Madrasdated High Court · 2010

W.P.No.11383 to 11388/2008, 11389 to 11394/08:Praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus' calling for theentire records on the files of 3rd and 6th respondents respectivelypertaining to notification issued by 3rd respondent under Section 4(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 and Published in ThiruvallurDistrict Gazette on 14.2.2007 and the declaration issued u/s 6(1)of the Act issued by the 6th Respondents and Published in theTamilnadu Government Gazette, Part VI, Section on 15.03.2008 andquash the same in so far as the lands of the petitioner comprised inSurvey No.5/36(W.P.11383/08) 5/37(W.P.11384/08) 5/74(W.P.11385/08)5/75(W.P.11386/08) 7/20(W.P.11387/08) 7/23(W.P.11388/08) 7/30(Part)(W.P.11389/08) 7(W.P.11390/08) 7/38(W.P.11391/08) 7/43(W.P.11392/08)7/47(W.P.11393/08) 7/44(W.P.No.11394/08) Respectively ofThiruninravur Village, Poonamallee Taluk and Thiruvallur District isconcerned and to direct the Respondents 1 and 2 to from the outerring road through the allemate alignment passing through theM.G.R.Nagar, Uzhaippalar Nagar and Srivignarajan Nagar, etc.,situate in Survey Nos.3, 4, 6,18, 198, 484, 541, 542, and 308 etc.,of the said Thiruninravur Village as alternatively proposed by the5th Respondent."(Prayer amended as per order dated 22.2.2010 by MJJ in M.P.No.2/10in W.P.No.11383 to 11388/08. 11389 to 11394/08)W.P.No.7641 to 7653/2008:Praying to issue a 'Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus' calling for theentire records on the files of 3rd and 6th Respondent respectivelypertaining to notification issued by 3rd Respondent u/s.4(1-A) ofthe L.A.Act 1894 and published in Thiruvallur District Gazette on24.2.2007 (W.P.7641, 7642, 7643, 7646/08) 14.2.2007(7644, 7647/08),24.1.2007(W.P.No.7645, 7648/08) 30.3.2007(W.P.No.7649, 7651, 7652,7653/08) 13.3.07(W.P.7650/08) and the declaration issued u/s.6(1) ofthe Act issued by 6th Respondent and published in theT.N.Govt.Gazette Part-VI Section on 2.4.2008 (W.P.No.7641, 7642,7643, 7646/08) 15.3.08(W.P.7644, 7645, 7647, 7648, 7651/08) 14.5.08(7649, 7652, 7653/08) 7.5.08(W.P.7650/08) and quash the same in sofar as the lands of the petitioner comprised in Survey No.7/15(W.P.7641/08) 7/37(W.P.No.7642/08) 7/27(W.P.7643/08) 5/4(W.P.7644/08) 8/10(W.P..7645/08)7/10(W.P..7646/08)5/39(w.P.7647/08)8/10(w.P.7648/08) 17/50(W.P.7649/08) 21/22(Part)(W.P.7650/08)8/9(W.P.7651/08) 17/37, 17/40(W.P.7652/08)17/30(W.P.7653/08)17/37,17/40(W.P.7652/08) 17/30(W.P.7653/08) respectively of ThiruninravurVillage, Poonamallee Taluk and Thiruvallur District is concerned andto direct the respondents 1 and 2 to form the outer Ring Roadthrough the alternate alignment passing through the MGR Nagar,uzhaippalar Nagar and Srivignarajan Nagar etc., situate in S.Nos.3,4,6,18, 198, 484, 485, 485, 541, 542 and 302 etc., of the said https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Thiuninravur Village as alternatively proposed by the 5thRespondents.(prayer amended as per order dated 22.2.2010 by MJJ in M.P.No.2/10in W.P.NO.7641 to 7653/08)W.P.19482/09:Praying to issue a 'Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus' calling for theentire records on the files of 4th & 3rd Respondents respectivelypertaining to notification issued by 4th Respondent u/s.4(1-A) ofthe Land Acquisition Act 1894 published in Thiruvallur DistrictGazette on 24.1.2007 and the declaration issued by the 3rdRespondent u/s.6(1) of the L.A.Act 1894, published in the Tamil NaduGovernment Gazette Part VI Section -1 on 15.3.2008 and quash thesame in so far as the lands of the petitioner comprised in surveyNo.8-4D of Thiruninravur Village, Poonamallee Taluk and ThiruvallurDistrict is concerned and to direct the Respondent 1 and 2 from theouter Ring Road Through the alternate alignment passing through theM.G.R.Nagar, Uzhaippalar Nagar and Srivignarajan Nagar etc., situatein Survey Nos.3, 4, 6,18,198,484,485, 541, 542 and 308 etc of thesaid Thiuninravur Village and alternatively proposed by the 6thRespondent.(Prayer amended as per order dated 22.2.2010 in M.P.No.1/10 inW.P.19482/09)W.P.No.11395 to 11398/08, 11400, 11401, 11403 to 11405/08Praying to issue a 'Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus' calling for theentire records on the files of 3rd and 6th respondents respectivelypertaining to notification issued by 3rd Respondent u/s.4(1-A) ofthe Land Acquisition Act 1894 and published in Thiruvallur DistrictGazette on 24.2.2007 an declaration issued u/s.6(1) of the Actissued by the 6th Respondent and published in the Tamil NaduGovernment Gazette, Part-VI section on 2.4.2008 and quash the samein so far as the lands of petitioners comprised in Survey No.7/45(W.P.11395/08) 7/36(W.P.11396/08) 7/21(W.P.11397/08), 7/25(W.P.11398/08) 7/26(W.P.11400/08) 7/48(W.P.11401/08), 17/32(W.P.11403/08) 17/43(W.P.11404/08) 17/39(W.P.11405/08) respectivelyof Thiruninravur Village, Poonamallee Taluk and Thiurvallur Districtis concerned and to direct the Respondents 1 & 2 to from the outerRing Road Through the alternate alignment passing Through the MGRNagar, Uzhaippalar Nagar and Srivignarajan Nagar etc., situate inSurvey Nos.3,4,6, 18,198,484,485,541, 542 and 308 etc., of the saidThriuninravur Village as alternatively proposed by the 5thRespondent. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Prayer amended as per order dated 15.6.2010 by MJJ in M.P.No.4/2010in W.P.No.11395 to 11398/08, 11400, 11401, 11403 to 11405/08)W.P.No.11399/08 & 11402/08Praying to issued 'Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus' calling for theentire records forming part of the notification of the 3rdRespondent dated 24.2.2007 passed u/s.4(1-A) of the LA Act 1894, andquash the same in so far as the land of the petitioner hereinmeasuring 1920 sq.ft and the residential house therein is concernedsituate in Sy.No.7/24(W.P.No.11399/08) measuring 2600 sq.ft andresidential house therein Sy.No.17(W.P.No.11402/08) in MathuraGangureddy Kuppam Village, Thiruninravoor Panchayat, PoonamalleeTaluk, Tiruvellore District and directing the Ist RespondentGovernment to lay the ORR in the original Route in the lands inSy.Nos.3, 4,6,17 and 18 situate in the above mentioned Village andutilize the said Government Poramboku land in this Regard.APPEARANCE For Petitioner For Respondent1.W.P.761/2010 toW.P.765/2010N.Subramaniyan P.S.Raman, Ad.GeneralAssisted by M.Dhandapani, Spl.G.P.(W) Land Acquisition for R1-R3 to R6. D.Veerasekaran for R2(CMDA)2.W.P.13287/2009toW.P.13289/2009 M.Christella PSR (R1, R2, R3) CMDA [R4] (I.Paranthaman for R4)3.W.P.No.29223/2007to W.P.NO.29228/2007 Mr.Ashok Menon PSR -for -R1 CMDA -R24.W.P.No.29315/2007 Mr.Ashok Menon PSR- For R1 CMDA-R2 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

5.W.P.NO.27926/2007 Mr.Ashok Menon PSR-For-R1 CMDA-R26.W.P.No.28522/2007 Mr.Ashok Menon PSR-For-R1 CMDA-R27.W.P.No.4362/2007 N.Subramaniyan PSR-For -R1; R3 to R6 CMDA-For-R28.W.P.No.2940/2010toW.P.No.2948/2010 N.Subramaniyan PSR-For -R1-R3 to R6 CMDA -For -R2 (I.Paranthaman for R2)9.W.P.3924/2010 N.Subramaniyan PSR-For-R1; R3 to R6 CMDA-For -R2) (I.Paranthaman)-R210.W.P.3925/2010 N.Subramaniyan PSR-For-R1, R3 to R6 CMDA- For -R2 (I.Paranthaman)R211. W.P.11383/08 to 11388/08: N.Subramanyan - PSR for R1-R3 to R6 CMDA- R212. W.P.11389/08 to 11394/2008: N.Subramaniyan PSR for R1, R3 to R6D. Veerasekaran forR2 (CMDA)13. W.P.7641/08 to 7653/2008 :N. Subramaniyan-PSR for R1-R3 to R6 CMDA for R2 (I.Paranthaman -R2)14. W.P.7495/2010 - N. Subramaniyan - PSR for R1, R3 to R5CMDA for R2C. Kathiravan for R2Mr.Jayesh L. Dolia for R615. W.P.19482/2009 N. Subramaniyan PSR for R1- R3 to R6 CMDA R2 (C. Karhiravan)16. W.P.14496/2010 N. Subramaniyan PSR for R1-R3 to R6 CMDA R2 17. W.P.11395/2008 to 11400/2008: N. Subramaniyan PSR for R1 R3 to R6 CMDA R2 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

18. W.P.11401/08 to 11405/08 N. Subramaniyan - PSR for R1-R3 to R6 CMDA for R219. W.P.18374/2010 - N. Subramaniyan - P.S. Raman Ad. General Assisted by M. Dhandapani Spl. G.P. (Land Acquisition) For R1-R3 to R5Mr.D. Veerasekaran for R2C O M M O N O R D E RSince, the issues arising for consideration and the facts andcircumstances of all the writ petitions are similar in nature, acommon order is passed.2. The main challenge in the above writ petitions relates tothe notifications issued by the District Collector, ThiruvallurDistrict, under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,published in the Thiruvallur District Gazette, and the notificationsissued by the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of LandAdministration, Chepauk, Chennai, under Section 6 of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894, published in the Tamil Nadu GovernmentGazette, Part-VI-Section 1, to acquire the lands of the petitionersfor the public purpose of forming the Outer Ring Road, under theOuter Ring Road Project, proposed by the Government of Tamil Nadu.Some of the petitioners have also prayed for a direction to directthe respondents to form the Outer Ring Road by opting for thealignment passing through the lands in survey numbers, includingS.Nos.3,4,6,18,198,308,484,485,541 and 542, of M.G.R.Nagar,Uzhaippalar Nagar and Srivignarajan Nagar etc., and other adjoiningareas of Thirunindravur Village, as proposed by the PallavanConsultancy Services Ltd., Egmore, Chennai.3. It has been stated that the lands comprised in S.Nos.2, 3,5, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 20, 21 and 22 are classified as residentialareas. Several residential buildings had been constructed in thesaid areas and they have been in existence for several decades.Based on the approval obtained from the Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority, a large number of residents have been livingin the said buildings for a number of years. The website of theRegistration Department reveals that the areas in question have beenclassified as 'residential zone' and the guide line values for thelands therein, during the relevant period, prior to 1.8.2007, had https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ varied from Rs.52/- to Rs.128/- per sq.ft. While so, the petitionershad come to know, from the newspaper reports, that the Government ofTamil Nadu has proposed to construct the Outer Ring Road betweenVandalur and Minjur. 4. As per the report, it had been learnt that the Government ofTamil Nadu had proposed to form the Outer Ring Road, between theVandalur and Minjur, having a length of about 63.2 kilometers, forthe purpose of reducing the traffic congestion in the city ofChennai and for facilitating the heavy vehicles to by-pass the cityof Chennai. It had been gathered that the width of the road would be400 feet out of which 100 feet at the centre would be earmarked forthe railway lines. 60 feet width, on either side of the railwaylines had been earmarked to accommodate the roads. The remaining 90feet, on either side, would be earmarked for the construction ofshops and other commercial buildings, in order to reduce the quantumof toll on the vehicles, proposed to be collected for the purpose ofconstructing the Outer Ring Road. The proposed project is to beexecuted by private partnership. 5. It has also been stated that the residents of the areaconcerned were of the belief that the Outer Ring Road would bealigned through poramboke lands available on the eastern side ofPrakash Nagar and Lakshmi Nagar and therefore, only a few houses,situated in Sri Vignarajan Nagar, would be affected. However, due tothe agitation, caused by some of the local residents, the alignmentof the road had been shifted, marginally. However, in view of thefact that a large number of residents were being affected, theAssociation of the residents of Prakash Nagar had sent severalrepresentations to the authorities concerned. In reply to the saidrepresentations, the authorities concerned had informed that thePallavan Consultancy Services Limited, Chennai, would examine thefeasibility of shifting the alignment of the road. The PallavanConsultancy Services Limited had submitted a report, on 6.10.1997,to the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Chennai,expressing its opinion that, by introducing two curves at thestarting point, with adequate radius, the alignment of the roadcould be shifted to the eastern side of Lakshmi Nagar. However, theChennai Metropolitan Development Authority had rejected the saidproposal. In such circumstances, the Lakshmi Nagar Residents'Welfare Association had filed a writ petition before this Court, inW.P.No.2000 of 1998, challenging the rejection of the proposedrealignment. This Court, by its order, dated 22.11.1998, had allowedthe writ petition. However, the writ appeal filed by the ChennaiMetropolitan Development Authority, in W.A.No.603 of 1999, (CHENNAIMETROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY REP. BY ITS MEMBER SECRETARY,CHENNAI – 600 008 Vs. LAKSHMI NAGAR RESIDENTS WELFARE ASSOCIATION,REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT, THIRUNINDRAVUR) had been allowed, by an https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ order, dated 19.9.2000, dismissing the writ petition filed by theAssociation. The review petition filed in R.A.No.20 of 2001, inW.A.No.603 of 1999, had also been dismissed by this Court, by itsorder, dated 31.7.2001. 6. It has also been stated that, in the meantime, the residentsof Morai village, situated in the line alignment of the road, asoriginally planned, had submitted similar representations, as thatof the residents of Lakshmi Nagar and Prakash Nagar. The saidrepresentations had been rejected by the Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority stating that the shifting of the alignment tothe western side of Morai village, as requested by its residentsassociation, would raise a new problem and that the costs of theproject would increase. However, the alignment, passing throughMorai village, had been shifted, based on the request of two of themembers of the legislative assembly. Thereafter, a writ petition hadbeen filed by the East Prakash Nagar Residents' Welfare Association,challenging the alignment passing through Lakshmi Nagar and PrakashNagar, in W.P.No.2090 of 2001. The said writ petition had beendismissed by this Court, by its order, dated 23.2.2007, stating thatthe said public interest litigation was not maintainable. However,it was made clear that it would be open to the affected parties toagitate the issues in question by appropriate proceedings. 7. It has been stated that notifications under Section 4(1) ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894, had been published in the GovernmentGazette calling for objections, if any, against the acquisitionproceedings. In some cases, such intimations had not been received.Those, who had the knowledge of the notifications, had submittedtheir objections during the 5-A enquiry proceedings stating that theproposed alignment through the patta lands, ignoring the GovernmentPoramboke lands, on the eastern side of the alignment, is illegal,arbitrary, contrary to the public interest and based on theextraneous considerations. However, the objections raised by thepetitioners had been rejected, without proper reasons beingassigned. The rejection of the objections raised by the petitionershad been based only on the reason that the Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority had not accepted the shifting of the alignmentof the Outer Ring Road. Thereafter, the declaration, under Section 6of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, had also been published in theTamil Nadu Government Gazette. In such circumstances, thepetitioners had preferred the present writ petitions before thisCourt, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, it hasbeen stated that the Government had approved the proposal of theChennai Metropolitan Development Authority for the development ofthe Outer Ring Road, between Thiruvallur Road and Thiruvottiyur https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Ponneri Panjetty Road, for a distance of 33.1. kilo meters, underPhase II of the project, in G.O.Ms.No.303, Housing and UrbanDevelopment Department, dated 2.7.1996. The Government hadsanctioned the creation of four land acquisition units, comprisingof a Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) and one supervisory unitheaded by a District Revenue Officer (Land Acquisition), with thenecessary supporting staff. 9. The District Revenue Officer (Land Acquisition) Outer RingRoad Project, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Chennai,had divided the entire extent of lands proposed to be acquired, into4 units. The lands located in Poonamallee Taluk, including those inThiruninravur Village, had been allotted to the Special Tahsildar(Land Acquisition) Unit IV. 10. It has also been stated that the member secretary, ChennaiMetropolitan Development Authority, Chennai, had given a requisitionfor the acquisition of 10.49.5 hectares of land, in Thirunindravurvillage, Poonamallee Taluk, Thiruvallur District. The acquisition of10.49.5 hectares of land, in Thiruninravur village, had been splitinto eight blocks. The notifications, under Section 4(1) of the Acthad been approved by the District Collector, Thiruvallur Districtand it had been published in the Thiruvallur District gazette, aswell as in the locality concerned. It had also been published in thelocal Tamil newspapers and announcement had also been made by way of‘tom tom’. Thereafter, an enquiry, under Section 5-A of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894, had also been conducted. The objectionsraised by the land owners had been forwarded to the requisitioningbody, namely, the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, forobtaining its remarks. The objections raised by the land owners hadalso been duly considered before a final decision had been taken. 11. It had also been submitted that the Government of TamilNadu had approved the Outer Ring Road Scheme, in the year, 1993, inG.O.Ms.No.381, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated25.5.1993. Thereafter, the first phase of the project had beencompleted. The lands, said to be belonging to the petitioners, hadbeen acquired for the purpose of phase II of the Outer Ring RoadProject. Even though some of the lands, acquired for the saidpurpose, may form a part of the approved layout, they had beenacquired, due to the necessity that had arisen for the acquisitionof the lands, for the said public purpose. 12. It had also been stated that the District Collector hadbeen given the power to issue the notifications for the acquisitionof the lands, having the value upto Rs.25,00,000/- by the Governmentof Tamil Nadu, by its communication, vide letter No.59440/LAI/1/1997Revenue Department, dated 31.8.2000, and by the Circular of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Special Commissioner of Land Administration, Chennai, in letterNo.Rc.50942/2000, dated 11.4.2001. Since, the lands sought to beacquired had been divided into units and blocks for the sake ofadministrative convenience, each of the notifications pertains tolands, the value of which does not exceed Rs.25,00,000/-.13. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that thelands notified under the impugned notifications are in respect ofthe lands having a value of more than 25,00,000/- cannot be held tobe correct. Therefore, the impugned notifications and theproceedings of the respondents, based on such notifications, arelegal and valid. 14. It had also been stated that all the prescribed modes ofpublications had been made, within a period of 30 days, as mandated,under Section 4(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The landowners had been given a reasonable opportunity to raise theirobjections. The objections raised by the land owners had beenconsidered and only thereafter, the awards had been passed. If theland owners have any grievance with regard to the fixation of theamount of compensation, it is open to them to seek a reference tothe concerned Subordinate Court or the Fast Track Court concerned,under section 18 of the land acquisition Act, 1894. 15. It had also been stated that the alignment of the road hadbeen drawn up, after verification of the physical feasibility, withthe support of aerial photographs, field survey and satellite spotimagery carried out in association with the expertise available inthe Institute of Remote Sensing of the Anna University, Chennai. Thealignment had been proposed, after taking into consideration thevarious factors, including the speed of the vehicles using the road,the safety of the buses using the road, and other such relevantaspects. The proposed alignment had been finalised by avoiding theagricultural lands, built up area, major water bodies, reservedforests etc. The proposed alignment had also been approved by theGovernment. 