.Sivagami Achi (4th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), whoalso died subsequently on 26.11.1988, apart from three sons, namelyPL.CT.Subramaniam Chettiar, PL.CT.Palaniappa Chettiar andPL.CT.Senthilnathan Chettiar, arrayed as defendants 1 to 3 inC.S.No.83 of 1965, and three daughters, namely Umayal Achi,L.Velliammai Achi arrayed as defendants 5 and 6 in C.S.No.83 of 1965,and K.R.Meenakshi Achi, who filed C.S.No.83 of 1965 for partition.2.2. The first son of late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, namelythe 1st defendant, also died leaving behind him his two wives, namelyDhoniprathambal Achi (48th defendant) and Umayal Achi (49th defendant),who also subsequently died, and their sons and daughters have beenimpleaded as defendants 50 to 62 in C.S.No.83 of 1965.2.3. Likewise, Umayal Achi (5th defendant), one of the daughterof late T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar, also died, who was succeededby her husband VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram Chettiar (25th defendant), whoalso subsequently died and thereafter his son – M.Veerappan has beenimpleaded as 26th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965.2.4. Some of the left out properties while filing the suit inC.S.No.83 of 1965 were subsequently added by an application filed bythe plaintiff and third parties, including Andiappan (7th defendant),were impleaded by order dated 24.11.1967.2.5. A preliminary decree by consent of the parties was passed on22.11.1968 declaring that the plaintiff and each one of defendants 1to 6 are entitled to 1/7th share in the estate of lateT.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. However, it appears that there was nodecision regarding the item of properties stated to have beenpurchased by the said Andiappan (7th defendant).2.6. It appears that Andiappan (7th defendant) has sold awayvarious portions of the properties under registered sale deeds to andin favour of VR.M.Meenakshi Sundaram (husband of the 5th defendant), https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Sivagami Achi (daughter of the 6th defendant), Muthulakshmi Achi (wifeof the 3rd defendant) and one Rangasamy Gounder, who was not relatedto the sharers. The plaintiff in the suit C.S.No.83 of 1965 filedApplication No.3220 of 1975 to implead the said purchasers and thesaid application for impleadment came to be dismissed by this Courton 12.3.1976 on the ground that they are pendente lite purchasersand, therefore, the doctrine of lis pendens would apply. The orderis as follows:"Admittedly the property in relation to which injunctionis sought does not form part of the preliminary decreein C.S.No.83 of 1965. Nevertheless, that the applicantcontends is that the 7th defendant is only a servant ofthe deceased father who has sold away the property infavour of respondents 2 to 5 sought to be impleaded asparties. Admittedly the sale is pending C.S.No.83 of1965 in which even the doctrine of lis pendens can beinvoked by the applicant as and when he succeeds inestablishing his right to these survey numbers formingthe subject amtter of the application. In this view, Isee no need to continue the interim injunction.Accordingly that will stand vacated and applicationNo.3220 of 1975 will also stand dismissed."Accordingly, the application for impleadment as well as theinjunction application came to be dismissed by this Court.2.7. After the conclusion of trial, by a second preliminarydecree dated 21.11.1977 in C.S.No.83 of 1965, it was held that thetransfer effected to Andiappan (7th defendant) is sham and nominaland, therefore, the said property also formed part of the estate oflate T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. The operative portion of thesaid judgment is as under:"... Therefore, even in the case of the 7th defendant, Ihad to accept the case of the plaintiff and I hold thatthe sale in favour of the 7th defendant was a sham andnominal transaction and that no title passed in respectof item (a) of III Schedule and the same remained aspart of the estate of Chidambaram Chettiar.Accordingly, issue No.1 is found in favour of theplaintiff."2.8. As against the said portion of the judgment, Andiappan (7thdefendant) filed O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and that appeal came to bedismissed as withdrawn on 14.8.1984. Thereafter, the above said fourpurchasers from Andiappan (7th defendant), who are not sharers in thejoint family property, have filed various applications to set asidethe order dated 14.8.1984 made in O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and all thesaid applications were dismissed on 23.12.1986 by a Division Bench ofthis Court. The Division Bench has, in fact, held that it was thesepurchasers who have resisted the application filed by the plaintiff https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in C.S.No.83 of 1965 to implead them as parties based on the doctrineof lis pendens and, therefore, they are estopped from taking adifferent stand. 2.9. As against the said order of the Division Bench in theapplications filed by the pendente lite purchasers, there was nofurther appeal, obviously because it was barred by limitation by thattime. Instead the said pendente lite purchasers filed C.S.No.674 of1987 praying to annul the order dated 21.11.1977, by which the secondpreliminary decree was passed by this Court in C.S.No.83 of 1965holding that the subject matter of properties stated to have beenpurchased by Andiappan (7th defendant) are sham and nominal, andbenami. It was that suit which was subsequently transferred to theCity Civil Court, Chennai based on monetary limit and was thereaftertransferred to this Court and re-numbered as C.S.No.686 of 2000. 2.10. The said pendente lite purchasers earlier filed applicationfor injunction against the sharers from proceeding further, whichcame to be dismissed by this Court on 9.1.1989, and the said orderwas also confirmed by a Division Bench in O.S.A.No.40 of 1989 on22.2.1989. It appears that there was an Advocate Commissionerappointed to identify the properties for division by metes andbounds, apart from the appointment of a Receiver in C.S.No.83 of 1965.2.11. It is also relevant to point out at this stage that theplaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965, having come to know about thepurchase made by the appellants, has filed Application No.2034 of1992 to implead the purchasers, including the Siloam EvangelicalMission Private Limited, and there was also an order of injunctionobtained in O.A.No.285 of 1992 restraining them from trespassing intothe property. Ultimately, the plaintiff withdrew the applicationseeking impleadment on 16.4.2010.2.12. The appellant herein, being the third party to the suit inC.S.No.83 of 1965 and stated to have been called as "The SiloamEvangelical Mission Private Limited" (10th defendant in C.S.No.686 of2000), claiming itself to have purchased about an extent of 26.49Acres from Meenakshi Sundaram (25th defendant), who subsequently diedand is represented by M.Veerappan (26th defendant), Muthulakshmi Achi(wife of the 3rd defendant) and Sivagami Achi (daughter of the 6thdefendant) under various registered sale deeds, which are as follows:Sl.No.Date ofthe saledeedDocumentNo.Survey No.Extent of theproperty121.7.19763889128/2C, 128/3B2 acres221.7.197638872827 acres321.7.197638482827 acres https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Sl.No.Date ofthe saledeedDocumentNo.Survey No.Extent of theproperty421.7.19763846128/2C, 128/3B2 acres515.7.19763844281/34 acres, 66 2/3621.7.19763888281/34 acres, 66 2/3721.7.19763847281/34 acres, 66 2/3815.7.19763845128/2C3B2 acresTotal33.99 acreshas filed the above said applications on the grounds that it is a bonfide purchaser having paid the amount of full consideration to itsvendors; that the plaintiff and sharers in collusion with the vendorsof the appellant have obtained preliminary decree; that by collusionthey entered into an arrangement among themselves and there islikelihood of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 to withdraw thesame on the basis of a compromise and execute the decree passed inthe partition suit C.S.No.83 of 1965, apart from many other grounds.2.13. The applications filed by the appellant were resisted bythe plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 on the ground that the purchasestated to have been made by the appellant from non-sharers isfraudulent in nature and in any event, the validity of theappellant's purchase depends upon the rights of Andiappan (7thdefendant) and inasmuch as it has been settled and become final thatthe transfer effected to Andiappan (7th defendant) is sham andnominal, the appellant or its vendors cannot claim any better title.2.14. It was after considering the rival contentions, the learnedJudge has dismissed the applications on the ground that the appellantis pendente lite purchaser of a portion of the property forming partof C.S.No.83 of 1965 and, therefore, under the legal concept of lispendens, it is not necessary party to decide the lis, and also on theground that the rights of the appellant are limited, since thepartition suit between the members of the family can be decided evenin the absence of the appellant and hence, the appellant is not anecessary and proper party.2.15. It is as against the said order of the learned Judge, theapplicant before the learned Single Judge has filed the presentappeals on various grounds, including that the appellant is necessaryand proper party to the suit in C.S.No.83 of 1965, as any decision inthe partition suit will result in dispossession of the appellant, whois in possession; that the learned Judge ought to have appreciatedthe implication of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure(for brevity, "the CPC"); that the reason given by the learned Judgethat the appellant is pendente lite purchaser is not correct; that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the learned Judge has not taken into consideration the applicationfiled by the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 to implead the appellant,which was withdrawn on 16.4.2010 and, therefore, she cannot now saythat the appellant is not necessary and proper party; that theappellant is bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and itsright is protected under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act,1882; and that no valid reason has been given for dismissing all thethree applications, especially when the presence of the appellantwill facilitate effective adjudication of the entire issue.3. Mr.P.S.Raman, learned counsel for the appellant wouldvehemently contend as under:(i)that the dismissal of