The Management of M.R.F. Ltd. v. S.N.D.Sampath & Ors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDated:23.01.2008Coram:The Honourable Mr.A.P.SHAH, CHIEF JUSTICEandThe Honourable Mr.Justice V.RAMASUBRAMANIANW.A.No. 1494 of 2007andM.P.No.1 of 20071. The Management of M.R.F. Ltd., rep. by its Chairman and Managing Director, Registered Office, No.124, Greams Road, Chennai – 600 006.2. The Senior General Manager, (Human Resources & Services) M.R.F. Ltd., 124, Greams Road, Chennai – 600 006.… AppellantsVs.1. S.N.D.Sampath2. The Special Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appellate Authority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947) D.M.S. Compound, Teynampet, Chennai – 600 006.3. M.K.Jose4. Sabu Verghese5. The General Manager (Marketing Operations) M.R.F. Limited, 124, Greams Road, Chennai – 600 006.… RespondentsAppeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against theorder passed in W.P.No. 22397 of 2004 dated 13.09.2007. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ WP.No.22397/2004 : Petition presented under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus,calling for the records of the first respondent in T.S.E.I.A.No.12 of2003 in T.S.E.No.4 of 2003 dated 23.12.2003 and quash the same andfurther direct the first respondent to dispose of the Appeal.For Appellant:::: Mr.Sanjay Mohan for M/s. Ramasubramaniam AssociatesFor Respondents:::: Mr.V.Prakash, Senior Counsel 1 for Mr.K.SudalaikannuJ U D G M E N TTHE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICEAdmit. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent waivesservice. By consent the appeal is taken up for hearing.2. Whether the appellate authority/second respondent hasjurisdiction to entertain the appeal preferred by the firstrespondent/employee under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops andEstablishments Act, 1947 (hereinafter for brevity’s sake referred to as‘the Act’) is the short question that falls for consideration in thisappeal filed by the Management of M.R.F Limited against the order passedby the learned single Judge in a writ petition filed by the firstrespondent. 3. The facts leading to the appeal are few and may be shortlystated. The first respondent joined the service of the appellant companyat its Registered Office at Chennai on 02.06.1980 as Clerk-cum-Typist,and was confirmed in service in January, 1981. He was subsequentlypromoted as Junior Assistant in the year 1983, and was transferred toBelgaum. Thereafter, he was promoted as Senior Assistant and transferredto Mangalore in the year 1988 and in the year 1996, he was promoted asManagement Assistant (MS-1). From Mangalore, he was transferred toPanaji, Goa in the year 2001. While he was working in Goa, he allegedlytendered resignation letter dated 18.01.2003 in his own writing, and thesame was accepted by the appellant company vide letter dated 21.01.2003.4. However, according to the first respondent, his resignation wasnot voluntary and while he was attending work in the sales depot on18.01.2003, the Operations Manager (West)/3rd respondent therein andMr.Sabu Verghese, Office Manager in the district office, Mumbai/4threspondent herein, came to the depot and asked from him a letter of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ resignation saying that the company has lost confidence in him and askedhim either to resign or to face the consequences. He had no intention toresign, but, however, due to pressure exerted on him, he gave the letterof resignation. On 20.01.2003, he rushed to Chennai, but could meet theGeneral Manager (Marketing) only on 22.01.2003 and told that theresignation letter was obtained under threat and he did not want toresign from service. He also gave a letter to the effect that theresignation letter was obtained from him under coercion and that he waswithdrawing the resignation letter. The General Manager (MarketingOperations) read the letter and gave back to the appellant saying thathe may forward to the same through his superiors. He then sent the sameby fax on 24.01.2003 with a copy to the District Manager - Bombay andalso to the Executive Director-Marketing, General Manager-Marketing andSenior General Manager - Human Resources and Services, Chennai. However,despite withdrawal of resignation, he received a telegram from thesecond appellant on 25.01.2003 accepting the resignation and he was alsosent a letter dated 28.01.2003 confirming the acceptance of resignation. 