16. The main points raised by the learned counsels appearingfor the petitioners are as follows:The impugned notifications under Section 4(1) of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894, had been issued by the District Collector,Thiruvallur District, even though he does not have the authority orthe jurisdiction to issue the said notifications. As per Section 4(1-A) of the Act, as mandated by the State Government, the DistrictCollector concerned would have the authority or power to issue thenotifications under Section 4(1-A) of the Act, only when the extentof the lands proposed to be acquired, does not exceed an extent of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 40 acres and its value should not exceed Rs.25,00,000/-. In theabsence of a decision taken by the state Government, in approvingthe notifications, the said notifications are void ab initio. Theimpugned notifications had been issued by the District Collector,Thiruvallur District, as a result of fraudulent and colourableexercise of the power, attracting penal provisions. Further, it hasbeen provided that the decision of the State Government shall beissued in the name of the Governor, as mandated under Article 166 ofthe Constitution of India. They should also be duly signed by theSecretaries to the Government, as authorised under the BusinessRules of the Government, under Article 166(3) of the Constitution ofIndia. However, in the present case, the District Collector hadissued the impugned notifications without such authorisation. Assuch, the impugned notifications ought to be quashed by this Court,without considering the technical pleas raised by the respondents inthe defence of the notifications, as per the following decisions ofthe Supreme Court: 16.1. In DEVINDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB ((2008) 1 SCC 728,it has been held as follows:"17. The Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 foracquisition of land for the companies have been framed bythe Central Government in exercise of its power underSection 55 of the Act. It is not in dispute that theguidelines provided thereunder are followed by the StateGovernment. Concept of constitution of a Land AcquisitionCommittee appears only from the Companies Rules; no otherprovision in respect thereof has been made either underthe Act or the Rules framed thereunder. A bare perusal ofsub-rule (1) of Rule 4 of the said Rules categoricallystates that the same shall be applicable where acquisitionof land is to be made for the company envisaged under PartVII. The State, as indicated hereinbefore, before thisCourt has categorically stated that advice rendered by asub-committee of the Land Acquisition Committee had beentaken into consideration by it with a view to proceedfurther in the matter. Rule 4 mandates the appropriateGovernment to arrive at a satisfaction in regard to thefactors enumerated therein. Rule 4 of the Rules reads asunder:“4. Appropriate Government to be satisfied with regard tocertain matters before initiating acquisition proceedings.—(1) Whenever a company makes an application to theappropriate Government for acquisition of any land, thatGovernment shall direct the Collector to submit a reportto it on the following matters, namely— https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (i) that the company has made its best endeavour tofind out lands in the locality suitable for the purpose ofthe acquisition;(ii) that the company has made all reasonable effortsto get such lands by negotiation with the personsinterested therein on payment of reasonable price and suchefforts have failed;(iii) that the land proposed to be acquired issuitable for the purpose;(iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired isnot excessive;(v) that the company is in a position to utilise theland expeditiously; and(vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is goodagricultural land, that no alternative suitable site canbe found so as to avoid acquisition of that land.(2) The Collector shall, after giving the company areasonable opportunity to make any representation in thisbehalf, hold an enquiry into the matters referred to insub-rule (1) and while holding such enquiry he shall,—(i) in any case where the land proposed to beacquired is agricultural land, consult the SeniorAgricultural Officer of the district whether or not suchland is good agricultural land;(ii) determine, having regard to the provisions ofSections 23 and 24 of the Act, the approximate amount ofcompensation likely to be payable in respect of the landwhich, in the opinion of the Collector, should be acquiredfor the company; and(iii) ascertain whether the company offered areasonable price (not being less than the compensation sodetermined), to the persons interested in the landproposed to be acquired.Explanation.—For the purpose of this rule ‘goodagricultural land’ means any land which, considering thelevel of agricultural production and the crop pattern ofthe area in which it is situated, is of average or aboveaverage productivity and includes a garden or grove land.(3) As soon as may be after holding the enquiry undersub-rule (2), the Collector shall submit a report to theappropriate Government and a copy of the same shall be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ forwarded by that Government to the Committee.(4) No declaration shall be made by the appropriateGovernment under Section 6 of the Act unless—(i) the appropriate Government has consulted theCommittee and has considered the report submitted underthis rule and the report, if any, submitted under Section5-A of the Act; and(ii) the agreement under Section 41 of the Act hasbeen executed by the company.”30. We would proceed on the said assumption but it isa well-settled principle of law that where an action takenis without jurisdiction, even an order which is conclusivemay be subject to judicial review. Jurisdictional errors,as is well known, are divided in two broad categories —(i) an order passed which is wholly without jurisdiction;and (ii) although the action is not ultra vires, thejurisdictional error has been committed while exercisingjurisdiction. (See John v. Rees (1969) 2 ALL ER 274)31. In R.L. Arora v. State of U.P. (AIR 1962 SC 764)this Court held: (AIR p.773, para 18)“18. Then it was urged on behalf of the respondentsthat Section 6(3) makes the purpose noted in thenotification under Section 6(1) not justiciable. We havenot been able to understand how that provision helps therespondents. All that Section 6(3) says is that thedeclaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land isneeded for a public purpose or for a company. In this casethe declaration was that the land was needed for a companyand that according to Section 6(3) is conclusive evidencethat the land is so needed. Now it is not the case of theappellant that the land was not needed for the Works inthe present case, nor does the appellant say that thoughthe land was needed for some other purpose, thenotification falsely declares that it was needed for theWorks. In the circumstances the conclusiveness envisagedby Section 6(3) is of no assistance to the solving of theproblem with which we are concerned in the present case.”32. Mr Sorabjee has strongly relied upon a decisionof this Court in Somawanti v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC151). In Somawanti this Court opined: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ "40. Though we are of the opinion that the courts arenot entitled to go behind the declaration of theGovernment to the effect that a particular purpose forwhich the land is being acquired is a public purpose wemust emphasise that the declaration of the Government mustbe relatable to a public purpose as distinct from a purelyprivate purpose. If the purpose for which the acquisitionis being made is not relatable to public purpose then aquestion may well arise whether in making the declarationthere has been, on the part of the Government a fraud onthe power conferred upon it by the Act. In other words thequestion would then arise whether that declaration wasmerely a colourable exercise of the power conferred by theAct, and, therefore, the declaration is open to challengeat the instance of the party aggrieved. To such adeclaration the protection of Section 6(3) will notextend. For, the question whether a particular action wasthe result of a fraud or not is always justiciable,provisions such as Section 6(3) notwithstanding.”(emphasis supplied)33. When an order is passed without jurisdiction, itamounts to colourable exercise of power. Formation ofopinion must precede application of mind. Such applicationof mind must be on the materials brought on record. Thematerials should be such which are required to becollected by the authorities entitled therefor. Theauthorities must act within the four corners of thestatute. An opinion formed even on the basis of an adviceby an authority which is not contemplated under thestatute renders the decision bad in law. A statutoryauthority is bound by the procedure laid down in thestatute and must act within the four corners thereof.34. The effect of contribution of a sum of Rs 100 bythe State purported to be towards the amount ofcompensation, may not be noticed.35. In Somawanti Vs State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 151)although this Court while upholding that contribution of asum of Rs100 as a part of the cost of acquisition maysubserve the requirement of law, proceeded to opine: (AIRp.169, para 52)“52. We would like to add that the view taken inSenga Naicken Vs. Secy. of State (AIR 1927 MAD 245) hasbeen followed by the various High Courts in India. On thebasis of the correctness of that view the StateGovernments have been acquiring private properties allover the country by contributing only token amounts https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ towards the cost of acquisition. Titles to many suchproperties would be unsettled if we were now to take theview that ‘partly at public expense’ means substantiallyat public expense. Therefore, on the principle of staredecisis the view taken in Senga Naicken case should not bedisturbed. We would, however, guard ourselves againstbeing understood to say that a token contribution by theState towards the cost of acquisition will be sufficientcompliance with the law in each and every case. Whethersuch contribution meets the requirements of the law woulddepend upon the facts of every case. Indeed the fact thatthe State’s contribution is nominal may well indicate, inparticular circumstances, that the action of the State wasa colourable exercise of power. In our opinion ‘part’ doesnot necessarily mean a substantial part and that it willbe open to the Court in every case which comes up beforeit to examine whether the contribution made by the Statesatisfies the requirement of the law. In this case we aresatisfied that it satisfies the requirement of law. Whatis next to be considered is whether the acquisition wasonly for a company because the compensation was to comealmost entirely out of its coffers and, therefore, it wasin reality for a private purpose as opposed to publicpurpose. In other words, the question is whether there wason the part of the Government a colourable exercise ofpower. Elaborating the point it is said that theestablishment of a factory for manufacturing refrigerationequipment is nothing but an ordinary commercial ventureand can by no stretch of imagination fall within the well-accepted meaning of the expression ‘public purpose’, thateven if it were to fall within that expression the factoryis to be established not by the Government, nor byGovernment participation but solely by Respondent 6, apublic limited concern and that, therefore, the concerncould acquire land for such a purpose only after complyingwith the provisions of Part VII and that the use of theprovisions of Section 6(1) is merely a colourable deviceto enable Respondent 6 to do something, which, under termsof Section 6(1), could not be done.”55. The approach of the High Court in this behalf, inour opinion, is totally erroneous. A provision of astatute is either mandatory or directory. Even if aprovision is directory, the same should be substantiallycomplied with. It cannot be ignored in its entirety onlybecause the provision is held to be directory and not animperative one. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

56. In this case admittedly there has been nocompliance with Rule 4. If Rule 4 has not been compliedwith, the exercise of jurisdiction under Part VII must beheld to have been erroneous."16.2. In HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPN. LTD Vs. DARIUS SHAPURCHENNAI ((2005) 7 SCC 627), it has been held as follows:6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Actconfers a valuable right in favour of a person whose landsare sought to be acquired. Having regard to the provisionscontained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the Statein exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may interferewith the right of property of a person by acquiring thesame but the same must be for a public purpose andreasonable compensation therefor must be paid.7. Indisputably, the definition of public purpose isof wide amplitude and takes within its sweep theacquisition of land for a corporation owned or controlledby the State, as envisaged under sub-clause (iv) of clause(f) of Section 3 of the Act. But the same would not meanthat the State is the sole judge therefor and no judicialreview shall lie. (See Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. Stateof Gujarat (1995 SUPP (1) SCC 596).8. The conclusiveness contained in Section 6 of theAct indisputably is attached to a need as also to thepurpose and in this regard ordinarily, the jurisdiction ofthe court is limited but it is equally true that when anopportunity of being heard has expressly been conferred bya statute, the same must scrupulously be complied with.For the said purpose, Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Actmust be read conjointly. The court in a case, where therehas been total non-compliance or substantial non-compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act,cannot fold its hands and refuse to grant a relief to thewrit petitioner. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Actrenders a declaration to be a conclusive evidence. Butwhen the decision-making process itself is in question,the power of judicial review can be exercised by the courtin the event the order impugned suffers from well-knownprinciples viz. illegality, irrationality and proceduralimpropriety. Moreover, when a statutory authorityexercises such enormous power it must be done in a fairand reasonable manner. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9. It is trite that hearing given to a person must bean effective one and not a mere formality. Formation ofopinion as regards the public purpose as also suitabilitythereof must be preceded by application of mind as regardsconsideration of relevant factors and rejection ofirrelevant ones. The State in its decision-making processmust not commit any misdirection in law. It is also not indispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers a valuableimportant right and having regard to the provisionscontained in Article 300-A of the Constitution it has beenheld to be akin to a fundamental right.18. In view of the fact that the action required tobe taken by the State Government is distinct and differentfrom the action required to be taken by the Collector;when the ultimate order is in question it was for theState to satisfy the court about the validity thereof andfor the said purpose the counter-affidavit filed on behalfof a Collector cannot be held to be sufficient compliancewith the requirements of law. The job of the Collector interms of Section 5-A would be over once he submits hisreport. The Land Acquisition Collector would not know thecontents of the proceedings before the State and,therefore, he would be incompetent to affirm an affidaviton its behalf.19. Furthermore, the State is required to apply itsmind not only on the objections filed by the owner of theland but also on the report which is submitted by theCollector upon making other and further enquiries thereforas also the recommendations made by him in that behalf.The State Government may further inquire into the matter,if any case is made out therefor, for arriving at its ownsatisfaction that it is necessary to deprive a citizen ofhis right to property. It is in that situation thatproduction of records by the State is necessary.20. In Gurdip Singh Uban (2000) 7 SCC 296) whereuponMr Ramamoorthy placed strong reliance, this Courtobserved: (SCC p.318, para 50)“50. No reasons or other facts need be mentioned in theSection 6 declaration on its face. If the satisfaction ischallenged in the court, the Government can show therecord upon which the Government acted and justify thesatisfaction expressed in the Section 6 declaration.” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ It was, thus, for the State to justify its action byproduction of record or otherwise.21. The counter-affidavit filed on 30-10-2003 wasalso affirmed by a Special Deputy Collector. A presumptionhaving regard to the passage of time can be raised that hewas not the Collector who had made enquiry under Section5-A of the Act and given an opportunity of hearing to theowner of the land. It has not been averred by him as towho had authorised him to affirm the affidavit on behalfof the State or how he was acquainted with the fact of thematter. In terms of the rules of executive business, he isnot authorised to act on behalf of the State. We havenoticed hereinbefore, that only when the High Courtdirected production of records, that a Principal Secretaryto the Government affirmed an affidavit wherein it was notstated that the records are lost but it was merely statedthat they were not readily traceable.22. The Court in a situation of this nature expectsthat the authorities of the State would take due care andcaution in preserving the records in relation whereto alis is pending before a court of law.29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation. ThisCourt in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma (AIR 1966SC 1593) observed that in such a case the provisions ofthe statute should be strictly construed as it deprives aperson of his land without consent. [See also Khub Chandv. State of RajasthaN (AIR 1967 SC 1074) and CCE v. OrientFabrics (P) Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 597).There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in a case ofthis nature due application of mind on the part of thestatutory authority was imperative."16.3. In VYALIKAVAL HOUSEBUILDING COOP.SOCIETY Vs. V.CHANDRAPPA((2007) 9 SCC 304), it has been held as follows: 4. In view of the aforesaid observation, theirLordships of the Division Bench held that since theacquisition was colourable exercise of the power,therefore, delay cannot be a good ground to dismiss thewrit petition. The said judgment of the Division Bench ofthe High Court of Karnataka was affirmed by this Court inSpecial Leave Petitions (C) Nos. ... CCs Nos. 525-32 of1999 and Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos. ... CCs 504-22of 1999 decided on 14-7-1999 and it was held that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appellant Society is a bogus housebuilding society andaccordingly, the order passed by the learned Single Judgewas set aside by the Division Bench. Against the order ofthe Division Bench passed in Writ Appeal No. 2294 of 1999a review petition was filed which was dismissed on 22-3-2002. Hence both these appeals.5. Learned counsel for the appellant urged before usthat the view taken by the Division Bench of the HighCourt is not correct as the Division Bench should not havecondoned the inordinate delay of 14 years and secondly,learned counsel further submitted that the respondentsherein being the beneficiary had entered into an agreementof sale and had accepted the whole amount not to fileobjections under Section 5-A of the Act for acquiring theaforesaid land. Learned counsel for the appellant hasemphasised that the Division Bench has gone wrong insetting aside the order of the learned Single Judge as thelearned Single Judge has discussed the factual controversyin greater detail.9. Learned counsel for the respondents has alsoinvited our attention that same notification was set asideby the High Court and the said order of the High Court wasalso upheld by this Court by dismissing SLP (C) No. 6196of 1998 on 7-4-1998 and SLPs (C) Nos. ... CCs Nos. 495-98of 1999 on 14-7-1999 concerning the very same appellantSociety. In this background, when the acquisition has beenfound to be totally mala fide and not for bona fidepurpose, the ground of delay and acquiescence in thepresent case has no substance. Learned counsel for theappellant tried to persuade us that as the amount inquestion has been accepted by the respondents, it is notopen for them now to wriggle out from that agreement. Itmay be that the appellant might have tried to settle outthe acquisition but when the whole acquisition emanatesfrom the aforesaid tainted notification any settlement onthe basis of that notification cannot be validated. Thefact remains that when the basic notification under whichthe present land is sought to be acquired stood vitiatedthen whatever money that the appellant