B.Ranganathan v. State represented by Inspector of Police & Ors.

the suit within the time specified in the order. The common orderpassed by the High court in CRPs was challenged before the Hon'bleSupreme Court by the defendants by way of SLP Nos.30471 and 30472 of2009 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court by order dated 6.1.2010 initiallystayed further proceedings in the suit. 4.Pending disposal of SLPs on the file of the Supreme Court, oneP.Selvamani residing at No.B1/17, Moon Enclave Apartment, MugappairWest, Chennai-37, who is the second respondent in Crl.O.P.No.23140 of2011 lodged a complaint before V7 Nolambur Police Station on 1.8.2011against the first petitioner Ranganathan, the second petitionerT.C.Venkatesh @ Gowri Sankar and 5 others Dhanasingh, Albert,Jayaram, Rathinapati, and Juliet Gnanavathi. The complaint proceedsas if the defacto complainant is the permanent resident of MoonEnclave Apartment, Mugappair and he purchased a house site measuring1 ground from one Gupta during 2002 and obtained due license andpermission for putting up construction and while so, during 2008 healong with 120 persons, who are all the purchasers of land measuring20 acres in different survey numbers in Nolambur, received copy ofexparte injunction order granted in favour of one Gowri Sankar on thebasis of the documents produced on his side before Poonamallee courtand the defacto complainant and others immediately entered appearancein the suit and injunction order was modified into an order of statusquo. While so, the named second accused Venkatesh @ Gowri Sankar atthe instigation of the named first accused B.Ranganathan, came to theproperty along with his hirelings, armed with weapons and put up ashed and installed a board and when the defacto complainant andothers met Gowri Sankar and others in the site, they were threatenedwith dire consequences, to leave the site, after receiving 25% of theamount paid by them by way of sale consideration. The enquiry in theTahsildar office reveals that kist receipts in C77 series for thefaslis 1405, 1406 and 1407, which were filed into court byGowrisankar, are forged documents on the strength of whichRanganathan and others threatened the individual owner of the landwith dire consequences and action is warranted against all the sevenaccused for act of criminal intimidation on the basis of the forgeddocuments. The compliant was received at 3pm on 1.8.2011 and the samewas registered on the file of V7 Nolambur Police station as Cr.no.758of 2011 for the offences under sections 147, 148, 447, 427, 387, 506(ii), 465, 468, 471 and 420 IPC and the same was followed bycommencement of investigation by the first respondent/IO. Pendinginvestigation, A1 to A5 were arrested on 2.8.2011 and were remandedto judicial custody on 3.8.2011 and an application was filed intocourt on 3.8.2011 under Section 167 (2) Cr.P.C seeking police custodyof the accused 1 and 2 for their custodial interrogation and the samewas rejected by the concerned judicial Magistrate. The correctness ofthe order of rejection by the Judicial Magistrate was challenged inCrl.O.P.No.18888 of 2011 and this court by order dated 12.8.2011dismissed the criminal Original Petition on the ground that thepolice custody of A1 and A2 for custodial interrogation isunwarranted. 5.Immediately thereafter, the second respondent inCrl.O.P.No.21714 of 2011 by name Varadarajulu, who is one of theresidents of S Block 16th Street, Anna Nagar, Chennai, lodged acomplaint on 24.8.2011 in V7 Nolambur Police Station against the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ petitioners 1 and 2 viz., Ranganathan and Gowrisankar and four othersDhanasingh, Albert, Jayapaul, Jayasingh, who are the accused 1 to 6in Crime no.758 of 2011. The allegations raised in the complaintgiving rise to Crime No.834 of 2011 culminating into CC.No.293 of2011 relates to criminal acts constituting the offences undersections 420, 468, 506(ii) r/w 120 B IPC relating tomisrepresentation made by A1 and A2 regarding ownership of theproperty and offer made by them for sale of the property on behalf ofthe owners and negotiation held between the defacto complainant andhis close relatives on one hand and A1 and A2 on other hand andacceptance of the defacto complainant and others to purchase theproperty for sale consideration of Rs.5 crores arrived at by them andpayment of Rs.2.50 crores by way of two cheques each on two occasionsdrawn in favour of M/s.National Developers and sale agreementexecuted between the defacto complainant and A3 to 6 in PoonamalleeSub Registrar Office and postponement of execution of sale deed by A1and A2 inspite of repeated demands and relating to act of criminalintimidation by A1 and A2 by threatening the defacto complainant andothers to leave the property, after receiving part of the money etc. 6.The complaint proceeds as if the defacto complainant, hisbrother Dhanasekaran and his paternal uncles Padmanabhan andVenkatraman have been running Brick Klins and are income taxassessees and T.C.Venkatesh @ Gowrisankar claiming himself to be therepresentative of M/s. National Developers established and run byB.Ranganathan, former M.L.A of Villivakkam and Purasaiwakkamconstituencies, represented to them that other four accused are theabsolute owners and possessors of vacant land in various surveynumbers measuring 20.95 acres in Nolambur Village and a portion ofthe land measuring 94 cents is offered for sale and the owners haveauthorised M/s.National Developers to mediate for and on their behalfto fix the sale price and to sell the said portion of the land andthe second petitioner herein T.C.Venkatesh @ Gowrisankar wasassisting the first accused Ranganathan and the same was alsoverified from A1 Ranganathan. When the defacto complainant and othersmet him in person, A1 and A2 assured and represented that other fouraccused have valid and marketable title and the landed property inquestion is not subjected to any encumbrance and all of thembonafidly believed and trusted the representation made by A1 and A2respectively as genuine and agreed to purchase the land for saleconsideration of Rs.5 crores and paid advance of Rs.2,50,00,000/- byway of two cheques drawn in favour of National Developers and twocheques were also encashed and thereafter, the intending purchaserswere summoned to Sub Registrar Office at Konnur at 4 pm for gettingthe sale agreement executed and three out of four persons had been toRegistrar office and the remaining four accused were shown as ownersand family cards and bank cards were shown as proof of their identityand the defacto complainant and two others were compelled to sign thedocuments without being allowed to read the same and the same wasalso registered. Subsequently, they came to know that larger extentof 17.15 acres as against 94 cents has been mentioned as the landagreed to be purchased for Rs.34,30,00,000/- instead ofRs.5,00,00,000/- and when they questioned A1 and A2 regarding thediscrepancy, they promised them to set right all the matters and makeother four persons to execute the sale deed by mentioning the correctparticulars. Inspite of repeated demands made, the execution of sale https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ documents being postponed by A1 and A2 and A3 to A7. In the meanwhile, they approached the civil court by filing suit O.S.No.23 of2008 for certain reliefs and again, the defacto complainant met themand they promised them to settle the issue shortly and thereafter toexecute the sale deeds. Subsequently, there was no proper responsefrom the persons concerned, which compelled the defacto complainantand others apprehending foul play to approach the plot ownersassociation, who filed earlier complaint against A1 and A2 and whoissued publication in the newspaper. 