P.Jagadeesan v. The Government of Pondicherry

and all the proceedings thereon including the order of the secondrespondent dated 15.02.2008 and consequently directing therespondents to reinstate him into service with continuity of service,full arrears of salary and all other attendant benefits.2. The case of the petitioner has got a long history, whichin nutshell, is set out here under:-2.1. The petitioner was appointed as a Karnam in the LocalAdministration Department by proceedings dated 30.08.1974. Due tocertain administrative exigencies, the post of Karnam in the LocalAdministration Department was abolished and the petitioner wastransferred to the Local Bodies in the year 1978 along other Karnams.In 1978, while he was functioning as the Secretary of the LocalAdministration Department, Karnams' Association, he raised objectionsregarding their transfer to the Local Bodies without consideringtheir services in the Local Administration Department. He also gavea complaint dated 09.10.1987 to the Commissioner against oneA.Chinnasamy, the Assistant Revenue Officer Grade-I. For the saidreason, various vindictive actions were taken against him.2.2. He was placed under suspension on 26.10.1987 by thefirst respondent. After a month, a charge sheet dated 28.01.1988 wasissued to him setting out four charges. The charges were that ofdifferent dates viz., he did not complete the work assigned to himand thus caused loss of revenue and was absent from duty and did notkeep relevant documents ready with him.2.3. On 29.02.1988, the petitioner requested theCommissioner to revoke his suspension. On 31.03.1988, the order ofsuspension was revoked by the first respondent pending enquiry to thecharges and he was reinstated into service. Once again, the petitionwas suspended by an order dated 22.08.1990. On the same day, asecond charge sheet was issued on a flimsy charge of having appliedcasual leave for one day on 08.06.1990. The petitioner offered hisexplanation on 30.08.1990. Again, a third charge sheet was issued tohim by proceedings dated 09.11.1990 alleging that he did not handover the records in the year 1989 and this amounted to wantonlydisobedience. The said charge was held not proved by the firstrespondent.2.4. The petitioner challenged the first and second chargesheets dated 28.01.1988 and 22.08.1990 by filing a writ petitionbefore this Court in W.P.No.17854 of 1997. In the said writpetition, the petitioner also sought for quashing the charge sheetsalong with the order of suspension dated 22.08.1990 and consequentlysought for a direction to the first respondent to reinstate him intoservice with all attendant benefits. This Court, by an order dated22.04.1999, quashed the charge sheets dated 28.01.1988 and22.08.1990. Further, the first respondent was directed to reinstate https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ him into service with all consequential benefits.2.5. Against the said order, the first respondentpreferred a writ appeal before this Court in W.A.No.888 of 2009,which was dismissed on 04.02.2000. Though an appeal was filed beforethe Hon'ble Apex Court, no interim order was obtained. Hence, thepetitioner had to initiate contempt proceedings and thereafter, theorder of suspension was revoked on 01.08.2000. The petitionerreturned to work on 04.08.2000, after ten years of suspension.2.6. However, once again, an order of suspension was passedon 08.08.2000 until the enquiry relating to the fourth charge sheetdated 12.01.1994 is completed. Hence, the petitioner had to file awrit petition in W.P.No.19374 of 2000 challenging the said order ofsuspension dated 08.08.2000. On 20.11.2000, this Court had grantedinterim stay of the said suspension order and directed therespondents to reinstate him into service. Thereafter, he wasreinstated into service with effect from 27.11.2000.2.7. In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed a writpetition before this Court in W.P.No.4228 of 1999 challenging thefourth charge sheet dated 12.01.1994. The same was admitted on15.03.1999 with a direction to proceed with the enquiry, but noorders shall be passed pending disposal of the writ petition. Theenquiry was completed in January, 2004 and an order of compulsoryretirement was passed on 20.10.2004. The said writ petition wastherefore dismissed on 02.06.2008 as it has become infructuous.2.8. The charge sheet dated 12.01.1994 relates to analleged loss to the tune of Rs.65,432.55 caused by the petitioner.Though the said loss was set right by collecting the balance taxamount from the concerned persons, the petitioner was proceeded with.2.9. The enquiry was not conducted properly in a mannerknown to law. While so, the disciplinary authority passed an orderof punishment dated 20.10.2004. The disciplinary authority was awitness in the domestic enquiry and he deposed against thepetitioner. While so, he should not have passed the order ofpunishment viz., compulsory retirement. The petitioner thereforefiled an appeal before the second respondent. Since the said appealwas not disposed of in spite of several representations, thepetitioner had to file an application dated 27.11.2006 under theRight to Information Act, 2005 seeking information regarding thesaid appeal. It was informed by a reply dated 28.12.2008 that hisappeal petition was under scrutiny of the competent authority and thedecision taken on the appeal petition would be intimated to him indue course. 