has paid, is at itsown risk. Once the notification goes no benefit could bederived by the appellant. We are satisfied that issue ofnotification was mala fide and it was not for publicpurpose, as has been observed by this Court, nothing turnson the question of delay and acquiescence. Learned counselfor the respondents raised other pleas like decree for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ partition was granted among brothers and they were notmade parties, we are not going into those questions whenwe are satisfied that when acquisition stands vitiated onaccount of mala fide, nothing remains further.16.4. In A.V.PAPAYYA SASTRY Vs. GOVT. OF A.P. ((2007) 4 SCC221), it has been held as follows:21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that ifany judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot besaid to be a judgment or order in law. Before threecenturies, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical ortemporal.”22. It is thus settled proposition of law that ajudgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on thecourt, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est inthe eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—bythe first court or by the final court—has to be treated asnullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can bechallenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision,writ or even in collateral proceedings.23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v.Beasley (1956) 1 ALL ER 341 Lord Denning observed: (All ERp.345 C)“No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can beallowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud.”24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith’s Leading Cases,13th Edn., p.644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey,C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicataand not impeachable from within, it might be impeachablefrom without. In other words, though it is not permissibleto show that the court was “mistaken”, it might be shownthat it was “misled”. There is an essential distinctionbetween mistake and trickery. The clear implication of thedistinction is that an action to set aside a judgmentcannot be brought on the ground that it has been decidedwrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was onewhich should not have been rendered, but it can be setaside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked intogiving the judgment.25. It has been said: fraud and justice never dwelltogether (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus neminipatrocinari debent).38. The matter can be looked at from a differentangle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competentcourt of law after hearing the parties and an order ispassed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which isupheld by all the courts including the final court. Let usalso think of a case where this Court does not dismissspecial leave petition but after granting leave decidesthe appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order cantruly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of theConstitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of mergeralso gets attracted. All orders passed by thecourts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgmentof this Court and after such judgment, it is not open toany party to the judgment to approach any court orauthority to review, recall or reconsider the order." 17. It has also been stated that Section 4(1) notification hadbeen issued by the District Collector, Thiruvallur District, withouthaving the jurisdiction to do so, as per Section 4(1-A) of the Act,as it is clear from the guideline values fixed by the RegistrationDepartment, for the lands notified by the Government, for the periodfrom 1.4.2003 to 1.8.2007, and as per the rate adopted by theDistrict Collector in passing the awards. 18. It has also been stated that even for each block of thelands, as formulated by the District Collector, the value of landsexceeds its pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs.25,00,000/-. The relevantrecords had not been produced by the respondents to substantiatetheir claims that the District Collector, Thiruvallur District, hasthe pecuniary jurisdiction to issue the impugned notifications.Therefore, the impugned notifications issued by the DistrictCollector, Thiruvallur District, under Section 4(1) of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894, are illegal and void, as per the decision ofthis Court, in SUSHIL KUMAR MEHTA Vs. GOBIND RAM BOHRA ((1990) 1 SCC193), wherein it has been held as follows:10. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (1955) 1 SCR 117the facts were that the appellant had undervalued the suitat Rs 2950 and laid it in the Court of the SubordinateJudge, Monghyr for recovery of possession of the suitlands and mesne profits. The suit was dismissed and onappeal it was confirmed. In the second appeal in the HighCourt the Registry raised the objection as to valuationunder Section 11. The value of the appeal was fixed at Rs https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9980. A contention then was raised by the plaintiff in theHigh Court that on account of the valuation fixed by theHigh Court the appeal against the decree of the court ofthe Subordinate Judge did not lie to the District Court,but to the High Court and on that account the decree ofthe District Court was a nullity. Alternatively, it wascontended that it caused prejudice to the appellant. Inconsidering that contention at page 121, a four judgebench of this Court speaking through Venkatarama Ayyar, J.held that: “It is a fundamental principle well established thata decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is anullity, and that its invalidity could be set up wheneverand wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon,even at the stage of execution and even in collateralproceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it ispecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect ofthe subject matter of the action, strikes at the veryauthority of the court to pass any decree, and such adefect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If thequestion now under consideration fell to be determinedonly on the application of general principles governingthe matter, there can be no doubt that the District Courtof Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment anddecree would be nullities.” 11. On merits it was held that since the appellanthimself had invoked the jurisdiction of the civil courtwith undervaluation, the objection as to jurisdiction wasnot available by operation of Section 99 of the Code andas to the territorial jurisdiction he was precluded byoperation of Section 21 of CPC; and on such premise it washeld that the decree of the District Court could not betreated to be a nullity and person who invoked thejurisdiction cannot plead prejudice to himself by his ownact.12. This Court has held that it is a well establishedprinciple that a decree passed by a court withoutjurisdiction is a nullity and the plea can be set upwhenever and wherever the decree is sought to be enforcedor relied upon, and even at the stage of execution or incollateral proceedings." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

19. It has also been stated that the act of the DistrictCollector, Thiruvallur District, in issuing several section 4(1)notifications, for acquiring the lands for the same public purpose,in the same locality, during the same period is a fraudulent andmala fide exercise of powers. Section 4(1) of the Act, mandates thatonly a single notification should be issued for a single publicpurpose in respect of the same locality, during the same period. Byissuing separate notifications, the District Collector, ThiruvallurDistrict, had contravened the mandatory provisions of Section 4(1)of the Act. 20. It has also been stated that the Supreme Court in itsdecision, reported in THE STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS Vs. VISHNU PRASADSHARMA AND OTHERS (AIR 1966 SC 1593(1)), had declared that issuingof multiple Section 6 declarations for a single section 4(1)notification is illegal and void. Therefore, the Section 4(1)notifications issued, under Section 4(1) of the Land acquisitionAct, 1894, and the declarations issued under Section 6 of the saidAct are arbitrary and invalid. If issuing of multiple notifications,under Section 4(1) of the Act, are permitted, the enquiry to beconducted under Section 5-A of the said Act would be meaningless, asthe authorities having confirmed their decisions during the initialenquiries would, automatically, reject the enquiries, that had beenconducted at a later point of time in order to avoid reopening ofthe issues. 21. The relevant paragraphs of the decision, in STATE OF M.P.Vs. VISHNU PRASAD SHARMA (1966) 3 SCC 1593 (1), read as follows:"3. It was said that the Government may havedifficulty in making the plan of its project complete at atime, particularly where the project is large and,therefore, it is necessary that it should have power tomake a number of declarations under Section 6. I am whollyunable to accept this argument. First, I do not think thata supposed difficulty would provide any justification foraccepting an interpretation of a statute against theordinary meaning of the language used in it. Generalconsiderations of the kind suggested cannot authorise adeparture from the plain meaning of words. Secondly, Icannot imagine a Government, which has vast resources, notbeing able to make a complete plan of its project at atime. Indeed, I think when a plan is made, it is acomplete plan. I should suppose that before the Governmentstarts acquisition proceedings by the issue of anotification under Section 4, it has made its plan forotherwise it cannot state in the notification, as it has https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to do, that the land is likely to be needed. Even if ithad not then completed its plan, it would have enough timebefore the making of a declaration under Section 6 to doso. I think, therefore, that the difficulty of theGovernment, even if there is one, does not lead to theconclusion that the Act contemplates the making of anumber of declarations under Section 6. I would like toobserve here to avoid confusion that we are not concernednow with extension of a completely planned projectconceived later. The present contention is not based onany difficulty arising out of such a case. It was saidthat if the Government has not finalised its plan when itmakes a declaration under Section 6, it would have tostart fresh acquisition proceedings beginning with anotification under Section 4 to provide for the completeplan if it could not make any more declarations and insuch a case, in conceivable circumstances, it may have topay more for the land that it then sought to acquire. Thisargument concedes that even if the Government has not beenable to make its plan when making a declaration underSection 6, the result is not that it cannot acquire anymore land later when the plan is completed. The realpoint, therefore, of the present argument is that the Actshould be so interpreted that the Government should not beput to extra cost when it has been unable to complete itsplan at a time. This seems to me to be a strange argument.First, there is no reason why the Act should provide forthe Government’s failure to complete the plan. Secondly,the argument is hypothetical for one does not know forsure whether a later acquisition will cost more or less,arguments on hypothetical considerations can have littleweight in interpreting statutes. But even otherwise, thisview of the matter does not support the argument. Afterthe issue of a notification under Section 4, an owner ofland in the locality notified cannot have full beneficialenjoyment of his property; he cannot, for example, buildon his land for if he does so and the land is acquired, hewill get no compensation for the building put up and willlose the costs incurred for it. If it is a justificationfor saying that a number of declarations can be made underSection 6 because otherwise the Government may have to paymore, it seems to me that it is at least an equaljustification for saying that such declarations cannothave been contemplated by the Act because that would meanan avoidable deprivation of the owners of their beneficialenjoyment of lands till such time as the Government isable to make its plan. As the Act is an expropriatory Act,that interpretation of it should be accepted which puts https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the least burden on the expropriated owner. The Governmentcould, of course, always make a complete plan at a timeand I am unable to hold that the Act contemplated that itneed not do so and go on making declarations from time totime as its plan goes on taking shape even though theresult might be to increase the hardship of persons whoselands are taken away.16. Sections 4, 5-A and 6 in our opinion areintegrally connected. Section 4 specifies the locality inwhich the land is acquired and provides for survey todecide what particular land out of the locality would beneeded. Section 5-A provides for hearing of objections tothe acquisition and after these objections are decided theGovernment has to make up its mind and declare whatparticular land out of the locality it will acquire. Whenit has so made up its mind it makes a declaration as tothe particular land out of the locality notified inSection 4(1) which it will acquire. It is clear from thisintimate connection between Sections 4, 5-A and 6 that assoon as the Government has made up its mind whatparticular land out of the locality it requires, it has toissue a declaration under Section 6 to that effect. Thepurpose of the notification under Section 4(1) is at thisstage over and it may be said that it is exhausted afterthe notification under Section 6. If the Governmentrequires more land in that locality besides that notifiedunder Section 6, there is nothing to prevent it fromissuing another notification under Section 4(1) making afurther survey if necessary, hearing objections and thenmaking another declaration under Section 6. Thenotification under Section 4(1) thus informs the publicthat land is required or would be required in a particularlocality and thereafter the members of the public owningland in that locality have to make objections underSection 5-A; the Government then makes up its mind as towhat particular land in that locality is required andmakes a declaration under Section 6. It seems to us clearthat once a declaration under Section 6 is made, thenotification under Section 4(1) must be exhausted, for ithas served its purpose. There is nothing in Sections 4, 5-A and 6 to suggest that Section 4(1) is a kind ofreservoir from which the Government may from time to timedraw out land and make declarations with respect to itsuccessively. If that was the intention behind Sections 4,5-A and 6 we would have found some indication of it in thelanguage used therein. But as we read these three sections https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ together we can only find that the scheme is that Section4 specifies the locality, then there may be survey anddrawing of maps of the land and the consideration whetherthe land is adapted for the purpose for which it has to beacquired, followed by objections and making up of its mindby the Government what particular land out of thatlocality it needs. This is followed by a declaration underSection 6 specifying the particular land needed and thatin our opinion completes the process and the notificationunder Section 4(1) cannot be further used thereafter. Atthe stage of Section 4 the land is not particularised butonly the locality is mentioned; at the stage of Section 6the land in the locality is particularised and thereafterit seems to us that the notification under Section 4(1)having served its purpose exhausts itself. The sequence ofevents from a notification of the intention to acquire[Section 4(1)] to the declaration under Section 6unmistakably leads one to the reasonable conclusion thatwhen once a declaration under Section 6 particularisingthe area out of the area in the locality specified in thenotification under Section 4(1) is issued, the remainingnon-particularised area stands automatically released. Ineffect the scheme of these three sections is that thereshould be first a notification under Section 4(1) followedby one notification under Section 6 after the Governmenthas made up its mind which land out of the locality itrequires.22. It has also been stated that the impugned notificationsissued under Section 4(1) of the Act had not been published in theofficial gazette, namely, the State Government gazette, as mandatedunder its provisions, as it had been published only in the districtgazette. It has also been stated that the “official gazette” wouldmean the state gazette and not the district gazette, in which thenotification had been published. Hence, there was no validpublication of the Section 4(1) notifications, as per the relevantprovisions of law. As per the General clauses Act, 1897, theexpression 'Official Gazette' means the gazette of the central orthe state Government. In fact, Section 6 declaration had been dulypublished by the authorities concerned in the State Governmentgazette, even though the same expression 'Official Gazette' is usedin section 6 of the Act. This Court in its decision, reported inA.S.PERIASAMY Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU ((2004) 1 M.L.J. 194)confirmed the said position of law holding that in the absence ofany definition of 'Official Gazette' in the Land Acquisition Act,the meaning ascribed to such expression in the General Clauses Act, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1897, should be followed, wherein, it has been indicated that theexpression 'Official Gazette' means the Gazette published by theCentral Government or the Official Gazette of the State Government.23. It has also been stated that there was no publication ofthe substance of the section 4(1) notifications in the convenientplaces of the locality, as mandated under Section 4(1) of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894, and Rule 2 of the Rules framed thereunder.The records produced by the respondents does not disclose thepublication of the substance of section 4(1) notifications in Form-A, as mandated under Rule 2 of the Land Acquisition Rules. Publicnotices under Section 4(1) of the Act, said to have been issued inform-3, as found from the records made available by the respondents,had not been approved by the District Collector, as prescribed bythe relevant provisions of the Act. The form-3 notices, alleged tohave been issued by the Special Tahsildar (LA), Chennai, is vague,and they did not contain the schedule of the properties. The form-3notices had been issued by the Special Tahsildar (LA) without theauthority of law. Therefore, it is invalid in the eye of law, inview of decision of this Court reported in CHENNRAYAR PERUMAL TEMPLEVs. THE DISTRICDT COLLECTOR, SALEM (2007 (4) CTC 84) wherein, ithas been held as follows:2. Para 6(3)(e) of the counter-affidavit, which isrelevant to decide the present case reads as follows:"6(e) The Personal Assistant to the Collector isempowered to pass orders on behalf of the Collector,Salem, so there is no violation of the procedurecontemplated under Section 4(3)(a) and (b) of the Act.and confirms the contention of the petitioner that theDistrict Collector has not passed the order ascontemplated under Section 4(3)(a) of the Act.3. The District Collector has to exercise the powerunder the Act. The delegation of such power is notcontemplated nor it has been shown that such power can bedelegated for the aforesaid purpose and therefore theproceedings are vitiated. See Hukam Chand v. Union ofIndia, AIR 1976 SC 789. Consequently, Notification underSection 4(1) of the Act is quashed with liberty to proceedwith the matter, if so advised. The writ petition isallowed. No costs.24. Thus, it is clear that there was no valid publication ofthe public notices, under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,1894. He had also submitted that when a statute prescribes aparticular manner of publication, the Courts cannot modify the same https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for any reason. For the said proposition, he had relied on thedecision, reported in PADMA SUNDARA RAO Vs. STATE OF T.N. ((2002) 3SCC 533), wherein it has been held as follows:4. Learned counsel for the appellants placed relianceon an unreported decision of this Court in A.S. Naidu v.State of T.N. (SLPs (C) Nos.11353-55 of 1988 wherein aBench of three Judges held that once a declaration underSection 6 of the Act has been quashed, fresh declarationunder Section 6 cannot be issued beyond the prescribedperiod of the notification under sub-section (1) ofSection 4 of the Act. It has to be noted that there isanother judgment of two learned Judges in Oxford EnglishSchool v. Govt. of T.N.