7.The complaint further proceeds as if the enquiry withAnnamalai Avenue Nolambur Plot Owners Association revealed pendencyof Civil Suit and that the predecessors-in-title of the members ofthe said association were the real owners and possessors of theentire Nolambur vacant land and after the sales made by them, themembers of the said association become the absolute owners andpossessors of the same and A1, A2 and others dishonestly andfraudulently created invalid and illegal sale agreement dated5.4.2007 in favour of the defacto complainant and others to cheat anddefraud the complainant and others. Again, the defacto complainantand others met A1 and A2 and demanded return of sale advance amount,but A1 and A2 threatened the defacto complainant and others to endtheir life, if they make any such demand. The complaint was receivedat 10.30 am on 24.8.2011 and was registered as Crime No.834 of 2011on the file of V7 Nolumbur Police Station against the petitioners 1and 2 and four others. 8.Admittedly, during pendency of civil suit filed by A3 to A7represented through A2/power of attorney and investigation uponpolice complaints, compromise was arrived at between the individualsby A1 and A2 returning entire amount to the defacto complainant andothers and by their giving up any claim upon the land in question andthe defacto complainant in both FIRs and others have mainly on thestrength of such settlement arrived at between the parties, intendedand agreed to drop the criminal proceedings. The petitioners 1 and 2,who are arrayed as A1 and A2 in both the crime Nos.758 and 834 of2011 have hence approached this court by way of Crl.O.P.Nos.21714 of2011 and 23140 of 2011 under Section 482 Cr.P.C to call for therecords relating to both crime numbers and to quash the same. 9.Crl.O.P.Nos.21714 and 23140 of 2011 were filed on 6.9.2011 and21.9.2011 respectively to call for the records relating to both CrimeNos.834 and 758 of 2011 respectively and to quash the same on theground that the petitioners/A1 and A2 have settled the issue withthe defacto complainant and all 120 members of Annamalai AvenueNolambur Plot Owners Association and in pursuance of the compromise,the civil suit O.S.No.23 of 2008 was dismissed by Supreme Court andSLPs pending before the Supreme Court were also dismissed andconsequent upon the same, the civil suit O.S.No.23 of 2008 on thefile of sub court, Poonamallee was also withdrawn by the plaintiffs,who are the accused in both Crime numbers. It is contended by thelearned counsel for the petitioners in Crl.OP.Nos.21714 and 23140 of2011 that the defacto complainant and others, in view of thesettlement arrived at between the parties, received the full amountand agreed to drop further action and to withdraw the proceedingswhich are already initiated, as no purpose will be served in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ continuing the prosecution as the dispute between the parties ispurely civil in nature and is amicably settled and no useful purposewill be served in keeping the prosecution against the petitionersalive and pending, as the chances of the defacto complainant andothers deposing against the petitioners and chances of getting themconvicted are remote and bleak and FIR registered as Crime Nos.758and 834 of 2011 are hence, in exercise of inherent jurisdiction underSection 482 Cr.P.C, liable to be quashed. However, before obtainingany order in both the Crl.OPs., investigation was completed in CrimeNo.834 of 2011 and charge sheet was filed and the same was taken upon file as C.C.No.293 of 2011 by the Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur,as such, the accused 1 and 2 herein have filed subsequentCrl.O.P.No.24938 of 2011 to call for the records in CC.No.293 of 2011on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur and to quash thesame.10.The petitioners have also in support of the settlement theoryproduced identical affidavits of the defacto complainant andremaining 120 owners/members of plot owners association to the effectthat after the dispute was amicably settled, it was representedbefore the Supreme Court and on the basis of representation,O.S.No.23 of 2008 was dismissed as withdrawn by the Supreme Court andthe petitioners have, as per the settlement, relinquished their claimin property and the defacto complainant and others have no otherclaim against the petitioners either civil or criminal and they haveno intention to continue the prosecution against the petitioners andhave no objection to quash the proceedings. 11.Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor would seriouslyoppose the relief sought for herein on the ground that theallegations levelled against the accused are not compoundable and arevery serious in nature involving crime against society and hence arenot liable to be quashed at the initial stage by exercising inherentpowers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 12.Both the learned counsel on record have also submittedcatenna of authorities for and against the contentions raised on bothsides.13.Heard the rival submissions made on both sides. 14.It is well settled that Section 482 of the Code does notconfer any new powers on the High Court, but only saves the inherentpower which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. Itenvisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdictionmay be exercised namely (i) to give effect to the order under thecourt (ii)to prevent abuse of process of court and (iii)to otherwisesecure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable tolay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise ofinherent jurisdiction and no legislative enactment dealing withprocedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Thecourts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisionsof law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions andduties imposed upon them by law. It is also equally well settled https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to beexercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when suchexercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in thesection itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do realand substantial justice for the administration of which alone thecourts exist and if it finds that initiation/continuance of theproceedings amounts to abuse of process of court or quashing of theseproceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. 