Lakshmanan v. G.Ayyasamy
Case at a glance
Outcome
Disposed of
The second appeals are disposed of accordingly
Provisions considered
Key paragraphs
- Para 99. The gist and kernal of the arguements of the learned counsel forthe appellants/defendants would run thus: (i) It is quite obvious and axiomatic that the defendants are havingno land belonging to them situated to the West of the defendants main walland in such a…
- Para 1717. Accordingly, if viewed it is clear that the defendants themselvescategorically and candidly, pellucidly and palpably admit that theplaintiff is the owner of the suit property, over which the defendantsclaimed such easementary right. Without having regard to this fundamentalprinciple of law, the Courts below decided…
- Para 1818. By virtue of Order 41 Rule 33, this Court, while dealing with thematter of this nature should necessarily rectify the error of lawcommitted by the Courts below. Accordingly, if viewed it is clear thatthe first appellate Court was wrong in its approach in holding…
Judgment
(a) The respondent herein, as plaintiff, has filed the suit seekingthe following reliefs: "to pass a judgement and decree against the defendant;a) Restraining the defendants, their men, agents, servantsin anyway disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment ofthe suit property by the plaintiff encroaching or any manner bymeans of permanent injunction.b) directing the defendants to remove the three windowsand the eaves of the tiled roof projection towards the suitproperty situated in the eaves of the tiled roof projectiontowards the suit property situated in the North South Wall inthe eastern boundary of the suit property by means of mandatoryinjunction.."(extracted as such)(b) The defendants resisted the suit by filing written statementalong with the counter claim making the following claims: "to declare the defendants' easementary right of accessover the eastern vacant site of the suit property for whitewashing, repairing and maintaining their western "AB" walldescribed in the schedule and consequential permanent injunctionrestraining the plaintiff from in any way interfering with theirright of entry into the eastern vacant site of the suit propertyfor the purposes of white washing, repairing and maintaining'AB" wall:to declare the defendants' easementary right of projectionof eaves of their western tiled roof into the suit property andconsequential permanent injunction restraining the plaintifffrom cutting down the projecting eaves and draining rain waterfalling therefrom into the suit property; to direct the plaintiff to pay the costs of counter claim.
"(c) Whereupon the trial Court framed the issues. The plaintiff his side examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.W.2 and P.W.3 and markedEx.A1 to A13. On the defendants' side, the second defendant examinedhimself as D.W.1 along with D.W.2 and D.W.3 and and marked Exs.B1 B15. Exs.C1 and C2 were marked as Court documents. (d) The trial Court dismissed the suit as well as the counter claim, however, granted the reliefs in favour of both to the effect that the areasituated to the Western wall of the is the common pathway for bothplaintiff and the defendants and they should enjoy by putting up a gate the entrance. (e) Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement anddecree of the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred the appeal and thedefendants filed the cross-appeal. The appellate Court reversed thejudgement and decree of the trial Court to the effect that the defendantshave no right of ingress and egress into the suit property.
However, theappellate Court allowed the aerial projection of the defendants' roof https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ continue. 4. Challenging and impugning the judgement and decree of theappellate Court, the defendants preferred the second appeal on variousgrounds, inter alia to the effect that the defendants would be having opportunity of repairing their Western side wall without entering intothe suit property.5. The following substantial questions of law are found suggested both the second appeals: "a) Whether in law is not the lower appellate Court wrongin reversing the decree and judgement of the trial Court in theabsence of seeking declaration of title.b) Has not the lower appellate Court erred in overlookingthat the plaintiff has to prove his case and cannot succeed onthe weakness of the defendant.c) Has not the lower appellate Court omitted to see thatthe Order in Ex.A7 has become final and in the absence ofchallenging the same as well as Ex.B2 sale deed by theplaintiff, they cannot be ignored.