(1995) 5 SCC 206) which takes aview similar to that expressed in A.S. Naidu case.However, in State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996)10 SCC 619) view in Narasimhaiah case (1996) 3 SCC 88) wasfollowed and it was held that the limitation of 3 yearsfor publication of declaration would start running fromthe date of receipt of the order of the High Court and notfrom the date on which the original publication underSection 4(1) came to be made.8. Learned counsel for the respondents referred tosome observations in Pooran Mal case Director ofInspection of Income Tax (Investigation) Vs. Pooranmal andSons (1975) 4 SCC 568) which form the foundation fordecisions relied upon by him. It has to be noted thatPooran Mal case was decided on entirely different factualand legal backgrounds. The Court noticed that the assesseewho wanted the Court to strike down the action of theRevenue Authorities on the ground of limitation hadhimself conceded to the passing of an order by theAuthorities. The Court, therefore, held that the assesseecannot take undue advantage of his own action.Additionally, it was noticed that the time-limit was to bereckoned with reference to the period prescribed inrespect of Section 132(5) of the IT Act. It was noticedthat once the order has been made under Section 132(5)within ninety days, the aggrieved person has got the rightto approach the notified authority under Section 132(11)within thirty days and that authority can direct theIncome Tax Officer to pass a fresh order. That is thedistinctive feature vis-à-vis Section 6 of the Act. TheCourt applied the principle of waiver and inter alia heldthat the period of limitation prescribed therein was oneintended for the benefit of the person whose property has https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ been seized and it was open to that person to waive thatbenefit. It was further observed that if the specifiedperiod is held to be mandatory, it would cause more injuryto the citizens than to the Revenue. A distinction wasmade with statutes providing periods of limitation forassessment. It was noticed that Section 132 does not dealwith taxation of income. Considered in that background,ratio of the decision in Pooran Mal case5 has noapplication to the case at hand.9. Courts should not place reliance on decisionswithout discussing as to how the factual situation fits inwith the fact situation of the decision on which relianceis placed. There is always peril in treating the words ofa speech or judgment as though they are words in alegislative enactment, and it is to be remembered thatjudicial utterances are made in the setting of the factsof a particular case, said Lord Morris in British RailwaysBoard v. Herrington (1972) 2 WLR 537). Circumstantialflexibility, one additional or different fact may make aworld of difference between conclusions in two cases.14. While interpreting a provision the court onlyinterprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provisionof law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process oflaw, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repealit, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd.v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 515). Thelegislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicialinterpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plainand unambiguous. There is no scope for reading somethinginto it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiahcase the period was further stretched to have the timeperiod run from date of service of the High Court’s order.Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language ofSection 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that acase can be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause(ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislativeintent."25. It has also been stated that the substance of thenotifications ought to have been published in the convenient placesin the locality concerned. However, it would not be proper on thepart of the respondents to publish the substance of thenotifications in the office of the village administrative officer https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ or the executive officer of the Thiruninravur Town Panchayat, asadmitted by the respondents. The records produced before this Courtdoes not disclose such publication in the locality concerned and nosignature had been obtained from the residents of the locality toprove such publication. Further, publishing of form-3 notices in theoffice of the District Collector, Thiurvallur District and in theoffices of the State Government would not mean that they areconvenient places, as contemplated under the land Acquisition Act,1894, and the rules framed thereunder. Even the records producedbefore this Court had not been maintained in the manner prescribedby the District Office Manual. 26. It has also been stated that the particulars of thepublication of the notices are not available. Even the particularsregarding the authenticity of the claims made on behalf of therespondents that there was publication regarding the landacquisition proceedings, in the locality concerned, by the beatingof 'Tom Tom', have not been made available by the respondents. It isclear that the records produced by the respondents are false andfabricated in nature. Therefore, such public documents cannot bepresumed to be genuine, as per Section 79 of the Indian EvidenceAct, 1872. As such, the alleged publication of the impugned notices,under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, have no legalsanction. Hence, they are liable to be rejected, as void. Hence, theland acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4(1) of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, are void ab initio. The learned counselfor the petitioners had relied on the following decisions in supportof the said contentions:26.1. In E.BALU Vs. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR ((2008) 4 MLJ 64), it hasbeen held as follows:"7. It is not in dispute that 4(1) notification wasnotified in the gazette dated 18.6.1997 in G.O.Ms.No.223and the gazette publication was on 9.7.1997. There are twonews papers publications on 2.8.1997 and 3.8.1997 inMalaimurasu and Thinathoodu. As far as the publication inthe locality is concerned, a perusal of the record showsthat except the proceedings of the Tahsildar dated15.6.1998, wherein, in the narration he has stated thatapart from publication in Malaimurasu on 2.8.1997 andThinathoodu on 3.8.1997, there was publication by Dhandoraon 10.8.1997. There is no record to show that necessarycertificate from the concerned officials like VillageAdministrative Officer or any other authority obtained tosubstantiate that the local publication was made on10.8.1997. This is particularly relevant because while https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ effecting such local publication in respect of 6declaration, the Tahsildar has followed the procedure notonly by Dhandora, but also has affixed in public places ascertified by the VAO apart from obtaining the signaturesof various residents in the area numbering more than 11,as it is seen in page Nos.552 and 553 of the file. As thelocality publication in respect of 4(1) notification,which is a legal requirement has not been made with anysuch certificate except narrating in the proceeding of theTahsildar, wherein he has narrated stating that there wasa local publication on 10.8.1997. Therefore, it has to betaken that there was no locality publication of Section 4(1) notification and the newspaper publication which wason 3.8.1997 in Thinathoodu has to be taken as a last dateof publication. It is admitted that the 6 declarationitself was issued in the gazette in G.O.Ms.No.312, dated7.8.1998. Therefore, by taking the last date ofpublication of 4(1) notification, with the said 6declaration dated 7.8.1998, it is beyond the prescribedperiod of one year. It is on this score, it has to be heldthat the land acquisition proceedings viz., 4(1)notification as well as 6 declaration in this case are notin accordance with the provisions of the land acquisitionAct.11. In view of the failure on the part of therespondent not providing the mandatory requirement ofpublication of the substance of 4(1) notification inconvenient places in the locality and inasmuch as the lastof the publication of 4(1) notification was on 3.8.1997and 6 declaration itself is as per the Government orderdated 7.8.1998, the land acquisition proceedings areclearly against the provisions of the Land AcquisitionAct." 26.2. In S.SARASWATHI Vs. STATE GOVERNMENT OF T.N. ((2008) 3MLJ 200), this Court has held as follows:"16. In the present case, Section 4(1) notificationwas issued under the impugned G.O.Ms. No. 73 Housing andUrban Development Department dated 19.02.1997; it waspublished in the official gazette on 19.03.1997;publication in two newspapers, viz., "Pirpagal" and "MalaiMalar" was on 29.03.1997; and the locality publication asseen in the records is 16.06.1997. Therefore, by applyingthe said explanation (b) to Section 4(1) of the Land https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Acquisition (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1997, if theearliest date of publication in the notification underSection 4(1) in the official gazette is taken, viz.,19.03.1997, the local publication was effected on16.06.1997, and therefore, the same is clearly beyond theperiod of 60 days. It is relevant to point out that evenfrom the date of newspaper publication, which is stated tobe on 29.03.1997, the local publication being on16.06.1997, there are more than 60 days in between thesame and therefore, it is clearly against the saidexplanation to Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act."26.3. In PETHU CHETTIAR Vs. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR, LAND ACQUISITION(2000 3 M.L.J. 430), it has been held as follows:"6. It is not in dispute that subsequent to theamended Act No.16 of 1997 there is no amendment by theParliament with respect to the provision in question. Thedecision relied on by the learned Government Advocate inSanjeeva Kumar Medical and Health Employees Co-operativeHousing Society Vs. Mohd. Abdul Wahab, A.I.R.1996 S.C.3360will not apply to the facts of the present case. The saiddecision has considered the scope of Amendment Act 9 of1983, prescribing the publication of the substance underSection 4(1) should be done within 40 days in the DistrictGazette, from the date of publication. The Apex Courttaking into consideration the amendment made by theParliament under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, has come tothe conclusion that in view of the said enactment made bythe Parliament under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984, theearlier amendment by the State cannot operate inconsistentto the subsequent amendment of the Parliament. 7. In view of the above settled principles, and alsoin view of the fact that the respondents have notcompleted the acquisition proceedings within the saidstipulated period, the entire proceedings are vitiated." 27. It is submitted that a perusal of the Act and the Rule 4(b)of the Rules and the guidelines issued by the Government forapproving the Section 6 declaration would show that the DistrictCollector shall receive the objections, within 30 days from the dateof section 4(1) notifications. Thereafter, he shall send theobjections to the requisitioning body, if any, and shall receive theremarks from the said body. The remarks obtained from therequisitioning body should be furnished to the objectors, for theirreply and thereafter, he shall fix a date for the enquiry. However,none of the said mandatory provisions prescribed under Section 5-Aof the Act had been followed in the present case. The following https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ decisions had been relied on by the learned counsel for thepetitioners in support of the said contentions.27.1. In D.ANNALAKSHMI AMMAL (DIED) Vs. STATE OF MADRAS (1997(III) CTC 593), it has been held as follows:"5. In the first of the decisions, Nainar Sundaram,J. as he then was, held that if remarks of therequisitioning body had not been obtained when the enquiryunder Section 5-A was held, much less furnished to theowner of the land, it would vitiate the proceedings. Inthe second decision Kannammal (deceased) V.N. Devadoss v.State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. 1990 W.L.R. 439 Kanakaraj, J.held that remarks of the requisitioning authority shouldbe available to the owner/claimant whose land is acquiredat the time of the enquiry under Section 5-A. As theremarks of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board in that case hadbeen communicated to the petitioners therein nearly twoyears after the enquiry under Section 5-A, it was heldthat it vitiated the entire enquiry under Section 5-A ofthe Act. The learned Judge held that in many cases, theLand Acquisition Officers held a second enquiry after theremarks were obtained by issuing notices to the landowners as well as to the requisitioning body and in theopinion of the learned Judge, such a procedure will aloneconform to the requirements of Rule 3(b)/(c) of the Rules.The learned Judge held that the enquiry under Section 5-Aof the Act was vitiated.6. In C. Ponnusamy and 62 others v. Government ofTamil Nadu rep. by the Commissioner and Secretary, Housingand Urban Development Department and Anr., 1997(I)CTC212, the remarks of the requisitioning body werecommunicated after the conclusion of the Section 5-Aenquiry and the remarks were not also furnished to thewrit petitioners after the Section 5-A enquiry got overand after the communication of the remarks, there was nofurther enquiry. The learned Judge E. Padmanabhan J.following the decision of or Division Bench of this Courtin Ramajunam v. Collector Madras and two others 1994W.L.R. 326 held that the mandatory Rule 3(b) had beenviolated and Section 5-A enquiry was vitiated for failureto comply with the requirements of Rule 3(b) as well asthe principles of natural justice and the learned Judgequashed the proceedings. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7. In Balkis Ammal by Power of Attorney Agent K.P.M. AbdulKafor v. The State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.,: 1997(I)CTC 427Kanakaraj, J. held that not conducting an enquiry afterservice of remarks of the requisitioning body upon theowners was defective and set aside the declaration underSection 6 of the Act and all subsequent proceedings.8. In Tube Suppliers Ltd. v. Government of Tamil Nadu andAnr.,: 1997(II)CTC213 N.V. Balasubramanian, J. held that"the requisitioning body should offer their remarks withreasons and unless remark are offered it would not bepossible for the petitioner to make further representationover the remarks. Hence, it is incumbent on therequisitioning body to give reasons why the objections ofthe petitioner were over- ruled. Hence, I am of the viewthat though records disclose that there was compliance ofRule 3(b) of the Rules, the spirit behind Rule 3(b) of theRules is not complies with. Mere communication from therequisitioning body, the objections were overruled wouldnot be sufficient for the land owner to make hisrepresentation on the remarks made by the requisitioningbody. Hence, the requisitioning body is duty bound to givereasons why the objections of the petitioner wereoverruled and only on the basis of such remarks, it wouldbe possible for the land owner to make furtherrepresentation over the remarks to find out the tenabilityof the prosecution of the acquisition proceedings. In theabsence of any reason in the rejection report, even if anyfurther enquiry is held, it would be an empty formalityjust to comply with the letter of law and would notachieve the object for which the further enquiry is held.Therefore, I hold that the enquiry held i without strictcompliance of the provisions of Rule 3(b) of the Ruleswhich is held to be mandatory, is not valid in law.Therefore, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act,which is challenged in this writ petition is liable to bequashed and accordingly, it is quashed."27.2. In SAKUNTHALA Vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU (1998) IIMLJ 453), it has been held as follows:"15. Now in the light of the above mentioned legaldecision, I shall consider the merits of both parties.There is no dispute that 5-A enquiry was fixed on26.10.1989. Admittedly the said enquiry did not takeplace. Likewise, even at the beginning the learnedGovernment Advocate appearing for respondents 1 and 2 and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ learned senior counsel for third respondent fairlyconceded that no further 5-A enquiry after 26.10.1989. Itis true that as per Section 5-A(1) any person interestedin any land which has been notified under Section 4(1) mayraise an objection within 30 days from the date ofpublication of the Notification. In our case, the lastmode of publication is the local publication which tookplace on 2.9.1989. Admittedly the petitioners submittedtheir objections on 20.10.1989, i.e., beyond 30 daysperiod fixed in Section 5-A(1) of the Act. By relying onSub-section 2, it is contended on the side of therespondents that inasmuch as the petitioners failed tosubmit their objections within 30 days as per Sub-section(1), there is no need to comply with Rule 3(b) of theRules or any further enquiry as stated therein. I havealready extracted Rule 3 (b) and (c) of the Rules framedunder Section 55(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It istrue that in the Division Bench decision, viz. I.L.R.(1996) 2 Mad. 299, their Lordships have categorically heldthat if the person interested failed to submit his/herobjection within 30 days the Land Acquisition Officer isexpected to conduct an enquiry under Section 5-A only andit is not open to the interested person to contend thatthere is a violation of Rule 3(b). With respect I am inagreement with the said proposition of the Division Benchand I am bound by the same. However, had the LandAcquisition Officer by pointing out Section 5-A(1) of theAct, rejected the objection of the petitioners orconducted an enquiry without forwarding the same to therequisitioning body as per Rule 3(b), the result wouldhave been different. In other words, if such procedure isfollowed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the contentionof the learned Counsel for the petitioner has to berejected even at the threshold. Here, after receiving theobjection of the petitioners on 20.10.1989, the saidobjection was communicated to the requisitioning body on23.10.1989. After getting another statement on 16.11.1989,the same was forwarded to the Madras MetropolitanDevelopment Authority for their remarks on 18.11.1989. TheMadras Metropolitan Development Authority have furnishedtheir remarks on the objections of the petitioners on5.12.1989. On receipt of the remarks of the MadrasMetropolitan Development Authority on 27.12.1989, thepetitioners submitted further objections on 29.1.90.Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer failed to conductfurther enquiry i.e., 3(b) enquiry. I have alreadyobserved that admittedly there is no such enquiry in termsof Rule 3(b) or any enquiry after 2.9.1989. If that is so, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Courtreported in 1994 Writ L.R. 326 is directly applicable tothe facts of this case, hence Section 5-A enquiry cannotbe sustained. Inasmuch as the Land Acquisition Officeraccepted and acted on the objections of the petitionersubmitted on 20.10.1989 and forwarded the same to therequisitioning body for remarks and again communicated theremarks to the petitioners, I am of the view that in thelight of the scheme of the Act and Rules, it is presumedthat the Land Acquisition Officer has waived the defaultif any in submitting objection as per 5-A(1) of the Act.As a matter of fact, Form B which is a notice issued underSection 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act enables the landowner to submit his objection within a prescribed time (inour case 30 days) and it is also open to the land owner toappear in person or by a person authorised in this behalfor by a pleader and he can adduce any oral or documentaryevidence in support of the said objections. A perusal ofNotice under Form B under Section 5-A of the Act shows theintention of the Legislature. Even at the time of 5-Aenquiry if the land owner has any further objection, it isopen to him to raise the same, or file it in the form ofwritten representation or it is open to the pleader torepresent the land owner and also place relevant documentsin support of the objections. When such opportunity isthere, coupled with the conduct of the Land AcquisitionOfficer in our case in accepting the objection of thepetitioner and forwarding the same to the requisitioningbody for remarks and again communicated the remarks to thepetitioner, their objections cannot be rejected on thesole ground that they were not filed within 30 days as per5-A (1) of the Act. In view of the peculiar factualposition, the conduct of the Land Acquisition Officer, itis not open to the respondents to take advantage of thedecision of the Division Bench rendered in I.L.R. 1996Mad. 299. The observation of their Lordships in (1997) 1SCC 134 is with reference to interim orders in landacquisition matters. No doubt, Their Lordships havecautioned the courts in interfering the land acquisitionmatters liberally by exercising powers under Article 226of the Constitution. However, when there is a violation ofstatutory provisions which are also mandatory one it isalways open to this Court to interfere and set right theposition. Hence, the observation in the decision of theSupreme Court would not preclude this Court frominterfering in the present case. Further, I have alreadyextracted the decision of their Lordships Palaniswamy, J.,Nainarsundaram, J., (as he then was) and Govindaswamy, J., https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ with regard to Section 5-A enquiry and Rule 3(b) of theRules.16. Before winding up regarding filing of objections bythe aggrieved land owners before the Land AcquisitionOfficer, it is worth-while to mention the followingobservation of the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court ina decision reported in State v. D.F. Mukhi A.I.R. 1975Guj. 68. Their Lordships considered Section 5-A of theAct. No doubt, one distinction is that there is a Ruleframed by the Gujarat Government, for condonation of delayin filing objection within the prescribed period, In thatcase, the land owner did not submit his objection within30 days. In this context, Their Lordships have concludedthus:...The essence of the matter is giving of suchopportunity, not giving it within a particular number ofdays. There is no conceivable virtue or merit in affordinga hearing "within" thirty days. It is not as if the periodof thirty days is of mystical significance and issurrounded by some magic halo. No principle or policyunderlies the selection of the period. Some time-limit hasto be provided for the sake of convenience and that is whythe tenure of 30 days was hit upon. There is no rationaleunderlying the selection of this particular period. It isnot as if the success or failure of the objections or thevalidity of the decision on this question turns on whetheror not the objections are lodged within these 30 fatefuldays. We do not detect any "logos" or "etos", in investinga "now-or-never" significance to this period. The partywhose lands are placed under acquisition, it is true, maynot have an unrestricted right to lodge objections beyondthe time limit of 30 days embodied in Section 5-A. Butthat time-limit operates as a limitation on the right ofthe party and not as a limitation on the power of theCollector to hear the objections. Surely, the party whoselands are under acquisition cannot question the power ofthe Collector to hear the objections on any conceivablerational ground notwithstanding the fact that they havenot lodged any such objections? Surely a party cannot bereasonably expected to object to his being dealt withfairly and his being afforded an opportunity to show causeagainst the proposed acquisition notwithstanding theexpiry of the dead line for filing objections? Even if therules had not provided for extension of the time-limit,under no principle of law could it have been said that theCollector acted in violation of the principles of fair-play in affording him such an opportunity. All that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Collector does by extending the time-limit of 30 days isto pay homage to the principles of natural justice and nomore. He does a good turn to the land owner, not an evilact. Even if the rules are silent, the courts usually readinto the relevant provisions the principles of fair-playand natural justice and insist on compliance with suchprinciples notwithstanding the fact that there is nopositive command by the Legislature. Is it not thereforefutile (it certainly is) to canvass that the Collector hasno legal jurisdiction or competence to hear the personwhose land is proposed to be acquired merely because thetime-limit for lodging such objections has expired?With respect I am in entire agreement with the viewexpressed by their Lordships. By giving such anopportunity to the land owner by applying the principlesof fair-play and natural justice they must be providedwith full opportunity and the provisions of the Act andRules must be strictly and fully complied with."27.3. In KUMAR NAICHER Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU ((1998) 2 MLJ533), it has been held as follows:"7. The next ground on which Govindaswami, J. quashedthe notification related to want of public notice of thesubstance of the notification. The learned Judge inparagraph 6 of his judgment has stated as follows:Insofar as the second contention that public notice of thesubstance of the 4(1) notification was not given in thelocality as contemplated under Rule 1 of the Rules framedunder Section 55 of the Act, learned Government Advocaterepresented that the public notice of the substance of the4(1) Notification was given in the locality by. beat oftom-tom as required under the rules on 1.10.1985. In thiscontext, it is relevant to consider the Rule 1 of theRules which is as follows; 1. Issue and publication ofnotice by the Collector-Immediately after the publicationof the notification under Section 4(1), the Collectorshall issue a notice stating that the land is needed asthe case way be, for a public purpose and requiring allpersons interested in the land to lodge before theCollector within thirty days after the issue of theNotification, a statement in writing of their objection,if any, to the proposed acquisition. This notice should bepublished at convenient places in the said locality, andcopies thereof fixed up in the Offices of the Collector,the Tahsildar, and in the nearest Police Station.The above rule clearly prescribed that the notice should https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ be published at convenient places in the said locality andcopies thereof should be fixed up in the Offices of theCollector, the Tahsildar, and in the nearest PoliceStation. It is obligatory on the part of the respondentsnot only to see that the notice is published in theconvenient places in the said locality but also to seethat copies thereof are affixed in the Offices of theCollector, the Tahsildar and in the nearest PoliceStation. The learned Counsel for the writ petitionercontended that mere publication of the Notification wouldnot suffice but notice should be published at convenientplaces in the locality and copies thereof should be fixedup in the Offices of the Collector, the Tahsildar and inthe nearest Police Station and that is mandatory, andfailure to do so vitiates the acquisition proceedings. Inthis context, the learned Counsel for the petitionerreferred to the decision of a Division Bench of this Courtin Valleswarar Temple, Nerkundram represented by soletrustee Kasiviswanathan v. The State of Tamil Nadurepresented by the Secretary to Government Housing andUrban Development and Anr. (1990) 2 M.L.J. 142, in whichit was held as under:Mr. A. Sivaji, learned Counsel for the appellant, covetsthe quashing of the very notification under Section 4 (1)of the Act and for this purposes, he advances the pointthat as enjoined by Section 4(1) of the Act and Rule 1 ofthe Tamil Nadu Rules under The Act, there was nopublication of the substance of the notification underSection 4(1) of the Act, point to the above effect hasbeen taken in the affidavit filed in support of the writpetition. But, this point has not been adjudicated upon bythe learned single Judge. That the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act and Rule 1 of the Tamil Nadu Rules underthe Act with regard to publication of the substance of thenotification under Section 4(1) of the Act, are mandatoryin nature and non-compliance with them will vitiate theentire acquisition proceedings, is a proposition wellsettled, which cannot permit any disputation. Therespondents have not care to file any counter-affidavitrebutting the above contention of the appellant, based onviolation of the mandatory provisions of law, eitherduring the pendency of the writ petition or during thependency of the writ appeal. Mr. K. Ravi Rajapandian,learned Additional Government Pleader (Writs), is also notin a position to put forth any voice of rebuttal supportedby records in the course of his submissions, over thisaspect. The result is, here we find a case where the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ mandate of law has been breached and the appellant musthave the relief of quashing the Notification under Section4(1) of the Act as converted through its learned Counsel.It is clear from the above decision that the procedureprescribed under Rule 1 of its rules framed under Section55 of the Act for giving public notice of the substance ofthe 4(1) Notification is mandatory and failure to followthe procedure will vitiate the entire proceedings. In theinstant case, except the averments that public notice ofthe substance of the notification under Section 4(1) ofthe Act publication was given in the locality by beat oftom-tom under rules on 1.10.1985, there is nothing onrecord to show that the respondent has followed theprescribed procedure for giving notice of the substance ofthe Notification in the locality viz., publication of thenotice at convenient places in the said locality, andaffixing copies thereof in the Offices of the Collector,the Tahsildar, and in the nearest Police Station: Havingregard to the aforesaid peculiar circumstances of thecase, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed.So far as this point is concerned, the counter filed onbehalf of the respondents does not advert to the giving ofpublic notice of the substance of the notification asrequired under the section and the Rules framedthereunder. There is no specific answer in the counterthough the writ petitioner has raised it as ground (a) inhis writ affidavit. This point has therefore to be held infavour of the writ petitioner.8. The third point urged before the learned Judge andconsidered by him is that while holding enquiry underSection 5-A, the petitioner had not received the views ofthe requisitioning department. The learned Judge foundthat in that case, the Government was not in a position tosubstantiate its stand that any detailed enquiry wasconducted as contemplated under the Rules framed. J.Kanakaraj, J. In Kannammal (Deceased) v. N. Devaraj v.State of Tamil Naduand Ors. (1990), W L.R. 439 held that"remarks of the Requisitioning Authority should beavailable to the owner so called claimant whose land isacquired at the time of enquiry under Section 5-A. As theremarks of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board in that case hadbeen communicated to the petitioner therein nearly twoyears after the enquiry under Section 5-A, it was heldthat it vitiated the entire enquiry under Section 5-A ofthe Act". The learned Judge held that in many cases, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Land Acquisition Officers held a second enquiry after theremarks were obtained by issuing notices to the landowners as well as to the Requisitioning Body and in theopinion of the learned Judge, such a procedure will aloneconform to the requirements of Rule 3(b)(c) of the Rules.The learned Judge held that the enquiry under Section 5-Aof the Act was vitiated. It does not appear in the presentcase, whether there was a further enquiry as requiredunder Rule 3(b). On this ground also, the petitioner isentitled to succeed."27.4. In ARUMUGHA MUDALIAR Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2002 (1)CTC 28), wherein it has been held as follows:"8. That being the position, as regards the violationof mandatory Rule 3(b) as pointed out by the learnedSenior counsel for the writ petitioners, it is notsatisfactorily shown as to how the said stand of the writpetitioners cannot be sustained. As stated by me earlier,there are no details or information as to whether theobjections raised on behalf of the petitioners wasforwarded to the requisitioning body and whether anyremark at all was received from them which was furnishedto the writ petitioners who are undoubtedly the owners ofthe lands which were sought to be acquired. In suchcircumstances, when the said violation strikes at the rootof the 5(A) enquiry, it will have to be held that theproceedings at the stage of 5-A enquiry cannot also besustained. Consequently, the declaration made underSection 6 of the Act should also fall to the grounds." 28. It has also been submitted that Section 5-A enquiry hadbeen conducted by an unauthorised person and therefore, all furtherproceedings issued pursuant to the said enquiry are void ab initio. 29. It has also been stated that according to Section 5-A ofthe Act, the District Collector should have conducted the enquiry.Section 3(c) of the Act defines the word ‘collector’, which meansthe Collector of a district or a Deputy Commissioner or any otherofficer specially appointed by the appropriate Government to performthe functions of the Collector under the Act. However, in thepresent case, the Special Tahsildar (LA), Plan IV, Outer Ring Road,Chennai, had not been appointed by the Government to act as theenquiry officer. There is nothing on record to show that he had beenauthorised by the Government to conduct the enquiry. The SpecialTahsildar (LA) does not have the authority to conduct the enquiry,under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, allsubsequent proceedings based on the said enquiry are null and void. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ As such, the authorisation given to the Special Thasildar (LA), bythe District collector, to conduct the enquiry, cannot be held to bevalid. In support of the said contentions, the learned counsel forthe petitioners had relied on the following decisions:29.1. In MAYAPATI Vs. STATE OF HARYANA (AIR 1973 (P&H) 356, ithas been held as follows:"4. As regards contention (2) the plea has been takenup specifically in para 12 and again in para 18(h) of thewrit petition. In the written statement filed by theRespondent-State, it is not specifically averred that theaforesaid General Assistant (Shri Jagbir Singh) was everappointed to perform the functions of the collector underthe Act. All that is stated, in reply to para 12 is "para12 in so far as it concerns the Respondent No.3 isadmitted. The rest of the para concerns Respondent No.2.It may, however, be added that the father of thepetitioner or the petitioners never raised any pointbefore the General Assistant, who is also the LandAcquisition Collector. Gurgaon with regard to hisjurisdiction to hear objections under Section 5-A andhence they are estopped to challenge his jurisdiction.General Assistant to Respondent No. 2 is also the LandAcquisition Collector, Gurgaon as is evident from Annexurefiled by Respondent No. 3.5. Similar is the reply to para 18(h). It will beseen, while respondent 1 has evaded to answer the point ofsubstance in para 12 of the writ petition by saying thatit concerns Respondent 2 (Collector District Gurgaon), thelatter has filed no return at all.6. Mr. Ashok Bhan, learned counsel for therespondents has been unable to refer to any notificationwhereby the Government appointed the General Assistant tothe Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, as a Collector for thepurposes of the Act. The expression "collector" has beendefined in Section 3(c) of the Act which says:--"the expression "Collector" means the Collector of adistrict and includes a Deputy Commissioner and anyofficer specially appointed by the appropriate Governmentto perform the functions of a Collector under this Act."In Arjan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1959 PUNJ 538, thefacts were that the Government Notification stated that aperson was appointed as 'officiating Land AcquisitionOfficer' but it did not state that he was so appointed toperform the functions of a Collector under the Act and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that person after taking proceedings under Section 9 and10 gave an award under Section 11 of the Act. Theproceedings were challenged by a writ petition in thePunjab High Court, Bishan Narain J. held:-"That theofficer not having been appointed to perform the functionsof a collector under the Act had no jurisdiction to takeproceedings under Ss. 9 and 10 or give an award.Therefore, the proceedings as well as the award wereinvalid.Similarly, in Civil Writ No. 1747 of 1964 (Punj) (GajjanSingh v. Commr. Ambala Division). I had the occasion toconsider the definition of the 'Collector' in Section 2(a)of the Punjab Premises and Land (Eviction and RentRecovery) Act, 1959, which is substantially the same asthe one given in Section 27 of the Punjab Land RevenueAct, 1887 and sub-section (1)(a) of Section 105 of thePunjab Tenancy Act, 1887 confers the powers of a collectorto hear and determine appeals from the orders, and decreesof Assistant Collectors of the 1st and 2nd grades, fallswithin the definition of Collector given in the PunjabAct, 1959. It was held:- "all the powers of the Collectorof the District were not conferred on him. He was not afull-fledged 'collector of the District' in the sense inwhich the expression is used in Section 2(a) of the Act.7. In the result, the order of the officer concerned wasstruck down. In Gajjan Singh's case, Civil Writ No. 1747of 1964 (punj) (supra) it was contended, as it has beendone before me in the instant case, that this objectionwith regard to lack of jurisdiction was not taken beforethe officer concerned and consequently the petitioner wasprecluded from raising it for the first time in thisCourt. The contention was repelled in these terms:--"this objection as to jurisdiction goes to the veryroot of the matter. It is purely a law point. It is,therefore, allowed to be raised now. It is well settledthat even consent of the parties cannot cure inherent lackof jurisdiction in a tribunal"If further authority is needed, the law on the point asexpounded by the Supreme Court, Abdul Hussain Tayabali v.State of Gujarat AIR 1968 SC 432, may be studied withadvantage. These observations are a complete answer to theplea raised by the Respondent State in reply to paras 12and 18(h) of the writ petition.8. For the foregoing reasons, I have no hesitation in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ holding that the proceedings conducted by the GeneralAssistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon, underSection 5A of the Act, were without jurisdiction. Themaking of a valid report after hearing objections of thepersons interested in the land under Section 5-A, by aperson who is duly constituted Collector within themeaning of Section 3(c) of the Act, being a sine qua nonall further proceedings, the notification made underSection 6 on the basis of the illegal report of such anofficer lacking inherent jurisdiction, will also bevitiated. In the result, I allow this writ petition andquash the impugned proceedings including the report madeby the General Assistant to the Government and theimpugned notification issued under Section 4(1), however,holds good and it is open to the collector of the Districtto rehear the objections filed by the petitioners undersection 5-A and proceed further in accordance with law.The petitioners shall have their costs from Respondent 1.Counsel's fee: Rs. 50/-."29.2. In STATE OF TAMIL NADU Vs. POWN AMMAL ((2004) 2 MLJ 726),this Court had held as follows:"8. We have already referred to the fact thatNotification under Section 4(1) is to be published in 3modes, namely, (i) in the Gazette, (ii) in two dailies,and (iiii) in the locality. Even as per the said section,it is only a preliminary notification. The three modes ofpublications are intended to give an opportunity to theland owner to make effective representation andparticipate in the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act.We have already held that without a specific authorizationby the Government, no officer can enter upon, survey anyland and perform the functions of the District Collectorunder Section 5-A of the Act. Accordingly, we are of theview that there must be a specific authorisation by theGovernment, authorising a particular officer to performboth the functions, as prescribed under Sub-Sec.(2) ofSec.4 and also under Clause (c) of Sec.3 of the Act. Thenotification published in the official gazette which is inEnglish version, contains both authorization not onlyconferring powers upon the Special Tahsildar (Adi-dravidarWelfare), Vellore, his staff and workmen to do the acts,as provided under Sub-Sec.(2) of Sec.(4), but also conduct5-A enquiry. One such mode was published in the officialgazette without any ambiguity giving clear power to theofficer concerned, here the Special Tahsildar to proceedwith the acquisition. With this, he can enter upon survey https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ any land and also conduct enquiry under Section 5-A of theAct. Merely because the exact contents of the gazettenotification having not been reproduced in verbal in Tamildailies, it cannot be construed that there is no specificauthorisation on the Special Tahsildar by the Government.Though the notification published in the two dailiesnewspapers in the regional language did containauthorization under Sub-Sec.(2) of Sec.4, there is aomission in mentioning Clause (c) of Sec.3 authorising theSpecial Tahsildar to perform the functions of theCollector under Sec.5-A. Even if we accept that there is aomission, we hold that this is only an irregularity and itwould not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. To put itclear, before initiation of proceedings, the Governmentshould authorize any officer to perform the functions of aCollector both under Sec.4(2) and Sec.3(c) of the Act toenquiry under Sec.5-A of the Act. Since the GazetteNotification contained both the authorizations, we are ofthe view that the officer concerned, namely, SpecialTahsildar can very well function and perform the duties ofthe District Collector. It is worthwhile to refer adecision of this Court in Maria Rosal DeRose Vs. State ofTamil Nadu, (1970) 2 M.L.J. 471, wherein it was held thatSec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894, imposestwo obligations before the Government could enter upon theland, survey, take level and do all such other actsnecessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for thepublic purpose. The first thing that has to be done isthat the Government should publish a notification in theofficial gazette that the land proposed to be acquired inany locality is needed or is likely to be needed for anypublic purpose. Secondly, the Collector or the LandAcquisition Officer, as the case may be, shall causepublic notice of the substance of such notification to begiven at convenient places in the said locality. Theentire purpose of this Sub Section is to give publicnotice of the proposal, and if, therefore, it is publishedin the locality and particularly persons affected by theproposal are aware that such an activity is a foot, thenit is sufficient. Hence, it is not correct to say that anydefect in the notification under Sec.4 is fatal to thevalidity of the proceedings. We are in agreement with thesaid conclusion of the learned Judge. Therefore in ourcase we are unable to accept the contrary conclusionarrived at by the learned single Judge; hence the same isliable to be set aside." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