15.In one of the earliest cases R.P.Kapur V. State of Punjab1960 (3) SCR 388 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has culled out varioussituations, wherein Section 482 Cr.PC could be exercised by the HighCourt to quash the main proceedings against the accused. These are(1)Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against theinstitution or continuance of proceedings (2)Where the allegations inthe FIR or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in theirentirety do not constitute the offence alleged (3)Where theallegations constitute an offence. But there is no legal evidenceadduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. The broadprinciples so laid down are reiterated in the subsequent judgments ofthe Supreme Court, our High Court and other High Courts. Thepetitioners have, in the present case, sought to quash theproceedings, not on any of the grounds as mentioned above, but solelyon the ground that the disputes between the defatco complainant andothers have been settled amicably and the claim of the defactocomplainant and other persons claiming to be the agreement holders orpurchasers of the property against the petitioners herein are fullysatisfied and finally settled and no useful purpose would serve incontinuing the prosecution and the continuance of criminal case wouldbe a futile exercise. 16. The power of the Court to quash the proceedings in respectof the offences which are compoundable and non compoundable underSection 320 Cr.P.C. in identical situation under settlement theorycame up for consideration before the Supreme Court and there weredivergent views expressed by the Supreme Court and the same isfinally on reference before larger bench recently settled in thelatest three judges larger bench of the Supreme Court. Earlier in2003 (4) SCC 675 in BS.Joshi V. State of Haryana the criminalproceedings initiated against her husband at the instance of the wifefor the offences under Section 498A, 323 and 406 IPC and during thependency of the proceedings the dispute between the husband and wifeand the family members was settled, the wife filed an affidavit tothat effect before the Court concerned and both the parties havejointly prayed for quashing the criminal proceedings on the sameground, the High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that theoffences under Section 498A and 406 IPC were non-compoundable and theinherent powers under Section 482 of the code could not be invoked toby-pass Section 320 of the code. The order of the High Court waschallenged before the Supreme Court wherein it is held that the HighCourt, in exercise of its inherent powers, can quash criminalproceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does notlimit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the code. It isobserved in para 14 of the judgment that "the hyper technical viewwould be counterproductive and would act against interests of womenand against the object for which this provision was added and there https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ is every likelihood that non exercise of inherent power to quash theproceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women fromsettling earlier and this is not the object of Chapter XX-A of theIndian Penal Code. 17. Similarly, in Nikhil Merchant's case in 2008 (9) SCC 677,one Mumbai company was granted financial assistance by Andhra Bankand the company defaulted in repayment of loan resulting ininstitution of civil suit for recovery of amount and the bank alsofiled a complaint against the Managing Director and the officials ofthe bank for diverse offfences namely Sections 120-B r/w Sections420, 467, 468, 471 IPC r/w. Sections 5(2), and 5(1)(d) of thePrevention of Corruption Act 1947 and section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The suit for recoveryof the amount was compromised between the company and the bank, uponthe defendants agreeing to pay the amount due as per the schedulementioned in the consent terms. Clause 11 of the consent terms read,"agreed that save as aforesaid neither party has any claim againstother and parties do hereby withdraw all the allegations and counterallegations made against each other". Based on the same, theManaging Director of the company filed an application for dischargefrom the criminal complaint. The application was rejected by theSpecial Judge, CBI, Greater Bombay and the same was challenged beforeBombay High Court and the High Court rejected the contention raisedbefore the same that since the subject matter of the dispute had beensettled between the parties, it would be unreasonable to continuewith the criminal proceedings and rejected the application fordischarge and the same was challenged before the Supreme Court. TheSupreme Court, having regard to the facts of the case and the earlierdecision made in B.S.Joshi's case, set aside the order of the HighCourt and quashed the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court has,while doing so, observed that "what, however, remains is the factthat certain documents were alleged to have been created by theappellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond thelimit to which the company was entitled and the dispute involvedherein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets.The question which is required to be answered in this case is whetherthe power which independently lies with this Court to quash thecriminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should atall be exercised? and it is a fit case where technicality should notbe allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminalproceedings since the continuance of the same after the compromisearrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise”.18.In the next case reported in (2008) 16 SCC 1 Manoj Sharma'scase, identical question came up for consideration is whether FIRregistered for the offences under sections 420, 468, 471, 34 and 120BIPC can be quashed either under Section 482 Cr.P.C or under Article226 of the Constitution, when the accused and the complainant havecompromised and settled the matter between themselves. The Hon'bleJustice Altamas Kabir, who delivered the lead judgment referred toB.S.Joshi's case, set aside the order of the High Court in rejectingto quash the proceedings. The Supreme Court in the said judgment,though upheld the power of the High court to refuse to quash the FIR,observed that "the ultimate exercise of discretion either underSection 482 Cr.P.C or under Article 226 of the Constitution is with https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the court, which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the facts ofeach case and