Kuppan v. State

BAIL SLIPThe accused was directed to be released on bail as per the orderdated 29.11.2006 made in Crl.M.P.4430 of 2006 in Crl.AppealNo.248/2006.IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED : 02.04.2008CORAM:THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.D.DINAKARANandTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.REGUPATHICriminal Appeal No.248 of 2006Kuppan..Appellant/Accusedvs.State, rep. byInspector of PoliceVellore South Police StationVellore.Crime No.65/2003...Respondent / ComplainantCriminal Appeal filed under Section 374 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure against the judgment of the learned AdditionalDistrict and Sessions Judge, Vellore (Fast Track Court), VelloreDistrict, dated 23.12.2005, in Sessions Case No.294 of 2005.-----For Appellant : Ms.Rajalakshmi for Mr.D.RajagopalFor Respondent : Mr.N.R.Elango Addl. Public Prosecutor-----JUDGMENT(Delivered by P.D.DINAKARAN,J)The appellant was charged and faced trial in accordance withlaw for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 324, 506(ii) ofthe IPC with reference to an alleged occurrence said to have takenplace on 20.2.2003 at about 8.15 p.m., when, according to theprosecution, the accused stabbed the deceased Sagadevan @ Mosseswith a knife and caused his death and thereby committed the offenceof murder; and that while doing so, he voluntarily caused hurt tothe child Rekha and also committed criminal intimidation to causethe death of Valli, wife of the deceased Sagadevan @ Mosses. Thelearned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Vellore vide hisjudgment and order of conviction dated 23.12.2005 in S.C.No.294 of2005 found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment andto pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorousimprisonment for six months.2. Initially, upon appearance of the accused and after supplyof documents to him, charges were framed against the accused, towhich the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3. To prove its case, the prosecution examined 20 witnesses asP.Ws.1 to 20, marked Exhibits P1 to P24 as well as M.Os.1 to 5.4.1. The brief facts of this case, as unravelled by theprosecution at the trial, are as follows:4.2. P.W.1 Valli is the wife of the deceased Sagadevan @Mosses. P.W.6 Selvi and P.W.9 Sarathkumar are the daughter and sonof the deceased respectively. The accused is the sister's son ofthe deceased. P.W.2 Moorthi, P.W.3 Murugan, P.W.4 Vatchala andP.W.5 Pachayammal are the relatives of the accused and thedeceased. 4.3. It is alleged that the deceased family failed to attendthe marriage of the cousin of the accused. On the fateful day,viz., 20.2.2003 at about 8.15 p.m., when the deceased, P.Ws.1, 6and 9 were in their house, the accused went there and engagedhimself in a wordy quarrel and used filthy words. When P.W.1questioned him, he replied that he would not give any respect toher. When the deceased asked him, the accused replied that thedeceased did not deserve any respect, as he failed to attend themarriage of his cousin and immediately went to his residence, whichis at the back side of the house of the deceased, returned withM.O.1-knife and stabbed the deceased on the left side of hisabdomen. When the accused continued to stab the deceased, P.W.1intervened with the child Rekha in her hand and during the course,the child sustained injuries. P.W.1 raised hue and cry. Theaccused fled away from the scene of occurrence with the weapon.P.Ws.6 and 9, daughter and son of the deceased respectively, areeye-witnesses to the occurrence and their evidence corroborates theevidence of P.W.1. P.Ws.2 to 5 have not supported the case of theprosecution and turned hostile.4.4. P.W.1 took the deceased to the Government Hospital,Vellore, with the aid of P.W.8 Devaraj, auto driver, where P.W.12Dr.Bharani, admitted the deceased. On examination, she found anincised wound 1cm x 1cm x 1cm on the left side of abdomen with acontusion 5cm x 3cm x 5cm and referred him to Surgery departmentfor further treatment. She also intimated to police. Ex.P6 is theaccident register issued by her.4.5. P.W.16 Rajmohan, Head Constable, on receipt of intimationfrom the Government Hospital, Vellore, on 22.2.2003 at 2.00 a.m.,went to the hospital and recorded the statement of P.W.1 andregistered a case in Crime No.65 of 2005 under Sections 324 and 506(ii) IPC. He proceeded to the scene of occurrence and prepared https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Ex.P2 observation mahazar and Ex.P15 rough sketch in the presenceof P.W.7 Ramasami and Selvam. He examined P.Ws.1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9and the deceased and recorded their statements. The statement ofthe deceased is Ex.P16. 