Application No.5301 of 2010 inC.S.No.686 of 2000 to transpose the appellant, who wasarrayed as 10th defendant, as the third plaintiff inthe said suit is unsustainable;(ii)that the appellant should be given opportunity tocontinue the suit filed by its vendors to set aside thedecree in C.S.No.83 of 1965, consequent to thewithdrawal of O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 by Andiappan (firstdefendant in C.S.No.686 of 2000), insofar as it relatesto schedule properties in the suit measuring 77.39Acres in Pratiyur, Edamallapatti Village, TrichyDistrict, especially when the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686of 2000, who are near relatives to the sharers, namelythe plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 in C.S.No.83 of1965, are attempting to withdraw the suit and arrive ata compromise final decree, in which event the appellantwill be losing its valuable right;(iii)that it has been the judicial precedent, as held inBhupendra Narayan Sinha Bahadur v. Rajeswar ProsadBhakat and others, AIR 1931 PC 162 and in the latestjudgment of this Court in R.Dhanasundari @ R.Rajeswariv. A.N.Umakanth and others, 2006 (5) CTC 440, thatright of transposition under Order I Rule 10 and OrderXXII Rule 10 of the CPC is to be decided on twofactors, namely complete adjudication of disputes andto avoid multiplicity of proceedings;(iv)that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act isapplicable only if it is not a collusive suit and sincethe plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 have alreadyapproached the court on the basis that the decreeobtained in C.S.No.83 of 1965 is collusive, theappellant, being the bona fide purchaser from the saidplaintiffs, must be given opportunity to continue thesuit in the absence of the efforts taken by theplaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 to proceed with thecase; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (v)that the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 themselveshave no objection for transposition except raisingobjection now and, therefore, that creates a strongsuspicion that they are not interested in prosecutingthe suit, in which event the appellant will be theaffected party;(vi)that the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965 having filedan application to implead the appellant and othersubsequent purchasers realizing that they are necessaryparties, has chosen to withdraw the application with aview to collusively file a compromise memo in order todeprive the appellant its right;(vii)that the withdrawal of O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 by thepredecessor-in-interest of the appellant and decliningefforts to restore O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 was on the factsof that case and that does not mean that the subsequentpurchaser has no right to continue the litigation;(viii)that even if the appellant is pendente litepurchaser, if it comes under Section 52 of the Transferof Property Act proving that the suit is collusive innature, it is entitled to be impleaded and in thisregard, reliance was placed on the decisions inDhanlakshmi and others v. P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10SCC 719 and Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal and others, (2004)2 SCC 601, following the earlier judgment of the FourJudges Bench of the Supreme Court in Saila Bala Dassiv. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC 394;(ix)that insofar as it relates to the sale effected byMeenakshi Sundaram (25th defendant) after the death ofhis wife who is a sharer, namely Umayal Achi (5thdefendant), he has actually inherited the share andafter his death, his son M.Veerappan (26th defendant)having inherited the share, cannot go back from thesale executed by his father and likewise, defendants 3and 6 are also bound by the sale made by theirrespective wife and daughter; and(x)that the order of this Court in 11.7.1989 supportshis case that the appellants should be made as partiesand in this regard, he placed reliance on the decisionin T.G.Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2MLJ 317 (SC).4. Per contra, Mr.K.Ravi, learned counsel appearing for the firstrespondent, who is the plaintiff in C.S.No.83 of 1965, submits:(i)that the appellant, being third party, is neither anecessary nor proper party;(ii)that the appellant – Good Shepherd EvangelicalMission Private Limited has never been in the scene and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the appellant has never stated that Siloam EvangelicalMission Private Limited has been converted as GoodShepherd Evangelical Mission Private Limited and,therefore, the status of the appellant is dubious;(iii)that inasmuch as indisputably the share has beenidentified in the preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968giving 1/7th share to each of the sharers andsubsequently, since the wife of T.S.PL.P.ChidambaramChettiar died, it has been made as 1/6th, and there isnothing to be adjudicated;(iv)that 77.39 Acres in Pratiyur, EdamallapattiVillage, Trichy District stood in the name of Andiappan(7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), who is not asharer and was only a servant of T.S.PL.P.ChidambaramChettiar, and the transfer effected to him was held tobe sham and nominal by the second preliminary decreewhich was passed on 21.11.1977; (v)that when proceedings were pending, Andiappan (7thdefendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) has fraudulently soldthe properties to the non-sharers, who are not entitledto any share in the estate, under two sale deeds dated10.2.1970 and 9.6.1970 and at the time of sale, theproperties which were sold were in custodia legis,namely within the custody of the court appointedReceiver;(vi)that when the first respondent herself filed anapplication for impleading the appellant and also thepurchasers, it was they who resisted their impleadmenton the ground of lis pendens and they cannot now take acontrary stand;(vii)that the order passed by this Court dated 12.3.1976refusing impleadment has become final and the appealfiled by Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965)having been withdrawn, the appellant, who purchasedlands from the vendors to whom Andiappan has sold theproperty, has no right and even the vendors of theappellant have filed applications to set aside thewithdrawal order and that also came to be dismissed on23.12.1986;(viii)that pendente lite purchasers have no right ofgetting themselves impleaded and in this regard, hewould rely upon the decisions in Sarvinder Singh v.Dalip Singh and others, (1996) 5 SCC 539, Bibi ZubaidaKhatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb and another, (2004) 1 SCC191, Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others, 2007 (2) CTC562 and T.G.Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal and another,(2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC);(ix)that even as per the decisions of the Supreme Courtin Amit Kumar Shaw and another v. Farida Khatoon and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 and Dhanlakshmi and othersv. P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10 SCC 719, only in caseswhere there is none to defend the title except thependente lite purchaser, the pendente lite purchasermay be impleaded and such impleaded party will only getwhat is allotted to his vendors in a partition suit,and inasmuch as the appellant has purchased from nonco-sharers, they are not entitled even on equity;(x)that during the pendency of the suit for partition,which according to him is not collusive, no transfer ofproperty subject matter of partition suit can beeffected without permission of the Court and theallegation of collusion should be raised at theearliest point of time; and (xi)that the plaintiff, being the admitted sharer,having filed the suit as early as in the year 1965,even in her advanced years is not able to get her rightin respect of the property due to vexatious litigation. 5. Mr.S.Raghavan, learned counsel appearing for the fourthrespondent (Senthilnathan Chettiar) would elaborate his contention oncustodia legis stating that the Division Bench has, in fact,appointed a Receiver. He would also very strongly repudiate thecontention that there has been collusion. It is his submission thatby the efforts of the Receiver, one of the properties, which is atheatre in the city of Chennai, came to be sold and, therefore, onthe principle of custodia legis, when the property is in the custodyof the Court, if a purchaser has not obtained any permission from theCourt, he cannot claim to be a bona fide purchaser and in thisregard, he would rely upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court inArumugha Gounder v. Ardhanari Mudaliar and others, AIR 1975 Madras231. To substantiate his contention about constructive res judicata,he would rely upon the decision in M.Nagabhushana v. State ofKarnataka and others, (2011) 3 SCC 408 and to show that benamitransaction has been effected, which is fraudulent in nature, hewould rely upon the decisions in R.Rajagopal Reddy (dead) by Lrs. andothers v. Padmini Chandrasekharan (dead) by Lrs., (1995) 2 SCC 630.6. Mr.Rahul Balaji, learned counsel appearing for the 27threspondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011 – M.Veerappan, wouldsubmit that the conduct of the appellant would amount to approbationand reprobation and it is not a necessary and proper party. He wouldsubmit that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppelby relying upon a judgment in Joint Action Committee of Air LinePilots' Association of India (ALPAI) and others v. Director Generalof Civil Aviation and others, (2011) 5 SCC 435. It is his submissionthat the title of the third parties is traceable to their vendors andinasmuch as Andiappan is not a sharer and his position has alreadybeen decided by this Court holding that the transfer effected to him https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is sham and nominal, which has become final, the appellant cannot gobeyond that and can never claim itself to be a necessary and properparty and in this regard, he would rely upon the decision in MumbaiInternational Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels(P) Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417. It is his submission that no person hasany right to insist that he has to be impleaded as a party merelybecause he is a proper party, by relying on the decision in RameshHirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay andothers, (1992) 2 SCC 524. It is his submission that inasmuch as theappellant is a rank outsider, it cannot have interest over thepartition suit. He further submitted that the appellant cannot evenclaim any equitable allotment, as it was held by the Apex Court inT.G.Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC).In respect of transposition of the appellant as the third plaintiffin C.S.No.686 of 2000, it is his submission that when the issue hasbeen determined in entirety, such transposition would amount to abuseof process and re-litigation, as it was held by the Supreme Court inK.K.Modi v. K.N.Modi and others, (1998) 3 SCC 573. According tohim, none of the grounds required for transposition is satisfied inthe present case. Mr.M.Sriram, counsel appearing for the 7threspondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 to 187 of 2011 and counsel appearing forvarious parties also adopted the above said contentions.7. We have heard the elaborate submissions made by the learnedSenior Counsel appearing for the appellants as well as the respectivecounsel appearing for various respondents, referred to the impugnedorder of the learned Judge, and given our anxious thought to theissue involved in this case.8. At the outset, it has to be made clear that admittedlyC.S.No.83 of 1965 filed by the plaintiff therein, who is the firstrespondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011, is still pending forpassing final decree. It is also not in dispute that the firstpreliminary decree passed in the said suit for partition on22.11.1968 declaring that the plaintiff and each one of defendants 1to 6 are entitled to 1/7th share in the estate of lateT.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar has become final. In the secondpreliminary decree passed in the said suit on 21.11.1977, whileconfirming the entitlement of the plaintiff in respect of her 1/7thshare, in respect of the other properties which were left out in thefirst preliminary decree, including the properties which are subjectmatter in these proceedings situated at Pratiyur, EdamallapattiVillage, Trichy District, a finding has been given by this Court thatthe transaction effected between T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar andAndiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) under various saledeeds is sham and nominal. 9. It is against the said preliminary decree, Andiappan (7thdefendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) filed O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, which was https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ subsequently withdrawn by him and it is also not in dispute thatafter such withdrawal of the appeal by Andiappan, four persons whohave purchased from him, who are the vendors of the appellants, havefiled C.M.P.Nos.15248 and 15249 of 1984 and 6836 of 1985 to impleadthem as appellants in the said O.S.A.No.85 of 1979 and all thosethree petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench on 23.12.1986 andthe said four persons, who are non-sharers, have also not filed anyappeal against the second preliminary decree dated 21.11.1977. Evenotherwise, filing of such appeal is totally time barred. It was inthe above said background we have to consider the appeals filed bythe appellant for impleadment, transposition, etc.10. The appellant cannot claim better title than theirtransferors. Their transferors (vendors), in their turn, havingpurchased from Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965), cannotclaim better title than Andiappan. Now that the transactions in theyear 1960 between Andiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) andT.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar have been held by this Court as shamand nominal, which has become final, it is yet to be seen as towhether the second suit (C.S.No.686 of 2000) filed by the vendors ofthe appellant, in effect to annul the second preliminary decree dated21.11.1977, is maintainable in the light of the dismissal of theirown applications to implead themselves in O.S.A.No.85 of 1979.11. As far as the implead petition filed by the appellant toimplead in C.S.No.83 of 1965, which is a suit for partition in whichthe shares of the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 have beenascertained in the preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968, it is to beseen as to whether in the absence of the appellant the final decreecan be passed effectively (or) as to whether the presence of theappellant will facilitate the proper adjudication of the partitionsuit, so as to come to a conclusion that the appellant is either anecessary or proper party.12. On the face of it, it is clear that the presence of theappellant is neither necessary for adjudication nor it is a properparty for arriving at a proper conclusion in the partition suit. Itis not as if by not impleading the appellant, the appellant is leftin the lurch. The contention raised by the learned Senior Counselfor the appellant that the appellant has parted with huge amount ofconsideration in respect of the purchase and, therefore, it cannot bedenied relief, even though appears to be attractive, in ourconsidered opinion, is without substance. It would have beendifferent if the appellant has paid the consideration to the sharers.Having paid consideration to the non-sharers in the joint familyproperty, it is certainly not open to the appellant to make a hueand cry that enormous amount has been parted with. Even if some ofthe vendors of the appellant, being the relatives of the sharers,receive any share ultimately in the final decree to be passed in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ partition suit, by virtue of inheritance due to the death of thesharers, the appellant can always proceed against their respectiveshares. Even in the absence of such shares having been received bythe vendors of the appellant, there are other remedies available. Ifit is taken as a commission of cheating by a non-owner, the largerissue to be decided is as to whether the doctrine of caveat emptorwill be applicable against the appellant.13. It is not the case of the appellant that it is not a pendentelite purchaser, but the case of the appellant, as contended byMr.P.S.Raman, learned Senior Counsel, is that the doctrine of lispendens would apply only if the suit is not a collusive suit. Thecase of the appellant is that the suits are collusive in nature and,therefore, the transfer effected in favour of the appellant is notaffected by lis pendens. 14. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, whichrefers to the transfer of property pending suit, is as follows:“Section 52. Transfer of property pending suit relatingthereto.— During the pendency in any court havingauthority within the limits of India excluding the Stateof Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limitsby the Central Government of any suit or proceedingswhich is not collusive and in which any right toimmovable property is directly and specifically inquestion, the property cannot be transferred orotherwise dealt with by any party to the suit orproceeding so as to affect the rights of any other partythereto under any decree or order which may be madetherein, except under the authority of the court and onsuch terms as it may impose.Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, thependency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed tocommence from the date of the presentation of the plaintor the institution of the proceeding in a court ofcompetent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suitor proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree ororder and complete satisfaction or discharge of suchdecree or order has been obtained, or has becomeunobtainable by reason of the expiration of any periodof limitation prescribed for the execution thereof byany law for the time being in force.”A reading of the said provision, no doubt, shows that the doctrine oflis pendens would apply only in respect of the transfer effectedpending suit which is not collusive. But in the present case, it ispending the partition suit C.S.No.83 of 1965 filed by the firstrespondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011, to which she is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ certainly entitled to being a sharer, in which no final decree hasbeen passed so far, the appellant has purchased a portion of theproperty forming part of the estate. In the light of the declarationin the form of the first preliminary decree dated 22.11.1968identifying the shares of the plaintiff as well as each of defendants1 to 6, it is not known as to how anybody can come to a conclusionthat there is collusion. Even the suit (C.S.No.686 of 2000) filed bythe vendors of the appellant cannot be termed as collusive for thesimple reason that the vendor of the plaintiffs in the said suithimself has lost his right by virtue of the second preliminary decreedated 21.11.1977, wherein his purchase from T.S.PL.P.ChidambaramChettiar has been held to be sham and nominal. There cannot be anyremote possibility of collusion between the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686of 2000 and the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 in C.S.No.83 of 1965.Merely because the appellant has purchased one of the properties ofthe family, it does not mean that it becomes a necessary party in thesuit for partition, especially when the appellant has admittedlypurchased from non-sharers. Therefore, the contention that doctrineof lis pendens would have affect only in cases of non-collusive suithas no applicability to the facts of the present case.15. Further, even on going through the pleadings in C.S.No.686 of2000, one cannot come to a conclusion that the suit is collusive innature. The averment contained therein only shows that the firstdefendant in the said suit, namely Andiappan, posed as the ownerunder the sale deed of the year 1960 and after the second preliminarydecree was passed on 21.11.1977, he has assured the plaintiffstherein that he would file appeal to take appropriate steps, howeverin collusion with defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 in the said suit, hehas withdrawn the appeal, namely O.S.A.No.85 of 1979. Further, thepleading shows that while withdrawing O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, the firstdefendant in the said suit, namely Andiappan, in collusion withdefendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8, has stated that the suit property wasthat of T.S.PL.P.Chidambaram Chettiar. The paragraphs which dealtwith the so-called collusion in the plaint in C.S.No.686 of 2000 areas follows:"38. Even then, the first defendant assure theplaintiffs and the 9th defendant that he would take upthe matter on appeal and requested the first plaintiffto provide funds for filing appeal; and accordingly withthe funds provided by the plaintiffs, O.S.A.No.85 of1979 was filed by the 1st defendant herein. In the saidappeal originally on 11.10.1979, interim stay wasgranted in C.M.P.No.10061 of 1979 and subsequently on17.9.1980, interim stay granted in C.M.P.No.10061 of1979 was made absolute.39. Thereafter it appears that some of the defendantshad purchased the 1st defendant and he having sold all https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ properties, evidently fell into the trap and colludingwith other defendants and in particular defendants 2 to4 and 6 to 8, he had actually taken steps to withdrawthe appeal O.S.A.No.85 of 1979.40. The Plaintiffs, and in particular the firstplaintiff, having come to know of the move of the firstdefendant, opposed the said withdrawal. It appears thatwhile withdrawing the said O.S.A.No.85 of 1979, thefirst defendant, in collusion with the other defendants2 to 4 and 6 to 8, had stated that the suit property wasthat of the Chidambaram Chettiar."Therefore, in filing C.S.No.686 of 2000 by the plaintiffs there is nocollusion at all and collusion is attributed to Andiappan (7thdefendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) and defendants 2 to 4 and 6 to 8 inC.S.No.686 of 2000. Hence, it cannot be said that C.S.No.686 of 2000or C.S.No.83 of 1965 is collusive in nature and, therefore, it isclear that the appellant is a pendente lite purchaser.16. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for theappellant that the appellant should be considered as necessary andproper party based on the decision in Dhanlakshmi and others v.P.Mohan and others, (2007) 10 SCC 719 cannot be accepted for thesimple reason that, on fact, in the said case the appellants havepurchased undivided share from the co-sharers, namely respondents 2,3, 4 and 6, and it was on the said facts the Apex Court has held thatthe appellants having purchased from the co-sharers are entitled tocome on record to workout equity. In paragraph (5) of the saidjudgment, it was held as follows:"5. Section 52 deals with a transfer of property pendingsuit. In the instant case, the appellants haveadmittedly purchased the undivided shares of Respondents2, 3, 4 and 6. It is not in dispute that the firstrespondent P. Mohan has got an undivided share in thesaid suit property. Because of the purchase by theappellants of the undivided share in the suit property,the rights of the first respondent herein in the suit orproceeding will not affect his right in the suitproperty by enforcing a partition. Admittedly, theappellants, having purchased the property from the otherco-sharers, in our opinion, are entitled to come onrecord in order to work out the equity in their favourin the final decree proceedings. In our opinion, theappellants are necessary and proper parties to the suit,which is now pending before the trial court. We alsomake it clear that we are not concerned with the othersuit filed by the mortgagee in these proceedings.But on the facts of the present case, admittedly, the purchase by theappellant is not from the co-sharers and it is from third parties. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

17. The reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel for theappellant on the judgment in Amit Kumar Shaw and another v. FaridaKhatoon and another, (2005) 11 SCC 403 to support his contention thatfor granting leave under Order XXII Rule 10 or Order I Rule 10 CPCread with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act no elaborateenquiry is required and the purchaser should be made a party in thepending proceedings, is also not applicable to the facts of thepresent case. That was a case where two items of properties wereobtained by the appellants before the Supreme Court, one by way ofdeed of assignment dated 15.12.1995 and other by way of a sale deeddated 15.12.1995 from Birendra Nath Dey and Kalyani Dey respectively,who have become owners of the property by the transfer effected bythe original owner Khetra Mohan Das. There was a litigation betweenthe original owner, namely Khetra Mohan Das, and the said BirendraNath Dey and Kalyani Dey and a suit was filed and ultimately, asecond appeal was pending at the time when the said assignment andsale were effected in favour of the appellants. It was in thosecircumstances, when the appellants came to know later about thependency of the appeal, they filed application for impleadingthemselves as parties. It was in the light of the above said factsand circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that on a combinedreading of Order I Rule 10, Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC and Section52 of the Transfer of Property Act it is clear that the object of thesaid provisions is to save honest and bona fide claimants from beingnon-suited. The observation made by the Supreme Court is extractedhere under:"8. On a combined reading of Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 52 ofthe Transfer of Property Act, can an application forsubstitution by a subsequent transferee be rejected andthe subsequent purchaser be non-suited altogether is theprime question for consideration in these appeals.9. The object of Order 1 Rule 10 is to discouragecontests on technical pleas, and to save honest and bonafide claimants from being non-suited. The power tostrike out or add parties can be exercised by the courtat any stage of the proceedings. Under this rule, aperson may be added as a party to a suit in thefollowing two cases:(1) when he ought to have been joined asplaintiff or defendant, and is not joined so, or(2) when, without his presence, the questions inthe suit cannot be completely decided."Ultimately, the Supreme Court has held that the transferee pendentelite to the extent he has acquired the property is vitally interestedin the litigation, thereby meaning a transferee from a sharer. In https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ this regard, it is relevant to extract paragraph (16) of thejudgment, which is as follows:"16. The doctrine of lis pendens applies only where thelis is pending before a court. Further pending the suit,the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made aparty to the suit, though the court has a discretion tomake him a party. But the transferee pendente lite canbe added as a proper party if his interest in thesubject-matter of the suit is substantial and not justperipheral. A transferee pendente lite to the extent hehas acquired interest from the defendant is vitallyinterested in the litigation, where the transfer is ofthe entire interest of the defendant; the latter havingno more interest in the property may not properly defendthe suit. He may collude with the plaintiff. Hence,though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make alis pendens transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. Asalready noticed, the court has discretion in the matterwhich must be judicially exercised and an alienee wouldordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protecthis interests. The court has held that a transfereependente lite of an interest in immovable property is arepresentative-in-interest of the party from whom he hasacquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleadedin the suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation; he isentitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of thecase."The heavy reliance placed on by the learned Senior Counsel for theappellant on the above said portion of the judgment of the SupremeCourt, in our view would be applicable to a case where the transfereeclaims right from the sharer. Unfortunately, on the facts of thepresent case, the appellant is not claiming any transfer of rightfrom the co-sharers of the family and, therefore, it cannot be saidthat the claim of the appellant is bona fide.18. Again, the Four Judges Bench judgment of the Apex Court inSaila Bala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and another, AIR 1958 SC394 relates to a case where an owner of the property at Calcuttaexecuted mortgage in favour of Nirmala Sundari Dassi, who instituteda suit on mortgage and obtained a preliminary decree on 8.3.1935 andfinal decree was passed on 20.4.1936. As per the Original Side Rulesof the Calcutta High Court, a person in whose favour a decree ispassed has to apply for drawing up of the decree within four days.However, the said Nirmala Sundari Dassi, who has hurriedly filed asuit and obtained decree, has not taken steps to draw up a decree for18 years and it was in those circumstances, the second respondent(Sudhir Kumar Mitter), namely the owner of the property, has sold the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ property and the purchaser under the said sale wanted to participatein the execution proceedings and it was in those circumstances, theSupreme Court has held as follows:"9. It remains to consider whether, on the merits, thereshould be an order in favour of the appellant. Of that,we have no doubt whatsoever. The proceedings in whichshe seeks to intervene arise in execution of a mortgagedecree. She has purchased the properties comprised inthe decree for Rs.60,000 under a covenant that they arefree from encumbrances. And after her purchase, thefirst respondent has started proceedings for sale of theproperties, nearly 18 years after the decree had beenpassed. The appellant maintains that the executionproceedings are barred by limitation, and desires to beheard on that question. It is true that P.B. Mukharji,J., has rejected this contention, but a reading of hisjudgment shows — and that is what he himself observes —that there are substantial questions of law calling fordecision. Even apart from the plea of limitation, thereis also a question as to the amount payable in dischargeand satisfaction of the decree obtained by the firstrespondent in Suit No.158 of 1935. Both the respondentsclaim that they have settled it at Rs.17,670. But it isstated for the appellant that under the decree which issought to be executed the amount recoverable forprincipal and interest will not exceed Rs.6000. In theaffidavit of Sanjit Kumar Ghose dated December 20, 1956,filed on behalf of the first respondent, particulars aregiven as to how the sum of Rs.17,670 was made up. Itwill be seen therefrom that a sum of Rs.7200 is claimedfor interest up to March 8, 1956, calculating it not atthe rate provided in the final decree but at thecontract rate. Then a sum of Rs.5000 is included as forcosts incurred by the mortgagee in suits other than SuitNo.158 of 1935 and in proceedings connected therewith.The appellant contends that the properties in her handscould, under no circumstances, be made liable for thisamount. A sum of Rs.1750 is agreed to be paid for costsin the sale reference, in the proceedings before P.B.Mukharji, J., and in Appeal No. 152 of 1955. Asks theappellant, where is the settlement in this, and how canit bind me? It is obvious that there are severalsubstantial questions arising for determination in whichthe appellant as purchaser of the properties is vitallyinterested, and indeed is the only person interested. Asa purchaser pendente lite, she will be bound by theproceedings taken by the first respondent in executionof her decree, and justice requires that she should be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ given an opportunity to protect her rights."That is certainly not the case before this court.19. As correctly submitted by Mr.K.Ravi, learned counselappearing for the first respondent in O.S.A.Nos.186 and 187 of 2011,the Supreme Court has consistently held that pendente lite purchaserhas no automatic right to be impleaded and the same is the discretionof the Court based on the facts and circumstances of the case. Thefinding of the Apex Court in respect of necessary party and theimplication of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act given inSarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh and others, (1996) 5 SCC 539 makes itabundantly clear that such discretion cannot be claimed as a matterof right. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as follows:"5. Having regard to the respective contentions, thequestion that arises for consideration is whether therespondents are necessary or proper parties to the suit?It cannot be disputed that the foundation for theexclusive right, title and interest in the property, thesubject-matter of the suit, is founded upon theregistered Will executed by Hira Devi, the mother of theappellant as on 26-5-1952. The trial court noted that ina suit filed on a previous occasion by the appellant,the Will was propounded as basis for an exclusive right,title and interest in the said property. He impleadedRajender Kaur, one of the daughters of Hira Devi, to thesuit along with two other sisters and the suit came tobe decreed by the trial court on 29-3-1974. The decreebecame final. In view of those facts, the necessaryconclusion that can be deduced is that the foundationfor the relief of declaration in the second suit is theregistered Will executed by Hira Devi in favour of theappellant on 26-5-1952. The respondents indisputablycannot challenge the legality or the validity of theWill executed and registered by Hira Devi on 26-5-1952.Though it may be open to the legal heirs of RajenderKaur, who was a party to the earlier suit, to resist theclaim on any legally available or tenable grounds, thosegrounds are not available to the respondents. Underthose circumstances, the respondents cannot, by anystretch of imagination, be said to be either necessaryor proper parties to the suit. A necessary party is onewhose presence is absolutely necessary and without whosepresence the issue cannot effectually and completely beadjudicated upon and decided between the parties. Aproper party is one whose presence would be necessary toeffectually and completely adjudicate upon the disputes.In either case the respondents cannot be said to beeither necessary or proper parties to the suit in whichthe primary relief was found on the basis of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ registered Will executed by the appellant's mother, SmtHira Devi. Moreover, admittedly the respondents claimedright, title and interest pursuant to the registeredsale deeds said to have been executed by the defendants-heirs of Rajender Kaur on 2-12-1991 and 12-12-1991,pending suit.6. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act envisagesthat:“During the pendency in any court havingauthority within the limits of India ... of anysuit or proceeding which is not collusive and inwhich any right to immovable property is directlyand specifically in question, the property cannotbe transferred or otherwise dealt with by anyparty to the suit or proceeding so as to affectthe rights of any other party thereto under thedecree or order which may be made therein, exceptunder the authority of the court and on suchterms as it may impose.”It would, therefore, be clear that the defendants in thesuit were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to dealwith the property and could not transfer or otherwisedeal with it in any way affecting the rights of theappellant except with the order or authority of thecourt. Admittedly, the authority or order of the courthad not been obtained for alienation of thoseproperties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would behit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation ofSection 52. Under these circumstances, the respondentscannot be considered to be either necessary or properparties to the suit."20. In Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb and another,(2004) 1 SCC 191, while referring to Order I Rule 10 and Order XXIIRule 10 CPC and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, theSupreme Court has reiterated that such party who seeks to impleadmust make out a prima facie case and impleadment is a matter ofdiscretion. It is relevant to extract paragraphs (7) to (12) of thesaid judgment which are as follows:"7. The learned Senior Counsel Shri S.B. Sanyalstrenuously urged that even though the petitioner is atransferee pendente lite within the meaning of Section52 of the Transfer of Property Act, to afford effectiveopportunity to her to prosecute the suit for redemptionof mortgage and the counter-suit for specificperformance of the contract, her joinder in the twosuits as party and prayer to bring subsequent events on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ record by proposed amendment to the pleadings ought tohave been allowed by the trial court. It is submittedthat the High Court ought to have interfered with theorders of the trial court as the latter had failed toexercise its judicial discretion in accordance with law.Reliance is placed on Khemchand Shankar Choudhari v.Vishnu Hari Patil, (1983) 1 SCC 18, Jayaram Mudaliar v.Ayyaswami, (1972) 2 SCC 200, Savitri Devi v. DistrictJudge, Gorakhpur, (1999) 2 SCC 577, Saila Bala Dassi v.Nirmala Sundari Dassi, AIR 1958 SC 394 and DhurandharPrasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University, (2001) 6 SCC 534.8. The learned counsel appearing for the contestingrespondents, supported the impugned orders of the trialcourt and the common order passed by the High Court.Reliance is placed on Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh,(1996) 5 SCC 539.9. It is not disputed that the present petitionerpurchased the property during pendency of the suit andwithout seeking leave of the court as required bySection 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thepetitioner being a transferee pendente lite withoutleave of the court cannot, as of right, seek impleadmentas a party in the suits which are long pending since1983. It is true that when the application for joinderbased on transfer pendente lite is made, the transfereeshould ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him toprotect his interest. But in the instant case, the trialcourt has assigned cogent reasons for rejecting suchjoinder stating that the suit is long pending since 1983and prima facie the action of the alienation does notappear to be bona fide. The trial court saw an attempton the part of the petitioner to complicate and delaythe pending suits.10. The decisions cited and relied on behalf of theappellant turned on the facts of each of those cases.They are distinguishable. There is no absolute rule thatthe transferee pendente lite without leave of the courtshould in all cases be allowed to join and contest thepending suits. The decision relied on behalf of thecontesting respondents of this Court in the case ofSarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 539 fullysupports them in their contentions. After quotingSection 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the relevantobservations are thus: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “6. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Actenvisages that:‘During the pendency in any court havingauthority within the limits of India … of anysuit or proceeding which is not collusive andin which any right to immovable property isdirectly and specifically in question, theproperty cannot be transferred or otherwisedealt with by any party to the suit orproceeding so as to affect the rights of anyother party thereto under the decree or orderwhich may be made therein, except under theauthority of the court and on such terms as itmay impose.’It would, therefore, be clear that the defendantsin the suit were prohibited by operation ofSection 52 to deal with the property and couldnot transfer or otherwise deal with it in any wayaffecting the rights of the appellant except withthe order or authority of the court. Admittedly,the authority or order of the court had not beenobtained for alienation of those properties.Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hitby the doctrine of lis pendens by operation ofSection 52. Under these circumstances, therespondents cannot be considered to be eithernecessary or proper parties to the suit.”