the said power is in no way limited by the provisionsof Section 320 Cr.P.C. The High Court has inherent powers to quashany criminal proceeding or first information report or complaintwhether the offences were compoundable or not. The Supreme court hasby observing so, decided in Manoj's case that in the facts of thecase concerned, continuing with the criminal proceedings would be anexercise in futility. The Supreme Court has also in Manoj's casenegatived the contention raised on behalf of the State that thedecision made in B.S.Joshi's case requires reconsideration. In thesame judgment, His Lordship Justice Markandey Katju, while concurringwith the view of His Lordship Justice Altamas Kabir that the case inhand is a fit case wherein the criminal proceedings deserved to bequashed, expressed the opinion that question may have to be decidedin some subsequent decision or decisions (preferably by a largerBench) as to which non compoundable cases can be quashed undersection 482 Cr.P.C or Article 226 of the Constitution on thebasis that the parties have entered into compromise and held that"where a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some laterdecisions of this Court preferably by a larger Bench and someguidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and the mattercannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, which hasto be exercised on some objective guiding principles and criteria,otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy”.The Hon'ble Justice Markandey Katju has expressed the opinion byaccepting the contention raised by the learned counsel for therespondent therein that the decision in B.S.Joshi's case should notbe understood to have meant that courts can quash any kind ofcriminal case merely because there has been a compromise between theparties.19. In Shiji @ Pappu and other v. Radhika and another (2011) 10SCC 705 the offences involved are Sections 354 and 394 IPC. The Highcourt rejected the prayer for discharge on the ground that thecharges are not personal in nature to justify quashing the criminalproceedings on the basis of a compromise arrived at between thecomplainant and the appellants. When the same was challenged beforethe Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has observed that "the width andthe nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparingand only in cases where the High court is for reasons to be recorded,of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would benothing but an abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court has, onthe facts of the case in hand, found that "it was not a case of broaddaylight robbery for gain. It was a case which has its origin in thecivil dispute between the parties, which dispute has, it appears,been resolved by them and continuance of the prosecution where thecomplainant is not ready to support the allegations which are nowdescribed by her as arising out of some "misunderstanding andmisconception" will be a futile exercise that will serve no purposeand is thus nothing but an empty formality. Section 482 Cr.P.C couldin such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High court toprevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wastefulexercise by the courts below.20.The Supreme Court has in the judgement reported in (2012) 5SCC 627 Rajiv Saxena and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ allowed the quashment of criminal case under sections 498A and 496r/w Section 34 IPC on the ground that the parties had settled theirdisputes and the complainant agreed that the criminal proceedingsneed not be continued. 21. Similarly in Jayarajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana V. State ofGujarat JT 2012 (6) SC 504, the Supreme Court quashed and setasidethe FIR registered for the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420and 120B IPC in so far as the appellant/A3 is concerned in terms ofthe settlement arrived at between the parties. 22. In Joseph Salvaraj v. State of Gujarat and others in (2011)7 SCC 59, the Supreme Court is of the view that "the purely civildispute is sought to be given a colour of a criminal offence to wreakvengeance against the appellant and it is necessary to draw adistinction between civil wrong and criminal wrong and the appellantcannot be allowed to go through the rigmarole of a criminalprosecution for long number of years, even when admittedly a civilsuit has already been filed against the appellant andrespondent/complainant and is still sub judice. The Supreme Courtquashed the FIR on the ground that the prosecution against theappellant before the same would only lead to his harassment andhumiliation.23. Whereas, in Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008)15 SCC 667 the parties arrived at compromise during pendency of theappeal against the order of conviction for the offence under section307 IPC. The Supreme Court observed that "no offence shall becompounded, if it is not compoundable under the Code", however, whiledealing with such matters, this court may take into account arelevant and important consideration about compromise between theparties for the purpose of reduction of sentence and the SupremeCourt by referring to the earlier decisions reported in Jetha Ram v.State of Rajasthan (2006) 9 SCC 255, Murugesan v. Ganapathy Velar2001 (10) SCC 504, Ishwarlal v. State of M.P. (2008) 15 SCC 671 andMahesh Chand and another v. State of Rajasthan 1990 (supp) SCC 681,held that "considering the totality of facts and circumstances, theends of justice would be met if the sentence of imprisonment awardedto the appellant (accused 1) is reduced to the period alreadyundergone". 24.In Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal and another 2009 (6) SCC364 the accused was being prosecuted for the offences under sections120B, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC along with the bank officers who werebeing prosecuted under Section 13(2) r/w section 13(1)(d) ofPrevention of Corruption Act and the accused prayed for her dischargeon the grounds that the accused paid the entire amount as per thesettlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the DebtsRecovery Tribunal and the dispute between the parties were purelyciivl in nature and that she had not fabricated any document norcheated the bank in any way whatsoever. The Supreme Court has, byreferring to Section 320 Cr.P.C and the earlier decisions of theSupreme court, refused to quash the charge against the accused on theground that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction undersection 482 Cr.P.C and the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 ofthe Constitution of India, would not direct quashing of a case https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ involving crime against the society particularly when both thelearned Special Judge as also the High Court have found that a primafacie case has been made out against the appellant herein for