2.10. Since the said reply was vague, the petitioner filedFirst Appeal under Right to Information Act on 18.01.2007 before the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Secretary to Government, Local Administration. He sent anotherrepresentation dated 08.03.2007 to the second respondent pointing outthe delay and requested him to dispose of his appeal at the earliest.While so, he received a letter dated 10.01.2008 from the secondrespondent asking him to appear at his office on 11.01.2008 for apersonal hearing in connection with the appeal filed by him.Thereafter, the petitioner received an order dated 21.02.2008 on thesecond appeal under Right to Information Act stating that the appealwas disposed of on 15.02.2008. The same was received by him on20.02.2008. The only point that was considered by the secondrespondent was that since the disciplinary authority was a witness inthe enquiry, the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed by himwas set aside and the first respondent was directed to nominate adisciplinary authority with the approval of the competent authority.Further, the second respondent directed that the petitioner would bedeemed to be placed under suspension from 20.10.2004, the date oforder of compulsory retirement passed by the disciplinary authority.Thus, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition forthe relief stated earlier.3. Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondents 1to 3 putting forth the following statement:-3.1. Challenging the charge sheet dated 12.01.1994, thepetitioner filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.4228 of1999. In W.M.P.No.6055 of 1999, this Court was pleased to order thatthe enquiry may proceed, but the decision shall be kept in abeyance.Thereafter, the main writ petition itself was dismissed as notpressed on 02.07.2008.3.2. The allegation that the charge sheet dated 12.01.1994is arbitrary, belated and vague is untenable. The contention thatthe loss to the Municipality was set right by collecting the balancetax amounts from the concerned persons, is a clear admission of thepetitioner for misappropriating the funds of the Municipality duringhis tenure.3.3. The allegation of bias, unfair and unjust against theEnquiry Officer is very vague and untenable. The fact that theappellate authority had taken note of the fact that the disciplinaryauthority, who imposed the punishment, was a witness will show thatthe grievance of the petitioner is redressed.3.4. The enquiry regarding the charge sheet dated12.01.1994 was completed and the enquiry report was filed on30.01.2004. On the basis of the same, the disciplinary authority hadimposed the major punishment of compulsory retirement with effectfrom the date of receipt of the order which was issued on 20.10.2004.Subsequent to the same, the petitioner was dismissed from service on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

04.11.2004 and as such, he was not in service from 04.11.2004.3.5. Against the order of the disciplinary authority, anappeal was filed and the same was allowed. The Appellate Authoritypassed an order of deemed suspension while setting aside the order ofcompulsory retirement. Since the petitioner was relieved fromservice, he is not entitled for any salary or subsistence allowance.Thus, the counter affidavit sought for the dismissal of the writpetition.4. On the basis of the above pleadings, Miss.Anna Mathew,learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mrs.N.Mala,learned counsel representing the learned Government Pleader,Pondicherry, have made their submissions.5.1. The first and foremost submission made by the learnedcounsel appearing for the petitioner is that the appellate authorityviz., the second respondent did not advert to the several groundsraised by the petitioner except the one that the disciplinaryauthority being a witness in the enquiry, ought not to have passed anorder of compulsory retirement against the petitioner. This factcould not be disputed by the learned counsel appearing for therespondents. It would be useful to extract the order of the secondrespondent dated 15.02.2008, more so paragraphs 5 to 9 which areextracted here under:-" 5. Whereas, the appellant has, inter-alia, statedin his appeal petition that the order dated 20.10.2004 ofthe Disciplinary Authority imposing the major penalty ofcompulsory retirement on him is null and void in view ofthe fact that the disciplinary authority who passed theorder of punishment is a witness in the case, and hasaverred against the appellant.6. Whereas the Appellant Authority has carefully andexclusively examined the above objection raised by theappellant viz-a-viz the relevant provisions of rules. Asper the extant rules on this subject, where the officer whois the prescribed disciplinary authority is / will be thecomplainant and / or the witness in a disciplinaryproceedings, another officer should be specified asdisciplinary authority by a special order.7. Whereas the Appellate Authority, in view of thesaid extant guidelines, is of the opinion that thedisciplinary authority, who ordered the major penalty ofcompulsory retirement on the appellant, should havedesisted from functioning a Disciplinary Authority in thegiven case on account of his being personally concerned https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ with the proceedings as a material witness in support ofthe charges against