M.B.Subramaniam v. A.Ramasamy Gounder & Ors.

1. Whether Arunachala Gounder had the unilateralright to cancel Ex.A6 by virtue of Ex.B3 withoutfiling a suit for cancelling Ex.A6?2. Whether Ex.A6 is a void document as put forthby the respondent-Ramasamy Gounder?3. Whether both the Courts below were perversein appreciating the evidence and giving a finding infavour of Ramasamy Gounder-the respondent?4. Whether the suit filed by M.B.Subramaniam isbad for want of prayer for declaration of title?"Heard both sides on these substantial questions of law.Gamut of the case:4. A deep analysis of and poring over the typed set ofpapers, including the judgments of both the Courts below, woulddemonstrate and display that M.B.Subramanian-the plaintiff inO.S.No.14 of 2000 and defendant in O.S.No.410 of 2004(hereinafter referred to as the appellant in both the secondappeals) filed the suit O.S.No.14 of 2000 for bare injunction,so as to safe-guard his possession as against the deceasedArunachala Gounder and his three sons, namely, RamaswamyGounder, Subbiyan and Shanmugam - on the death of ArunachalaGounder, his wife Karupathal also was added - on the groundthat as per Ex.A6-the sale deed dated 10.11.1999, the deceasedArunachala Gounder sold, in favour of the appellant, the suitproperty and he has been continuing in possession of the sameand the fact also remains that previous to such purchase he hadbeen in possession and enjoyment of the suit property as atenant under Arunachala Gounder. 5. Whereas, Ramaswamy Gounder(hereinafter referred as therespondent in both the appeals) filed the suit O.S.No.410 of2004, seeking recovery of possession on the ground that thetenancy of M.B.Subramaniam was terminated relating to the suitproperty and that Ramasamy Gounder being the absolute owner ofthe suit property by virtue of the Settlement Deed-Ex.B1 dated12.3.2000, which was executed by Arunachala Gounder.Significant submissions of learned Advocates on both sides:6. The gist and kernal, the nitty-gritty of the argumentsof the learned Senior counsel for the appellant would be to theeffect that Ex.A6 being a registered sale deed, admittedlyexecuted by the deceased Arunachala Gounder, should not havebeen cancelled by him unilaterally by executing Ex.B3, withoutfiling a suit, during his life time, for cancellation of Ex.A6;if at all Arunachala Gounder wanted to cancel the said sale https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ deed on the grounds alleged by the respondent herein, then heshould have filed such a suit within three years, but he hadnot chosen to do so; as per the respondent’s plea, had therebeen no consideration paid by the vendor to the vendee underEx.A6, the vendor Arunachala Gounder should have filed a suitfor recovery of sale consideration in view of the fact that asper Ex.A6 the title over the suit property passed fromArunachala Gounder to the appellant; Ex.A6, by no stretch ofimagination, could be termed as a void document and both theCourts below were perverse in appreciating the evidence, whichwarrants interference by this Court. 7. By way of remonstrating and refuting the arguments ofthe learned Senior counsel for the appellant, the leaned Seniorcounsel for the respondent advanced his arguments, the pithand marrow, the quintessence and core of it would be to theeffect that Ex.A6 was a void document, requiring no filing ofsuit, at the instance of Arunachala Gounder, to get itcancelled or set aside as per law; he had the right to cancelEx.A6 by virtue of Ex.B3-the registered cancellation deed,without filing a suit and execute Ex.B1-the settlement deed infavour of his son-Ramaswamy Gounder-the respondent; both theCourts below gave a categorical finding to the effect thatEx.A6 contains bogus consideration; even without executingEx.B3-the registered cancellation deed, Arunachala Gounder hadthe right to execute Ex.B1-the Settlement Deed; the suit filedby the appellant for injunction is bad for want of a prayer fordeclaration of title and accordingly, he prayed for dismissalof both the second appeals.8. Since all the four substantial questions of law areinterlinked and interwoven, interconnected and entwined witheach other, they have been taken up together for discussion.9. Indubitably and indisputably, Ex.A6 is a registeredsale deed, which contains the recitals to the effect that thesaid Arunachala Gounder sold the suit property in favour of theappellant for a total sale consideration of Rs.2,00,000/-(Rupees two lakhs). The said two lakhs of sale consideration isfound detailed in the sale deed as under:-"(1) The purchaser (M.B.Subramanian) paid a sumof Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees one lakh) to K.Ramaswamy(P.W.2) in connection with the loan availed byArunachala Gounder from P.W.2 to meet his medicalexpenses. (2) The purchaser (M.B.Subramanian) paid a sumof Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty thousand) toBalasubramanian (P.W.3) for and on behalf of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Arunachala Gounder-the vendor by way of dischargingthe dues payable by the vendor.(3) the seller received a sum of Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty thousand only) in cash in the presenceof the witnesses as contemplated in Ex.A6.10. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent wouldcontend that all the said three considerations as found setout in Ex.A6 are bogus ones; the appellant, with the help ofArunachala Gounder’s son-Shanmugam (D4) in O.S.No.14 of 2000managed to bring about Ex.A6; the said P.W.2 and P.W.3 are theclose relatives of D.4-Shanmugam and as such, both the debtswere not proved and consequently, the discharge of thosealleged deeds also were not proved and D4 shunned the witnessbox even though the recitals in Ex.A6 would be to the effectthat in the presence of D4 and one other person, the allegedcash of Rs.50,000/- was paid by the appellant to the father ofthe respondent, namely, Arunachala Gounder. Accordingly, thelearned Senior counsel for the respondent would argue that boththe Courts below correctly held that Ex.A6 was not supported bythe consideration and the consideration found stated thereinwere bogus and in such a case, the voidity of Ex.A6 warrantedno compulsion on the part of Arunachala Gounder to file a suitfor declaring its voidity or for canceling it.11. Whereas the learned Senior counsel for the appellantwould argue that absolutely there is no shard or shred,scintilla or pint-sized, iota or miniscule extent of evidenceto demonstrate and evince that Ex.A6 is a void document. Hewould cite the following decisions in support of his arguments:(i) JT 1995(1) SCC 223- Smt Ramti Devi v. Union of India,an excerpt from it would run thus:"Held – We are afraid that we cannot agree withthe learned counsel. As seen, the recitals of thedocuments would show that the sale deed was executedfor valuable consideration to discharge pre-existingdebts and it is a registered document. Apart fromthe prohibition under S.92 of the Indian Evidence Actto adduce oral evidence to contradict the terms ofthe recitals therein, no issue in this behalf on thevoidity of the sale-deed or its binding nature wasraised nor a finding recorded that the sale-deed isvoid under S.23 of the Contract Act. Pleading itselfis not sufficient. Since the appellant is seeking tohave the document avoided or cancelled, necessarily,a declaration has to be given by the Court in thatbehalf. Until the document is avoided or cancelledby proper declaration, the duly registered document https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ remains valid and binds the parties. So the suitnecessarily has to be laid within three years fromthe date when the cause of action had occurred.Since the cause of action has arisen on January 29,1947, the date on which the sale-deed was executedand registered and the suit was filed on July 30,1966, the suit his hopelessly barred by limitation."