"6. Heard both sides regarding the substantial question of law to framed and accordingly, the following substantial questions of law areframed. (i) Whether the trial Court was justified in rejecting theprayer of the defendants in the counter claim for having theprojection of the roof of the defendants over the suit propertywhich belong to the plaintiff and whether the first appellateCourt was justified in reversing the said finding relating tothe aforesaid relief by ordering that such projection of theroof of the defendants could exist, so as to enable the rainwater to fall into the suit property of the plaintiff withoutthe backing of the law in support of the appellate Court'sfinding?(ii) Whether the first appellate Court was right inreversing the finding of the trial Court, in the absence of anylaw supporting the findings of the appellate Court, which heldthat the defendants should have ingress and egress into the suitproperty of the plaintiff to whitewash and repair the wall ofthe defendants?(iii) Whether there is any perversity or illegality in thejudgements passed by both the Courts below?7. Points (i) to (iii): All these points are taken together fordiscussion as they are interwoven and interlinked, interconnected andentwined with one another.8. Both sides advanced arguments in this connection. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/
The gist and kernal of the arguements of the learned counsel forthe appellants/defendants would run thus: (i) It is quite obvious and axiomatic that the defendants are havingno land belonging to them situated to the West of the defendants main walland in such a case, in order to repair the said wall of the defendants, necessarily, the defendants have to have ingress and egress into theplaintiff's property, which is a suit property and carry out repairs the defendants' wall. (ii) The appellate Court, without having any regard for this apparentfactual as well as the legal position, simply dismissed the prayer of thedefendants. (iii) The trial Court erroneously rejected the prayer of thedefendants to have the defendants' roof projecting over the suit propertyand that right was acquired by the plaintiff by continuous enjoyment forover 80 years, whereas, the first appellate Court so far that relief concerned, correctly decided in favour of the defendants. (iv) The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants would pray forsetting aside the judgement and decree of the first appellate Court rejecting the prayer of the defendants for declaring their easement rightto have ingress and egress into the suit property for repairing the Western side wall of the defendants. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants praysfor allowing the second appeals.
By way of torpedoing and pulverising the arguements as put forthand set forth on the side of the appellants/defendants, the learnedcounsel for the respondent/plaintiff would submit thus: (i) The the defendants are having no right of ingress and egress intothe suit property, which exclusively belonged to the plaintiff and thedefendants cannot have their roof projecting over the suit property. (ii) Even though no appeal has been preferred as against the firstappellate Court's judgement in granting the relief of the eaves projectingover the suit property, in favour of the defendants, still this Court, while comprehensively deciding these appeals, by virtue of Order 41 Rule33 could decide the entire lis, in the interest of justice, that thedefendants are not having any right to have eaves projecting over the suitproperty.
At the outset itself I recollect and call up the followingmaxims: "(i) Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est Usque ad coelum' – The person who owns the soil owns up to the sky. (ii) 'Superficies solo cedit' – The surface goes with the land. (iii) 'Sic Utere Tuo ut alienum non laedas' – Use your property so as not to damage aother's. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/
The owner of the property is entitled to have his right exercisedup to the sky and in such a case aerial projection cannot be permitted.
I would like to refer to the relevant passages in the famoustreatise 'The Law of Torts ((25th Edition 2006 page 374):"Tresspass, in its widest sense, signifies anytransgression or offence against the law of nature, of society, or of the country, whether relating to a man's person or to hisproperty. But the most obvious acts of trespass are – (1)trespass quare clausum fregit "because he (the defendant) brokeor entered into the close" or lad of the plaintiff; and (2)trespass de bonis asportatis, wrongful taking of goods orchattels. Here we are concerned with the former, i.e.trespassto land. Trespass to land is also an offence under the Indian PenalCode (s.441) provided the requisite intent is present. To constitute the wrong of trespass neither force, norunlawful intention, nor actual damage, nor the breaking of anenclosure is necessary. "Every invasion of private property, beit ever so minute, is a trespass.
"Trespass may be committed (1) by entering upon the land ofthe plaintiff, or (2) by remaining there, or (3) by doing an actaffecting the sole possession of the plaintiff, in each casewithout justification. (1) Entry is essential to constitute a trespass.A man is not liable for a trespass committed involuntarily, but he is liable if the entry is intentional, even though madeunder a mistake, e.g.,if, in mowing in his own land, a maninadvertently allows his blade to cut through into hisneighbour's field, heh is guilty of a trespass. Notwithstandingthe decision of Court of Appeal in Letang v. Cooper, approvingFowler v. Lanning, which lays down that intention is a necessaryelement to constitutes trespass to person, it is still the lawthat an entry upon another's land constitutes trespass to landwhether or not the entrant knows that he is trespassing. If thedefendant consciously enters upon a land believing it to be hisown but which turns out to be of the plaintiff, he is liable fortrespass.