4.6. P.W.13 Dr.Kothandapani, attached to Vellore GovernmentHospital, had deposed that the deceased died in the hospital on23.2.2003 at 12.20 a.m. and he sent Ex.P7 death intimation to thepolice.4.7. P.W.17 Perumal, Head Constable, on receipt of deathintimation, informed to P.W.20 Settu, Inspector of Police, VelloreSouth Police Station, who altered the case into one under Section302 of IPC and sent Ex.P18 Express Report to the Court as well asto the higher officials through P.W.19 Munusamy, Head Constable.He took up the case for investigation, went to the hospital andconducted inquest over the body of the deceased and prepared Ex.P19inquest report. He sent the body with Ex.P23 requisition for post-mortem through P.W.18 Kalyanaraman, Head Constable. P.W.18 handedover the clothes worn by the deceased under Ex.P17 special reportto P.W.20. 4.8. P.W.14 Dr.Kathiravan, attached to Vellore GovernmentHospital, conducted post-mortem on the body of the deceased andnoticed the following injuries:Punctured like wound on left side of abdomen(hypochondrium) ½ x ½ cm. On probing, wound entersinto abdominal cavity. The whole abdomen is distendedand rigid. Exploration of the wound:Part of the omentum is attached to under surface ofthe wound. Erythroma surrounding the under surface ofthe wound present. Omentum congested. The greaterwall of the stomach has perforating wound measuring 1cmx 1cm x entering into the stomach with a surroundinghaematoma. Edges of perforation is irregular and softin consistency. Inner wall of stomach adjacent toperforation is congested. Stomach empty. Jejunumshows 4 perforating wounds measuring (1) 1 x ½ cmentering into the cavity on the proximal segment ofjejunum. No.2, 3 and 4 perforating injuries are foundin the superior part of middle portion of jejunum. Inall the above injuries margins irregular. Soft inconsistency with surrounding haematoma. The doctor was of the opinion that the deceased would appear tohave died of septicaemia 10–12 hours prior to autopsy due toperforating injury to stomach and intestine and that the injuriescould have been caused with M.O.1 knife. Ex.P8 is the post-mortemcertificate.4.9. P.W.20 has examined the witnesses and recorded their https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ statements. He prepared Ex.P21 rough sketch and caused the place ofoccurrence to be photographed through P.W.10 Photographer. Ex.P2series are the photos with negatives. Based on the intimation givenby one Valliammal, he arrested the accused on 23.2.2003 at 4.30p.m. in the presence of P.W.11 Pon Sivasankaran, VillageAdministrative Officer and his menial. The accused gave aconfession statement voluntarily in the presence of P.W.11 and hismenial. Ex.P4 is the admissible portion of the confessionstatement and Ex.P3 is the signature of P.W.11 in the confessionstatement. Pursuant to the confession, the accused took the policeand P.W.11 to the place, where he hid M.O.1 knife. P.W.20recovered M.O.1 bloodstained knife and M.O.3 bloodstained shirtunder Ex.P5 Mahazar. P.W.20 prepared Ex.P20 arrest card andremanded the accused to judicial custody. He sent the materialobjects to the Court for subjecting the same for chemicalexamination through Exs.P22 and 24 Form-95. 4.10. P.W.15 is the Magisterial Clerk, who despatched thematerial objects to the Chemical Analyst under Exs.P9 and P10Court's letter and received Ex.P11 Viscera Report, Ex.P12 ChemicalExaminer's Report and Ex.P13 Serologist Report. 4.11. P.W.20, Inspector of Police, completed the investigationand after following all the legal formalities, filed the finalreport in the court against the accused under Section 302 IPC on11.4.2003.5. When the incriminating circumstances inculpating andconnecting the accused with the crime were put to the accused, inhis examination under Section 313 of the Code of CriminalProcedure, he denied the same and did not lead any evidence.6. The trial court, on consideration of the oral anddocumentary evidence placed before it, found the accused guilty andconvicted and sentenced him as referred to earlier.7. The learned counsel for the appellant assails theconviction and sentence as under:(i) P.Ws.1, 6 and 9, who are relatives of thedeceased, and P.Ws.2 to 5, who are independentwitnesses, have witnessed the occurrence. When theindependent witnesses have turned hostile, theSessions Judge ought not to have convicted the accusedbased on the evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9, who areinterested witnesses.(ii) The evidence of P.W.12, who treated the deceased,that there were two injuries on the body of thedeceased, does not corroborate the evidence of ocularwitnesses, viz. P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 that the deceased wasstabbed only once by the accused.(iii) As per the evidence of ocular witnesses there is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ no prior enmity between the deceased and the accusedand therefore, the prosecution has not proved themotive for commission of the offence and accordingly,the conviction and sentence have to be set aside.(iv) Alternatively, it is contended that theoccurrence took place, without premeditation in asudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a suddenquarrel and hence, the act of the accused would beculpable homicide not amounting to murder coming underException-4 to Section 300 I.P.C. 8.1. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitsthat:(i) The evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 cannot bedisregarded on the ground that they are interestedwitnesses, since their evidence is cogent, natural andcorroborates in all respects.