framingthe charges.25.In Sushil Suri V. CBI reported in 2011 5 SCC 708 similarquestion arose regarding the scope and ambit of inherent jurisdictionof the High Court. In that case, the company and its directors werecharge sheeted by the CBI and petition was filed under Section 482for quashing the charge sheet mainly on the ground that the companyrepaid the entire loan to Punjab and Sind Bank along with interestand no loss was caused to Punjab and Sind Bank and therefore, nooffence was committed by them. It was argued so by relying upon thedecision of the Supreme Court in Nikhil Merchant V. Central Bureau ofinvestigation and another in 2008 (9) SCC 677. The argument wasopposed by CBI on the ground that the appellant and others had notonly duped PSB but also defrauded the revenue by claimingdepreciation on non existent machinery by forging documents/vouchersto show purchase of machinery, a precondition for release ofinstalments of loan and in the process cheated the public exchequerof crores of rupees. The High Court refused to quash the proceedingby ordering that merely because the Company and its directors hadrepaid the loan to PSB, they could not be exonerated of the offencescommitted by forging/fabricating the documents with the intention ofdefrauding the bank as well as the exchequers. The High Court waspleased to hold so by applying the ratio decidendi laid down in RumiDhar (smt.) V. State of West Bengal and another 2009 (6) SCC 364.The Supreme Court distinguished the facts involved in Nikhil Merchantcase and the case at hand and held that the view in Rumi Dhar case ismore applicable than the decision made in Nikhil Merchant case anddeclined to quash the criminal proceedings.26. In the latest case reported in JT 2012 3 SCC 469 AshokSadarangani and another v. Union of India, the accused was chargedfor the offences under sections 120B, 465, 467, 468 and 471 IPC forhaving secured the credit facilities by submitting forged propertydocuments. However, the Supreme Court, having regard to the facts ofthe case, held that "in the instant case, where the emphasis is moreon the criminal intent of the petitioners than on the civil aspectinvolving the dues of the bank in respect of which a compromise wasworked out, as such, the ratio laid down in the decisions made inJoshi, NiKhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma's cases are not applicable andhence rejected the relief sought for by the accused for quashing thecriminal proceedings.27. Thus, in view of the conflicting views of the Hon'bleSupreme Court in the judgments referred to above, the Hon'ble SupremeCourt has, when Gian Singh V. State of Punjab and another case inSpecial Leave Petition (Crl) No.8989 of 2010 along with the batch ofsimilar SLP (Crl) cases, came up for hearing referred the matter to alarger Bench. While doing so, the Bench consisting of theirLordships Justice Markandey Katju and Justice Gyan Sudha Misra,doubted the correctness of the decision of Supreme Court in B.S.Joshiand others V. State of Haryana and another, Nikhil merchant case andManoj Sharma V. State and others and expressed the opinion that theabove three decisions required to be reconsidered as something which https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly and noncompoundable offences cannot be permitted to be compounded whetherdirectly or indirectly. When the matter came up for considerationbefore three judges larger bench (consisting of their LordshipsR.M.Lodha, J, Anil R.Dave, J. and Jyoti Mukhopadhaya,J.) the largerbench after duly referring to all the earlier judgments in thisregard finally laid down the correct law. For better appreciation,para 57 of the judgment in which the legal position summarised isextracted herein: "57. The position that emerges from the abovediscussion can be summarised thus: the power of the HighCourt in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaintin exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct anddifferent from the power given to a criminal court forcompounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutorylimitation but it has to be exercised in accord with theguideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure theends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process ofany Court. In what cases power to quash the criminalproceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where theoffender and victim have settled their dispute would dependon the facts and circumstances of each case and no categorycan be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,the High Court must have due regard to the nature andgravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences ofmental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim orvictim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute.Such offences are not private in nature and have seriousimpact on society. Similarly, any compromise between thevictim and offender in relation to the offences underspecial statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or theoffences committed by public servants while working in thatcapacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashingcriminal proceedings involving such offences. But thecriminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatinglycivil flavour stand on different footing for the purposesof quashing, particularly the offences arising fromcommercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership orsuch like transactions or the offences arising out ofmatrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputeswhere the wrong is basically private or personal in natureand the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In thiscategory of cases, High Court may quash criminalproceedings if in its view, because of the compromisebetween the offender and victim, the possibility ofconviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminalcase would put accused to great oppression and prejudiceand extreme injustice would be caused to him by notquashing the criminal case despite full and completesettlement and compromise with the victim. In other words,the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair orcontrary to the interest of justice to continue with thecriminal proceeding or continuation of the criminalproceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ despite settlement and compromise between the victim andwrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it isappropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if theanswer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the HighCourt shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash thecriminal proceeding."28.Thus, the legal position is now well settled that inappropriate cases, the High Court can, in exercise of its inherentpowers, quash the criminal case on the basis of compromise betweenthe offender and victim as the possibility of conviction in suchcases is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would putthe accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injusticewould be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case the samewould tantamount to abuse of process of law and it is but appropriateto put an end to criminal case to secure the ends of justice.29.In the legal premises as discussed above, the merits anddemerits of the reliefs sought for in all the three Crl.OPs are to benow decided. 