But a person is not liable if the entry isinvoluntary, e.g., when he is thrown upon the land by someoneelse. In such a situation, there is no act of entry at all bythe defendant. It is also possible that the defendant maysuccessfully plead inevitable accident in his defence. The presumption is that he who owns the surface of landowns all the underlying strata. So an entry, beneath thesurface at whatever depth, is an actionable trespass at theinstance of the owner of surface. But it is possible that theunderlying strata may be in possession of a different person,e.g., when mining rights are held by a person who is not inpossession of the surface. So if the surface of land is in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ possession of A and the subsoil in possession of B, entry on thesurface will be trespass against A and entry in the subsoil willbe trespass against B, e.g., a tunnel dug from the adjoiningland; and in case of a vertical hole dug on the land that wouldbe trespass both against A and B.. . . . . . . . . . (3) Every interference with the land of another, e.g.,throwing stones or materials over a neighbour's land, is deemedconstructive entry and amounts to trespass.
Deliberateplacement of matter, e.g., jettisoning of oil, in suchcircumstances, as will carry it to the land of the plaintiff bynatural forces, may constitute trespass. The matter may not betangible; if may be gas or invisible fumes.A trespass may be committed by driving a nail into aperson's wall, or by placing anything against his wall, or byshooting over his land, or by placing anything above andoverhanging his land, or by planting trees in his land, orplacing any chattel upon his land, or causing any physicalobject or noxious substance to cross the boundary of his land. But trespass of the nature described above must be distinguishedfrom private nuisance which resembles trespass. The distinctionis important for trespass is actionable per se whereas nuisanceis actionable only on proof of damage. The distinction lies inthe nature of the injury whether it is direct or consequential. If the injury is direct, it is trespass; whereas, if the injuryto the plaintiff is consequential it is a case of nuisance.
Ifa person throws stones on the neighbour's land, it is trespass. If a person plants a tree on his land the roots of which aftersome years undermine the foundation of the neighbour's building, it is nuisance. Discharge of filthy water on plaintiff's landfrom a spout in defendant's house is trespass. 2(B) Aerial Trespass The owner of land is entitled to the column of air spaceabove the surface ad infinitum. The ordinary rule of law isthat whoever has got the site – is the owner of everything up tothe sky and down to the centre of the earth. An ordinaryproprietor of land can cut and remove a wire placed at anyheight above his land. At least in modern times, this is anoverstatement. The correct view is that the owner's right toair and space above his land is restricted to such height as isnecessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and thestructures on it. If the rule were as used to be statedearlier, it would lead to the absurdity of a trespass at commonlaw being committed by a satellite every time it passes over asuburbun garden. If a man were to erect a building overhangingthe land of another, he would commit trespass and an actionwould lie against him. "
I would also like to refer to Section 15 of the Indian Easements https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Act, 1882, which is relating to acquisition by prescription and alsoSection 17, which would contemplate that certain rights cannot be acquiredby prescription: "Section 15. Acquisition by prescription – Where the accessand use of light or air to and for any building have beenpeaceably enjoyed therewith, as an easement, withoutinterruption, and for twenty years, and where support from one person's land, or things affixedthereto, has been peaceably received by another person's landsubjected to artificial pressure or by things affixed thereto, as an easement, without interruption, and for twenty years, and where a right of way or any other easement has beenpeaceably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming titlethereto, as an easement, and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or air, supportor other easement, shall be absolute. Each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken tobe a period ending within two years next before the institutionof the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates iscontested. "Section 17. Rights which cannot be acquired by prescription– Easements acquired under Section 15 are said to be acquired byprescription, and are called prescriptive rights. None of the following rights can be so acquired - (a) a right which would tend to the total destruction ofthe subject of the right, or the property on which, if theacquisition were made, liability would be imposed; (b) a right to the free passage of light or air to an openspace ground; (c) a right to surface-water not flowing in a stream andnot permanently collected in a pool, tank or otherwise; (d) a right to underground water not passing in a definedchannel. "
The above provisions of law and the passages extracted supra fromthe famous treatise on Law of Torts would amply make the point clear thatthe defendants should arrange their own roof in such a manner that therain water falling on their roof does not flow into the suit property. There is nothing to indicate and exemplify that the suit property is thejoint property of the plaintiff and the defendants. In fact, from a mereperusal of the written statement and the counter claim, it is clear thatthe defendants claim only easementary right to have ingress and egressinto the suit property, which is situated to the West of the defendants'wall and they also pray for retaining the projection over that suitproperty, as an easement only.