(ii) (1998) 7 SCC 498 – Bishundo Narain Rai (dead) by Lrs.And others vs. Anmol Devi and Others, certain excerpts from itwould run thus:"11. Apropos the question noted above, areference to Section 54 of the Transfer of PropertyAct will be apposite. While defining 'sale', Section54 sets out how sale is made. Sale is defined tomean a transfer of ownership in exchange for pricepaid or promised or part-paid or part-promised; itsays, inter alia, in case of tangible immovableproperty of the value of Rs.100 and upward or in caseof a reversion or other tangible things, sale can bemade only by a registered instrument. Section 8 ofthe Transfer of Property Act declares that on atransfer of property, all the interests which thetransferor has or is having at that time, capable ofpassing in the property and in the legal incidencethereof, pass on such a transfer unless a differentintention is expressed or necessarily implied. Acombined reading of Section 8 and Section 54 of theTransfer of Property Act suggests that though onexecution and registration of a sale deed, theownership and all interests in the property pass tothe transferee, yet that would be on the terms andconditions embodied in the deed indicating theintention of the parties. It follows that onexecution and registration of a sale deed, theownership title and all interests in the propertypass to the purchaser unless a different intention iseither expressed or necessarily implied which was tobe proved by the party asserting that title has notpassed on registration of the sale deed. Suchintention can be gathered by intrinsic evidence,namely, from the averments in the sale deed itself orby other attending circumstances subject, of course,to the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act,1872.14. These averments unmistakably indicate conveyingof title to the property absolutely for considerationas outlined; by virtue of the sale, the purchasers https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ were put in possession of the property conveyed,became entitled to the custody of the sale deed andother documents and enjoyment of the property. Thesefactors satisfy all the requirements of absolutesale. No recital in Exhibit C is brought to ournotice to indicate any contraintention. What is,however, argued is that out of the consideration, asum of Rs 3235 remained unpaid; that themortgage loan under “Sudhbharna Bond dated 29-7-1946”was not discharged and that the registration receiptwas retained by the vendors so it is manifest thatthe intention of the parties was that the title wouldnot pass to the purchaser on execution andregistration of Exhibit C. We are not impressed bythis submission. It appears that in the State ofBihar, a practice is prevalent that when the whole orpart of a sale consideration is due or any otherobligation is undertaken by the vendee, then onexecution and registration of the sale deed by thevendor, title to the property, the subject-matter ofthe sale, does not pass “ta khubzul badlain”, thatis, until there is “exchange of equivalent” and insuch a case registration receipt is retained by thevendor, which on payment of consideration due or onfulfilment of the obligation by the vendee isendorsed in his favour or if the sale deed hasalready been received by the vendor, then the saledeed is delivered to the vendee. Even so, this onlyshows that such agreements are common in that part ofthe country but it is essentially a matter ofintention of the parties which has to be gatheredfrom the document itself but if the document isambiguous, then from the attending circumstances,subject to the provisions of Section 92 of theEvidence Act.15. We have already referred to the findings of thecourts below. Although the trial court found that Rs 3000, a part of the consideration, was not paid,the High Court relying upon the receipt, Exhibit 6,held that it was paid on 5-5-1963, as claimed by thefirst purchasers; the balance of consideration of Rs 235 was admittedly deposited by the firstpurchasers in court. Thus, the entire considerationwas paid by the first purchasers. Further, the HighCourt expressed the view that not depositing theSudhbharna Bond amount of Rs 6249 in court would befatal to the case of the first purchasers. That viewis contrary to the judgment of a Division Bench of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Patna High Court in Shiva Narayan Sah v. BaidyaNath Prasad Tiwary1. We are in agreement with theopinion of the Patna High Court in Shiva Narayan Sahcase1 that depositing the mortgage amount in court isone of the three ways available to the mortgagorbefore filing a redemption suit and that he was freeto choose any mode; non-deposit of the mortgage moneywas not fatal to the suit. Further, as the firstpurchasers had deposited that amount in terms of thedecree of the trial court, this point is notavailable to the vendors. Therefore, on that ground,it cannot be said that that part of the considerationwas not paid. In any event, as sale of suit propertyunder Exhibit C was subject to mortgage, it was forthe vendee to discharge the mortgage debt so anydefault or delay in payment of the said amount cannotbe construed as non-payment of consideration. Onconstruction of Exhibit C, we find that the recitalsthereof are unambiguous and that the parties haveexpressed no intention that unless the SudhbharnaBond amount is paid, the title to the suit propertywill not pass to the vendee. The only ground thatremains is non-delivery of the registration receiptby the vendors to the first purchasers which appearsto be due to subsequent developments, namely,execution of Exhibit H and Exhibit C/1, so it cannotbe said to indicate an intention which interdictspassing of title to the first purchasers underExhibit C. We may observe that it was not open to thevendors to unilaterally cancel Exhibit C by executingExhibit H. The trial court on interpretation ofExhibit C came to the conclusion, in our viewrightly, that (1) title to the suit property passedon to the first purchasers on execution andregistration of Exhibit C, but the High Courtreversed that finding for reasons which, as pointedout by us, are unsustainable.(iii) A.I.R.1920 Madras 164 – Yella Krishnammavs.Kotipalle Mali(iv)1999(3) L.W.162 – Raveedran Nair v. Thankam(v) 1998(3) MLJ 372 – Chellappa Gounder (died)and others v. Ramasami Gounder alias Karuppa Gounder(died) and others;A bare perusal of those judgments would highlight and spotlightthe legal position that a vendor of a sale deed cannot simply,throwing to winds Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, treatthe sale deed as a void one. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