5. Aggrieved, the first respondent preferred an appeal before thesecond respondent under Section 41(2) of the Act challenging thedecision of the appellant management purporting to treat him as havingresigned from service. The appellant management filed its preliminaryobjection on the maintainability of the appeal mainly on the ground thatas the first respondent was not employed in any commercial establishmentwithin the State of Tamil Nadu, the second respondent has no territorialjurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The second respondent upheld thepreliminary objection holding inter-alia that the first respondent wasan employee in the appellant company’s depot at Goa, even though hisinitial appointment was in Chennai and just because the Head Office isin Chennai, he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the second respondentunder Section 41(2) of the Act. Aggrieved by this, the first respondentpreferred a writ petition praying for a writ of certiorarified mandamusto quash the order of the second respondent. The learned single Judgerelying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bikash Bhushan Ghoshv. Novartis India Limited, 2007 (5) SCC 591 held inter alia that in thefacts and circumstances of the case, the first respondent has got acause of action to challenge the order either in Chennai or at Goa underthe respective Shops and Establishments Acts, and consequently set asidethe order of the second respondent and remitted the matter back to thesecond respondent for fresh disposal on merits. It is the correctness ofthis order that is questioned by the appellant company in this writappeal. 6. Mr.Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel appearing for the appellantstrenuously contended that the subsistence of the relationship betweenmaster and servant while working in an establishment in the State ofTamil Nadu was necessary to clothe the second respondent under the TamilNadu Act with jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. In support of thissubmission, he placed strong reliance on the decision of a Division https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Bench of this Court in The Management of Punjab National Bank v.S.C.Gupta and Another, 1990 I LLJ 605 (Mad.) and also on the judgment ofa learned single Judge (N.V.Balasubramaniam, J) of this Court inRavirajan, S v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour, 1998 (III) CTC 561.Learned counsel submitted that the last location of employment of theemployee was in an establishment in Goa and it was not in dispute, asadmitted by the first respondent himself, that the letter of resignationdated 13.01.2003 was submitted while he was an employee of the Goaestablishment to the Mumbai office of the Company. He submitted that theTamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act would apply to establishment inthe State of Tamil Nadu alone and to employees employed to work in suchestablishment, and it would not be open to the employee to maintainproceedings under the Act merely because the Senior Manager – HumanResources and Services, who sits in the Corporate Office situated in theState of Tamil Nadu (in Chennai), issued letter accepting hisresignation. He lastly submitted that merely because the CorporateOffice was in Chennai or because the resignation was accepted in Chennaiwould not confer jurisdiction on the second respondent under Section 41(2) of the Act. 7. In reply, Mr.V.Prakash, learned senior counsel appearing for thefirst respondent submitted that the second respondent under Section 41(2) of the Act has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as the CorporateOffice of the appellant company is situated in Chennai. He submittedthat there is a clear nexus between the dispute arising from thetermination of the service of the first respondent and the territory ofthe State, and the well-known test of jurisdiction of Civil Courtincluding the residence of the parties and the subject matter of thedispute substantially arising therein would be applicable. He submittedthat in any event the letter of resignation was accepted by theCorporate Office at Chennai and thus, a part of cause of action arose inChennai, and hence the appeal was maintainable. He relied upon thedecisions of the Supreme Court in Bikash Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis IndiaLimited (supra) and Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India, 2006 (6)SCC 207 to substantiate his contention that it is immaterial as towhether the employee is working in an establishment in the State ofTamil Nadu. According to him, the decision of the Division Bench inPunjab National Bank’s case does not lay down the law correctly andrequires reconsideration in the light of the above decision in BikashBhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Limited (supra)8. Before proceeding to consider the rival submissions, it would benecessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 1(2)of the Act extends the provisions of the Act to the whole of the Stateof Tamil Nadu . Under Section 2(3) of the Act, a ‘commercialestablishment’ has been defined as follows: -“ ‘commercial establishment’ means an establishmentwhich is not a shop but which carries on thebusiness of advertising, commission, forwarding or https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ commercial agency, or which is a clerical departmentof a factory or industrial undertaking or which isan