At this juncture, I would like to extract hereunder Section 4 the Indian Easements Act, 1881:"Section 4. "Easement" defined – An easement is a right https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ which the owner or occupier of certain land possesses, as such, for the beneficial enjoyment of that land, to do and continueto do something, or to prevent and continue to prevent somethingbeing done, in or upon, or in respect of, certain other land nothis own. Dominant and servient heritages and owners – The land forthe beneficial enjoyment of which the right exists is called thedominant heritage, and the owner or occupier thereof thedominant owner; the land on which the liability is imposed iscalled the servient heritage, and the owner or occupier thereofthe servient owner. "Here the plaintiff is the owner of the servient heritage and thedefendants are the owners of the dominant heritage.
Accordingly, if viewed it is clear that the defendants themselvescategorically and candidly, pellucidly and palpably admit that theplaintiff is the owner of the suit property, over which the defendantsclaimed such easementary right. Without having regard to this fundamentalprinciple of law, the Courts below decided the lis, warrantinginterference in second appeal.
By virtue of Order 41 Rule 33, this Court, while dealing with thematter of this nature should necessarily rectify the error of lawcommitted by the Courts below. Accordingly, if viewed it is clear thatthe first appellate Court was wrong in its approach in holding that thedefendants could have the eaves of the roof of the defendants' projectingover the suit property belonging to the plaintiff.
At this context, I would like to refer certain excerpts from the Broom's Legal Maxims (Tenth Edition – page Nos.238 and 240):'Sic Utere tuo ut alienum non laedas' – Enjoy your ownproperty in such a manner as not to injure that of anotherperson.A man must enjoy his own property in such a manner as notto invade the legal rights of his neighbour: expedit reipublicaene sua re quis male utatur. "Every man," observed Lord Truro,"is restricted against using his property to the prejudice ofothers"; and :the principle embodied in the maxim, sic utere tuout alienum non laedas, applies to the public in at least as fullforce as to individuals. . . . . . . . . . . . . In trespass quare clausum fregit, the defendantpleaded that he had land adjoining plaintiff's close, and uponit a hedge of thorns; that he cut the thorns, and that they, ipso invito, fell upon the plaintiff's land, and the defendanttook them off as soon as he could. On demurrer, judgment wasgiven for the plaintiff, on the ground that, "though a man do alawful thing, yet if damage thereby befalls another, he shallanswer it, if he could have avoided it". . . . . . . . . https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The following instances will serve to show in what mannerthe maxim placed at the head of these remarks is applied, toimpose restrictions, first, upon the enjoyment of property andsecondly, upon the conduct of each individual member of thecommunity. In illustration of the first branch of the subject, we may observe, that, if a man build a house so close to minethat his roof overhangs mine, and throws the water off upon it, this is a nuisance, for which an action lies. . . . . "
As such, necessarily, the defendants should remove their roof'sprojection over the suit property in such a manner that it is notprojecting over the suit property of the plaintiff and that the rain waterfalling from the defendants roof should be arranged in such a manner thatit is not falling into the suit property and for that the defendants haveto take remedial measures and any one having civil engineering knowledgeor an experienced mason would be able to guide the defendants to make sucharrangements.
The next phase of the dispute involved in this case is as whether the defendants could have ingress and egress into the suitproperty, so as to whitewash and repair the defendants wall.
