T.T. Gnanamurugan v. The Inspector General of Registration & Ors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED : 28.04.2009CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.N.BASHAW.P.No.6015 of 20001. T.T.Gnanamurugan (deceased)2. G.Aye Muthu (2nd petitioner was impleaded in the place of the deceased 1st petitioner as per order dated 26.6.2008 in W.P.M.P.No.490/2008)... PetitionersVs1. The Inspector General of Registration, Santhome High Road, Chennai.2. District Registrar, Tirupur, Coimbatore District.... RespondentsPrayer :Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari, calling for the recordsrelating to the proceedings of the Inspector General of Registration,Santhome High Road, Chennai-600 028 made in Pa.Mu.No.17473/E3/95dated 14.10.1999 received on 8.2.2000, the first respondent hereinand the proceedings of the District Registrar, Tirupur made inNo.3271/83/94 dated 20.1.1995, the second respondent herein and quashthe same.For Petitioners: Mr.N.DamodaranFor Respondents: Mrs.Lita Srinivasan, Government AdvocateO R D E RThis petition was heard on 08.04.2009 and again posted on24.04.2009 for certain clarifications and after hearing both sidesthis order is passed today, i.e., on 28.04.2009.2. The petitioner has come forward with this Writ Petitionseeking for the relief of calling for the records relating to theproceedings of the Inspector General of Registration, Santhome High https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Road, Chennai-600 028 made in Pa.Mu.No.17473/E3/95 dated 14.10.1999received on 8.2.2000 , the 1st respondent herein and the proceedingsof the District Registrar, Tirupur made in No.3271/83/94 dated20.1.1995, the second respondent herein and quash the same.3.The case of the petitioner is that as per the compromisedecree passed on 25.4.1970 in O.S.No.272/1990 on the file of theSubordinate Judge, Coimbatore for partition and separate possessionof the property comprised in Survey No.376, Ravanapuram Village, thepetitioner and all other respective parties were in possession andabsolute enjoyment of their shares. That being the position, thepetitioner applied to the Tahsildar, Udumalpet to effect sub-division of the property to their respective possession on 12.1.1992and necessary fees also paid. The Tahsildar, Udumalpet whileeffecting the sub-division committed mistakes and omissions inrespect of the properties. It is further stated that the wronginclusion of the survey numbers by the Revenue authorities will notconfer any title upon other sharers, namely, the brother of thepetitioner in respect to the said extent of lands and as such, thepetitioner and his brother and his brother's son entered into a deedof confirmation dated 30.5.1994, wherein it was made clear that theother sharers namely, the brother of the petitioner and hisbrother's son have no objection for the petitioner to get a separatepatta in respect of the portion under his possession and enjoyment.The petitioner further states that by such confirmation, thepetitioner's brother and his brother's son only confirmed the titleinterest and possession of the petitioner herein in an extent of 89cents in Survey No.376/2 of Ravanapuram Village and by the saiddocument they have also conveyed their no objection for transferringthe patta wrongly given in their names.4.The further version of the petitioner is that when theabove said document was presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Komangalam on 30.5.1994, the said authority impounded thesaid document by treating it as a Settlement Deed and valued theproperty at Rs.3,25,954/- and directed the petitioner to pay thedeficit stamp duty of Rs.39,120/-. The 2nd respondent accepted thesaid view of the Sub-Registrar, Koramangalam by interpreting the saiddocument as Settlement Deed, issued a show-cause notice dated18.11.1994 calling upon the petitioner to give his explanation why heshould not pay the deficit stamp duty of Rs.39,110/- and Rs.90/-towards penalty within one month from the date of the said show causenotice. The petitioner submitted a detailed explanation dated12.1.1995 to the said show cause notice.5.It is further stated by the petitioner that the secondrespondent without properly considering the facts of the case andwithout properly adverting to the recitals of the documents confirmedthe earlier order in his proceedings No.3271/B1/94 dated 20.1.1995and directed the petitioner to pay the amount within one month from https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the date of receipt of such proceedings. Being aggrieved againstsuch order, the petitioner preferred a statutory appeal before thefirst respondent herein and the first respondent after hearing thematter, passed the impugned order dated 14.10.1999 confirming theorders of the second respondent herein.6.Mr.N.Damodaran, the learned counsel appearing for thepetitioner contended that both the respondents 1 and 2 have wronglyinterpreted the disputed document as settlement deed withoutconsidering the actual contents and recitals of the document. It isfurther contended that the reading of the document on the face of itmakes it very clear that it is only a deed of confirmation and not adeed of settlement. The learned counsel for the petitioner alsocontended that both the authorities have ignored the detailedexplanation given by the petitioner herein