(emphasis supplied)11. In the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. JaiPrakash University, (2001) 6 SCC 534 observationsrelevant for the purpose of these appeals read thus: Where a party does not ask for leave, he takesthe obvious risk that the suit may not beproperly conducted by the plaintiff on record,yet he will be bound by the result of thelitigation even though he is not represented atthe hearing unless it is shown that thelitigation was not properly conducted by theoriginal party or he colluded with the adversary.12. The above statement of law by this Court in thecases (supra) clearly shows that the trial court hasrightly exercised its discretion in rejecting the threeapplications for impleadment of the transferee pendente https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ lite as a party to the suits and for amendment of thepleadings. The High Court was also justified in refusingto interfere with the order of the trial court.Consequently, there is absolutely no merit in any ofthese appeals. They are, accordingly, dismissed withcosts to be borne by the petitioner of the contestingrespondents."21. While referring to the implication of Section 52 of theTransfer of Property Act, the Apex Court has held that the purpose ofthe said section is not to prevent the parties from dealing with theproperty, but postulates that pending suit any alienation will notaffect the rights of the other parties under any decree, unless suchalienation is made with the permission of the Court. That was inSanjay Verma v. Manik Roy and others, 2007 (2) CTC 562, wherein theSupreme Court has observed as follows:"11. The principles specified in Section 52 of the TPAct are in accordance with equity, good conscience orjustice because they rest upon an equitable and justfoundation that it will be impossible to bring an actionor suit to a successful termination if alienations arepermitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite isbound by the decree just as much as he was a party tothe suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied inSection 52 of the TP Act being a principle of publicpolicy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises.The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigatingparty is exempted from taking notice of a title acquiredduring the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendencyof a suit does not prevent one of the parties fromdealing with the property constituting the subject-matter of the suit. The section only postulates acondition that the alienation will in no manner affectthe rights of the other party under any decree which maybe passed in the suit unless the property was alienatedwith the permission of the court."22. While construing the said provision, the Apex Court inT.G.Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal and another, (2011) 2 MLJ 317 (SC)held that only if a transferee has purchased from a co-owner,equities can be worked out by allotting the property or portion ofthe property transferred pendente lite. The Apex Court held asfollows:"10. The principle underlying Section 52 is clear. Ifduring the pendency of any suit in a court of competentjurisdiction which is not collusive, in which any rightof an immovable property is directly and specifically inquestion, such property cannot be transferred by anyparty to the suit so as to affect the rights of any https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ other party to the suit under any decree that may bemade in such suit. If ultimately the title of thependente lite transferor is upheld in regard to thetransferred property, the transferee's title will not beaffected. On the other hand, if the title of thependente lite transferor is recognized or accepted onlyin regard to a part of the transferred property, thenthe transferee's title will be saved only in regard tothat extent and the transfer in regard to the remainingportion of the transferred property to which thetransferor is found not entitled, will be invalid andthe transferee will not get any right, title or interestin that portion. If the property transferred pendentelite, is allotted in entirely to some other party orparties or if the transferor is held to have no right ortitle in that property, the transferee will not have anytitle to the property. Where a co-owner alienates aproperty or a portion of a property representing to bethe absolute owner, equities can no doubt be adjustedwhile making the division during the final decreeproceedings, if feasible and practical (that is withoutcausing loss or hardship or inconvenience to otherparties) by allotting the property or portion of theproperty transferred pendente lite, to the share of thetransferor, so that the bona fide transferee's right andtitle are saved fully or partially."In fact, in that case, the Apex Court has made suggestion to the Law-makers to find out a solution in order to enable the transferee toknow whether there is a pending litigation, which is as follows:"13. It is necessary to refer to the hardship, loss,anxiety and unnecessary litigation caused on account ofabsence of a mechanism for prospective purchasers toverify whether a property is subject to any pending suitor a decree or attachment. At present, a prospectivepurchaser can easily find out about any existingencumbrance over a property either by inspection of theRegistration Registers or by securing a certificaterelating to encumbrances (that is copies of entries inthe Registration Registers) from the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar under Section 57 of the Registration Act,1908. But a prospective purchaser has no way ofascertaining whether there is any suit or proceedingpending in respect of the property, if the personoffering the property for sale does not disclose it ordeliberately suppresses the information. As a result,after parting with the consideration (which is many atime the life time savings), the purchaser gets a shockof his life when he comes to know that the propertypurchased by him is subject to litigation, and that it https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ may drag on for decades and ultimately deny him title tothe property. The pendente lite purchaser will have towait for the litigation to come to an end or he may haveto take over the responsibility of conducting thelitigation if the transferor loses interest after thesale. The purchaser may also face objections to hisbeing impleaded as a party to the pending litigation onthe ground that being a lis pendens purchaser, he is nota necessary party. All these inconveniences, risks,hardships and misery could be avoided and the propertylitigations could be reduced to a considerable extent,if there is some satisfactory and reliable method bywhich a prospective purchaser can ascertain whether anysuit is pending (or whether the property is subject toany decree or attachment) before he decides to purchasethe property."23. On the facts of the present case, as admitted, neitherAndiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) nor the vendors of theappellant are co-sharers. 24. It is not in dispute that in the above legal proceedingsReceiver was appointed and, in fact, some of the properties were alsosold and it was during that time alienation has taken place, whichultimately resulted in the purchase of the portion of the property bythe appellant and in such event, in our considered view, by applyingthe principle of custodia legis, the appellant may not be entitled tohave any legal protection, as submitted by Mr.S.Raghavan, learnedcounsel. While construing the Tamil Nadu Cultivating TenantsProtection Act, a Full Bench of this Court in Arumugha Gounder v.Ardhanari Mudaliar and others, AIR 1975 Madras 231 has observed asfollows:"6. So then the act of the Receiver in letting out theland in the suit is an act of the Court itself and it isdone on behalf of the Court, the whole purpose of theCourt taking possession through the Receiver appointedby it is to protect the property for the benefit of theultimate successful party. If that is the essence andpurpose of appointment of a Receiver as we hold it is,it will be difficult to agree that by a literalapplication of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating TenantsProtection Act, it could be put beyond the reach of theCourt to give relief to the successful party entitled topossession. Not only actus curiae nominem gravabit (anact of the Court shall prejudice no man) but also thedoctrine of the property being in custodia legis coupledwife public policy in rendition of proper justice andconservance of power therefor would be valid andeffective reasons for our view that the intention of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Act is not to extend the protection to the tenant of theReceiver and thus defeat justice eventually. Actuslegis nomini est damnosus, that is to say an act of lawshall prejudice no man is another aspect of publicpolicy. Our view derives also strength from the factthat an act of the Receiver done on behalf of the Courtis done pendente lite and anyone who gets possessionthrough such act can only do so subject to thedirections and orders of Court. That is implied fromthe nature and legal position relating to theappointment and powers as well as the management by theReceiver."25. The vendors of the appellant, who have filed the second suitin C.S.No.686 of 2000, even though are not the co-sharers, areadmittedly related to the co-sharers and they cannot plead ignoranceof the pendency of the partition suit as well as the first and secondpreliminary decrees passed in the said suit wherein not only adecision regarding the identification of the share of the co-sharershas been arrived at, but also the transfer of property effected toAndiappan (7th defendant in C.S.No.83 of 1965) has been held to besham and nominal and, therefore, such finding cannot be said to benot binding on the plaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 by applying theprinciples of constructive res judicata, as it has been explained indetail by the Apex Court in M.Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka andothers, (2011) 3 SCC 408, wherein the Apex Court has culled out theprinciple from various foreign legal sources. It is worthwhile toextract paragraphs (11) to (16) of the said judgment, which are asunder:"11. We find that disregarding the aforesaid clearfinding of this Court, the appellant, on identicalissues, further filed a new writ petition out of whichthe present appeal arises. That writ petition, as notedabove, was rejected both by the learned Single Judge andby the Division Bench in clear terms. It is obvious thatsuch a litigative adventure by the present appellant isclearly against the principles of res judicata as wellas principles of constructive res judicata andprinciples analogous thereto.12. The principles of res judicata are of universalapplication as they are based on two age-old principles,namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium whichmeans that it is in the interest of the State that thereshould be an end to litigation and the other principleis nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit prouna et eademn causa meaning thereby that no one ought tobe vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ court that it is for one and the same cause. Thisdoctrine of res judicata is common to all civilisedsystem of jurisprudence to the extent that a judgmentafter a proper trial by a court of competentjurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusivedetermination of the questions litigated and should forever set the controversy at rest.13. That principle of finality of litigation is based onhigh principle of public policy. In the absence of sucha principle great oppression might result under thecolour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be noend of litigation and a rich and malicious litigant willsucceed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitivesuits and actions. This may