In this connection, the learned counsel for theappellants/defendants cited the following two decisions of this Court. (i) 1965 (II) M.L.J. 522 – L.DAMODARASWAMI NAIDU VS.S.T.DAMODARASWAMI NAIDU, certain excerpts from it would run thus: ". . . My attention was drawn by the learned counsel to a recentdecision of Veeraswami,J., in Kamalammal v. Chakravrthy. It wasnot necessary to discuss the question because the Court in thatcase was not called upon to decide whether this right of accesswas a necessary easement that would attach to every wall. Therein referring to Bhagavatulu Subramanya Sastri v.Bhagavatula Lakshminarasimhan, the learned Judge has observed asfollows: "In that case all that was held was that a house owner inorder to repair his wall on his neighbour's side of the premiseshad the right to go to the other side of the wall on the land ofhis neighbour, the right being in the nature of a necessaryeasement.'. . . . . . . . . In the view I take, and as the facts ofthe present case differ from the facts of the decision in Bhagavatula Subramanya Sastri v.
Bhagavatula Lakshminarasimhan.I prefer to follow the decision of Krishnaswami Naidu, J., andhold that the plaintiff in this case has the right he claims togo over the vacant space of the defendant to carry on repairs tothe exposed northern wall. It may be rested as an urbanservitude customarily enjoyed or on the facts of this case as agrant implied from the existence of the wall for over twenty https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ years at the very extremity of the property.. . . . . In my view as in Bhagavatula Subramanya Sastri v.Bhagavatula Lakshminarasimhan, it would be sufficient if theplaintiff is permitted to go on the defendant land for repairingthe wall in question once a year. He must, as provided by thetrial Court give a fortnight's notice in writing at the timewhen he intends to make the repairs. The repairs, as alreadyprovided should be between 9 a.m. And 5 p.m.and shall not exceedfour days in the year.
(ii) 1965 (II) M.L.J.241 – N.KAMALAMMAL,WIFE OF A.MANJIA PILLAI S.CHAKRAARTHY AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus: ". . . . . It is settled that there is no other access tothe southern wall and therefore the appellant has an easement bynecessity. On behalf of the appellant reliance is placed on Bhagavatula Subramanaya Sastry v. Bhagavatulu Lakshminarasimhan. In that case al that was held was that a house owner in order torepair his wall on his neighbour's side of the premises had theright to go to the other side of the wall on the land of hisneighbour, the right being in the nature of a necessaryeasement. But it was also pointed out in that case that such aneasement did not extend to going over the neighbour's roof forthat purpose. But that is what the appellant precisely wants inthis case, namely, to have access, through the staircase, to theopen terrace of the 1st respondent's house, so that she mighteffect repairs to her southern wall, and the windows on thatwall. Apart from that, the trial Court as a matter of factfound that there were other methods of attending to the repairsfrom within the property of the plaintiff himself. That findingis clearly fatal to the claim of easement of necessity. "
The above excerpts from the famous treatise and also the aboveprovisions of the Easements Act cited supra would unambiguously andunequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that a owner of particular house is having a right to go into his neighbour's land for thepurpose of repairing his outer side wall and also for whitewashing thesame. In such a case, I am at a loss to understand as to how the firstappellate Court simply reversed the finding of the trial Court regardingthe right of the defendants to have ingress and egress into the suitproperty for effecting such whitewashing and repairing.
No doubt, the trial Court was also not right in holding as thoughthe suit property is the common property of both the plaintiff and thedefendants and here that was not the plea of the defendants themselves.
To the risk of repetition and pleonasm, but without beingtautalogous I would like to hold that the very claim of the defendantsthat they are having only easement right over the suit property wouldexemplify and demonstrate that they are not claiming joint ownership overthe suit property. Holding that the suit property is a common property https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ different from holding that the defendants are having easementary rightover the suit property for the purpose of effecting whitewashing andrepairing the Western side wall of their house.
The defendants, without going into the suit property cannot, virtually, as revealed by the sketch available on record, effectwhitewashing or repairing and in such a case, the first appellate Courtwas wrong in rejecting the prayer of the defendants to that extent.