(ii) Even though the evidence of P.W.12 Doctor, whogave treatment to the deceased, was that the deceasedsuffered two injuries, since the second injury is theconsequence of the first injury, there is nocontradiction between the medical evidence and theocular evidence. (iii) As per the evidence of ocular witnesses, theaccused came to the residence of the deceased andshouted at him for not attending his cousin'smarriage, and when it was questioned by the deceased,the accused used filthy words and went to his house,brought M.O.1 knife and stabbed the deceased and alsohis child. The above evidence would clearly prove themotive for commission of the offence.8.2. However, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor concurswith the alternative submission made by the learned counsel for theappellant that the occurrence took place without premeditation in asudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel andhence, the act of the accused would be culpable homicide notamounting to murder coming under Exception-4 to Section 300 of IPC.9. We have perused the entire materials on record and heardthe submissions of both sides. The question that arises for ourconsideration in this appeal is whether the prosecution proved theguilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.10. The case of the prosecution that the deceased Sagadevandied due to homicidal violence stands proved by the evidence ofP.W.12, the doctor who examined the deceased initially and P.W.14,the doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body, coupled withEx.P6, Accident Register and Ex.P8 post-mortem certificate.11. To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ examined P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 as eye witnesses. P.W.1 is the wife andP.Ws.6 and 9 are daughter and son of the deceased respectively.P.W.1 has deposed that the accused came to her house and shouted atthe deceased and herself using filthy words for their failure toattend the marriage of his cousin. When the deceased questionedhim as to his behaviour, he told that the deceased does not deserveany respect. Pursuant to the altercation between the deceased andthe accused, the accused went to his house, brought M.O.1 knife andstabbed the deceased on the left side of his abdomen. When P.W.1intervened, her child, whom she was carrying at that time,sustained injuries on her head. On hearing the hue and cry ofP.W.1, the accused ran away from the scene of occurrence with M.O.1knife. The evidence of P.Ws.6 and 9, who witnessed the occurrence,corroborates and strengthens the evidence of P.W.1. The statementof the deceased, Ex.P16, recorded by P.W.16 under Section 161Cr.P.C., is also supporting the version of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 in allfours. Therefore, the testimony of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 has establishedbeyond reasonable doubt that the accused stabbed the deceased onhis abdomen. 12.1. Of course, the learned counsel for the appellantcontends that the evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 is not trustworthysince they are interested witnesses. But, the law on the point iswell settled. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibilityof a witness. It is more often than not that a relation would notconceal actual culprit and make allegations against an innocentperson. 12.2. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1953 SC 364),the Apex Court held as hereunder:-"26. A witness is normally to be considered independentunless he or she springs from sources which are likely tobe tainted and that usually means unless the witness hascause, such as enmity against the accused, to which toimplicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation wouldbe the last to screen the real culprit and falselyimplicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelingsrun high and there is personal cause for enmity, thatthere is a tendency to drag in an innocent person againstwhom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, butfoundation must be laid for such a criticism and the merefact of relationship far from being a foundation is oftena sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attemptingany sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged onits own facts. Our observations are only made to combatwhat is so often put forward in cases before us a generalrule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Eachcase must be limited to and be governed by its ownfacts."12.3. Again in Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202, theApex Court observed that:"But it would, we think, be unreaonsable to contend that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only onthe ground that it is evidence of partisan or interestedwitnesses. .... The mechanical rejection of suchevidence on the sole ground that it is partisan wouldinvariably lead to failure of justice. No hard and fastrule can be laid down as to how much evidence should beappreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious indealing with such evidence; but the plea that suchevidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannotbe accepted as correct."12.4. Further, in Pulicheria Nagaraju v. State of A.P.