the appellant. The appellant Authorityfinds palpable procedural lapse on the part of theDisciplinary Authority, rendering his order of punishmentliable to be set aside.8. Now, therefore, the Appellant Authority,considering the above infirmity that the order of theDisciplinary Authority suffers from orders that the orderdated 20.10.2004 of the Disciplinary Authority imposingmajor penalty of Compulsory retirement on the Appellant isset aside with further directions as under:-(i) The Disciplinary Authority shall nominate an ad-hoc disciplinary authority with the approval of theCompetent Authority and the findings of the InquiringAuthority along with all relevant documents includingstatements of witness shall be placed before him forcareful consideration and passing appropriate orders in thecapacity as ad-hoc Disciplinary Authority.(ii) The ad-hoc Disciplinary Authority shall passappropriate orders within three months from the date of his/ her nomination as ad-hoc Disciplinary Authority.(iii) The appellant shall be deemed to be placedunder suspension from the date of order of Compulsoryretirement, and continue to remain under deemed suspensionuntil further orders. He shall be eligible for subsistenceallowance from the date of deemed suspension.9. The appeal is disposed of accordingly."The above order would indicate that the second respondent did notadvert to the other grounds raised by the petitioner challenging theorder of compulsory retirement passed by the original authority. 5.2. In view of the above stated position, I am in entireagreement with the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner thatthe second respondent did not advert to the several grounds raised bythe petitioner in the appeal preferred by him challenging the orderof the original authority and hence, the said order is liable to beset aside.6.1. The next contention of the learned counsel appearingfor the petitioner is that while setting aside the order of theoriginal authority, the second respondent ought not to have passed anorder stating that the petitioner shall be deemed to be placed undersuspension from the date of order of compulsory retirement andcontinue to remain under deemed suspension until further orders to be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ passed by the ad-hoc disciplinary authority, to be nominated by theauthority. Emphasizing on this point, learned counsel appearing forthe petitioner submitted that once the second respondent appellateauthority found that the original authority, who imposed the majorpunishment of compulsory retirement on the petitioner should havedesisted from functioning as disciplinary authority on account of hisbeing personally concerned with the proceedings as a materialwitness in support of the charges against the petitioner renderinghis order of punishment is liable to be set aside and directing thedisciplinary authority to nominate an Ad-hoc disciplinary authoritywith the approval of the competent authority for passing appropriateorders, the further order keeping the petitioner under suspensiontill final orders are passed by the Adhoc Committee is totallyunjustifiable.6.2. To this, the learned counsel appearing for therespondents submitted that Rule 21 (2) of the Pondicherry MunicipalServices (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1982, (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) envisages that the appellateauthority shall consider the case and pass orders confirming,enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting thesame to the authority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to anyother authority with such direction as it may deem fit in thecircumstances of the case. In view of the said clear provision,according to the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, theorder keeping the petitioner under suspension till an order is passedby the ad-hoc disciplinary authority, is in confirmity with the saidrule and the same cannot be faulted with.6.3. Before adverting to the said contention, it would beuseful to extract Rule 21 (2) of the said rules and the same isextracted here under:-(2) In the case of an appeal against an orderimposing any of the penalties specified in rule 7 orenhancing any penalty imposed under the said rule, theAppellate Authority shall consider:-(a) Whether the procedure laid down in these ruleshas been complied with, and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in the violation of any provisionsof the Constitution of India or in the failure of justice;(b) Whether the findings of the disciplinaryauthority are warranted by the evidence on the record; and(c) Whether the penalty or the enhanced penaltyimposed is adequate, inadequate or severe;and pass orders - https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (i) confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting asidethe penalty; or(ii) remitting the case to the authority whichimposed or enhanced the penalty or to any other authoritywith such direction as it may deem fit in thecircumstances of the case;No doubt, the said Rule envisages that if a case is remitted to theauthority which imposed or enhanced the penalty or to any otherauthority with such direction as it may deem fit considering thecircumstances of the case. But, it does not mean that while settingaside the order of original authority and remitting the case, he canpass further orders as