29.3. In GULABRAO KESHAVRAO PATIL Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT ((1996)2 SCC 26), it has been held as follows:6. Under Article 163, the Council of Ministers withthe Chief Minister at the head is to aid and advice theGovernor in the exercise of his functions, except insofaras he is by or under the Constitution required to exercisehis functions or any of them in his discretion. The ChiefMinister should be appointed by the Governor and the otherMinisters are appointed on his advice by the Governor. TheCouncil of Ministers under Article 164 shall becollectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly ofthe State. Under Article 167, the Chief Minister shallhold the duty to communicate to the Governor all decisionsof the Council of Ministers relating to the administrationof the affairs of the State and proposals for legislationetc. It would, thus, be clear that the Chief Ministerholds the ultimate responsibility to the Governor and isaccountable to the people of the State for the goodgovernance of the State with the assistance of his Councilof Ministers. The executive power of the State is carriedon by the Governor with the aid and advice of the Councilof Ministers, Chief Minister being the head. In otherwords, the Cabinet transacts the business of the State andit is discharged by its Chief Minister to whom business ofthe State on specified subjects are allocated forconvenient transaction of the business of the Government.7. Article 166(1) and (2) of the Constitution statethus:“166. Conduct of business of the Government of aState.— (1) All executive action of the Government of aState shall be expressed to be taken in the name of theGovernor.(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed inthe name of the Governor shall be authenticated in suchmanner as may be specified in rules to be made by theGovernor, and the validity of an order or instrument whichis so authenticated shall not be called in question on theground that it is not an order or instrument made orexecuted by the Governor.”In other words, Article 166(1) and (2) expressly envisageauthentication of all the executive actions and shall beexpressed to be taken in the name of the Governor and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ shall be authenticated in such manner specified in therules made by the Governor. Under Article 166(3), theGovernor is authorised to make the rules for the moreconvenient transaction of the business of the Governmentof the State, and for the allocation among Ministers ofthe said business insofar as it is not business withrespect to which the Governor is by or under theConstitution required to act in his discretion. In otherwords, except in cases when the Government in hisindividual discretion exercises his constitutionalfunctions, the other business of the Government isrequired to be conveniently transacted as per the BusinessRules made by Article 166(3) of the Constitution. If theaction of the Government and the order is dulyauthenticated as per Article 166(2) and the Business Rule12, it is conclusive and irrebuttable presumption arisesthat decision was duly taken according to Rules. Theletter of the Section Officer is not in conformity withRule 12 and Article 166(1) and (2), though under Rule 13he is one of the authorised officers to communicate thedecision of the Government. In Major E.G. Barsay v. Stateof Bombay (AIR 1961 SC 1762) this Court held that if anorder is issued in the name of the President and is dulyauthenticated in the manner prescribed in Article 77(2),there is an irrebuttable presumption that the order ismade by the President. Whereby the order does not complywith the provisions of Article 77(2), it is open to theparty to question the validity of the order on the groundthat it was not an order made by the President and toprove that it was not made by the Central Government.Where the evidence establishes that the Dy.Secretary onbehalf of the Central Government made the order a delegatethe order cannot be questioned. Therefore, it is necessaryto show whether decision of the Government is according toBusiness Rules.8. Rule 15 of the Business Rules provides that theserules may, to such extent as may be necessary, besupplemented by instructions to be issued by the Governoron the advice of the Chief Minister. Under the BusinessRules 33 subjects were allotted to the Revenue Departmentof which Item 15 relates to acquisition of property,principles on which compensation for property acquired forthe purpose of the State or for any other public purposesis to be determined and the form and manner in which suchcompensation is to be ‘given’; acquisition of immovableproperty for defence purpose etc. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9. The Urban Development and Urban Housing Departmentgets allotted 18 items of which Item 8 contemplates ofTown Planning Scheme and Item 9 contemplates Town Planningand Valuation Department. It would thus be seen that thetwo departments are entitled to deal with the landacquisition and valuation thereof. Urban Planning Schemein the urban area was allotted to the Urban DevelopmentDepartment and Urban Development and Urban HousingDepartment and the land acquisition, though part of theTown Planning Scheme, was equally an allotted subject tothe Revenue Department under the subject referred tohereinbefore.10. It is seen from the note file that when theproceedings have gone before the Secretary to the RevenueDepartment, by his note dated 3-7-1993 he stated thus:“(1) May be submitted to Government.(2) Legal position being what it is, it would serveno useful purpose in discussing the issue in a survivalmeeting with UDD.”11. It would appear that initially in the note dated2-7-1993, there was a suggestion to refer the matter tothe Urban Development Department but later it was struckoff and the above endorsement came to be made. On thatbasis, the Minister for Revenue had approved thesuggestion made by the Secretary on 6-7-1993. It is alsoclear from the record placed before us that the UrbanDevelopment Department after finding that the RevenueDepartment is not proceeding with the acquisition hadtaken a decision to approach the Chief Minister who, onreceipt thereof, sought legal opinion and the LawDepartment opined that the view of Revenue Department doesnot bind the Chief Minister. The question then is whowould take the decision in that behalf. It would beappropriate to deal with the instructions issued in thisbehalf.12. Instruction 4 in Part II says that:“4. (1) Except as otherwise provided in theseinstructions cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by orunder the authority of the Minister-in-charge, who may, bymeans of standing orders, give such directions as hethinks fit for the disposal of cases in the Department.”Instructions 9 and 10 says that: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “(9) When the subject of a case concerns more thanone Department no order shall be issued nor shall the casebe laid before the Council or the Cabinet until it hasbeen considered by all the Departments concerned unlessthe case is one of extreme urgency.(10) If the Departments concerned are not inagreement regarding a case dealt with under Instruction 9,the Minister-in-charge of the Department may, if he wishesto proceed with the case, direct that the case besubmitted to the Chief Minister for orders for laying thecase before the Council or the Cabinet.”13. The instructions are integral part of the schemeof the Business Rules and have constitutional flavour andforce to supplement the rules. It would thus be seen thatthough the Minister-in-charge of the subject is empoweredto have the subject disposed of in the manner laid down inthe Business Rules and when two Ministers are not inagreement with the manner of the disposal of a matter ordecision, then under Instruction 10 the subject concernedshould be submitted to the Chief Minister for laying thesame before the Council or the Cabinet.14. The responsibility of Council of Ministers underArticle 164(2) of the Constitution embodies the politicalresponsibility of the Ministry headed by the ChiefMinister. Collective responsibility makes each Ministerresponsible to the Legislature for the acts of himself andother members of the Council of Ministers. Since theCouncil of Ministers would stay in office as long as itcommands the majority of the Legislative Assembly, theCouncil of Ministers is politically responsible as oneentity. In case it loses its confidence the Ministry as awhole is required to resign. The responsibility to theGovernor and accountability to the people collectively bythe Council of Ministers is through and by the ChiefMinister. It would, therefore, be clear that the decisionof a Minister under the Business Rules is not final orconclusive until the requirements in terms of clauses (1)and (2) of Article 166 are complied with. Before theaction or the decision is expressed in the name of theGovernor in the manner prescribed under the Business Rules https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and communicated to the party concerned it would always beopen by necessary implication, to the Chief Minister tosend for the file and have it examined by himself and totake a decision, though the subject was allotted to aparticular Minister for convenient transaction of thebusiness of the Government. The subject, thoughexclusively allotted to the Minister, by reason of theresponsibility of the Chief Minister to the Governor andaccountability to the people, has implied power to callfor the file relating to a decision taken by a Minister.The object of allotment of the subject to a Minister isfor the convenient transaction of the business at variouslevels through designated officers. The ultimate object isto secure an impartial, pure and efficient administrationas propounded by Dr Ambedkar in the Constituent Assemblyvide Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, p.546.15. In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab (1962 Supp(3) 713) a Constitution Bench of this Court was toconsider whether the order of the Revenue Minister couldnot be reviewed and set aside by the Chief Minister. Inthat context it was held that the order must be expressedin the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) ofArticle 166 and then it has to be communicated. Until suchan order is drawn up by the State Government in accordancewith Article 166(1), the State Government cannot beregarded as bound by what was stated in the file. Thebusiness of State is a complicated one and has necessarilyto be conducted through the agency of large number ofofficials and authorities. The action must be taken by theauthority concerned in the name of the Raj Pramukh. TheMinister is no more than an advisor and as the head of theState the Governor or the Raj Pramukh has to act with theaid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Until theadvice is accepted by the Governor, whatever the Ministeror the Council of Ministers may say with regard to aparticular matter, does not become the action of the Stateuntil the advice of the Council of Ministers is acceptedby the head of the State. Until order is drawn up in themanner indicated by Article 166(1) and communicated to theperson who would be affected by the order it would be opento the Council of Ministers to consider the matter overand over again and, therefore, till its communication, theorder cannot be regarded as anything more than provisionalin character. Even if the rule does not contemplate thatthe Chief Minister would be entitled to pass an order butwhen the rule envisages that he is entitled to call for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the file for issue of order, it clearly implies that hehas the right to interfere and make such order as he maydeem appropriate. The Chief Minister may call any file anddeal with it himself. The order passed by the ChiefMinister even though it is a matter pertaining to theportfolio of the Revenue Minister will be deemed to be anorder of Council of Ministers. So deemed, its contentswould be the Chief Minister’s advice to the Governor forwhich the Council of Ministers would be collectivelyresponsible. This view was reiterated by a larger Bench ofseven Judges of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Unionof India (1977) 4 SCC 608. In para 46 this Court held thatthe object of collective responsibility is to make thewhole body of persons holding ministerial officecollectively or if one may so put it, vicariouslyresponsible for such acts or the other as are referable totheir collective volition so that even if an individualmay not be responsible for it he will be deemed to sharethe responsibility with those who may have actuallycommitted the wrongful act. In para 48 the Court observedthat responsibility to Parliament only means that theMinister may be compelled by convention to resign. Out ofthis responsibility arose the principle of collectiveresponsibility. The Government has to be carried on as aunity rather than by a number of advisers of the Sovereignacting separately."30. It had also been stated that 30 days time had not beengiven to the land owners to submit their objections, as providedunder the Act. Since, sufficient time had not been given to raisetheir objections, the petitioners were not in a position to maketheir effective representations, based on proper legal advise. Fromthe records produced by the respondents, it is noted that the landowners had submitted their objections only on the date of theenquiry fixed by the respondents in their section 3-A notices. Thus,it is clear that the enquiry conducted by the respondents is inviolation of Section 4(1) of the Act. 31. It has also been stated that the Special Tahsildar hadfailed to arrive at a decision and he had made no specificrecommendation, as mandated under the relevant provisions of theAct. In fact, he had issued the Section 6 declaration, accepting theremarks of the requisitioning body, to acquire the lands of thepetitioners without applying his mind, independently. Further,Section 6 declaration has been passed by the Special Commissionerand Commissioner of Land Administration, Chennai, without having theauthority to do so, as the value of the lands notified is more thanRs.25,00,000/-. In such circumstances, it is only the State https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Government, which is empowered to issue such a declaration.Therefore, the Section 6 declarations made in respect of the landsin question are ultra vires and void. 32. It has also been stated that no public notice, containingthe substance of the Section 6 declaration, had been published inthe locality, by the District Collector, as mandated under Section 6(2) of the Act, within the period of 60 days, as contemplated in theexplanation (b) of the State amendment issued to Section 6 of theAct. Since, no proper publication had been made, as prescribed bythe relevant provisions of law, the declaration would be null andvoid. The learned counsel had relied on the decision of the SupremeCourt, in KUNWAR PAL SINGH Vs. STATE OF U.P. ((2007) 5 SCC 85),wherein it has been held as follows: "9. Shri Anil Raj Kumar, Officer on Special Duty,MDA, Respondent 4 herein, in his counter-affidavit statesthat the High Court has taken into consideration the awardpassed by the Collector specifically referring to 13-8-1985, the date of publication of notification underSection 6 of the Act and the fact that the stay order wasin operation w.e.f. 2-8-1985 till 19-9-1996. It is alsostated that the High Court has upheld the award havingbeen passed on 18-9-1998 within the period of limitationas prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act and as such theland acquisition proceedings would not lapse as contendedby the appellants. He reasserted that declaration underSection 6 of the Act was issued on 13-8-1985 and not on25-7-1985 as alleged by the appellants.16. Section 6(2), on a plain reading, deals with thevarious modes of publication and they are: (a) publicationin the Official Gazette, (b) publication in two dailynewspapers circulating in the locality in which the landis situate of which at least one shall be in the regionallanguage, and (c) causing public notice of the substanceof such declaration to be given at convenient places inthe said locality. There is no option left with anyone togive up or waive any mode and all such modes have to bestrictly resorted to. The principle is well settled thatwhere any statutory provision provides a particular mannerfor doing a particular act, then, that thing or act mustbe done in accordance with the manner prescribed thereforin the Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