30. The offences involved in Crl.O.P.Nos.21714 and 24938 of 2011in Crime No.834 of 2011 are Sections 420, 468, 506(ii) r/w 120(B) IPC. Section 420 deals with act of cheating and dishonestlyinducing the person deceived to deliver any property to any person.Section 468 deals with forgery for purpose of cheating. Section 506(ii) r/w 120 B IPC is an act of criminal intimidation to cause deathor grievous hurt in furtherance of criminal conspiracy. The recitalsof FIR proceeds as if A1 and A2 cheated the defacto complainant andothers and made them to part with Rs.5 crores on false andmisrepresentation that the remaining accused have valid andmarketable title over the vacant land and had an agreement of salewith false particulars executed between the defacto complainant andothers and other remaining accused and thereafter, failed to respondto their demand for return of advance amount paid by them andcriminally intimidated them to cause death, if any money is demanded.The final report was after investigation filed by the police in thesame line and the same was also taken up as CC for the offences asreferred to above. The reading of Section 320 Cr.P.C and the tabularcolumn appended to the same would disclose that out of four offencesas above referred to, the offences under Section 420 and Section 506(ii) are compoundable offences and other offences are noncompoundable.31. Whereas, the offences involved in Crl.O.P.No.23140/2011 inCrime no.758 of 2011 dated 1.8.2011 are under Sections 147, 148, 447,427, 387, 506(ii) 465, 468, 471, 420(II) counts IPC. Sections 147 and148 deal with punishment for rioting and rioting, armed with deadlyweapon. Section 427 deals with mischief causing damage to the amountof Rs.50/-. Section 447 deals with punishment for criminal trespass.Section 387 is against putting the person in fear of death or ofgrievous hurt, in order to commit extortion. Section 506(ii) dealswith punishment for criminal intimidation if threat be to cause deathor grievous hurt. Section 465 deals with punishment for forgery.Section 468 deals with forgery for purpose of cheating. Section 471is against using as genuine a forged document or electronic record https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and Section 420 IPC deals with an act of cheating and dishonestlyinducing the person deceived to deliver or to make, alter or destroyany property to any person. The allegations raised herein proceeds asif the defacto complainant and others purchased the propertymeasuring 20 acres and A2 Gowrisankar, who is benami ofRanganathan/A1, obtained an order of exparte injunction by usingforged kist receipts and thereafter, A2 Gowrisankar along with 15hirelings arming with weapons trespassed into the property andthreatened the defacto complainant and others to leave the propertyby receiving the amount failing which to put end to their life. Herealso, out of 10 sections mentioned in FIR, Sections 427, 447, 420 and506 are compoundable offences and other offences are noncompoundable. 32. For the purpose of combined appreciation of the reliefssought for in Crl.OP Nos.21714/2011 and 24938/2011 and 23140 of 2011,the offences to be commonly considered are all the offences mentionedin FIR No.834 of 2011 culminating into CC.293 of 2011 and theoffences under sections 147, 148, 447, 427, 387, 506(ii) and 420 IPCin FIR No.758 of 2011 which are both compoundable and noncompoundable. The other non compoundable offences allegedlypunishable under sections 465, 468 and 471 are, in my consideredview, to be dealt with separately.33. In my considered view, compoundable and non compoundablenature of the offences as mentioned above is not relevant fordeciding the reliefs sought for herein on the basis of the settlementarrived at between the parties in view of the latest legal positionlaid down in the judgments cited above. The Hon'ble Supreme Courtand our High court in the judgments cited above reiterated the legalposition that non compoundable offences cannot be compounded undersection 320 Cr.P.C, but the power of this court under Section 482Cr.P.C is wider in nature, with no statutory limitation and the Highcourt can well within its jurisdiction, to quash non compoundableoffences, when the opinion of the High court is that continuance ofcriminal proceeding is abuse of process of law and is futile and itis appropriate to put an end to criminal case to secure the ends ofjustice.34. It may be true that both the FIRs can be said to be arisingout of same cause of action i.e. act of cheating on the part of A1abetted by other accused, but the allegations raised in Crime Nos.758and 834 of 2011 are for different acts constituting differentoffences and all the three Crl.OPs are filed against identical set ofaccused for identical relief to quash the FIR on the same ground ofsettlement between the parties. As rightly argued by the learnedcounsel for the petitioners, unlike the case decided by the SupremeCourt in Rumi Dhar v. Centrel Bureau of Investigation, AshokSadarangani and another and Susil Suri cases, the allegationsconstituting the offences, which are referred to above, in both crimenumbers do not involve any crime against the society. The partieshave arrived at amicable settlement in respect of main disputebetween them i.e. Claim made upon the land in question and in respectof huge amount received by A1 and A2 as sale consideration andwithdrew the civil case. Though any judgment in civil proceedings onthe basis of the settlement entered into between the parties would https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ not automatically render the criminal proceedings to come to an endand it is not much relevant to the criminal proceeding, thecompromise effected herein not only put an end to the dispute betweenthe parties, but will also, considering the nature of the offences,have very little impact upon the society in the event of the samebeing quashed. 