it has been done in the present case viz.,keeping the petitioner under suspension till an order is passedfinally. "Such direction as it may deem fit", only mean that whileremitting the case to the authorities, a direction could be issuedto the authority concern pointing out the deficiencies in the saidorder and to dispose of the same within a reasonable time to be fixedtherefor. It will not mean a further order as has been done in thecase on hand. Hence, I am of the considered view that the furtherorder passed by the second respondent in keeping the petitioner undersuspension even after the order of the original authority was setaside, is totally unjustifiable and uncalled for. The secondrespondent cannot take advantage from Rule 21 (2) of the said Ruleswhich in no way helps the case of the respondents. Thus, I am of theconsidered view that the said contention raised by the learnedcounsel appearing for the petitioner deserves to be accepted and theanswer given by the respondents has to be rejected in toto.7.1. The third contention of the learned counsel appearingfor the petitioner is that since the charge sheet dated 12.01.2004issued to the petitioner relates to the period between September,1982 to 21st August 1990, the same has to be quashed by this Court onthe following grounds:-(i) The charges are vague.(ii) To proceed with the charges after more than twodecades is wholly unjustifiable.(iii) The alleged loss of revenue was collected fromthe concerned persons and in view of the same, there needbe no further proceedings pursuant to the charge sheet.7.2. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for therespondents would submit that --(i) on the ground of mere delay, charge sheet cannotbe quashed. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (ii) merely because the amount of alleged loss wasrecovered from the concerned persons, the charge sheetcannot be dropped against the petitioner.(iii) since already the enquiry report was before thedisciplinary authority, he has to pass orders on the basisof the same and hence, the charge sheet cannot be quashed.(iv) the petitioner filed a writ petition inW.P.No.4228 of 1999 challenging the charge sheet andallowed it to be dismissed as infructuous and hence, onceagain, the petitioner cannot challenge the charge sheet.7.3. Before adverting to the said contention in thisregard, it would be more appropriate to consider the following datesand events:- (1)26.10.1987The petitioner was placed under suspension.(2)28.01.1988First charge sheet was issued to the petitioner.(3)31.03.1988The suspension was revoked.(4)22.08.1990Second charge sheet was issued and the petitionerwas again suspended.(5)09.11.1990The third charge sheet was issued to thepetitioner.(6)12.01.1994The fourth charge sheet was issued.(7)In the year1997W.P.No.17854 of 1997 was filed by the petitionerchallenging the 1st, 2nd and 3rd charge sheets.(8)In the year1999W.P.No.4228 of 1999 was filed by the petitionerchallenging the fourth charge sheet.(9)22.04.1999W.P.No.17854 of 1997 was allowed and thepetitioner was directed to be reinstated. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (10)In the year1999Writ Appeal was filed by the respondentMunicipality in W.A.No.888 of 1999.(11)04.02.2000The said Writ Appeal was dismissed.(12)19.05.2000The petitioner issued contempt notice as he wasnot reinstated.(13)01.08.2000His suspension was revoked.(14)04.08.2000The petitioner was reinstated into service.(15)08.08.2000The petitioner was placed under suspension againtill the enquiry in the fourth charge sheet iscompeted.(16)August, 2000The petitioner filed W.P.No.19374 of 2000 toquash the order of suspension dated 08.08.2000.(17)20.11.2000The suspension order dated 08.08.2000 was stayedby this Court.(18)27.11.2000The petitioner was reinstated into service.(19)10.04.2003An Enquiry Officer was appointed to enquire intothe fourth charge sheet.(20)January,2004The said enquiry was completed.(21)14.01.2004The Enquiry Officer has given his findings.(22)20.10.2004The disciplinary authority imposed the punishmentof compulsory retirement.(23)17.12.2004The petitioner preferred an appeal against theorder of disciplinary authority imposing thepunishment of compulsory retirement. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (24)01.08.2005The petitioner sent a representation to thesecond respondent raising a plea that there is adelay in passing orders in the appeal.(25)27.09.2005A reminder was sent.(26)27.11.2006An application was filed by the petitioner underthe Right to Information Act.(27)28.12.2006The petitioner received a reply stating that theappeal is under scrutiny by the competentauthority.(28)18.01.2007First appeal was preferred under the Right toInformation Act, since the reply referred toabove dated 28.12.2006 was vague.(29)08.03.2007The petitioner sent a representation to thesecond respondent bringing his notice about thedelay in passing an order in the appeal preferredby him.(30)30.03.2007The said appeal was dismissed rejecting the sameon the ground that the petitioner has soughtreinstatement in service.(31)04.06.2007The petitioner preferred a second appeal underRight to Information Act.(32)30.01.2008The Chief Information Commissioner sought replyfrom the second respondent on the appealpreferred by the petitioner.(33)12.02.2008The second respondent requested the petitioner tosend a copy of the appeal filed before the ChiefInformation Commissioner. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (34)15.12.2008The second respondent passed an order in theappeal preferred by the petitioner dated17.12.2004.The above facts would indicate that there was a lethargic attitude onthe part of the respondents from the beginning of issuing the chargememos, appointing an Enquiry Officer, conducting an enquiry, passingorders by the disciplinary authority and passing orders in the appealpreferred by the petitioner.7.4. In the case of State of A.P. v. N.Radhakrishnan –(1998) 4 Supreme Court Cases 154, the Hon'ble Apex Court has heldthat balance has to be maintained between purity of administrationand the adverse effect which the prolonged proceedings have on anemployee. The unexplained delay in conclusion of the proceedingsitself is an indication of prejudice caused to the employee.Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings have to be quashed.7.5. In the case of Loganathan, G . Union of India – 2000(III) CTC 351, this Court has held that the delay in issuing acharge memo, which is unexplained, vitiates the charge memo. Thedelay constitutes denial of reasonable opportunity to defend himselfand violative of principles of natural justice.7.6. In the case of Harish C.P. v. Central WarehousingCorporation - 2000 (IV) CTC 517, this Court again has held thatdisciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated after lapse ofconsiderable time. Delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedingsamounts to giving room for allegations of bias, mala fide and misuseof power.7.7. In the case of Union of India v. CentralAdministrative Tribunal – 2005 (2) CTC 169, this Court has held asfollows:-" 4. Having regard to the above undisputed facts weasked a question to ourselves as to whether, in such statedcircumstances, should the enquiry be allowed to continueassuming the orders in challenge are liable to be set asidewhen for all the delay the employee cannot be found faultwith at all. The Supreme Court in the judgment in State ofPunjab and Others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, 1995 (2) S.C.C. 570held that even the delay in serving the charge sheet wouldvitiate the charges and the Court should, on the factsavailable in each case, adopt a balancing process i.e.,weighing the factors for and against and then take adecision on the totality of circumstances. It also heldthat the Court cannot infer that the employer had droppedthe idea of proceeding against the delinquent from the mere https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ inaction on the part of the Government. In anotherdecision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh andanother, 1990 (Supplement) S.C.C. 738, the Hon'ble SupremeCourt had come down heavily when there is latches on thepart of the employer in conducting departmental enquiry.Finding that on the facts of that case, there was nosatisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay, theSupreme Court went on to hold that it would be unfair toorder the departmental enquiry to proceed with even at thatlate stage. These two judgments, in our consideredopinion, squarely applies to the case on hand. ... Thedelay remains totally unexplained. Therefore, we have nohesitation at all in concluding that the ground ofinordinate delay in proceeding with the departmentalenquiry as referred to above by us, would come in the wayof the Government to continue with the enquiry any further.Therefore, on that ground stated by us, the orders inchallenge are sustained and the writ petitions aredismissed...."7.8. In the case of Obaidullah, V. v. The State of TamilNadu – 2005 (5) CTC 380, this Court in paragraph 15, has held asfollows:-" 15. Mr.K.V.Srinivasaraghavan has also brought toour notice a letter (Ms) No.1118/Per.N/87 dated 22.12.1987issued by Personnel and Administrative Reforms Department,Government of Tamil Nadu to all the heads of departmentshow the disciplinary cases should be disposed ofexpeditiously and prescribed a revised time limit fordisposal of disciplinary cases. A perusal of thecommunication shows that time limit has been prescribed forcompletion of investigation / enquiry at every stage,including report by the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, etc. In the absence of explanation at all onthe side of the Government, except change of Governmentthen and there, we are of the view that the Tribunal oughtto have accepted the case of the petitioner (A.Obaidhullah)and quashed the charge memo on the ground of unexplainedinordinate delay".7.9. In the case of Parasmeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu -2006 (1) CTC 476, this Court, in paragraphs 8 and 10, has held asfollows:-" 8. The above details amply show that there is noexplanation at all for not pursuing the first and secondcharge memos or for not considering the explanationsoffered by the petitioner for the same. Likewise, there isno reply for not pursuing the third charge memo, when https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ admittedly no order of stay was passed by the Tribunal inO.A.No.2420 of 1994. In other words, though the saidapplication had been filed before the Tribunal in 1994 andthe same was disposed of on 4.7.2002, admittedly, there wasno order barring the Department from proceeding with thecharge memo. Even before us, there is no answer for notpursuing the charge memo and completing the enquiry."