and passed the ordermechanically without application of mind. It is contended that thesecond respondent while passing the original order dated 20.1.1995clearly stated that the petitioner is entitled to prefer an appealand accordingly, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 56(1) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (hereinafter referred to as 'theAct') raising elaborate grounds.7. The learned counsel would also submit that the firstrespondent passed the impugned order without even adverting to andconsidering the detailed grounds raised by the petitioner herein. Itis contended that the first respondent has not given reasons forconfirming the order passed by the second respondent exceptincorporating certain portion of the disputed document presented bythe petitioner for registration as a deed of confirmation. It ispointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that theportion incorporated from the disputed document in the impugned ordershows that the brother and the son of the brother of the petitionerhave no objection for the change of patta in the name of thepetitioner and as such recitals, the said document could not beconstrued to be a deed of settlement as the brother and the brother'sson of the petitioner have not conveyed or transferred any of theirproperty and they have simply declared and confirmed the propertywhich were already in possession and enjoyment of the petitioner andthe title of the property belonging to the petitioner. It iscontended that as such the disputed document has construed to be a'deed of declaration' confirming the earlier partition effectedbetween the parties and as such it would come under the Article 4 tothe Schedule I of the Act attracting the stamp duty of Rs.20/- only.The learned counsel for the petitioner lastly contended that evenassuming if not admitting that there is any doubt about theinterpretation of the document in dispute, the first respondent oughtto have invoked Section 57 of the Act and referred the matter to thisCourt. The learned counsel in support of his contention placedreliance on the following decisions : https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (1)Chief Controlling Revenue Authority V. M.S.Dhanakodireported in 2000 (IV) CTC 275 ;(2)Dulip Singh V. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority &Inspector General of Registration reported in 2003 (1)CTC 295 ;(3)V.S.Somasundaram V. The Chief Controlling RevenueAuthority reported in 2003 (2) L.W. 253 ; and (4)Chief Controlling Revenue Authority V. The MaharashtraSugar Mills Limited reported in AIR 1950 SC 218 ;8. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate contended thatthere is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed bythe first respondent and the original order passed by the secondrespondent to the effect that the disputed document is a deed ofsettlement and not a mere deed of confirmation. It is submitted thatthe petitioner only preferred a revision invoking Section 56(1) ofthe Act and not an appeal. The learned Government Advocate wouldfurther contend that the authorities have rightly classified thedocument as a deed of settlement as per the definition of the deedof settlement under the Sub-Section (24) of section 2 of the Act andchargeable to duty as per Article 58(A) (ii) of the Schedule I to theAct, 1899. Therefore, it is submitted that the Writ Petition isliable to be dismissed as devoid of merits.9.I have carefully considered the rival contentions put forthby either side and also thoroughly scrutinised the entire materialsavailable on record including the impugned orders passed by the firstrespondent herein confirming the order passed by the secondrespondent.10. The crux of the question involved in this matter is inrespect of the interpretation of the disputed document involved inthis matter, namely, whether the instrument is a 'deed of settlement'as held by the respondents or a 'deed of confirmation' as contendedby the petitioner.11.Before proceeding to consider the above said question, itis relevant to refer the provision for definition of 'settlement'under the Act. Section 2(24) of the Act defines 'settlement' whichreads hereunder :"2. Definitions –(24) Settlement – "Settlement" means any non-testamentary disposition in writing of movable orimmovable property, made- https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (a) ....(b) for the purpose of distributing property of thesettlor among his family or those for whom he desired toprovide, or for the purpose of providing for some persondependent on him, or (c) ...."12. A reading of the above said provision makes it crystal clearthat the quintessence of the definition of the word "settlement" inclause 24 (b) to Section 2 of the Act is that the property should bedistributed among the members of the family of the settlor or shouldbe ordained to be given to near and dear to him. In the absence ofany such clause express or implied to be culled out by necessaryimplication from out of the instrument to conclude about distributionof property, either movable or immovable among the settlor's heirs orrelatives, it would be difficult to hold that such an instrumentshould be treated as a settlement.13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Madras Refineries V. ChiefControlling Revenue Authority reported in AIR 1977 SC 500 whiledealing with the definition of "settlement" also referred thedefinition of the term "disposition" used in the above said provisionas hereunder :"The terms "disposition" has been defined in Stroud'sJudicial Dictionary as a devise "intended to comprehend amode by which property can pass, whether by act of partiesor by an act of the law" and "includes transfer and chargeof property."14. In the light of the above said definition of the term"settlement", let me now scrutinise and peruse the disputed documentinvolved in this matter. 