(2006) 11 SCC 444, the Apex Court observed that:".. that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merelyon the ground that he is either partisan or interested orclosely related to the deceased, if it is otherwise foundto be trustworthy and credible. It only requiresscrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither theguilty escape nor the innocent wrongly convicted. If onsuch careful scrutiny, the evidence is found to bereliable and probable, it can be acted upon. If it isfound to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to berejected. Where the witness has a motive to falselyimplicate the accused, his testimony should havecorroboration in regard to material particulars before itis accepted."12.5. In the instant case, the evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 isthat the accused had stabbed the deceased on his abdomen, pursuantto the altercation between the deceased and the accused. The overtact attributed against the accused is corroborated by the medicalevidence, P.W.12, the Doctor, who had treated the deceasedinitially and deposed that she found an incised wound on the leftside of abdomen; and P.W.14, the Doctor, who had conducted post-mortem, deposed that the deceased died due to septicaemia due toperforative injury to the stomach and intestine. Further, he hasopined in Ex.P8, post-mortem certificate that the injuries wouldhave been caused with M.O.1 knife. Therefore, the evidence ofP.Ws.1, 6 and 9 cannot be rejected on the ground of interestedwitnesses.13. The ocular evidence of P.Ws.1, 6 and 9 that the accusedstabbed the deceased only once is corroborated by the medicalevidence of P.W.12 that she found an incised wound 1 x 1 x 1 cm onthe left side of abdomen with a contusion 5 x 3 x 5cm andtherefore, the deceased suffered only one injury and the contusionis the result of the first injury and hence, the contention of thelearned counsel for the appellant that there is contradictionbetween the medical evidence and the ocular evidence is rejected. 14. In view of the hostile attitude of the deceased in notattending the marriage of the cousin of the accused, a suddenquarrel took place between the appellant and the deceased, and onaccount of heat of passion, the appellant went home, brought a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ knife and stabbed the deceased. If the accused had really nointention, naturally he would have taken some weapon at the placeof occurrence and hit the deceased. The action of the accused ingoing to his house and bringing the knife and thereafter, coming tothe house of the deceased and stabbing him, for the only reasonthat the deceased had not attended the marriage of his cousin,would explicitly prove the intention of the accused in committingthe crime. Further, the commission of crime was witnessed byP.Ws.1, 6 and 9, which is corroborated by the medical evidence ofP.Ws.12 and 14. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that itis only the accused who attacked the deceased at the time andmanner as projected by the prosecution.15.1. However, the next question for consideration is whetherthe offence established by the prosecution against the appellant is'murder' - as held by the trial Court or 'culpable homicide notamounting to murder' - as contended on behalf of the appellant?15.2. The distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicidenot amounting to murder' has been clearly stated by the Apex Courtin State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., [1976]4 SCC 382."16. In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words'likely to cause death' occurring in the correspondingclause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in theordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously,the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely tocause death and a bodily injury sufficient in theordinary course of nature to cause death. Thedistinction is fine but real, and, if overlooked, mayresult in miscarriage of justice. The differencebetween clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) ofSection 300 is one of the degree of probability ofdeath resulting from the intended bodily injury. Toput it more broadly, it is the degree of probability ofdeath which determines whether a culpable homicide isof the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word"likely" in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the senseof 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility.The words "bodily injury ... sufficient in the ordinarycourse of nature to cause death" mean that death willbe the "most probable" result of the injury, havingregard to the ordinary course of nature.17. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is notnecessary that the offender intended to cause death, solong as the death ensues from the intentional bodilyinjury or injuries sufficient to cause death in theordinary course of nature. Rajwant v. State of Kerala(AIR 1966 SC 1874) is an apt illustration of thispoint. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

18. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958 SCR1495), Vivian Bose, J. Speaking for this Court,explained the meaning and scope of clause (3), thus (atp.1500):The prosecution must prove the followingfacts before it can bring a case under Section300, "thirdly". First, it must establish quiteobjectively, that a bodily injury is present;secondly the nature of the injury must be proved.These are purely objective investigations. Itmust be proved that there was an intention toinflict that particular injury, that is to say,that it was not accidental or unintentional orthat some other kind of injury was intended. Oncethese three elements are proved to be present, theinjury proceeds further, and fourthly it must beproved that the injury of the type just describedmade up of the three elements set out above wassufficient to cause death in the ordinary courseof nature. This part of the enquiry is purelyobjective and inferential and has nothing to dowith the intention of the offender.19. Thus according to the rule laid down in VirsaSingh's case, even if the intention of accused waslimited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficientto cause death in the ordinary course of nature, anddid not extend to the intention of causing death, theoffence would be 'murder'. Illustration (c) appendedto Section 300 clearly brings out this point.20. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) ofSection 300 both require knowledge of the probabilityof the act causing death. It is not necessary for thepurpose of this case to dilate much on the distinctionbetween these corresponding clauses. It will besufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 wouldbe applicable where the knowledge of the offender as tothe probability of death of a person or persons ingeneral- as distinguished from a particular person orpersons – being caused from his imminently dangerousact, approximates to a practical certainty. Suchknowledge on the part of the offender must be of thehighest degree of probability, the act having beencommitted by the offender without any excuse forincurring the risk of causing death or such injury asaforesaid.21. From the above conspectus, it emerges thatwhenever a court is confronted with the questionwhether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicidenot amounting to murder' on the facts of a case, itwill be convenient for it to approach the problem inthree stages. The question to be considered at the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ first stage would be, whether the accused has done anact by doing which he has caused the death of another.Proof of such causal connection between the act of theaccused and the death, leads to the second stage forconsidering whether that act of the accused amounts to"culpable homicide" as defined in Section 299. If theanswer to this question is prima facie found in theaffirmative, the stage for considering the operation ofSection 300, Penal Code, is reached. This is the stageat which the court should determine whether the factsproved by the prosecution bring the case within theambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of'murder' contained in Section 300. If the answer tothis question is in the negative the offence would be'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' punishableunder the first or the second part of Section 304,depending, respectively, on whether the second or thethird clause of Section 299 is applicable. If thisquestion is found in the positive, but the case comeswithin any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300,the offence would still be 'culpable homicide notamounting to murder', punishable under the first partof Section 304, Penal Code."(emphasis supplied)15.3. In the said decision, State of Andhra Pradesh v.Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr., referred supra, it has been observedby the Apex Court that the secured way of approach to theinterpretation and application of Sections 299 and 300 IPC is tokeep in focus the key words used in various clauses of the saidSections. The Apex Court observed that whenever a Court isconfronted with the question whether the offence is 'murder' or'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', on the facts of acase, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in threestages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be,whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has causedthe death of another. Proof of such causal connection between theact of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage forconsidering whether that act of the accused amounts to 'culpablehomicide' as defined in Section 299 of IPC. If the answer to thisquestion is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage forconsidering the operation of Section 300 of IPC, is reached. Thisis the stage at which the court should determine whether the factsproved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any ofthe four clauses of the definition of 'murder' contained in Section300 of IPC. If the answer to this question is in the negative theoffence would be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder',punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304 ofIPC, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the thirdclause of Section 299 of IPC is applicable. If this question isfound in the positive, but the case comes within any of theexceptions enumerated in Section 300 of IPC, the offence wouldstill be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishableunder the first part of Section 304 of IPC. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