12. At this juncture, I call up and recollect thefollowing decision also:(2003) 6 SCC 595 [Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani], an excerptfrom it would run thus:"17. It is likewise a general and mostinflexible rule that wherever written instruments areappointed, either by the requirement of law, or bythe contract of the parties, to be the repositoriesand memorials of truth, any other evidence isexcluded from being used either as a substitute forsuch instruments, or to contradict or alter them.This is a matter both of principle and policy. It isof principle because such instruments are in theirown nature and origin, entitled to a much higherdegree of credit than parol evidence. It is ofpolicy because it would be attended with greatmischief if those instruments, upon which men'srights depended, were liable to be impeached by loosecollateral evidence."13. I would also like to extract hereunder Section 92 ofthe Indian Evidence Act."92.Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement –When the terms of any such contract, grant or otherdisposition of property, or any matter required bylaw to be reduced to the form of a document, havebeen proved according to the last section, noevidence of any oral agreement or statement shall beadmitted, as between the parties to any suchinstrument or their representatives gin interest, forthe purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, orsubtracting from, its terms.Proviso(1) – Any fact may be proved which wouldinvalidate any document, or which would entitle anyperson to any decree or order relating thereto; suchas fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of dueexecution, want of capacity in any contracting party,want or failure of consideration, or mistake in factor law."14. A plain reading of the above would evince andevidence, express and expatiate that any document required tobe reduced in writing, so to say including a sale deed, ishaving the sanctity of its own and parties cannot be allowed toplead anything contrary to the terms and conditions containedtherein. However, under the five provisos to Section 92 ofthe Indian Evidence Act, the interested parties concerned arepermitted to adduce evidence to the contrary and it has to be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ seen as to whether in this case, the first proviso to Section92 of the Indian Evidence Act is attracted. As such the onus ofproof as well as onus probandi is on the respondent to provethat the recitals contained in Ex.A6 are way are bogus ones.But a plain reading of the plaint in O.S.No.410 of 2004 filedby Ramasamy Gounder-the respondent is bereft of any avermentsconstituting his pleadings, capable of attracting the firstproviso to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. 15. As such, if Ramasamy Gounder wanted to invoke theproviso (1) to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, he shouldhave pleaded in his plaint specifically about want ofconsideration in Ex.A6. The plaint in O.S.No.410 of 2004comprised of 14 paragraphs, but in none of the paragraphs thereis any whisper at least that Ex.A6 is a void document, in viewof the total absence of consideration.16. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent wouldrefer to Section 25 of the Contract Act and the followingdecisions to highlight the point that any contract notsupported by consideration is void.(i) 1998(1) CTC 443 – Sri Tarsem Singh vs. SriSukhminder Singh;(ii) 2007(4) CTC 186 – Andritz Qy.rep. throughPower of Attorney Agent, Mr.Siraj Ahmad, New Delhi vs.Enmas Engineering Pvt.Ltd., rep.by its Director andPrincipal Officer, Chennai and another;(iii) AIR 1966 SC 193 – Chidambara Iyer andothers vs. P.S.Renga Iyer and others.17. The Apex Court's judgment reported in 1998 (1) CTC443-Sri Tarsem Singh vs. Sri Sukhminder Singh, cited supraemerged relating to a different set of facts from the oneinvolved in this case. In the said decision agreement to sellalone was contemplated and in that connection, the HonourableApex Court highlighted as to what are all void documents andthat if documents are not supported by consideration, it wouldbe void. Such a proposition is quite explicit and there couldbe no second thought over it.18. The decision of the Honourable Apex Court reported inAIR 1966 SC 193-Chidambara Iyer and others vs. P.S.Renga Iyerand others defines what is consideration and valuableconsideration and how it is essential for a contract and assuch, there could be no quarrel over such a proposition.19. The decision of this Court reported in 2007(4) CTC186- Andritz Qy.rep. through Power of Attorney Agent, Mr.SirajAhmad, New Delhi vs. Enmas Engineering Pvt.Ltd., rep.by its https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Director and Principal Officer, Chennai and another alsohighlights that absence of consideration would lead to voidityof a contract and such a verdict is based on well settled legalposition.20. Absolutely there could be no quarrel over suchpropositions of law found enunciated in these decisions. Buthere Section 25 of the Contract Act and the decisions, whichthe learned Senior counsel for the respondent cited on his sidecannot directly be applied out of context in view of the factthat absolutely there is no pleading at all to show that Ex.A6is a void document. The suit O.S.No.410 of 2004 filed by therespondent-Ramasamy Gounder is only for obtaining delivery ofpossession of the suit property on the alleged ground thattermination notice was sent to the appellant herein terminatingthe tenancy relating to the suit property and that he alsocommitted default in paying rents. As has been highlighted byme supra, the onus of proof is on the respondent-RamasamyGounder to show that Ex.A6-the registered sale deed, executedby Arunachala Gounder, is a void one and that he had unilateralright to execute Ex.B3 by way of cancelling Ex.A6 andconsequently to execute Ex.B1. There is absolutely no prayerfor declaration of respondent's/Ramasamy Gounder's title to thesuit property.21. It is a trite proposition of law that any amount ofevidence, without pleadings should be eschewed. Here therespondent/Ramasamy Gounder, despite knowing the existence ofEx.A6, simply had chosen to file the suit as thoughM.B.Subramaniam was a tenant under him. The learned Seniorcounsel for the appellant would correctly point outincidentally that not even the termination notice, terminatingthe alleged tenancy of the appellant herein was marked beforethe lower Court, for which, the learned Senior