22. The statement of Smt Nisha Goel made in the counter-affidavit filed by her on behalf of Respondents 1, 2 and 3that the declaration of public notice by last mode underSection 6(2) of the Act by beat of drums in the localityon 13-8-1985 manifestly is wrong and on the face of itcontrary to the contents of the notice (Annexure R-2)filed by her with the affidavit. This notice dated 13-8-1985 was issued by the Land Record Inspector, Block Rohta,Tehsil Meerut, in response to the letter of MDA dated 9-8-1985 and that of the District Land Acquisition Officer,Meerut, dated 1-8-1985. The relevant substance of thenotice reads as under:“The land described in the enclosed list situate inVillage Dantal, Block Rohta, Tehsil Meerut has beenacquired by Meerut Development Authority for itsresidential scheme and letter for obtaining its possessionhas been received on 12-8-1985 at 3 p.m. and intimation ofwhich has been given today, 13-8-1985 in Village Dantal toall farmers and residents concerned of the village by beatof drums and in loud voice that notification had beenpublished on 19-7-1985, 25-7-1985 in daily newspapers,Meerut Samachar, Janta Express and Hamara Yug andGovernment Gazette. Since the land has been acquired forthe residential scheme of Meerut Development Authority, nofarmer should change the nature of rights in the land andthe possession of acquired land will be taken on 16-3-1985.”23. This notice appears to have been signed by marginalwitnesses Har Pal Singh, Sudhir Kumar and Yash Vir Singhand thumb mark by Chhote on 13-8-1985. The languageemployed in this notice would not prove that it was thelast mode of publication referred to in Section 6(2) ofthe Act. In substance, this notice appears to have beenissued in purporting exercise of power under Section 9 ofthe Act for taking possession of the acquired land on 16-8-1985. Thus, this notification, in no circumstances,would prove that it was the last mode of publicationreferred to in Section 6(2) of the Act.27. The ratio of the judgment in State of Haryana v.Raghubir Dayal (1995) 1 SCC 133 relied upon by therespondents, is of no assistance or help to them. In thatcase, while dealing with the provisions of Sections 4(1),5-A and 6(2) of the Act, this Court held: (SCC pp.133-34) “Since there is an opportunity already given to the ownerof the land or persons having interest in the land to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ raise their objections during the inquiry under Section 5-A, or otherwise in case of dispensing with inquiry underSection 5-A unless they show any grave prejudice caused tothem in non-publication of the substance of thedeclaration under Section 6(1), the omission to publishthe substance of the declaration under Section 6(1) in thelocality would not render the declaration of Section 6invalid. However, this does not mean that the officersshould not comply with the requirement of law. It is theirduty to do it.” 33. The learned counsels for the petitioners had also submittedthat it cannot be said that the petitioners had waived their rightsby participating in the enquiry and therefore, they would be barredfrom challenging the said proceedings, based on the principles ofacquiescence and estoppel, as their participation in the enquiry wasbased on their belief that it was being conducted fairly andproperly. Subsequently, they had learnt that the enquiry had notbeen conducted by the person authorized to do so, as per law.He hadrelied on the decision in DADU DAYALU MAHASABHA, JAIPUR (TRUST) Vs.MAHANT RAM NIWAS (2008 11 SCC 753), in support of the saidcontention, wherein it had been held as follows: "22. The judgment of a court, it is trite, should notbe interpreted as a statute. The meaning of the words usedin a judgment must be found out from the backdrop of thefact of each case. The court while passing a judgmentcannot take away the right of the successful partyindirectly which it cannot do directly. An observationmade by a superior court is not binding. What would bebinding is the ratio of the decision. Such a decision mustbe arrived at upon entering into the merit of the issuesinvolved in the case.26. We, however, are not unmindful of the principles ofestoppel, waiver and res judicata are procedural in natureand, thus, the same will have no application in a casewhere judgment has been rendered wholly withoutjurisdiction or issues involve only pure questions of law.Even in such cases, the principle of issue estoppel willhave no role to play." 34. It has also been submitted that the acquisition of land isbeyond the scope of the public purpose notified under Section 4(1)of the Act. When the Section 4(1) notifications state that thepublic purpose, for which the petitioners’ lands are being acquired, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is for the formation of the Outer Ring Road, the acquiring ofadditional extent of lands for about 90 feet, on either side of theroad, would be arbitrary and illegal, especially, when theadditionally acquired lands are meant to be used for commercial andresidential purposes, by developing them into plots, through privatepartners. 35. It has also been stated that the records produced by therespondents would not show the correct picture. In fact, some of theaspects stated in the counter affidavit are contrary to the factsavailable from the records. Thus, it is clear that the nonconsideration of the requests made on behalf of the land owners toshift the alignment to the eastern side, as proposed by the PallavanTransport Consultancy Services Limited, Chennai, is arbitrary andillegal. 36. It has also been submitted that the respondents had playedfraud on this Court by making false statements and by producingfabricated records. Further, they are liable to pay compensation tothe petitioners and to pay the costs of the litigations, as the landacquisition proceedings are totally illegal and void. Thus, Section5-A Enquiry conducted by the authorities concerned cannot be said tobe valid in the eye of law. 37. The learned counsels for the petitioners, in W.P.Nos.13287,13288 and 13289 of 2009, had submitted that the petitioners were notserved with Section 4(1) notices, said to have been issued by therespondents. Since, the lands belonging to the petitioners, soughtto be acquired by the respondents, are vacant lands, the petitionersare not residing in the said lands. Therefore, it would not besufficient if the notifications, in respect of the land acquisitionproceedings, are published in the district gazette. In fact, widepublicity ought to have been made to inform all the land owners,including, those who are residing far away from the lands. 38. It has also been submitted that the approval for theformation of the Outer Ring Road project had been granted in theyear, 1993, vide G.O.Ms.No.381, Housing and Urban DevelopmentDepartment, (UD III-1) dated 25.5.1993. While so, a formal approvalhad been granted to Sri Vignarajan Nagar Layout, on 16.8.1994, videL.O.No.85/1994. Thus, it is clear that the acquisition of landsbelonging to the petitioners is arbitrary and illegal. It had alsobeen stated that the District Collector has no jurisdiction to issuethe notifications, as the value of the lands in respect of which thesection 4(1) notifications had been issued exceeds Rs.50,00,000/-. 39. It had also been stated that the alignment of the OuterRing Road, between the relevant points, is not based on valid https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ scientific reasons. It is only based on the recommendations made bycertain interested parties. The learned counsel had relied on thedecision of this Court, dated 30.8.2010, made in W.P.No.16417 of1998, wherein this Court had quashed the notification holding thatsome of the lands were excluded from the acquisition proceedingsmerely on the recommendations of the high level committee and hence,it is unlawful. 40. It has also been stated that Section 5-A enquiry had notbeen conducted by the proper persons authorised to do so as per law.The decision in KUMAR NAICKER K. Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHER(1998 W.L.R.417) had been relied on in support of the saidcontention.41. It had also been stated that no notice had been sent forgiving an opportunity of personal hearing, as contemplated under therelevant provisions of law. In fact, the Section 5-A enquiry hasonly been an empty formality, as the petitioners had not been put onnotice regarding such enquiry. 42. It had also been stated that the acquisition of the landsby the respondents was not only for public purpose but it was alsofor certain commercial purposes and for the construction ofresidential houses. Therefore, the acquisition is improper andinvalid, as held in SHANMUGADURAI Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2001 (2)CTC 257). The relevant paragraphs of the said decisions are asfollows:"8. Of course, in order to get-over the objectionsbased on vagueness of Section 4(1) notification, therespondents would contend (vide counter affidavit filed onbehalf of the respondents in W.P.No.21355 of 1993) that inorder to enlighten more about the project, it wasmentioned in the declaration under Section 6 of theAcquisition Act that the lands are needed for commercialand residential neighbourhood schemes under the projectknown as "land assembly and development project". In otherwords, the contention is that failure to give detailedparticulars of the public purpose in Section 4(1)notification could not vitiate it, more so, whensufficient particulars had been provided in thenotification issued under Section 6(1) of the AcquisitionAct. This is too untenable a contention to be accepted. Inour considered opinion, the Government may not bejustified in filling up the lacuna in Section notificationby improving it further in Section 6 declaration. It iswell settled that when a statutory functionary makes anorder or issues a notification based on certain grounds, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ its validity must be Judged by the reasons so mentionedand cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shapeof affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, any order bad in thebeginning, may, by the time it comes to Court on accountof a challenge, get validated by additional grounds laterbrought out. We may here draw attention to theobservations of Bose J in Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC16, which reads as follows:"Public orders publicly made. In exercise of astatutory authority cannot be construed in the light ofexplanations subsequently given by the officer making theorder of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, orwhat he intended to do. Public orders made by publicauthorities are meant to have public effect and areintended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whomthey are addressed and must be construed objectively withreference to the language used in the order itself." Orders are not like old wine becoming better as theygrow older. (See in this connection, the ConstitutionBench decision of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Vs.Chief Election Commr, AIR 1978 SC 851, at page 858,paragraph 8). The question arose more specifically beforethe Supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh Housing Board's Case,1992 (2) SCC 168, wherein, the Apex Court, after notingthe disparities in Section 4(1) notification and Section 6(1) declaration held as follows:"17. That apart, this case also discloses non-application of mind by the authorities concerned andrather casual manner in dealing with the property of thecitizens vitiating the acquisition proceedings. Whereasthe letter of the Executive Engineer of the Housing Boardto the Collector had indicated that the Chairman of theBoard had found the land suitable for "construction ofbuildings and shops under the self-financing scheme", thenotification issued under Section 4(1) makes no mentionthereof and instead declares the "public purpose" to be"residential". Again, in the declaration issued underSection 4 (1) of the Act the "public purpose" has beenstate to be "housing scheme of Housing Board" and not"construction of buildings and shops under the selffinancing scheme. Admittedly, apart from the letterreferred to above, there was no other material with theState Government and therefore, it is not under stand ableon what material, did the State Government state the"public purpose" in different terms in the notificationsissued under Section 4 and 6(1). No explanation has been https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ furnished by the learned counsel as to why differentpublic purposes were mentioned in the letter of the Boardand the two notifications issued under Section 4 and 6 ofthe Act. (Italics supplied by us). These factors go toexpose non-application of mind by the authorities whileissuing the impugned notification and it appears that theywere not even sure about the "public purpose" for whichthe land was sought to be acquired. This position stands settled as per the decision ofthe Supreme Court rendered as early as in 1971 inNarendrajit Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1971 SC 306, wherein, ithas been held that the defect in a notification underSection 4(1) cannot be cured by giving full particulars innotification under Section 6(1). In the light of theaforesaid discussion, we have no hesitation in holdingthat notification issued under Section 4(1) is vitiated byvagueness and the defect of vagueness cannot be cured bythe subsequent declaration under Section 6(1) of theAcquisition Act. 9. The Government have a case that theappellants/petitioners are guilty of laches in so far asthey failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the Courtimmediately after the issuance of notification underSection 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. This again is anuntenable contention. Similar contention advanced inNarendrajit's case, AIR 1971 SC 306 was repelled by theApex Court in the following terms:"The fact that the petitioners (owners) did not go toCourt immediately after the publication of the firstnotification is not a matter of any moment. The defectswere not cured and cannot be glossed over by reason of thefact that the petitioners went to Court after the issue ofthe notification under Section 6(1)."Accordingly, we reject the abovesaid contention ofthe Government as well. 16. At any rate, the facts of the cases on hand areclearly different from the facts of the above mentionedcases cited by the respondents. In the present batch ofcases, the question of vagueness was raised by theappellants/land owner before the authorities by way ofobjections immediately after issuance of Section 4(1)notification. Before the Court, vagueness was pleaded andargued in the writ petitions, and this Court, consideredthe vagueness in the notification as an issue and answered https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the same in the common order. In all the abovesaid casesreferred to by the respondents, the land owners did nottake up the plea of vagueness before the Land AcquisitionOfficer with a contention that since the public purpose isvague, they are not in a position to file a meaningobjection. In the cases on hand, the specific contentionwas taken by the appellants before the Land AcquisitionOfficer that since the public purpose in the notificationunder Section 4(1) is vague, and as the term: "landassembly and development project" is a very general term,they are not in a position to object specifically againstthe acquisition. The extent, of land in the cases referredto by the respondents comes to thousands of acres. On theother hand, the property acquired in the cases on hand isonly 33.16 acres. The public purpose shown in Section 4(1)and Section 6 are entirely different. Even according tothe Government, Section 4(1) does not contain the detailsof the public purpose which necessitated them to explainthe public purpose in Section 6 declaration. In all thecases referred to by the respondents, the Apex Courtdeclined to interfere in the land acquisition proceedings,as the land owners were found guilty of laches, whereas,the appellants in these batch of cases, are not guilty oflaches." 43. It has also been stated that, when poramboke lands areavailable on the eastern side of the proposed lands, it would beimproper on the part of the respondents to acquire the lands whereina number of residential buildings had been constructed, based on theapproval of the layouts, by spending huge amounts of money. Further,an extent of 3.5 kilo meters of lands, from Nemilicherry toPalavedu, belongs to the state Government. 44. The learned counsels had also submitted that no publicnotice, as contemplated under Section 6(2) of the Act, had beenpublished, by the District collector, at the convenient places inthe locality. Therefore, the declaration is invalid in the eye oflaw. 45. Per contra, Mr.P.S.Raman, the learned Advocate General,appearing for Mr.M.Dhandapani, the learned Special GovernmentPleader, appearing on behalf of the respondents 1, 3, 4 and 5 hadsubmitted that the Government of Tamil Nadu had issued the necessaryorders, vide G.O.Ms.No.381, Housing and Urban Development (UD III-1)Department, dated 25.5.1993, for the formation of the Outer RingRoad, between Thiruvallur Road and Thiruvotriyur Ponneri PanjettyRoad, for a distance of 33.1 kilo meters, under phase II of theproject. In the Government order, in G.O.Ms.No.303 Housing and Urban https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Development Department, dated 2.7.1996, the Government hadsanctioned the creation of four land acquisition units. Eightnotifications had been issued, in respect of blocks 1 to 8, underSection 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose ofthe acquisition of lands. Since, the value of each of the eightblocks did not exceed Rs.25,00,000/-, the District Collector hadissued the Section 4(1) notifications, which had been published inthe district gazette, as well as in two Tamil Dailies, namely, 'DinaThanthi' and 'Dina Malar'. Publication had also been done in thelocality concerned. 46. It had also been submitted that the objections had beencalled for from the land owners and an enquiry, under Section 5-A ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been held, in accordance with theprocedures established by law. Thereafter, an award had also beenpassed in respect of the acquired lands. 47. It has also been submitted that the contentions raised onbehalf of the petitioners that the District Collector, ThiurvallurDistrict, does not have the jurisdiction to issue the impugnednotifications, for acquiring the lands in question, are notacceptable. As per Section 4(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act,introduced by the Tamil Nadu State Amendment the District collectoris the authority to publish the 4(1) notification, in respect of thelands not exceeding 40 acres in extent, the value of which does notexceed Rs.25,00,000/-. It cannot be said that there should only be asingle notification, under Section 4(1) of the Act, in respect ofthe lands proposed to be acquired. Nothing in law prevents theGovernment from splitting large extents of lands, which are neededfor a public purpose, into different blocks for the purpose ofadministrative convenience in issuing the necessary notifications. 48. It has also been submitted that the value of the landsacquired for the Outer Ring Road Project had been ascertained by theconcerned officers by taking the market value of the lands, locatedwithin an area of 1.6 kilo meters radius from the lands sought to beacquired, during the period of 3 years prior to the issuance of theSection 4(1) notifications. From the records available, it could beclearly seen that the value of the lands sought to be acquired bythe respondents, in each of the blocks, would not exceedRs.25,00,000/-. Thus, it is clear that the District collectorconcerned was having the jurisdiction to issue the impugned Section4(1) notifications. 49. It had also been stated that, while passing the award, ifthe authorities concerned decides to give a higher compensation, orif the sub court concerned comes to the conclusion that thecompensation given to the parties had to be enhanced, such higher or https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ enhanced compensation, granted in favour of the land owners, wouldnot, in any way, vitiate the notifications issued by the DistrictCollector, whose decisions had been made, based on the materialsavailable at the relevant point of time, as per law.50. It had also been submitted that it is true that thepublication of the impugned notifications had been made in thedistrict gazette and not in the state gazette. However, thecontention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the publicationof the impugned notifications in the district gazette, instead ofpublishing them in the state gazette, would invalidate the landacquisition proceedings, is hyper technical in nature, as held bythe Supreme Court, in WASTE PRODUCTS RECLAIMOR PRIVATE LTD Vs.BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. (1993 SUPP (2) SCC 358). In suchcircumstances, the decision of this Court in A.S.PERIASAMY Vs. STATEOF TAMIL NADU REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, SOCIAL WELFARE DEPARTMENT, FORTST. GEORGE, CHENNAI – 9 AND OTHERS (2004 (2) CTC 406) cannot be heldto be laying the correct position of law. 51. It has also been stated that the petitioners had been givenproper notice of the enquiry conducted, under Section 5-A of theAct. The records available with the respondents would show that thenotices of section 5-A enquiry had been dispatched by the concernedauthority to the land owners, by registered post, withacknowledgment due. The notices had been sent to their addresses, asrecorded in the revenue records. In cases, where the notices hadbeen returned unserved, they have been affixed in the concernednotice boards and in the lands in question. Apart from such stepshaving been taken to serve the notices, the necessary informationhad been announced, by way of ‘tom tom’, as contemplated under theAct. 52. It had also been submitted that the Supreme Court had held,in W.B.HOUSING BOARD Vs. BRIJENDRA PRASAD GUPTA (1997 6 SCC 207),that the concerned authority is not expected to make a rovingenquiry into the ownership of the lands in question. If notices hadbeen served at the addresses recorded in the revenue records, theprocedure prescribed for such service of notices would have beensatisfied. In the case of the petitioners, notices had been served,as per the procedures prescribed by law and most of them hadparticipated in the enquiry proceedings. 