15.4. Every Court must methodically follow these steps beforecoming to a conclusion whether the offence of murder has beenproved and whether the offence of murder would slide back to theoffence of culpable homicide defined under Section 299 of IPC. Inthis case, we find that without considering whether the offencewould be one of culpable homicide under Section 299 IPC and whetherit would be one of murder under Section 300 of IPC, the trial Judgehad come to the conclusion that the offence would be only culpablehomicide amounting to murder.16.1. Now, let us analyse the facts of this case, in the lightof the well settled law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisionin State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr.,referred supra.16.2. The first stage to be considered is whether the accusedhas done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another.We have already held that the accused is the perpetrator of thecrime and it is only the overt act attributed against him, whichcaused the death of the deceased.16.2. The second stage to be considered is, whether that actof the accused amounts to 'culpable homicide' as defined in Section299 of IPC. The definition of Section 299 of IPC makes it clearthat whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention ofcausing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injuryas is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he islikely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpablehomicide. In this case, the accused engaged himself in a wordyquarrel with P.W.1 and the deceased at the scene of occurrence. Notstopping with that, he went to his residence brought a knife andstabbed the deceased. This overt act, as already observed by us,has been clearly established by the evidence of the eye-witnesses.The act of the accused in going to his residence, bringing theweapon and stabbing the deceased is, in our considered opinion,with an intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely tocause death of the deceased and the said act of the accused amountsto 'culpable homicide' as defined in Section 299 of IPC.16.3. The next stage for consideration is whether the factsproved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any ofthe four clauses of the definition of 'murder' contained in Section300 of IPC. In this case, we have already held that the act of theaccused was with an intention to take away the life, and thereforeit would attract the ingredients of Section 300 of IPC. However,we have to examine, whether the act of the accused would comewithin any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300 of IPC.It is not the case of the prosecution that before the occurrence,the appellant had pre-meditated the crime of murder. From thefacts, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that in view of thehostile attitude of the deceased in not attending the marriage ofthe cousin of the accused, a sudden quarrel took place between theappellant and the deceased, and on account of heat of passion, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ appellant went home, brought a knife and stabbed the deceased. Atthe most, it can be said that he had the intention of causing suchbodily injury as is likely to cause death, and as such, the presentcase would fall within the second clause of Section 299 of IPC.Thus, in our opinion, the offence committed by the appellant wasonly 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable underthe first part of Section 304 of IPC. Resultantly, we partly allow the appeal; set aside theconviction of the appellant under Section 302 of IPC and insteadconvict him under Section 304 Part I IPC. The sentence of rigorousimprisonment for seven years would meet the ends of justice.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.ATR/sasiTo1. The Additional District and Sessions Judge Vellore District (Fast Track Court).2. -Do-Through The District and Sessions Judge,Vellore.3. The Inspector of Police Vellore South Police Station Vellore District.4. The Public Prosecutor High Court, Madras.5. The Superintendent Central Prison, Vellore.6.The District Collector, Vellore7.The Judicial Magistrate No.1, Vellore8.The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vellore (for information)9.The Director General of Police, Mylapore, Chennai - 8+ 1 CC To Mr.D.Rajagopal, Advocate SR NO.19275Crl.A.No.248 of 2006CMP(CO)SRA(28/05/2008)