...10. In the case before us, the alleged failure toutilise the advance amount and failure to complete the workentrusted to him by utilising the funds had taken placeprior to 1985. It is not a case of misappropriation orretention of Government money. On the other hand, theallegation relates to negligence in monitoring the projectsand non-utilizing the funds within the time prescribed.Taking note of the same and in the light of unexplainedreason for not pursuing the first and second charge memos,when admittedly, the petitioner submitted his explanationsdenying all the allegations and considering the length oftime involved, viz., 20 years, we are of the view that thejudgment of the Supreme Court referred to aboveP.V.Mahadevan v. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board, 2005 (4)CTC 403, is directly on the point. Further, the petitionerhas already suffered enough mental agony on account of theprotracted disciplinary proceedings. These materialaspects have not been considered by the Tribunal, which hascommitted an error in dismissing the original applicationfiled by the petitioner."7.10. In the case of Elangovan, M vs. The Trichy DistrictCentral Co-op. Bank Ltd. - 2006 (2) CTC 635, this Court, inparagraphs 14, 15 and 16, has held as follows:-" 14. It is in this regard, the judgment of the ApexCourt is a guiding factor wherein, the Supreme Court hascategorically held that keeping an official under chargesand disputing integrity would cause unbearable agony anddistress to the officer concerned stating that theprotracted disciplinary enquiry against the Governmentemployee should be avoided not only in the interest of theemployee but also in the interest of inspiring confidencein the minds of the Government employees. Therefore, theSupreme Court heavily came down against the protractedenquiry and put an end to the said enquiry.15. The Supreme Court in this regard for the futureguidance states as follows:- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "14. Under the circumstances, we are of theopinion that allowing the respondent to proceed furtherwith the departmental proceedings at this distance of timewill be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping ahigher Government official under charges of corruption anddispute integrity would cause unbearable mental agony anddistress to the officer concerned. The protracteddisciplinary enquiry against a Government employee should,therefore, be avoided not only in the interest of theGovernment employee but in public interest and also in theinterests of inspiring confidence in the minds of theGovernment employees. At this stage, it is necessary todraw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. Theappellant had already suffered enough and more on accountof the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, themental agony and suffering of the appellant due to theprotracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more thanthe punishment. For the mistakes committed by thedepartment in the procedure for initiating the disciplinaryproceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer".16. Applying the said dictum in the present case, itcan be safely concluded that the petitioner has alreadysuffered enough on account of the disciplinary proceedingsand as pointed out and the mental agony and sufferings ofthe petitioner due to the protracted disciplinaryproceedings would be much more than the proposed punishmentitself. For the mistakes committed by the department ininordinate delay in the initiating proceedings and alsoduring the conducting of the proceedings the petitionershall not be made to suffer any further". 7.11. In the case of Amaladoss, D. v. The State of TamilNadu – 2006 (5) CTC 141, this Court, in para 21, has held asfollows:-" Though we cannot re-appreciate the evidence recordedduring the course of enquiry conducted by the EnquiryOfficer, but we are satisfied on the overwhelming materialavailable on record and after going through the entiredeposition of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and the explanation offeredby the petitioner that the enquiry officer should not haveheld that the Charge No.1 is proved against the petitioner.As per the judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counselfor the petitioner in Bani Singh case, cited supra, whereinthe Supreme Court has interfered with the punishment wherethere was a delay of twelve years from the date of issuanceof the charge-sheet and the imposition of penalty. In thepresent case also, it took nearly six years to complete theenquiry and impose the punishment. Therefore, we are https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ satisfied that the findings with regard to Charge Nos.1 and2 are to be set aside."7.12. In the case of M.V.Bijlani v. Union of India –(2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 88, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held thatthe Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into considerationthat the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years andthey continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation ofthe disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such along time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer. 7.13. However, it was contended by the learned counselappearing for the respondents that since the earlier writ petitionfiled by