53. It had also been submitted that the objections had beenraised, regarding the alignment of the road, stating that porambokelands were available on the eastern side of the proposed alignment.In JAYABHERI PROPERTIES (P) LTD., Vs. STATE OF A.P. (2010 (5) SCC590), the Supreme Court had held that, in the facts and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ circumstances of a given case, public interest would outweigh theinterest of individual plot owners, especially, with regard to theaspect of fixing of the alignment of the road concerned andtherefore, the proposed alignment of the outer ring road project forHyderabad and Secunderabad had been upheld. Further, the First Benchof this Court had held, in R.KUMAR Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2007 (2)MLJ 384), that the question of alignment is best left to theauthorities concerned. The State always has the power to acquire anyland for a public purpose, and once compensation is given, the poweris complete. There being no deviation or violation of any procedureestablished by law, a party cannot have any legal grievance. In thepresent case, the alignment of the outer ring road project had beendecided by the authorities concerned and the same had been approvedby the state Government. Any change in the alignment would give riseto new technical problems. At this juncture it would be appropriateto note that a Division Bench of this Court, in CHENNAI METROPOLITANDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY REP. BY ITS MEMBER SECRETARY, CHENNAI – 600008 Vs. LAKSHMI NAGAR RESIDENTS WELFARE ASSOCIATION, REPL BY ITSPRESIDENT, THIRUNINDRAVUR (W.A.No.603 of 1999), by its order, dated19.9.2000, had rejected similar contentions raised on behalf of theland owners. Thus, it is clear that the respondents had followed allthe procedures prescribed for the acquisition of the lands inquestion. As such, the impugned notification, as well as the otherprocedures followed by the respondents, are valid in the eye of law.54. It has also been submitted that the acquisition of thelands in question is for the public purpose of building the roads,in order to prevent the congestion of the traffic in the city. Eventhough Phase-I of the project had already been completed, the wholeproject had been delayed, in view of the pendency of the presentlitigations initiated by some of the owners of the lands. Most ofthe owners of the lands, acquired by the respondents for the OuterRing Road Project, had accepted the compensation, without anyprotest. 55. It has also been stated that, in RAMNIKLAL N.BHUTTA Vs.STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (1997 1 SCC 134), it has been held that thecourts have to weigh the public interest, as against the privateinterest, while exercising their power, under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, even if it is found that the acquisitionproceedings are vitiated on account of the non-compliance of certainlegal requirements. The persons interested may only be entitled tocertain specified amounts to be awarded as damages. Therefore, whenappropriate reliefs could be granted, by way of compensation, thequashing of the acquisition proceedings may not be the only solutionto redress the grievance of such interested persons. The saiddecision had been reiterated by the supreme Court, in GIRIASINVESTMENT (P) LTD., AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA (2008) 7 SCC https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 53) holding that though the rights of an individual whose propertyis sought to be acquired must be scrupulously respected, anacquisition for the benefit of public at large is not to be lightlyquashed and extraordinary reasons must exist for doing so. In suchcircumstances, the contentions raised on behalf of the petitionersare not sustainable in the eye of law. Hence, the writ petitions areliable to be dismissed, as they are devoid of merits. 56. It is seen that the main contentions raised on behalf ofthe petitioners are as follows:56.1. It has been submitted that the government of Tamil Naduhad not taken the decision to notify the lands in question for thepurpose of acquiring the said land for the Outer Ring Road Project,even though the notifications state that the Government had takensuch a decision. The District Collector, Thiruvallur District, hadmisrepresented the facts stating that the Government had taken thedecision for acquiring the lands in question. As such, it is afraudulent and colourable exercise of power and therefore, it isinvalid in the eye of law. 56.2. It has also been submitted that the District Collectorconcerned did not have the pecuniary jurisdiction to issue theimpugned notifications, since, the impugned notifications are inrespect of lands, the value of which exceeds Rs.25,00,000/-, even ifit could be assumed that the division of the lands proposed to beacquired into units and blocks is correct and valid. 56.3. It had also been submitted that the respondents had notproduced the necessary records to show that the District Collectorconcerned had applied his mind in fixing the rate for the lands.There is nothing on record to show the basis on which the rates hadbeen fixed. Further, the value of the buildings in the lands soughtto be acquired, by the respondents, exceeds the limit fixed for thedetermination of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the DistrictCollector. When there are vacant lands available on the eastern sideof the proposed alignment of the road, as poramboke lands, there isno proper explanation from the respondents to justify theacquisition of lands belonging to the petitioners, which are forminga part of the approved layouts concerned. Enormous amounts of moneyare being spent by the State Government for acquiring the lands,when poramboke lands, belonging to the Government, are available. 56.4. The right of the citizen available under Article 300-A ofthe Constitution of India cannot be taken away, except by the dueprocedures established by law. Even the splitting of the lands intounits and blocks had been done in an arbitrary manner, there is nopublication of the substance of the notifications in the locality https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ concerned. There is no evidence of the announcement regarding theacquisition, by way of 'tom tom'. 56.5. It had also been claimed that form 3 notices should havebeen issued only by the District Collector, whereas, it is theSpecial Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), who had issued the saidnotices. The respondents have not been in a position to show theavailability of form 3 notices in the schedule. Further, the recordsproduced on behalf of the respondents should substantiate theprocedures followed during the land acquisition proceedings,specifically. As per Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, noevidentiary value can be attached to the documents. The documentsrelied on by the respondents are not in the prescribed form. Theimproper maintenance by the respondents would go to show theirlackadaisical attitude, in respect of the impugned land acquisitionproceedings. While the Outer Ring Road project is said to be apublic purpose, there is no proper reason shown by the respondentsfor the acquisition of larger extents of lands, which are meant forcommercial purpose. No clear reasons had been given for the earlierrealignment of the proposed road. 56.6. It had also been stated that the Chennai MetropolitanDevelopment Authority had not filed a counter, denying the claimsmade on behalf of the petitioners. Hence, adverse inference had tobe drawn against the land acquisition proceedings. It had also beenstated that the order passed by this Court, on 19.9.2000, in thewrit appeal, in W.A.No.603 of 1999, is not binding on thepetitioners, based on the principle of res judicata, as it had beenobtained by fraud. Further, the Division Bench order does notconclusively deal with the issue regarding the alignment. Since, theissues raised in the present writ petitions had not been raised inthe earlier writ petition filed by the land owners, the principle ofres judicata would not be applicable to the present case. Therefore,the State Government should be directed to consider the aspect ofre-alignment of the proposed road. The State Government ought tohave considered the technical, as well as the economic aspects ofthe land acquisition proceedings before arriving at a finalconclusion. The decision making process of the respondents aretotally arbitrary in nature, violating the wednesbury principle.Since, the acquisition of land is also for commercial purpose andfor the construction of residential houses, as seen from the recordsavailable, the acquisition proceedings cannot be said to be purelyfor a public purpose. Since, Section 4(1) notifications had beenissued by the authority concerned, without having the jurisdictionto do so and as the Section 5-A enquiry proceedings had not beenconducted, as per the procedure established by law, the entire landacquisition proceedings in question would be invalid and void. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

57. Mr.P.S.Raman, the learned Advocate General appearing forMr.M.Dhandapani, the learned Special Government Pleader , appearingon behalf of the respondents 1, 3, 4 and 5 had submitted, in hisreply, that the Government of Tamil Nadu is the authority empoweredto acquire the lands necessary for a public purpose. The StateGovernment had authorised the District Collector, ThiruvallurDistrict, to acquire the lands in question for the purpose of phaseII of the Outer Ring Road Project. The fixing of the value of thelands had been done, based on a valid valuation report. However, theclaim made on behalf of the petitioners, for enhanced compensation,cannot vitiate the entire land acquisition proceedings. In fact, 90percent of the land owners had accepted the award. Since, there isno mala fide intention on the part of the respondents, in the landacquisition proceedings under challenge, the said proceedings cannotbe held to be invalid in the eye of law. The order of the DivisionBench of this Court, in W.A.No.603 of 1999, operates as res judicataagainst the petitioners in the present writ petitions. All the pleasraised by the petitioners had already been rejected by this Court inthe said order. No instructions had been given by the StateGovernment for the acquisition of lands for commercial purpose. Asthe enquiry proceedings had been conducted by the authorityconcerned, as per Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, bygiving sufficient opportunity of representation to the petitioners,it cannot be said that such enquiry is invalid in the eye of law. 58. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of therespondents had relied on the decision in EXECUTIVE ENGINEER ANDADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, VELLORE Vs.S.GOVINDARAJ (2004) 1 M.L.J.381), wherein it has been held that aplain reading of Sections 4(1) and 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, make it clear that the Act itself provides the period oflimitation of 30 days from the date of the publication of theSection 4(1) notification. As such, the land acquisition proceedingsof the respondents, for the formation of phase II of the Outer RingRoad between Thiruvallur Road and Thiruvotriyur Ponneri PanjettyRoad, for a distance of 33.1 kilo meters cannot be held to becontrary to the procedures established by law. As such, the writpetitions are devoid of merits and therefore, they are liable to bedismissed. 59. In view of the averments made in the affidavits filed insupport of the writ petitions and in the counter affidavits filed onbehalf of the respondents and in view of the submissions made by thelearned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioners, as well asthe respondents, and in view of the decisions cited by them, thisCourt is of the considered view that the petitioners have not shownsufficient cause or reason to grant the reliefs, as prayed for bythem in the present writ petitions. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

60. From the records placed before this Court, it is seen thatthe Government of Tamil Nadu had approved the proposal of theChennai Metropolitan Development Authority, for the development ofthe Outer Ring Road, between Thiruvallur Road and ThiruvotriyurPonneri Panjetty Road, for a distance of 33.1 kilo meters, in itsorder, in G.O.Ms.No.381, Housing and urban Development (UD III-1)Department, dated 25.5.1993. In its order, in G.O.Ms.No.303, Housingand Urban Development Department, dated 2.7.1996, the StateGovernment had sanctioned the creation of four land acquisitionunits, comprising of the Special Tahsildar, (LA) and a supervisoryunit headed by a District Revenue Officer, (LA), along with thenecessary supporting staff. The District Revenue Officer (LA) haddivided the entire extent of land, proposed to be acquired andallotted for the purpose of the Outer Ring Road project into fourunits. The lands in Poonamallee Taluk, including those inThirunindravur village, had been allotted to Special Tahsildar (LandAcquisition) Unit IV. The acquisition of 10.49.5 hectares of land,in Thirunindravur Village, Poonamallee Taluk, Thiruvallur District,has been split into eight blocks. The necessary notifications, underSection 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, had been approved bythe District Collector, Thiruvallur District. Thereafter, they hadbeen published in the Thiruvallur District Gazette and in thelocality concerned. The notification had been published in the localnewspapers and had also been announced, by way of ‘tom tom’.Enquiries had been conducted, as per Section 5-A of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894. The objections of the land owners had beenforwarded to the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, therequisitioning body, and their remarks had been received. Theobjections raised by the land owners had been duly considered.Thereafter, the awards had been passed, acquiring the lands inquestion. 61. It has also been noted that the necessary publication hadbeen made, within the period of 30 days, as mandated under Section 4(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The land owners had beengiven a reasonable opportunity to file their objections, if any, andnecessary publication had been made. After considering theobjections raised by the land owners, the awards had been passed.Therefore, it is not open to the petitioners to challenge the landacquisition proceedings, at this belated stage. However, it would beopen to them to seek the relief of enhancement of the amount ofcompensation by approaching the concerned Court, under Section 18 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 62. It is also seen that the issue regarding the realignment ofthe road, raised in W.A.No.603 of 1999, had already been rejected bya Division Bench of this Court, by its order, dated 19.9.2000. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

63. It is also clear from the decisions of the First Bench ofthis Court, in R.KUMAR Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU (2007 (2) MLJ 384)and as held by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in JAYAPHERI(P) LTD., Vs. STATE OF A.P. (2010) 5 SCC 590), that the issueregarding the alignment of the road in question is to be decided bythe experts, who are concerned with it and therefore, it is not forthis Court to decide the issue raised by the petitioners relating tothe alignment of the road in question, forming a part of the OuterRing Road project. Further, the petitioners have not been in aposition to substantiate their claim that they are residing in thelands sought to be acquired by the respondents said to be forming apart of the approved layouts concerned.64. It is also seen that the State Government had granted itsapproval for the formation of the Outer Ring Road, in the year,1993, whereas the approval of the layouts is said to have been givenonly in the year, 1994. However, in view of the well establishedconcept of 'Eminent Domain', it is open to the appropriateGovernment to acquire the lands found to be necessary for publicpurposes, even if it is found to be in conflict with certain privateinterests. 65. It is also seen that the petitioners have not been in aposition to sufficiently substantiate their claims that the DistrictCollector, Thiruvallur District, does not have the jurisdiction toissue the notifications under section 4(1) of the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894. The valuation of the lands, as given by the petitioners,cannot be the basis on which it could be held that the value of theacquired lands, which had been divided into units and blocks, ismore than Rs.25,00,000/-. There is nothing shown on behalf of thepetitioners for this Court to come to the conclusion that thedivision of the lands, into units and blocks, has been done in amala fide manner. It is for the concerned Government to approve suchdivisions of the lands for the sake of administrative convenience. 66. Once it is found that the procedures prescribed underSection 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, had been followed bythe respondents, it cannot be said that sufficient opportunity hadnot been given to the petitioners to raise their objections. Thereis nothing to show that the respondents had not sent the necessarynotices to the petitioners, asking them to raise their objections,if any, by way of registered post, with acknowledgment due. Inrespect of those notices, which had been returned unserved, therespondents had served the notices, by affixture. It is the claim ofthe respondents that the notices had been issued to their addresses,as found in the revenue records. In such circumstances, it cannot beheld that the enquiry conducted by the authorised authority wasimproper, illegal and void. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

67. The petitioners have not been in a position to establishtheir claim that the acquisition of the lands, said to be belongingto the petitioners, is not for a public purpose. 68. The allegation of the petitioner that a portion of the landhad been acquired both for commercial, as well as for residentialpurposes, had not been established, by necessary evidence. It isrelevant to cite the decision of the Supreme Court, in WASTEPRODUCTS RECLAIMOR PRIVATE LTD Vs. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. (1993SUPP (2) SCC 358), wherein, it has been held as follows:"6. The main objection of the raiyats in the otherappeal is that the notification under Section 6 has notbeen published in the Official Gazette and was publishedonly in the District Gazette and since the same is not inaccordance with the provisions of Section 6, theacquisition proceedings should be quashed. This is ahighly technical objection. The raiyats never raised anyobjection for so many years but sought to intervene forthe first time in the High Court." 69. As such, it cannot be said that the land acquisitionproceedings initiated by the respondents, for the acquisition of thelands, for the Outer Ring Road project, is vitiated by proceduralirregularities and in violation of the provisions of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, in the given facts andcircumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that theprocedures prescribed by the various provisions of the said Act hasbeen shown to be complied with, by the respondents. In suchcircumstances, the contentions raised on behalf of the petitionerscannot be countenanced. As such, the writ petitions are devoid ofmerits and therefore, they are liable to be dismissed. Hence, theyare dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected M.Ps are closed. Sd/- Asst.Registrar. /true copy/ Sub Asst.Registrar.lan https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To:1. The Secretary The Government of Tamil Nadu Housing and Urban Development Fort St. George, Chennai – 92. The Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority Rep. by its Member Secretary No.8, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore Chennai – 83. The Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Land Administration Chepauk, Chennai – 600 005 4. The District Collector Thiruvallore District Thiruvallore5. The Special Tahsildar (LA) Plan-IV, Outer Ring Road CMDA, No.8, Gandhi Irwin Road Egmore, Chennai -86. The Pallavan Consultancy Services Ltd., rep. by its Managing Director CMDA Building, Egmore, Chennai-67. The SecretaryGovernment of TamilnaduTransport DepartmentFort St. George,Chenani-98. The Special TahsildarOuter Ring Road, KoyambeduChennai-921 cc to Government Pleader, Sr. 865353 ccs to M/s. M. Christella, Advocate, r. 85966 to 859681 cc to Mr.N. Subramaniyan, Advocate, Sr. 85971.W.P. Nos.761,762,763,764 and 765 of 2010, W.P.Nos.13287,13288and 13289 of 2009, W.P.Nos.29223,29224,29225,29226,29227 and29228 of 2007, W.P.No.29315 of 2007, W.P.No.27926 of 2007, W.P.No.28522 of 2007, W.P.No.4362 of 2010, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ W.P.Nos.2940,2941,2942,2943,2944,2945,2946,2947 and 2948 of 2010, W.P.No.3924 of 2010, W.P.No.3925 of 2010,W.P.Nos.11383, 11384, 11385,11386,11387 and 11388 of 2008, W.P.Nos.11389,11390,11391,11392,11393 and 11394 of 2008,W.P.Nos.7641,7642,7643,7644,7645,7646,7647,7648,7649,7650,7651,7652 and 7653 of 2008, W.P.No.7495 of 2010,W.P.No.19482 of 2009, W.P.No.14496 of 2010,W.P.Nos.11395,11396,11397,11398,11399,11400 of 2008,W.P.Nos.11401,11402,11403,11404 and 11405 of 2008, andW.P.No.18374 of 2010 kk,km,sr,pmk 28/12