35. As already referred to, the allegations raised in the FIRand the charge sheet in both the crime numbers insofar as theoffences as referred to above would reveal that the same constitute acivil wrong arising out of civil transaction involving no publicpolicy and ingredients of criminal offences are wanting and is civildispute with certain criminal facets as explained in NikhilMerchant's case and the facts involved in the case at hand is more orless similar to that of Nikhil Merchant's case and B.S.Joshi andothers case. The parties have admittedly on the basis of thecompromise, agreed to withdraw all the claims and allegations madeagainst each other. The affidavits are filed by the defactocomplainant and others to that effect before Apex Court, Civil courtbefore the concerned criminal court and also before this Court.Under such circumstances, the defacto complainant and the witnessesare not likely to support their allegations during trial and thechances of ultimate conviction are very remote and no useful purposewill be served by allowing the prosecution to continue. It is heldby the Supreme court in Madan Mohan Abbot case (2008) 4 SCC 582 that"it is perhaps advisable that in disputes, where the questioninvolved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarilyaccept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings sincekeeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour ofthe prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened asthey are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised indeciding more effective and meaningful litigation". The Supreme Courttermed it as a common sense approach to the matter based on ground ofrealities and bereft of the technicalities of the law". The SupremeCourt in Manoj Sharma's case was of the view that "once thecomplainant decided not to pursue the matter further, High courtcould have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter". 36.The learned brother Judge of our High court T.Mathivanan J.in (2012) MLJ (Crl) 473 by relying upon the cases cited in the same,quoted the wording of Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.G.Balakrishnan, the thenChief Justice of India and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B.Sinha, ondifferent occasions on different context on alternate disputemechanism, which are extracted at paragraphs 47, 48, 49, 50 , 52 and53 in the judgment which read as follows: “47. Nowadays, ADR mechanism gets momentum and theneeds, for getting the cases, be it civil or criminal innature, compounded by way of amicable settlement, have beenincreasing day by day.48. From the notes for a law lecture, prepared byMr.ABRAHAM LINCOLN, in the year 1850, it appears that hehas advised the lawyers community and the litigant publicas under:Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbours tocompromise wherever you can. Point out to them how thenominal winner is often a real loser-in fees, expenses and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ waste of time. As a peace maker, the lawyer has a superioropportunity of being a good man. There will still bebusiness enough.49. It is also imperative on the part of this Court toquote the wordings of their Lordships Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICEK.G.BALAKRISHNAN, the Then Chief Justice of India andHon'ble Mr.JUSTICE S.B.SINHA, which they have employed intheir messages dated 10.06.2009 and 11.06.2009 respectivelysent to the Tamil Nadu State Legal Services Authority onthe eve of publishing a book on Alternative DisputesResolution-Mediation titled 'ADR # An Overview' on13.06.2009.50. His Lordship Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE K.G.BALAKRISHNAN,in his message has stated as under:The importance of mediation is underscored by the factthat it is an important device to tackle the mountingcaseload before courts at all levels.His Lordship Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE S.B.SINHA, in hismessage has stated as under:When a person knocks at the door of justice, he doesso because he has a grievance and in the expectations thatthe matter will be dealt within a reasonable period oftime. This is intricately connected with the issue of thehuge pendency of cases in the Courts and the solution tothis problem lies in Alternative Disputes Resolution.52. In the following two cases, the Hon'ble SupremeCourt of India has suggested that the Law Commission shouldundertake the exercise of identifying more compoundableoffences to be included with the proviso to Section 320Cr.P.C.,i.In the case of Ramgopal vs. State of M.P., reportedin 2010 (7) SCALE 711, the Supreme Court of India hasobserved as under:There are several offences under the IPC that arecurrently non-compoundable. These include offencespunishable under Section 498-A, Section 326 etc., of theIPC. Some of such offences can be made compoundable byintroducing a suitable amendment in the statute. We are ofthe opinion that the Law Commission of India could examinewhether a suitable proposal can be sent to the UnionGovernment in this regard. Any such step would not onlyrelieve the courts of the burden of deciding cases in whichthe aggrieved parties have themselves arrived at asettlement, but may also encourage the process of re-conciliation between them. We, accordingly, request theLaw Commission and the Government of India to examine allthese aspects and take such steps as may be consideredfeasible.ii.In an another case, viz.in Crl.A.No.433 of 2004(Diwaker Singh vs. State of Bihar) decided on 18.08.2010,the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made similar observations,which are extracted as under:Further, we are of the opinion that Section 324 IPC andmany other offences should be made compoundable. We havealready referred to the Law Commission of India and the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Ministry of Law & Justice, Government of India oursuggestion that suitable amendments should be made in theCode of Criminal Procedure for making several offenceswhich are presently treated as non-compoundable underSection 320 Cr.P.C., as compoundable. This will greatlyreduce the burden of the courts.The Law Commission of India and the Ministry of Law &Justice, Government of India may also examine thissuggestion. The Law Commission may also examine severalother provisions of the Indian Penal Code and otherstatutes in order to recommend that they may also be madecompoundable even if they are presently non-compoundable.53. It appears that pursuant to these observations ofthe Supreme Court, the Law Commission of India has embarkedon the task of identifying appropriate offences which couldbe added to the list of compoundable offences under Section320 Cr.P.C., It also appears that the Law Commission hasundertaken that the exercise is only in respect of theoffences made punishable under Indian Penal Code for thepresent. It also appears that the Law Commission of Indiahas addressed a letter to the Hon'ble Minister for Law andJustice forwarding the report of the Law Commission ofIndia, on 'Compounding of (IPC) Offences'.The learned brother judge concluded the judgment by expressing firmbelief that "the Government of India will make necessary amendment tosub section 9 of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973to relax its vigor and rigidity and to identify more compoundableoffences under section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973".37.For the discussions held above, this court is, on overallappreciation of the facts and conduct of the parties involved herein,of the view that it is a fit case, wherein, it is but expedient tomeet the ends of justice, not to permit the prosecution to continueand is in exercise of inherent power vested upon this court underSection 482 Cr.P.C, inclined to quash the criminal proceedingsagainst A1 and A2 in its entirety in Crl.O.P.Nos.21714 and 24938 of2011 and in respect of the offences under Sections 147, 148, 447,427, 387, 506(ii) and 420 IPC in Crl.OP.No.23140 of 2011. 