15. It is to be borne in mind that in order to interpret thenature of a document, the document should be read as a whole and anyisolated portion of the document cannot be taken into consideration.It is well-settled by a catena of decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Courtthat it is a sound cannon of construction that all parts of adocument are to be read together ; no portion can be read disjunctlyor in isolation or omitted. 16. It is also equally important that in order to interpret adocument, the recitals in the said document ought to be generallysafe and sole guide for such interpretation. The Hon'ble Apex Courtin the decision cited supra in the Madras Refineries's case also heldthat, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "In order to determine whether any, and if any, whatstamp duty is chargeable upon an instrument the legal ruleis that the real and true meaning of the instrument is tobe ascertained, that the description of it given in theinstrument, itself by the parties is immaterial."17. A perusal of the disputed document discloses that it isdated 30.05.1994 and titled as "agreement deed". There are threeparties to the document, namely, the petitioner, the petitioner'sbrother and his brother's son. The third party to the document isthe petitioner herein ; the first party is the brother of thepetitioner ; the second party is the brother's son of the petitioner.The recitals of the document reveals that all the three partiesincluding the petitioner were in actual possession and enjoyment ofthe property situated at Ravanapuram village under Survey No.376/2 asper the partition deed dated 01.08.1949 under the documentNo.2908/49. It is revealed from the impugned document that the pattawas wrongly given in the names of the parties 1 and 2, namely, thepetitioner's brother and brother's son in respect of the portion ofthe property under the above said survey Number, namely, 376/2 and assuch the parties 1 and 2 have no objection for giving a separatepatta in favour of the third party, namely, the petitioner herein.Therefore, the above said recitals contained in the impugned documentmakes it crystal clear that there is no distribution or dispositionof the property in favour of the petitioner or any one of the partiesto the impugned document and the parties 1 and 2 have not transferredor conveyed any share of their property in favour of the petitionerherein. All the three parties to the impugned document were incontinuous possession and enjoyment of their respective portion ofthe property as per the partition deed dated 01.08.1949 as statedabove. The ingredients of the provision under Section 2(24)(b) of theAct to the definition of settlement are not at all attracted from therecitals of the impugned document. 18. Though the document is described as "agreement deed", therecitals of the document reveals that it is nothing but a deed ofdeclaration of confirmation of the earlier partition effected betweenthe parties and their possession and enjoyment of their respectiveportion of the property and as such it would attract stamp duty underthe Article 4 to the Schedule I of the Act, namely, affidavitincluding the confirmation or declaration in the case of persons bylaw allowed to affirm or declare instead of swearing.19. Now coming to the impugned orders passed by the respondents1 and 2, it is to be stated, at the outset, that both the respondentshave wrongly interpreted the instrument involved in this matterconstruing the said document as "settlement deed" ignoring andoverlooking the fact that none of the ingredients to the definitionof settlement under Section 2(24)(b) of the Act made out. It ispertinent to note that both the respondents considered and referred https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ only an isolated portion of the impugned document in stead of readingthe document as a whole. The respondents 1 and 2 have not read therecitals together and also not considered the true character of thedocument. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that theimpugned orders passed by the respondents 1 and 2 are unsustainablein law and accordingly, the impugned orders passed by the firstrespondent in Pa.Mu.No.17473/E3/95 dated 14.10.1999 and the secondrespondent in No.3271/83/94 dated 20.01.1995 are hereby quashed. 20. It is made clear, as already pointed out, that the impugneddocument would attract stamp duty under Article 4 to the Schedule Iof the Act. The Writ Petition ordered accordingly. No costs. Sd/- Asst. Registrar / True Copy / Sub.Asst Registrar tsi/ggTo1. The Inspector General of Registration, Santhome High Road, Chennai.2. The District Registrar, Tirupur, Coimbatore District.+ 1 cc to Mr.N.Damodaran,Advocate,SR.12558+ 1 cc to Government Pleader,SR.13225W.P.No.6015 of 2000KLT(CO)EM/2.6.09