the petitioner challenging the charge memo was dismissed asinfructuous at the instance of the counsel appeared for thepetitioner, the very same charge memo cannot be the subject matter inquestion in the present writ petition. To this, learned counselappearing for the petitioner submitted that since the said writpetition was not dismissed on merits, the same can be agitated by wayof fresh writ petition.7.14. Before adverting to the said contention, it would beuseful extract the endorsement made in the said writ petition, whichis extracted here under:-" It is reported that the enquiry was conducted andthe petitioner was awarded compulsory retirement. Thematter thereby becomes infructuous".Thus, as rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner, the merits of the charge sheet in question was notconsidered by this Court in the said writ petition. In view of thefact that final orders were passed in the disciplinary proceedings,the writ petition was allowed to be dismissed as it has becomeinfructuous. Now, since the petitioner challenges not only the ordermade in the appeal but also the charge memo itself, I am of theconsidered view that the present writ petition challenging the chargememo also is perfectly in order.7.15. In this connection, the learned counsel appearing forthe petitioner drew my attention to the judgment in the case ofVirudhunagar S.R. Mills v. Madras Govt. - A.I.R. 1968 Supreme Court1196. It would be useful to extract a portion of para 6 of thejudgment made thereunder, which is extracted here under:-" ... Where therefore a writ petition is dismissedwithout notice to the other side but the order of dismissalis a speaking order and the petition is disposed of onmerits, that would still amount to res judicata and wouldbar a petition under Article 32..." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7.16. In the case of Daryao v. State of U.P. - A.I.R. 1961Supreme Court 1457, Their Lordships have held as follows:-"... If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and anorder is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not thedismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon thenature of the order. If the order is on the merits itwould be a bar; if the order shows that the dismissal wasfor the reason that the petitioner was guilty of laches orthat he had an alternative remedy it would not be a barexcept in cases which we have already indicated. If thepetition is dismissed in limine without passing a speakingorder then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating abar of res judicata. It is true that, prima facie,dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking orderin that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took theview that there was no substance in the petition at all:but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easyto decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court andthat makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such asummary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as suchconstitutes a bar of res judicata against a similarpetition filed under Art. 32. If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn itcannot be a bar to a subsequent petition under Art.32because in such a case there has been no decision on themerits by the Court."8. In view of the above stated position, as stated already,the present writ petition challenging the charge memo in this writpetition de hors the filing of the earlier writ petition, isperfectly maintainable and it will not operate as res judicata.9. The discussions made above amply establish that thepetitioner would have suffered maximum mental agony in view of thependency of the disciplinary proceedings pending against him from1987 when he was placed under suspension for the first time. Theproceedings referred to above would indicate that there was delay onthe part of the authorities, the respondents herein, at all point oftime. Even the order in appeal was passed only after the petitionerapproached the authorities under Right to Information Act, 2005. Thepetitioner had, thus undergone the maximum punishment than thepunishment which could be imposed by the authorities concern. Hence,I am of the considered view that directing the authorities once againto deal with the charge sheet against the petitioner, of the year1994, would be a futile exercise at this stage. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

10. Thus, considering the over all circumstances, I am ofthe considered view that the charge sheet dated 12.01.1994 of thefirst respondent and the order of the second respondent dated15.02.2008 are liable to be quashed and accordingly quashed. Therespondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner within two weeksfrom the date of receipt of this order with all benefits.11. In fine, the writ petition stands allowed. However,there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneouspetitions are closed.Sd/-Asst.Registrar/True Copy/Sub.Asst.Registrarsbi To 1.The Commissioner, Government of Pondicherry, Pondicherry Municipality, Pondicherry.2.The Appellate Authority cumDirector, Local Administration Department, Pondicherry.3.The Special Officer cum Disciplinary Authority, Pondicherry Municipality, Pondicherry.+ 1 cc to M/s.S.Meenakshi, Advocate,SR.65132+ 1 cc to Government Pleader,Pondicherry,SR.65181 W.P.No.6699 of 2009 CKN(CO)EM/10.12.09