insurance company, joint stock company, bank,broker’s office or exchange and includes such otherestablishment as the State Government may bynotification declare to be a commercialestablishment for the purposes of this Act.” Section 2(5) of the Act defines the expression ‘employer’ as follows: -“ ‘employer’ means a person owning, or having chargeof, the business of an establishment and includesthe manager, agent or other person acting in thegeneral management or control of an establishment.”Under Section 2(6), the expression ‘establishment’ is defined as under: -“ ‘establishment’ means a shop, commercialestablishment, restaurant, eating-house, residentialhotel, theatre or any place of public amusement orentertainment and includes such establishment as the(State) Government may by notification declare to bean establishment for the purposes of this Act.” The expression ‘person employed’ is defined in Section 2(12) of the Act.Section 2(12)(iii), which is relevant for the purpose of this Act, readsas under: -“ (iii) in the case of a commercial establishmentother than a clerical department of a factory or anindustrial undertaking, a person wholly orprincipally employed in connection with the businessof the establishment, and includes a peon” 9. Chapter III of the said Act deals with establishments otherthan shops and Chapter VI deals with holidays with wages for a personemployed in any establishment. Chapter VII deals with payment of wagesfixation of wage-period, etc. In exercise of power conferred underSection 49 of the Act, Rules have been framed, viz., the Tamil Nadu Shopsand Establishments Rules, 1948 and several forms have been prescribed fordue compliance with the provisions of the Act. Under the said Rules, noemployer should require any person employed to work in his establishmentwithout exhibiting notice in Form-A and without sending a copy of thesame to the Inspector of Labour concerned and the employee is notrequired or allowed to work on weekly holidays. There are other rulesalso wherein the employer is required to exhibit notices containingrelevant extracts. It is in the light of the statutory scheme, theprovision of Section 41 has to be construed. Section 41(1) of the Actreads as under: - https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ “ No employer shall dispense with the services of aperson employed continuously for a period of notless than six months, except for a reasonable causeand without giving such person at least one month’snotice or wage in lieu of such notice, providedhowever, that such notice shall not be necessarywhere the services of such person are dispensed withon a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactionevidence recorded at an enquiry held for thepurpose.”Under Section 41(2) of the Act, the person employed shall have a rightto appeal to such authority within the time that may be prescribedeither on the ground that there was no reasonable cause for dispensingwith his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty ofmisconduct as held by the employer.10. In The Management of Punjab National Bank v. S.C.Gupta andAnother (supra), the first respondent therein, who was employed in theappellant bank at its Madras Branch, was transferred to the CentralOffice at Kanpur and pursuant to the order of transfer, the employeehanded over the charge to the Manager of the Madras Branch and reportedfor duty at Kanpur and there he was served with the order of terminationof service. Against the order of termination, the first respondentpreferred an appeal under Section 41(2) of the Act claiming that hewould be governed by the provisions of Tamil Nadu Shops andEstablishments Act. The Appellate Authority found that the cause ofaction with reference to termination of service of the first respondentarose at Kanpur, to which place he was transferred and not within theState of Tamil Nadu and therefore, it had no jurisdiction to entertainthe appeal. Accordingly, the Appellate authority dismissed the appeal.Aggrieved by this, the first respondent preferred a writ petition, whichcame to be allowed by the learned single Judge. Allowing the writappeal, the Division Bench observed: -“Applying the aforesaid definitions, there cannot beany doubt that for purposes of the Act, the bankwould be a commercial establishment as well as anestablishment. Under Section 41(1) of the Act, anemployer cannot dispense with the services of a“person employed” continuously for a period of notless than six months, except for a reasonable causeand without giving atleast one month’s notice or onemonth’s wages in lieu of such notice, barring caseswhere such service is dispensed with on proof ofmisconduct established by evidence at an enquiryheld for that purpose. The essential requisite for adismissal contemplated by Section 41(1) of the Act https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is the subsistence of the relationship of employeror commercial establishment in Tamil Nadu. UnderSection 