compel the weaker party torelinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata hasbeen evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why itis perceived that the plea of res judicata is not atechnical doctrine but a fundamental principle whichsustains the rule of law in ensuring finality inlitigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty anda fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse inthe matter of accessing court for agitating on issueswhich have become final between the parties.14. Tek Chand, J. delivering the unanimous Full Benchdecision in Lachhmi v. Bhulli, ILR (1927) 8 Lah 384traced the history of this doctrine both in Hindu andMohammedan jurisprudence as follows: (ILR pp. 391-92)“In the Mitakshra (Book II, Chapter I, Section V,verse 5) one of the four kinds of effective answersto a suit is ‘a plea by former judgment’ and inverse 10, Katyayana is quoted as laying down that‘one against whom a judgment had formerly beengiven, if he brings forward the matter again, mustbe answered by a plea of purva nyaya or formerjudgment’ (Macnaughten and Colebrooke's translation,p. 22). The doctrine, however, seems to have beenrecognised much earlier in Hindu jurisprudence,judging from the fact that both Smriti Chandrika(Mysore Edn., pp. 97-98) and Virmitrodaya (Vidya-Sagar Edn., p. 77) base the defence of prang nyaya(former decision) on the following text of theancient law-giver Harita, who is believed by someOrientalists to have flourished in the 9th centuryBC and whose Smriti is now extant only in fragments—‘The plaintiff should be non-suited if thedefendant avers: “in this very affair, there was https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ litigation between him and myself previously”,and it is found that the plaintiff had lost hiscase.’There are texts of Prasara (Bengal AsiaticSociety Edn., p. 56) and of Mayukha (Kane's Edn.,p. 15) to the same effect.Among Muhammadan law-givers similar effect wasgiven to the plea of ‘Niza-i-munfasla’ or ‘AmarMania taqrir mukhalif’. Under Roman Law, asadministered by the Proetors' courts, a defendantcould repel the plaintiff's claim by means ofexceptio rei judicatoe or plea of formerjudgment. The subject received considerableattention at the hands of Roman jurists and asstated in Roby's Roman Private Law (Vol. II, p.338) the general principle recognised was that‘one suit and one decision was enough for anysingle dispute’ and that ‘a matter once broughtto trial should not be tried except, of course,by way of appeal’.”15. The learned Judge in Bhulli case also noted that inBritish India the rule of res judicata was firstintroduced by Section 16 of Bengal Regulation 3 of 1773which prohibited the Zila and City Courts fromentertaining any cause which, from the production of aformer decree or the record of the court, appears tohave been heard and determined by any Judge or anySuperintendent of a court having competent jurisdiction.The learned Judge found that the earliest legislativeattempt at codification of the law on the subject wasmade in 1859, when the first Civil Procedure Code wasenacted, whereunder Section 2 of the Code barred everycourt from taking cognizance of suits which, on the samecause of action, have been heard and determined by acourt of competent jurisdiction. The learned Judgeopined, and in our view rightly, that this was partialrecognition of the English rule insofar as it embodiedthe principles relating to estoppel by judgment orestoppel by record. Thereafter, when the Code was againrevised in 1877, the operation of the rule was extendedin Section 13 and the bar was no longer confined to theretrial of a dispute relating to the same cause ofaction but the prohibition was extended againstreagitating an issue, which had been heard and finallydecided between the same parties in a former suit by a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ competent court. The learned Judge also noted thatbefore the principle assumed its present form in Section11 of the Code of 1908, the section was expanded twice.However, the learned Judge noted that Section 11 is notexhaustive of the law on the subject.16. It is nobody's case that the appellant did not knowthe contents of the FWA. From this it follows that itwas open to the appellant to question, in the previousproceeding filed by it, that his land which was acquiredwas not included in the FWA. No reasonable explanationwas offered by the appellant to indicate why he had notraised this issue. Therefore, in our judgment, such anissue cannot be raised in this proceeding in view of thedoctrine of constructive res judicata."26. For a person to claim himself to be a necessary party, it isnot just sufficient that his presence may enable to give certainevidence or give correct solution to some of the questions, as it washeld by the Apex Court in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. MunicipalCorporation of Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524. Therelevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:"14. It cannot be said that the main object of the ruleis to prevent multiplicity of actions though it mayincidentally have that effect. But that appears to be adesirable consequence of the rule rather than its mainobjective. The person to be joined must be one whosepresence is necessary as a party. What makes a person anecessary party is not merely that he has relevantevidence to give on some of the questions involved; thatwould only make him a necessary witness. It is notmerely that he has an interest in the correct solutionof some question involved and has thought of relevantarguments to advance. The only reason which makes itnecessary to make a person a party to an action is sothat he should be bound by the result of the action andthe question to be settled, therefore, must be aquestion in the action which cannot be effectually andcompletely settled unless he is a party. The line hasbeen drawn on a wider construction of the rule betweenthe direct interest or the legal interest and commercialinterest. It is, therefore, necessary that the personmust be directly or legally interested in the action inthe answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation maylead to a result which will affect him legally that isby curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to saythat the rule contemplates joining as a defendant aperson whose only object is to prosecute his own cause https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v.Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd., (1956) 1 All ER 273, whereinafter quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry, J. inDollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England,(1950) 2 All ER 605, that their true test lies not somuch in an analysis of what are the constituents of theapplicants' rights, but rather in what would be theresult on the subject matter of the action if thoserights could be established, Devlin,J. has stated:“The test is ‘May the order for which theplaintiff is asking directly affect theintervener in the enjoyment of his legalrights’.”"27. It was in Joint Action Committee of Air Line Pilots'Association of India (ALPAI) and others v. Director General of CivilAviation and others, (2011) 5 SCC 435 the Apex Court has held thateven by the conduct of the parties the principle of estoppel can beapplied on equitable ground. In fact, in the said case, the SupremeCourt has also discussed about the doctrine of election as follows:"12. The doctrine of election is based on the rule ofestoppel—the principle that one cannot approbate andreprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel byelection is one of the species of estoppels in pais (orequitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By thatlaw, a person may be precluded by his actions or conductor silence when it is his duty to speak, from assertinga right which he otherwise would have had. Takinginconsistent pleas by a party makes its conduct far fromsatisfactory. Further, the parties should not blow hotand cold by taking inconsistent stands and prolongproceedings unnecessarily. [Vide Babu Ram v. Indra PalSingh, (1998) 6 SCC 358, P.R. Deshpande v. MarutiBalaram Haibatti, (1998) 6 SCC 507 and MumbaiInternational Airport (P) Ltd. v. Golden ChariotAirport, (2010) 10 SCC 422.]"28. On the facts of the present case, inasmuch as the appellanthas denied his right to be impleaded when the plaintiff in C.S.No.83of 1965 took steps to implead on the ground that it is not a properand necessary party, it cannot now turn back to say that it is anecessary and proper party, for, a party cannot be permitted toapprobate and reprobate, as it was held by the Apex Court in MumbaiInternational Airport (P) Ltd. v. Golden Chariot Airport, (2010) 10SCC 422 and that would amount to an abuse of process of Court, as itwas held by the Apex Court in K.K.Modi v. K.N.Modi and others,(1998) 3 SCC 573 in the following paragraphs: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "42. Under Order 6 Rule 16, the court may, at any stageof the proceeding, order to be struck out, inter alia,any matter in any pleading which is otherwise an abuseof the process of the court. Mulla in his treatise onthe Code of Civil Procedure, (15th Edn., Vol. II, p.1179, note 7) has stated that power under clause (c) ofOrder 6 Rule 16 of the Code is confined to cases wherethe abuse of the process of the court is manifest fromthe pleadings; and that this power is unlike the powerunder Section 151 whereunder courts have inherent powerto strike out pleadings or to stay or dismissproceedings which are an abuse of their process. In thepresent case the High Court has held the suit to be anabuse of the process of the court on the basis of whatis stated in the plaint.43. The Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by Sweet &Maxwell in paragraphs 18/19/33 (p. 344) explains thephrase “abuse of the process of the court” thus:“This term connotes that the process of the courtmust be used bona fide and properly and must notbe abused. The court will prevent improper use ofits machinery and will in a proper case,summarily prevent its machinery from being usedas a means of vexation and oppression in theprocess of litigation. ... The categories ofconduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious oran abuse of process are not closed but depend onall the relevant circumstances. And for thispurpose considerations of public policy and theinterests of justice may be very material.”44. One of the examples cited as an abuse of the processof the court is relitigation. It is an abuse of theprocess of the court and contrary to justice and publicpolicy for a party to relitigate the