counsel for therespondent would argue that admitted facts need not be provedand that the appellant admitted such issuance of terminationnotice. In my considered opinion, statutory notice underSection 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should have beenspecifically marked during trial, but the respondent failed todo so during the joint trial of both the suits.22. Be that as it may, here the serious law point isrelating to the right of Arunachala Gounder to unilaterallycancel Ex.A6 by virtue of Ex.B3. The unassailable andincontrovertible fact is that knowing fully well that Ex.A6 isa sale deed, Arunachala Gounder consciously had put his leftthumb impressions in all sheets of Ex.A6 and executed the saidsale deed in the presence of his son-D4 and one other witness.In such a case, Arunachala Gounder, before executing Ex.B3-the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ cancellation deed should have filed the suit for cancellationof Ex.A6 the said deed. Had he been not a party to Ex.A6, thenthe matter would be entirely different. 23. Here, in Ex.A16-the caveat petition filed byArunachala Gounder, even anterior to the filing of the suit, hewould simply state as follows:-"He falsely obtained the sale deed. The saidsale deed cancelled by me"(emphasis supplied)Arunachala Gounder's stand in Ex.A6 would clearly reveal thatas per him a fraud was committed on him in getting executedEx.A6 by him, wherefore it is crystal clear as per the wellsettled proposition of law that 'fraud' would render a documentvoidable and not void. In this connection I would like toextract hereunder an excerpt from the famous legal classicBroom's Legal Maxim (10th Edition page 541) ". . . . . . . And acontract induced by fraud is not void but only voidable at theelection of the party defrauded". A fortiori ArunachalaGounder, as per his stand, should have filed a suit to get setaside or cancelled Ex.A6, which he had not done. It is not forArunachala Gounder to decide his case for himself. It is forthe Court, in such appropriate suit which ought to have beenfiled by Arunachala Gounder, as per his stand, to decidewhether the said sale deed executed by him is false or not.24. The decision of the Honourable Apex Court reported inJT 1995(1) SCC 223 – Smt.Ramti Devi v. Union of India, citedsupra, would exemplify and demonstrate that the vendor in asale deed should necessarily approach the Court for gettingsuch sale deed avoided or cancelled by filing a suit within theperiod of limitation.25. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent citedthe following Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh HighCourt reported in AIR 2007 Andhra pradesh 57- YanalaMalleshwari w/o.Yadgiri Reddy etc., etc., v. Smt.AnbanthulaSayamma w/o.Late Gopaiah and another etc. etc. and try to pointout that there could be unilateral cancellation of a sale deedby the vendor if he finds that the sale deed is a void one. 26. At this juncture I would like to point out that theratio decidendi of a judgment alone would act as a bindingprecedent. Hence, it has to be seen as to what is the ratiodecidendi of the Full Bench decision of the Honourable AndhraPradesh High Court. Certain excerpts from it would run thus:-" 33. . . . Further, in case of an instrument,which is void or voidable against executant, a suitwould be maintainable for cancellation of such https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ instrument and can be decreed only when it isadjudicated by the competent Court that suchinstrument is void or voidable and that if suchinstrument is left to exist, it would cause seriousinjury to the true owner.99. As already referred to in these cases, thereare serious disputed questions of fact regarding theallegations of fraud and misrepresentation played bythe vendors as well as vendees against each other,there are also questions raised regarding thecompetence and entitlement of a person executing thedocument. In some cases (W.P.Nos.22298, 23005 and23088 of 2004), the sale deeds were cancelled sometime in August, 2003, but the writ petitions arefiled with considerable delay. In some cases, thereare complaints of cancellation of deeds/instrumentsafter lapse of ten years after execution of theoriginal deed. In the opinion of this Court, theseare the matters which are to be decided based onevidence and the affidavit evidence available onrecord is hardly sufficient to decide the issues insuch a manner to meet the ends of justice. Indeed,in some of the matters (W.P.Nos.879, 880, 881, 882,979, 980 and 981 of 2006), suits are already filedfor injunction and the orders of status quo are inforce. Therefore, this Court is of consideredopinion that the parties should be relegated to thecivil Court to file suit either under Section 31 orunder Section 34 of Specific Relief Act. Point No.2is answered accordingly.100. In the result, for the above reasons, allthe writ petitions are dismissed subject toobservations made hereinabove. Be it noted, as andwhen any suits are filed, the civil Court has todecide the issues regarding disputed questions offacts without in any manner influenced by theobservations made in this Judgment. There shall beno order as to costs."27. A bare perusal of the Full Bench decision of theHonourable Andhra Pradesh High Court would clearly indicatethat there is no favourable point in favour of RamasamyGounder. Nowhere the Full Bench decision postulates that in acase like the one here, Arunachala Gounder was absolved frominstituting a suit within three years to get cancelled Ex.A6,wherein he happened to be the executor and that too when headmits the due execution, but pleads only failure ofconsideration. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

28. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant wouldcite the recent decision of this Court reported in 2009-2-L.W.247-G.D.Subramaniam vs. 1.The Sub Registrar, Office ofKonur Sub Registrar, SIDCO Nagar, Chennai-49 and three others.In the said decision, the aforesaid decision of the AndhraPradesh High Court has been referred to and ultimately thisCourt concluded as under:-31. Out of the foregoing discussions, theemerging conclusions are summed up as follows:-(i) Challenging registration of a unilaterallyexecuted deed of cancellation of a sale, a writpetition is maintainable under Article 226 of theConstitution of India;(ii) A deed of cancellation of a sale executedby mutual consent by all parties to the sale deed, ifpresented for registration, the registering Officeris bound to register the same provided the otherrequirements like Section 32-A of the RegistrationAct have been complied with.