2(12)(iii) of the Act, before a person canbe a “person employed”, such person should be whollyor principally employed in connection with thebusiness of the establishment. Under Section 41(2)of the Act, the person employed is conferred on theright of appeal to the appellate authority againstthe order of termination of service on the groundthat there was no reasonable cause for dispensingwith his services or that he had not been guilty ofmisconduct. A careful consideration of the aforesaidprovisions in the Act clearly establishes that therelationship of employer and employee in a businessor commercial establishment in Tamil Nadu is a pre-requisite for the termination of the services of theemployee and for the employee to complain about itby preferring an appeal under Section 41(2) of theAct.” (emphasissupplied)The Bench held that when the termination order was served on theemployee at Kanpur, the relationship of employer and employee was notsubsisting between the appellant and the first respondent with referenceto an establishment situate in Tamil Nadu, and therefore the appeal wasnot maintainable in law. 11. The above decision in Punjab National Bank’s case was followedby the learned single Judge (N.V.Balasubramaniam, J) in Ravirajan, S v.Deputy Commissioner of Labour (supra), where the learned single Judgeheld as follows: -“ In my view, when there is no employer-employeerelationship subsisting with reference to an establishmentsituate in the State of Tamil Nadu on the date when theorder of termination was passed, the mere fact of serviceof order of termination on an employee in the State ofTamil Nadu would not be enough or sufficient to clothe theappellate authority with the jurisdiction to decide thevalidity of the order of termination of the employment.Therefore, in my view, the decision of the Division Benchof this Court in Mgt. Of P.N.Bank vs. S.C.Gupta and Anr,1990 (I) LLJ 605 would squarely apply to the facts of thecase and I hold that there is no infirmity in the view ofthe first respondent holding that he has no jurisdiction toentertain the appeal preferred under Section 41 of theShops and Establishments Act. Consequently, the writ https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ petition fails and accordingly, it is dismissed. However,there will be no order as to costs. Consequently,W.M.P.No.26359 of 1990 is dismissed.”(emphasis supplied)12. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by theDivision Bench in Punjab National Bank’s case that the relationship ofemployer and employee with reference to a commercial establishment inTamil Nadu is a pre-requisite for preferring an appeal under Section 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act. The Tamil Nadu Shopsand Establishments Act is expected to apply to establishments in theState of Tamil Nadu alone and to employees employed to work in suchestablishments. In the case at hand, there is no dispute that the firstrespondent was employed in the Goa establishment of the Company, anestablishment governed by the Goa Shops and Establishments Act. It isalso not in dispute that while working at Goa, the first respondentsubmitted his resignation letter dated 18.01.2007. The first respondentin his resignation letter has given his temporary address as residing atGoa, while his permanent address is at Kolar Gold Fields, which is inthe State of Karnataka. On receiving the said resignation letter, theSenior General Manager – Human Resources and Services, Chennai relievedhim vide his letter dated 21.1.2003 and the acceptance of resignationwas despatched on 24.01.2003. The acceptance letter was sent to thefirst respondent to his Goa address as well as to his permanent addressat Karnataka. The acceptance letter was received by him at both theaddresses on 31.01.2003, as evident from the postal acknowledgmentsproduced by the management. When there is no employer employeerelationship subsisting with regard to an establishment situate in theState of Tamil Nadu, the mere fact that the resignation letter wasaccepted at Chennai would not be enough or sufficient to clothe theappellate authority under Section 41(2) of the Act to entertain theappeal filed by the first respondent. We are unable to agree with theview taken by the learned single Judge that both the authorities namely,the authority under the Goa Shops and Establishments Act and theauthority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act hadconcurrent jurisdiction to deal with the case of the first respondent. 