same issue whichhas already been tried and decided earlier against him.The reagitation may or may not be barred as resjudicata. But if the same issue is sought to bereagitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the processof the court. A proceeding being filed for a collateralpurpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigationmay also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse ofthe process of the court. Frivolous or vexatiousproceedings may also amount to an abuse of the processof the court especially where the proceedings areabsolutely groundless. The court then has the power tostop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the public and the court from being wasted. Undoubtedly,it is a matter of the court's discretion whether suchproceedings should be stopped or not; and thisdiscretion has to be exercised with circumspection. Itis a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised,and exercised only in special cases. The court shouldalso be satisfied that there is no chance of the suitsucceeding."29. Therefore, looking from any angle, we are unable to agreewith the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellantthat the appellant is a necessary and proper party and on this score,we see no reason to interfere with the finding of the learned SingleJudge.30. This now leads us to the next issue of the plea oftransposition of the 10th defendant in C.S.No.686 of 2000 as the thirdplaintiff. Transposition, as contemplated under Order XXIII Rule 1-Aof the CPC which is as follows:"Order XXIII – Withdrawal and adjustment of suits.Rule 1. ****Rule 1-A. When transposition of defendants as plaintiffsmay be permitted.—Where a suit is withdrawn or abandoned by a plaintiffunder rule 1, and a defendant applies to be transposedas a plaintiff under rule 10 of Order I the Court shall,in considering such application, have due regard to thequestion whether the applicant has a substantialquestion to be decided as against any of the otherdefendants.",connotes that such applicant who desires to transpose himself as aplaintiff should not only prove that the original plaintiff hasabandoned the suit, but the condition precedent is the identity ofinterest between the plaintiff and the defendant who wants totranspose and the suit must be such that such defendant was addedonly as a proforma defendant and in other words, both the partiesmust be projecting the same claim. Sivasubramaniam,J. (as HisLordship then was) has observed in Nagoor Gani @ Rajamani and othersv. Gandhi Meenal and others, 1988 (II) MLJ 171 as follows:"12. Insofar as the right of the defendants 19 and 20 totranspose themselves as plaintiffs is concerned, I havealready extracted the provision of Order 23, Rule 1-AC.P.C. This new rule has been enacted in order to enablea defendant, who has identical interest, from beingdenied his interest if he rested on the success of theplaintiff's suit and the plaintiff wanted to withdrawthe suit. Before a defendant could invoke thisprovision, it must be shown that the plaintiff isseeking to withdraw or abandon his claim under Rule 1 of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Order 23, C.P.C. It is a condition precedent to enable adefendant to get himself transposed. The principle thatfollows this rule is that there must be identity ofinterest between the plaintiff and such a defendant whowants to transpose as a plaintiff. It must be a suitwhere the defendant is entitled to succeed automaticallyon the success of the plaintiff in the suit. Such adefendant is usually called as a proforma defendant. Toput it in other words, both the parties are projectingthe same claim against the other defendants, and,therefore, the success of one is the success of theother. In such cases, the law comes to the rescue ofsuch a defendant so that the plaintiff, who is having asimilar right, cannot defeat the rights of the defendantby colluding with the other contesting defendants.Though Courts lean against multiplicity of suits, theywould not permit sch transposition just to give a chanceto a litigant to avoid filing a suit or permit him totake advantage of the suit filed by his adversaryagainst him by becoming a plaintiff and trying to bringout the averments and reliefs which are contrary tothose claimed by the original plaintiff, as held inJethiben v. Maniben, AIR 1983 Gujarat 194. Here in thiscase, we find that the suit is for possession on thebasis that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of thesame. On the other hand, it is the case of thedefendants 19 and 20 that they are the exclusive ownersof the property. Practically, there is a serious fightbetween the plaintiff and the defendants 19 and 20. Theplaintiff in this case cannot be deemed to havewithdrawn or abandoned her claim by entering into acompromise with the other defendants. What has been doneis, instead of the plaintiff getting actual possessionof the properties, she allowed the same to be vested ina Trust to be managed by herself and some others. Insuch circumstances, it is not possible to hold that shehas abandoned her claim in full. Secondly, if we applythe test of identify of interest, it is impossible tocome to a conclusion that the parties have suchidentical interest. If defendants 19 and 20 aretransposed as plaintiffs 2 and 3 in the suit, there willbe two sets of plaintiffs having conflicting claimsbetween themselves. In such a case, the main fight wouldbe between the plaintiffs and there is no commonplatform on which they can stand, and fight thedefendants. Defendants 19 and 20, after transposition asplaintiffs, cannot agitate their rights against theinterest of the original plaintiff. It is not a casewhere the existing plaintiff has vanished from the scene https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ by abandoning her claim so that the proposed plaintiffscan take up the case and get a decree in their favour onthe averments contained in the plaint already. On theother hand, she is very much in the suit and show hassought for a compromise decree being passed inrecognition of her rights. Therefore, in the presence ofthe plaintiff, the defendants 19 and 20 cannot bepermitted to be impleaded as plaintiffs in such a way asto defeat the rights of the plaintiff herself."31. First of all, there is nothing on record to show that theplaintiffs in C.S.No.686 of 2000 have withdrawn the suit. Merelybecause the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 in the partition suit,namely C.S.No.83 of 1965, have arrived at a final decision regardingthe demarcation of the portions to them as per the preliminarydecree, it does not mean that the suit in C.S.No.686 of 2000 islikely to be withdrawn. Even otherwise, as discussed in detail, theappellant having not purchased the property from the co-sharers,especially when the transfer effected to Andiappan has been finallyheld to be sham and nominal, the transposition is certainly not goingto serve any purpose. When the right of the predecessor-in-title ofthe appellant has been held to be sham and nominal, by transposing,the appellant does not get any better title.32. Even if the second suit (C.S.No.686 of 2000) is withdrawn, itis not as if the appellant has no right against the vendors in theevent of deciding that its vendors have fraudulently deceived theappellant. Moreover, if the vendors of the appellant, being relatedto the sharers, by virtue of succession obtain any share, theappellant can always workout its remedy.33. The power of Court in ordering transposing of parties is notmerely discretionary, but there should be bona fide on the part ofthe party seeking such transposition, as it was held by a DivisionBench of this Court in Vasantha Ammal v. V.P.Dhanaraj, 1990-I-LW 209with the following observation:"3. On the question of transposition of parties, thepowers of Court, are wide enough to confer a discretionon it to transpose the necessary and proper party, ifthat is required for an effective and a comprehensiveadjudication of the controversy in the lis. The use ofthe discretion will depend upon the facts andcircumstances of the case. This discretion is not anunbridled one, but is circumscribed by two broadlimitations. One is, where rights valuable have accruedto the other side. The other is, where there is lack ofbona fides on the part of the party seekingtransposition, in that he has no plausible case toagitate, having a genuine interest in the lis. In https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ these circumstances, the Court will fetter its hands andwill not exercise its discretion. But, the question, asalready noted, has to be decided depending on the factsof each case and by bare recapitulation of theprinciples, the Court should not abdicate itsdiscretionary power for ordering transposition, when, infact, that application needs to be countenanced in theinterests of justice and on the facts of the case."34. Therefore, it is clear that a person who seeks to transposehimself as a plaintiff must prove that he has substantial question tobe decided and must have identity of interest along with theplaintiff, etc. Inasmuch as the appellant cannot be categorized as abona fide purchaser, in our considered view, the appellant cannotclaim as a matter of right to be transposed itself as the thirdplaintiff in C.S.No.686 of 2000.35. In that view of the matter, we are not impressed by thecontentions raised on behalf of the appellant to interfere with theorder of the learned Judge. It is true that the issue has not beenelaborately discussed, but the decision arrived at by the learnedJudge cannot be said to be inappropriate. We are of the firm opinionthat the appellant is not entitled to any relief claimed and there isabsolutely no reason warranting interference of this Court with theorder of the learned Single Judge.For the foregoing reasons, the appeals stand dismissed and theorder of the learned Single Judge stands confirmed. No costs.Consequently, M.P.Nos.1 of 2011 (3 petitions) are closed. To day, after the pronouncement of the judgment in the aboveappeals, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has prayed forleave to file an appeal and further requested to suspend theproceedings till then.2. Since, we have decided that the appellant has no right toimplead itself as third plaintiff in C.S.No.686 of 2000, the aboverequest of the counsel for the appellant cannot be heeded to.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ SasiToThe Sub Assistant Registrar,Original Side,High Court, Madras.1 CC to M/s.V.Ramakrishnan, Advocate, SR.9136 1 CC to M/s.M.Sriram, Advocate, SR.89093 CCs to M/s.Rugan and Arya, Advocate, SR.8917O.S.A.Nos.186 to 188 of 2011TAM(CO)SRA(10/02/2012)