(iii) The Registering Officer is obligedlegally to reject and to refuse to register a deed ofcancellation of a sale unilaterally executed withoutthe knowledge and consent of other parties to thesale deed and without complying with Section 32 A ofthe Registration Act.The Result:32. In the result, the writ petition isallowed. The registration of the cancellation deed(Document No.4433 of 2007) by the first respondent ishereby quashed. Having regard to the facts andcircumstances of the case, the respondents 2 to 4 aredirected to pay a cost of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees tenthousand only) to the petitioner. Consequently,connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.In fact, this Court in the judgment cited supra had taken adifferent view from the one taken by the majority in the FullBench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 29. I would like to point out that here the main issue isnot relating to the right to file writ petition challenging theunilateral execution of a cancellation deed and getting thesame registered. However, this Court, in the judgment cited in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 2009-2-LW 247 held that unilateral execution of a cancellationdeed and getting it registered is not tenable.30. Axiomatically and apparently, in this case, despitethe vendor of the sale deed Ex.A6 having had full knowledgeabout the execution of the sale deed Ex.A6 by him, had notchosen to file the suit to get Ex.A6 cancelled or avoided.Ex.A6 is dated 10.11.1999, whereas, Arunachala Gounder died on9.1.2001 and before his death, even though he had chosen tofile the caveat-Ex.A16, as set out supra, he had not chosen tofile a suit, as contemplated in the decision of the HonourableApex Court cited supra. No doubt, he died within three yearsfrom Ex.A6-dated 10.11.1999 and Ramasamy Gounder-his son, whoclaims to be the beneficiary of the settlement deed Ex.B1 couldhave, within three years computing from 10.11.1999, filed suchsuit, as contemplated in the Apex Court's judgment. But he hasalso not chosen to file such a suit. As such, the learnedSenior counsel for the appellant is right in his argument thathaving failed to file the suit, as contemplated above andhaving lost the right to get set aside or cancelled or avoidedthe said document Ex.A6, it is not open for Ramasamy Gounder,in a suit for bare recovery of possession, based on the allegedcause of action to plead that the appellant was the tenantunder him.31. At this juncture, I call up and recollect thatRamasamy Gounder filed the suit O.S.No.410 of 2004 based on thealleged cause of action as found set out in paragraph 13 of theplaint, which reads as follows:"13. The cause of action for the suit arose on31.12.2000 when the defendant became a tenant underplaintiff's father and on 12.3.2000 when theplaintiff became the owner and the tenancy was alsoattorned and the defendant failed to pay rent and on12.8.2000 when the tenancy was terminated with effectfrom 30.9.2000 and the defendant failed to deliverthe possession and failed to pay the arrears of rentat all at: Somanur Village, where the tenancypremises is situate within the jurisdiction of thisHonourable Court." 32. Glaringly and pellucidly, it is clear that RamasamyGounder, in his plaint in O.S.No.410 of 2004 (O.S.No.653 of2003) pre-supposed and assumed for himself that there wasattornement of tenancy in his favour by M.B.Subramaniam(appellant) and filed the suit. The fact remains thatRamaswamy Gounder's father, during his life time, filed thecaveat petition-Ex.A16, disputing the sale deed Ex.A6 and alsoreferred to his own cancellation deed Ex.B3. In such a case, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Ramasamy Gounder, is guilty of suppression of material factsin the plaint, attracting the maxim 'Supressio veri Expressiofalsi'(suppression of the truth is equivalent to espression ofwhat is false).33. The suit, as such framed by Ramasamy Gounder is farfrom satisfactory and it was liable to be dismissed in limini;but both the Courts below, without properly understanding thescope of the suit and actual dispute between the appellant andthe respondent decreed Ramasamy Gounder's suit O.S.No.410 of2004 by going into various aspects of the matter in anunsatisfactory manner.34. At this juncture, it is just and necessary to extracthereunder the actual issues framed by the trial Court. m/t/vz/410-2004 y; vGtpdhf;fs;@01/ jhth brhj;jpd; RthjPdj;ij xg;gilf;f nfhUk; jhthghpfhuk; thjpf;F fpilf;fj;jf;fjh>02/ thjp nfhUk; jhth bjhif U:/68.000- gpd; tl;oa[ld;bgw thjp jFjp cilatuh>03/ thjpf;F fpilf;fToa ,ju ghpfhu';fs; vd;d>m/t/vz/14-2000 y; vGtpdhf;fs;01/ thjp g[ujpthjpfSf;F vjpuhf nfhUk; epue;jucWj;Jf;fl;lis ghpfhuk; thjpf;F fpilf;fj;jf;fjh>02/ 10/11/99 k; njjpapd; fpiua gj;jpuj;jpd;go thjp 1 k;vjph; thjpaplk; jFe;j gpujpgadpd; nghpy; fpiuak; bgw;Ws;shuh>03/ thjpf;F fpilf;ff;Toa ,ju ghpfhu';fs; vd;d>translationO.S.No.410 of 2004(1) Whether the plaintiff-Ramasamy Gounder isentitled to recovery of possession?(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover asum of Rs.68,000/-?(3) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?ANDO.S.No.14 of 2000:(1) Whether the plaintiff (M.B.Subramaniam) isentitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?(2) Whether the plaintiff (M.B.Subramaniam) purchasedthe suit property from Arunachala Gounder(D1) forvaluable consideration?(3) to what relief is the plaintiff entitled?35. In a bare suit for injunction filed by the appellant,in O.S.No.14 of 2000, I am of the considered opinion that suchissue No.2 does not arise at all and it is beyond the scope https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the suit. In the suit for permanent injunction filed by theappellant, the respondent-Ramasamy Gounder had not raised anyplea that there was no consideration at all or considerationwas not paid by M.B.Subramaniam to Arunachala Gounder. Eventhen, the lower Court did choose to frame the said issue No.(2)as above, without any basis and it is totally antithetical toOrder 14 of C.P.C. In fact, D4, in his written statement inO.S.No.14 of 2000 would clearly support the appellant's casethat Ex.A6 was supported by consideration. But D2-RamasamyGounder, who was the contesting defendant in that suit had notchosen to put forth his plea in black and white in his writtenstatement that Ex.A6 was bad in law due to certain reasons.Absolutely there is no whisper about failure of considerationmuch less about bogus nature of the consideration in Ex.A6.Hence, the trial Court and the first appellate Court havingbeen unable to see the wood for tree, decided the lis,warranting interference by this Court.36. I am fully aware of the fact that in second appeal,the High Court will not reevaluate the evidence afresh unlessthere is perversity. 37. In view of my discussion supra, I hold that withoutunderstanding the scope of the suits and the gamut of Order14 of C.P.C.relating to framing of issues and also theprovisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, both theCourts below misdirected themselves in deciding the lis. 38. It is explicit that Arunachala Gounder, during hislife time, and his son Ramaswamy Gounder, within three yearsfrom 10.11.1999-the date of execution of Ex.A6, did not file asuit for its cancellation or setting aside the same and therebyRamasamy Gounder lost his right to lay claim over the suitproperty. 39. Alternis visibus, at least, Ramasamy Gounder in thesuit O.S.No.410 of 2004 could have prayed for declaring thealleged voidity of Ex.A6 by setting out certain grounds andtherdeby trying to justify that he was not under the necessityto file a suit to get cancelled or set aside Ex.A6 and that hecould straight away file a suit for recovery of possession bygetting his title declared in respect of the suit property onthe strength of Ex.B1-the Settlement Deed executed byArunachala Gounder in his favour. But for obvious reasons,Ramasamy Gounder, had not chosen to seek for declaration oftitle. No doubt, Ramasamy Gounder will raise his accusativefinger as against M.B.Subramaniam(appellant) that the suitO.S.No.14 of 2000 is bad for want of a prayer for declarationof title. This amounts to pot calling kettle black. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