13. We are unable to agree with the argument of the learned seniorcounsel Mr.Prakash based on the cause of action having arisen atChennai, atleast in part, owing to the acceptance of the resignationletter of the first respondent by the Head Office at Chennai. Thereliance placed by Mr.Prakash on the decision of the Supreme Court inBikash Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Limited (supra), is completelymisconceived. In that case, the appellants were workmen of therespondent company. They were transferred to Siwan (Bihar), Farukhabad(U.P.) and Karimganj (Assam) by issuing separate orders of transfer.According to the workmen, the said orders of transfer were violative of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the memorandum of undertaking signed by the company and the union, andwere issued with an ill-motive of victimizing them for their trade unionactivities. As despite requests, the purported orders of transfer werenot revoked, they sought intervention of the Labour Commissioner, WestBengal. Allegedly, a conciliation proceeding was initiated, but duringthe pendency thereof, their services were terminated by the respondentcompany. Contending that the said orders of terminations wereunauthorized, arbitrary and illegal, as no domestic enquiry was heldprior thereto, they raised an industrial dispute. The State of WestBengal, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 10(1)(c) read withSection 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred the disputeto the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. Before the said Tribunal,inter alia, a contention was raised that the State of West Bengal had nojurisdiction to make a reference. The question in regard to themaintainability was determined by the Tribunal in favour of the workmenholding the same to be maintainable. By its award, the Tribunal heldthat the orders of termination passed against the appellants/workmenwere illegal and they were directed to be reinstated in service withbackwages. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents filed a writpetition before the Calcutta High Court which came to be dismissed bythe learned single Judge. On an intra-court appeal filed by therespondents under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, the Division Bench,however, without going into the merit of the matter, held that the Stateof West Bengal, being not the appropriate government in respect of thedispute raised by the appellants, had no jurisdiction to make thereference and on that premise allowed the said appeal and consequently,set aside the award made by the Tribunal, as also confirming the orderof the learned single Judge. Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court heldas follows: - (SCC pp 596-599) “11. It is, however, not disputed that the orders oftermination were served upon the appellants atCalcutta. The orders of termination as against themwere passed for not obeying the orders of transfer.The transfer of the appellants, therefore, had somenexus with the order of their termination fromservices. It is, therefore, not correct to contendthat the State of West Bengal was not theappropriate Government. 12…..13…..14…. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

15. With respect to the Division Bench, we do notthink that it has posed unto itself a correctquestion of law. It is not in dispute that theappellants did not join their duties at thetransferred places. According to them, as the ordersof transfer were illegal, their services wereterminated for not complying therewith. Theassertion of the respondent that the appellants wererelieved from job was unilateral. If the orders oftransfer were to be set aside, they would be deemedto be continuing to be posted in Calcutta. Thelegality of the orders of transfer, thus, had adirect nexus with the orders of termination. Whatwould constitute cause of action, has recently beenconsidered by this Court in Om Prakash Srivastava v.Union of India wherein it was held: (SCC pp. 211-12,paras 12-14) “ 12 . The expression ‘cause of action’ has acquireda judicially settled meaning. In the restrictedsense ‘cause of action’ means the circumstancesforming the infraction of the right or the immediateoccasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, itmeans the necessary conditions for the maintenanceof the suit, including not only the infraction ofthe right, but also the infraction coupled with theright itself. Compendiously, as noted above, theexpression means every fact, which it would benecessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,in order to support his right to the judgment of thecourt. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved,as distinguished from every piece of evidence, whichis necessary to prove each fact, comprises in ‘causeof action’. (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates’Assn. v. Union of India, 2001 (2) SCC 294). 13 . The expression ‘cause of action’ has sometimesbeen employed to convey the restricted idea of factsor circumstances which constitute either theinfringement or the basis of a right and no more. Ina wider and more comprehensive sense, it has beenused to denote the whole bundle of material facts,which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed.These are all those essential facts without theproof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit.(See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 791) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 14 . The expression ‘cause of action’ is generallyunderstood to mean a situation or state of factsthat entitles a party to maintain an action in acourt or a tribunal; a group of operative factsgiving rise to one or more bases of suing; a factualsituation that entitles one person to obtain aremedy in court from another person (see Black’s LawDictionary ). In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary a‘cause of action’ is stated to be the entire set offacts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; thephrase comprises every fact, which if traversed, theplaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. InWords and Phrases (4th Edn.) the meaning attributedto the phrase ‘cause of action’ in common legalparlance is existence of those facts, which give aparty a right to judicial interference on hisbehalf. (See Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State ofMaharashtra (2000) 7 SCC 640.)” 16. Judged in that context also, a part of cause ofaction arose in Calcutta in respect whereof theState of West Bengal was the appropriate Government.It may be that in a given case, two States may havethe requisite jurisdiction in terms of clause ( c )of sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the IndustrialDisputes Act. Assuming that other State Governmentshad also jurisdiction, it would not mean thatalthough a part of cause of action arose within theterritory of the State of West Bengal, it would haveno jurisdiction to make the reference.”(emphasis supplied) 14. In our view, the above decision in Bikash Bhushan Ghosh’s casewas rendered in the context of the Industrial Disputes Act, which is aCentral Act, and the ratio of this case is clearly inapplicable to theinstant case. In that case the workmen were employed in companyestablished in West Bengal and they were transferred to differentStates, but they did not join the duty at the respective transferredplaces. According to them, as the orders of transfer were illegal, theirservices were terminated for not complying there with. The assertion ofthe company that the workmen were relieved from job was unilateral andif the orders of transfer were to be set aside, they would be deemed tobe continuing to be posted in Calcutta. Consequently, the Court heldthat the legality of the orders of transfer had direct nexus with theorders of termination and a part of cause of action arose in Calcutta inrespect where of the State of West Bengal is the appropriate government.The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable. Though thefirst respondent herein was initially employed in the State of TamilNadu, he was later transferred to the State of Karnataka and then to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Goa. The first respondent tendered his resignation letter while workingin the sale depot at Goa, which was forwarded to the Mumbai Office andfrom there to the Company’s Corporate Office at Chennai where it wasaccepted by the Senior General Manager – Human Resources and Services.In our view, notwithstanding the fact that the resignation letter of thefirst respondent was accepted in Chennai, his situs of employment beingat Goa, he ought to have approached the appellate authority under theGoa Shops and Establishments Act and the appellate authority under theTamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act had no jurisdiction to entertainthe appeal preferred by the first respondent. When a person is employedto work in an establishment in Goa, it must be held that he was employedwholly in connection with the business of Goa establishment. Merelybecause, the Corporate Office was in Chennai or because the resignationletter has been accepted in Chennai would not confer jurisdiction on theappellate authority under Section 41(2) of the Act.15. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the appellateauthority under Section 41(2) of the Act has no jurisdiction toentertain the appeal preferred by the first respondent. In the result,the appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single Judge is setaside and that of the appellate authority/second respondent is restored.However, we add that if the first respondent files an appeal before theappellate authority under the Goa Shops and Establishments Act, theauthority may consider the question of delay in the light of the factthat the present proceedings were pending under the Tamil Nadu Act underthe provision of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. No costs.Consequently miscellaneous petition is closed. Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.RegistrarPv/To:The Special Deputy Commissioner of Labour,(Appellate Authority under the Tamil NaduShops and Establishments Act, 1947), D.M.S.Compund, Teynampet, Chennai – 600 006.1 cc To Mr.K.Sudalaikannu, Advocate, SR.2749.1 cc To M/s.Ramasubramaniam Associates, Advocate, SR.2613.W.A.No. 1494 of 2007 KLT(CO)RVL 10.03.2008