In the result, the substantial questions of law are answered under: Substantial Question of law (i) is decided to the effectthat the trial Court was justified in rejecting the prayer ofthe defendants in the counter claim for having the roof of thesuit property, which belongs to the plaintiff and the firstappellate Court was not justified in reversing the said findingrelating to the aforesaid relief by ordering that suchprojection could exist. In other words, the substantialquestion of law (i) is decided to the effect that the defendantsshould remove the eaves of the roof projecting over the suitproperty of the plaintiff. Substantial question of law (ii) is decided to the effectthat the first appellate Court was wrong in reversing thefinding of the trial Court that the defendants should haveingress and egress to the suit property of the plaintiff towhitewash and repair the wall of the defendants. In otherwords, the trial Court's finding that the said area situated tothe West of the Western wall of the defendants is a common pathway is wrong, but the trial Courts recognition of the right ofthe defendants that the defendants should have ingress andegress to the plaintiff's area to whitewash and repair the wallof the defendants is justified. Substantial Question of law (iii) is answered to the effectthat since there was apparent perversity and illegality in thejudgements of both the Courts below in not properlyunderstanding the reliefs prayed and in granting the same, interference in the second appeal was warranted and that too, byinvoking Order 41 Rule 33 of C.P.C.
In order to make the point clear I would like to set out thereliefs to which the parties are entitled: (i) The defendants and their men shall have the right ofingress and egress into the suit property for the purpose ofwhitewashing as well as repairing the Western side wall of thedefendants house; and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (ii) The defendants shall remove the projection of thedefendants' roof over the suit property and make their ownarrangements to see that the rain water falling from the roof ofthe defendants is not falling into the suit property andaccordingly, the reliefs are granted.
Operative part
The second appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. Msk Sd/-xx 24.1.2011At the time of mentioning it has been brought to the knowledge both sides, the actual realities which occurred during the litigativeprocess. The trial Court while decreeing the suit did not grant anyrelief as prayed for either by the plaintiff in the plaint or by thedefendants in the counter claim about the retention of the windows in theconcerned wall of the defendants. As against such non granting of reliefin favour of the plaintiff, no appeal was filed, but cross appeal wasfiled by the plaintiff and there was nothing solid reffered to about thewindows.2. This Court while disposing of the second appeal adverted to thefacts and evidence and granted the relief by permitting the defendants have ingress and egress into the plaintiff's suit properly for the purposeof repairing the Western side wall of the defendants and also mandatedthat the defendants should remove the eaves of their roof over hanging the plaintiff's property, which is situated to the West of the Westernwall of the defendants.3.
In respect of the windows in the Western wall of the defendants, the prayer in the plaint was for removing those three windows, however, the counter claim filed before the trial Court, the defendants did noteven make any prayer for retaining those three windows. The trial Courtdismissed the prayer of the plaintiff as well as the defendants, butgranted the relief, on the trial Court's own understanding and discretionand the appellate Court did not grant any relief relating to the windows. In the counter claim filed in the trial Court also there is no prayer forretaining those windows by the defendants. The fact remains that as perthe findings of the trial Court, the suit came to be filed only in theyear 2002 and the windows had been in existence for nearly four years onlyanterior to the filing of the said suit and not for 20 years, so as attract the acquisition by prescription as contenmplated under Section of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, wherefore, the plaintiff was entitledto the relief of removal of those three windows in the Western wall of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ defendants and for closure of that area occupied by those windows and thedefendants shall comply with the same by closing down the windows.
SD/- Asst. Registrar True Copy Sub Asst. Registrar. To1.The Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore,2.The III Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore. 3. The Section Officer, V.R.Section, High court, Madras. +1cc to Mr.V.Bhiman, SR.No.5199/11+1cc to Mr.Ishtiaq Ahmed, SR.No.5241/11S.A.Nos.479 and 480 of 2008SA(CO)KPL/16.6.2011.
Questions this judgment answers
What did the Court decide in this case?
The Court recorded the following disposition: The second appeals are disposed of accordingly
Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?
Indian Easements Act, 1881 — s. 4; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. 41 r. 33; Indian Easements Act, 1882.
Which court decided this case, and when?
Madras High Court, on 24 Jan 2011. The bench was G RAJASURIA.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.