40. It is a common or garden principle of law that whenthere is a serious title dispute to the knowledge of theparties, they, while filing a suit for certain relief, shouldnecessarily pray for declaration of the title. My own judgmentreported in 2007(4) CTC 70 – Chinna Nachiappan and another vs.PL.Lakshmanan has been cited on the side of the respondent-Ramasamy Gounder to highlight the following points:"14. Not to put too fine a point on it, rightat the outset, I may proceed to refer to theaverments in the plaint at paragraph Nos.4,5,6, 7 and8 which unambiguously and unequivocally referred to aserious title disputes between the plaintiff and thedefendants. Paragraph No.8 is extracted here underfor ready reference:"Though joint patta had been issued to theplaintiff and his pangalis have been and are inpossession as per the partition amongthemselves. Thus the suit property continues tobe in the possession and enjoyment of theplaintiff".15. The above extract from the plaint itself,is sufficient to non-suit the plaintiff in view ofhaving not prayed for declaration of title. It istrite proposition of law that if the plaint itselfcontains the averments relating to title disputesbetween the plaintiff and the defendants, the formercannot simply pray for protecting his allegedpossession by filing a suit for injunction. Heshould necessarily pray for declaration of his title.In this connection, Order 2, Rule 2 of Code of CivilProcedure, could fruitfully be referred to and it isextracted here under for ready reference:"2. Suit to include the whole claim –Every suit shall include the whole of theclaim which the plaintiff is entitled tomake in respect of the cause of action; buta plaintiff may relinquish any portion ofhis claim in order to bring the suit withinthe jurisdiction of any Court"41. I would reiterate the same law point, without anyhesitation. My observation relating to the injunction suitwould squarely be applicable to the appellant's injunction suitas well as to the suit filed by Ramasamy Gounder for recovery https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of possession. In civil jurisprudence, a suit for recovery ofpossession of an immovable property is always taken as aserious and heavier suit than a suit for bare injunction.42. Here the appellant-M.B.Subramaniam filed a simple suitfor injunction, without praying for declaration of his title.Whereas, in the subsequently instituted suit by RamasamyGounder, he, after knowing the actual dispute and the historyof the dispute, did choose to make a prayer for recovery ofpossession, based on the cause of action, as found detailed inparagraph 13 of his plaint, which is extracted supra,suppressing the intricacies of the real dispute involved in thematter. In fact, in O.S.No.14 of 2000, M.B.Subramaniam,elaborately narrated the history of his title even though hehad not made a prayer for declaration of his title and therespondent-Ramasamy Gounder filed the written statement,disputing the title of the appellant (M.B.Subramaniam) also.The fact also remains that Ramasamy Gounder's brother-D4 inO.S.No.14 of 2000 filed his written statement as early as on6.4.2000 itself supporting M.B.Subramanhiam's case. Theincontrovertible fact is that Ramasamy Gounder filed the suitO.S.No.653 of 2003, in the year 2003, which was subsequentlyrenumbered as O.S.No.410 of 2004 and he should have adverted tothe title dispute in his plaint and prayed for declaration ofhis title, but he totally and completely suppressing the actualdispute, simply filed the suit for recovery of possession asthough the appellant was a tenant under him and that heallegedly terminated such tenancy. In the plaint relating toO.S.No.14 of 2000, filed by the appellant herein, hecategorically averred that ever since Ex.A6 dated 10.11.1999,his possession was not that of a tenant but that of a owner.It is therefore crystal clear that the avermentrs in the suitO.S.No.410 of 2004 filed by Ramasamy Gounder would notconstitute a legal plaint to obtain recovery of possession ofthe suit property from the appellant. 43. Not to put too fine a point on it, a fortiori, boththe Courts below, without au fait with law and au courant withfacts, misdirected themselves and decided the lis in favour ofRamasamy Gounder, warranting interference by this Court.44. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Courtshould have posed the question to themselves as to whetherwithin the scope of those two suits, they were justified inprobing into the factum of passing of consideration under Ex.A6or the alleged factum of bogus nature of consideration foundrecited in Ex.A6. The answer is an emphatic 'no'. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

45. In view of the scope of those suits, absolutely therehad been no chance for either of the parties to adduce evidencerelating to the passing of the consideration or the allegedbogus nature of the consideration etc.relating to Ex.A6. Eventhen, both the Courts below thought fit to consider theevidence before them and curiously jumped to the conclusion asthough non production of the discharged pro note and receipts,evidencing the discharge of loans of Arunachala Gounder byM.B.Subramaniam, was fatal to Ex.A6. 46. To the risk of repetition without being tautologous, Iwould highlight that this Court while exercising its powerunder Section 100 of C.P.C.could probe into the perversity ofboth the Courts below in their appreciation of evidence and asto how they got the wrong end of the stick. Before venturingto analyse such perversity, I would once again place on recordthat both the Courts below were not justified in entertainingevidence relating to validity or otherwise of Ex.A6, Ex.B3 andEx.B1. Nonetheless, I would like to point out that how both theCourts below were not justified in expecting M.B.Subramaniam toprove that he discharged the loans referred to in Ex.A6 andalso paid the cash of Rs.50,000/- to Arunachala Gounder underEx.A6. 47. My discussion supra centered on Section 92 of theIndian Evidence Act would highlight that Arunachala Gounderhaving executed Ex.A6 cannot unilaterally ignore it. Thefailure of consideration or bogus nature of considerationshould have been proved by Arunachala Gounder or his sonRamasamy Gounder, the claimant for the suit property, as theonus probandi and the onus of proof cannot be fobbed off onM.B.Subramaniam, who is the holder of a registered sale deedEx.A6.48. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent wouldargue that in order to prove Ex.A6, the contesting witnesseshave not been examined. In my considered opinion, such anargument fails to carry conviction with this Court for thereason that a sale deed is not a document like 'Will'. Aregistered sale deed can, as such, be marked and that too whenArunachala Gounder himself in his caveat Ex.A16 admitted theexecution of the sale deed Ex.A6. Denying the execution ofsale deed in toto is different from admitting a sale deed, butdenying certain recitals in it or the failure of considerationor bogus nature of consideration. The distinction which I havemade is not one that of tweedledum and tweedledee, but thereis an abysmal difference between the said two pleas. In a caseif the executant denies his signature as well as execution andpleads virtually impersonation, it is obvious that the vendee https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in addition to relying on Section 114(e) of the IndianEvidence Act, has to examine the attesting witnesses to provethe due execution. But, here, Arunachala Gounder, during hislife time, clearly admitted the execution of Ex.A6-the saledeed. But he only pleaded failure of consideration and thesame could rightly be understood by a plain reading of Ex.B3-the cancellation deed dated 19.1.2000. An excerpt from Ex.B3dated 19.1.2000 would run thus:-@/ / / / vk;/gp/Rg;ukzpak; vd;gtUf;F fpiuak; bra;JbfhLj;jjhf xU fpiua rhrdk; vGjg;gl;L mJ R{Yuh; rhh;gjpthsh; mYtyfj;jpy; 1 g[j;jfk; 1630 bjhFjp 65 Kjy; 68tiu gf;f';fspy; 3534-1999 k; vz;zhf gjpt[ bra;ag;gl;Ls;sJ/ mjpy; ehd; bgw;Wf;bfhz;ljhfFwpg;gpl;Ls;s U:/2.00.000- U:gha; ,uz;L yl;rk;) vdf;Fbry;yhftpy;iy/@49. A bare perusal of the said excerpt from Ex.B3 wouldindicate and exemplify that according to Arunachala Gounder,the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- stated as consideration in Ex.A6, wasnot in fact got credited in his favour. By his words"bry;yhftpy;iy@. Arunachala Gounder did not dispute about eventhe two loans referred to in Ex.A6 as bogus ones. What are allin Ex.B3-the cancellation deed Arunachala Gounder stated wasthat the consideration of Rs.2,00,000/- was not credited to inhis favour, so to say "bry;yhftpy;iy@/50. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent wouldtry to argue that in the sale deed Ex.A6 there is incongruitybetween the specification of the value of the property and theconsideration. No doubt, in Ex.A6, the value of the propertywas specified as Rs.2,79,000/- and the consideration was statedas Rs.2,00,000/-. It is quite obvious that for the purpose ofpaying stamp duty the actual market value should be specifiedand it is for the parties to fix the sale price. Here,Arunachala Gounder in Ex.B3 did not state anything about theinadequacy of the sale consideration and consequently thealleged bogus nature of the consideration in the sale deed. 51. Ramasamy Gounder is not at all specific in hispleading as to what actuated and accentuated, propelled andimpelled Arunachala Gounder to go to the Registrar's Office andgot the sale deed registered and that too by having his son D4with him. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

52. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent wouldtry to argue that D4, one of the sons of Arunachala Gounder,played the mischief. But absolutely there is no pleading andproof to that effect. The learned Senior counsel for therespondent also would submit that D4 was not examined beforethe trial Court.53. In my considered opinion, once the onus probandi andonus of proof is on Ramasamy Gounder to prove the plea, it wasnot for the appellant-Subramaniam to examine D4 on his side andthat too when the fact remains that the execution of Ex.A6 wasadmitted by Arunachala Gounder himself. It is not the recitalof Arunahala Gounder in drafting Ex.B3 that Ex.A6 emerged outof impersonation, or it was made to be signed by him by makinghim to believe that it was not a sale deed but a different one.The recitals in Ex.B3, a portion of which extracted supra,would exemplify that Arunachala Gounder admitted the dueexecution of the sale deed by him and in such a case, admittedfacts need not be proved by M.B.Subramaniam by examining D4,who is one of the attesting witnesses to Ex.A6.54. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent alsowould try to impeach Ex.A6 on the ground that in the first pagethere is some shaky signature purported to be that ofArunachala Gounder, but in all sheets only his left thumbimpressions are found. 55. In fact, such a factor lends strength to Ex.A6. Inthe first page of the photo copy of Ex.A6, which is foundenclosed in the additional typed set of papers filed by therespondent, a shaky signature of Arunachala Gounder is foundand it is found struck out and thereafter, at page No.5 of thesaid sale deed, a version is found inserted to the effect thatat that relevant time Arunachala Gounder's hand was tremblingand shaky, owing to his ill-health and that he could not signand that in all pages, he was affixing his left thumbimpressions. This clearly exemplifies and evinces as to howArunachala Gounder, in the subsequent cancellation deed andEx.B1-the Settlement deed, had put his signatures as duringthat relevant time he was capable of doing so by recuperatinghis health to the limited extent possible. 56. It is a common or garden principle in geriatrics andalso it is a sheer common sense that aged people, on certaindays, would be in a position to put their signatures and whenthere is slight ill-health on their part or set back in theirhealth, they would not be able to sign. Here, consequent uponthe fact that in the first page, he could sign with tremors, itwas thought at that time that it was better not to obtain his https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ signatures and accordingly, a clause was inserted at page No.5,which was not already found typed in a pre-planned manner.Above all, Arunachala Gounder by himself admitted about the dueexecution of the sale deed and in such a case, all these factswould not matter at all.57. Both the Courts below erroneously found that non-production of the discharged pro note and the receipts issuedby P.W.2 and P.W.3 in token of the discharge of theirrespective debts was fatal to the case of the appellant. I amof the considered opinion that once again I need not dilate onthe same point, as the burden of proof was on Ramasamy Gounder,to plead about such bogus nature of consideration and prove itand not for M.B.Subramaniam. Even then, cutting across thetechnicalities, as to who should prove first and who shouldprove next, as per the Indian Evidence Act, the appellantherein examined those two creditors of Arunachala Gonder,namely, P.W.2 and P.W.3 on his side and they clearly andcategorically, without mincing words, deposed that the duesunder those debts referred to in Ex.A6 payable by ArunachalaGounder were discharged by the appellant. There cannot be anybest evidence than the creditors evidence. 58. No doubt P.W.2 and P.W.3 are the relatives of P.W.1(M.B.Subramaniam) and it does not mean that their evidenceshould be looked askance at. Because they happened to be therelatives, there is no presumption that the appellant hadchosen to concoct Ex.A6, reciting bogus consideration thereinand that too when absolutely that was not the case ofArunachala Gounder and Ramasamy Gounder, as set out supra.There is nothing to doubt the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3. 59. It is not the case of anyone that those two creditorsproceeded against Ramasamy Gounder for those debts of hisfather Arunachala Gounder. However, on Ramasamy Gounder'sside, they would try to argue as though those two debts werebogus ones and I would highlight that that was not the case atall of Ramasamy Gounder or his deceased father ArunachalaGounder either in their pleadings or in Ex.B3 or Ex.B1. Insuch a case, both the Courts below misunderstanding the conceptof burden of proof as well as 'onus probandi', simply carriedaway by the case of Ramasamy Gounder. 60. There is nothing to indicate that Ramaswamy Gounderwas prevented from examing D4-Shanmugam, his brother on hisside or as a Court witness so as to cross-examine him, with thepermission of Court about his version in his written statementthat in his presence only a sum of Rs.50,000/- was paid byM.B.Subramaniam to Arunachala Gounder. Here once again Section https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 92 of the Indian Evidence Act would fortify and buttress thestand of the appellant, in view of the recitals found in Ex.A6relating to payment of consideration of Rs.50,000/- in cash bythe vendee to the vendor.61. The depositions of D.W.2 and D.W.3 on the side ofRamasamy Gounder, are for proving Ex.B1 and Ex.B3 and in thefacts and circumstances of this case and in view of thesubstantial questions of law framed herein, those are notgermane to be considered in these second appeals. 62. Absolutely, there is no infinitesimal or minisculeextent of evidence to convey or expatiate that even afterEx.A6, the appellant continued to be a tenant under ArunachalaGounder or under Ramasamy Gounder and in such a case both theCourts below were not justified in ordering eviction of theappellant from the suit property.63. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent,inviting the attention of this Court to Ex.A17-the proceedingsof the Executive Officer-Karumathampatti Town Panchayat woulddevelop his argument that the said document refers to adifferent property from the suit property and there is noindication that consequent upon Ex.A6, in the house taxregister there took place mutation by replating the name ofArunachala Gounder, with the name of M.B.Subramaniam.64. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant wouldappropriately and appositely torpedo and pulverize such anargument as put forth on the side of the respondent by pointingout that no cross-examination was made as against the saidstand of M.B.Subramaniam as PW.1 before the trial Court andthat in Ex.A17, the name of Arunachala Gounder was foundspecified as the erstwhile owner and his name was replaced bythe name of M.B.Subramaniam-the appellant. In Ex.A.17-the doornumber is found specified as 12/9 in ward No.12, which aredifferent from the ones found in Ex.A6. According to thelearned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the ward number anddoor number got changed. It is not the case of Ramasamy Gounderthat M.B.Subramaniam got some other house purchased fromArunachala Gounder. Preponderance of probabilities wouldgovern the adjudication in civil cases and hence, therespondent cannot try to make a mountain out of a molehill.65. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant wouldconvincingly argue that the so called deficiency in institutingthe injunction suit by the appellant-M.B.Subramaniam, without aprayer for declaration of his title, got automatically cured byRamasamy Gounder in his filing a suit for possession, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ recognising the appellant's possession over the suit property.In a suit for bare injunction what the Court has to find out isas to whether as on the date of filing of the suit forinjunction, the appellant was in exclusive, establishedpossession of the suit property. 66. Here Ramasamy Gounder clearly and categoricallyadmitted the exclusive and established possession of theappellant-M.B.Subramaniam in the suit property and in such acase, based on such admission, injunction could be granted andI would like to reiterate the law point as found exemplified inmy earlier judgment reported in 2007(4) CTC 70 – ChinnaNachiappan and another vs. PL.Lakshmanan and also point outthat in that suit, the exclusive and established possession ofthe plaintiff was not admitted by the defendant therein. Buthere, the exclusive and established possession of the appellantin the suit property was admitted by Ramasamy Gounder and thelatter sought for recovery of possession on the ground ofalleged subsisting tenancy, which he failed to establish.Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered asunder:-Substantial question of law (1) is answered tothe effect that Arunachala Gounder and RamaswamyGounder have not proved that Ex.A6 is a void documentand accordingly Arunachala Gounder had no unilateralright to execute Ex.B1, without cancelling Ex.A6.Substantial question of law (2) is decided to theeffect that Ex.A6 is not proved to be a void documentas put forth by Ramasamy Gounder.Substantial question of law (3) is answered tothe effect that both the Courts are perverse inappreciating the evidence and in giving a finding infavour of Ramasamy Gounder.Substantial question of law (4) is answered tothe effect that the suit filed by M.B.Subramaniam isbad for want of prayer for declaration of title.however, in view of admission of Ramasamy Gounder thatthe appellant is in exclusive and establishedpossession of the suit property, permanent injunctioncould be granted in favour of Subramaniam-theappellant herein.67. In view of the ratiocination adhered to in decidingthe aforesaid substantial questions of law, both the secondappeals are allowed, setting aside the common judgments anddecrees of both the Courts below and consequently O.S.No.410 of2004 filed by Ramasamy Gounder is dismissed and O.S.No.14 of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 2000 is decreed, granting injunction. However, there is noorder as to costs.Msk Sd/- Asst. Registrar / True Copy / Sub.Asst Registrar To1. The Subordinate Court, Tiruppur.2. The District Munsif cum Magistrate Court, Palladam.3. The Section Officer, VR Section, High Court, Madras.+ 4 ccs to Mr. C. R. Prasanan, Advocate SR No.14938, 14849,14850, 14937+ 1 cc to Mr. T. V. Krishnamachari, Advocate SR No.15577NTK(CO)SR/10.6.2009 S.A.Nos.1668 & 1669 of 2008