38.As far as the allegations raised against the petitioners/A1and A2 for the offences under Sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC in CrimeNo.758 of 2011 are concerned, the same are in respect of act offorgery of the documents i.e., kist receipts in C77 series for thefaslis 1405, 1406 and 1407, which are according to the defactocomplainant, forged and produced before the Civil Court to obtainorder of status quo. The kist receipts are admittedly filed alongwith plaint in OS.No.23 of 2008 by the accused Dhanasingh, Albert,Jayapaul, Rathinavathy and Juliet Gnanavathy, who are arrayed as A3to A7 herein through the second accused T.C.Venkatesh @Gowrisankar/A2 as their power of attorney. The three kist receiptsare for the faslis 1405 to 1407 corresponding calender years 1995 to1997 having S.No.C77 509489. This suit is filed against the rivalclaimants and against the members of Annamalai Avenue Nolambur Plotowners Association and other officials for questioning the validityand enforceability of compromise decree made in earlier suitOS.No.3427 of 1974 and for other consequential and permanent https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ injunctions. The suit is filed along with 22 documents, out of which,the documents 19 to 21 filed along with plaint are kist receiptsdated 19.3.1995, 18.2.1996 and 18.4.1997 obtained from DeputyTahsildar by the plaintiffs. The kist receipts are issued in thenames of N.K.K.Dhanasingh, N.K.K.Albert and N.K.K.Jayapaul for thefaslis 1405, 1406 and 1407 for 20.59 acres in S.No.88 situated inSaidapet Taluk, Chengalpet District and the amount collected undereach of the receipts is Rs.11,968/-. The reading of para 56 at page33 of the plaint and memo of calculation would reveal that theproperty is, for the purpose of payment of court fee in suit, valuedat 30 times of the kist value at Rs.76.13 and the total kist valuecomes to Rs.2284/- and the plaintiff's 5/7th share is valued atRs.1631-50 and the court fee is paid under section 37(1) of the TamilNadu Court Fee Act at Rs.122-50. The suit is valued for the relief ofdeclaration at Rs.10,400/- and the injunction reliefs are valued atRs.1,000/- each etc. The suit is filed along with I.A.Nos.156 and157/2008. But, the kist receipts are not produced as exhibits in thecourse of enquiry in IAs. However, the contesting respondents have inthe course of argument in I.As, seriously contended that thedocuments so produced before this court are forged for the purpose ofthe present case. But, the trial court declined to render anyfinding on the genuineness of the documents on the ground that thedocuments are not marked as exhibits and while doing so, the trialcourt also stated that in the event of the property being valued onthe basis of the documents, the property can be, for the purpose ofsuit reliefs, re-valued and subject to such revaluation be presentedbefore the appropriate court, but the suit cannot be dismissed on thebasis of the documents, the genuineness of which need not be goneinto. 39.Similar observation was made by High court in para 27 of itsorder dated 5.8.2009 made in CRP.Nos.2913 and 3006 of 2008 filedunder Article 227 of the Constitution of India against numbering andentertaining of suit OS.23 of 2008 and to strike out the same fromthe file of the same court. Our High court though pointed out certaindiscrepancies in the kist receipts produced by the plaintiffs, wasnot inclined to render any observation and finding as regards thepleadings on merits, probative value of the documents, nature of thereliefs sought for and the right of the parties and left the same tobe decided by the trial court. Aggrieved against the same, SLP.30471and 30472 of 2011 are filed before the Supreme court, where again,forgery nature of the documents, is seriously agitated. The seriousobjection raised before the Supreme Court is that the kist receiptsfor previous years i.e. receipts dated 19.3.95, 18.2.96 and 18.4.1997are forged by using the kist receipt book printed in the year 2003and the entries made therein are written in hand. Similarly, theplaintiffs have produced adangal register relating to the fasli year1388 corresponding with calendar year 1978-79, which is much prior tocompromise decree dated 8.10.1980 and which is also forged documentand the same was used to make the court to believe that they are thepersons in possession and enjoyment of the property, thereby obtainedinterim injunction using the forged documents. The supreme court byorder dated 6.1.2010 entertained SLPs and issued notice to therespondents and stayed the proceedings. The supreme court thereafter,in view of the compromise entered into between parties, finallydisposed of SLPs on 13.9.2011 in and under which, interlocutory https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ applications filed by the respondents 1 to 5, who are the plaintiffsin O.S.23 of 2008 are allowed and the suit is dismissed as withdrawnand SLP are also dismissed as infructuous. 40.In the present compliant registered as FIR No.758 of 2011filed on 1.8.2011, during the pendency of SLPs before the SupremeCourt, here again, the allegations raised for the offences undersections 465, 468 and 471 IPC are that three receipts are forged andsuch forged receipts are produced before the court for obtaining anorder of status quo. In the course of investigation upon the same,the investigating officer reported to have obtained statement fromthe witnesses and also statement from the revenue officials andreported to have collected the copy of the documents produced beforethe court and the original kist receipts book pertaining to C77bearing kist receipts serial nos.509489. The other documentscollected by the Investigating Officer is the reply given byTahsildar, Ambattur by name K.Mahatma in Na.Ka.No.4548/2011/A6 dated2.7.2011 and the reply is addressed to the Inspector of Police, CrimeBranch, Nolambur Police Station and the letter of the Inspector ofPolice dated 20.7.2011 is mentioned in the reference column. Thedocument reads as if the same is given in reply to reference citedletter of the Inspector of Police dated 20.7.2011. It is statedtherein that the receipts in question in C.77 serial numbers, onverification of the original kist receipts book, found to be notgenuine. The Investigating Officer has also reported to have obtainedstatement from the author of the aforementioned letter and collectedfurther particulars on 4.10.2011 and also obtained statement from oneManoharan, VAO, Ambattur Taluk and Retired VAO, Murthy, who is thesignatory in the receipts in question. 41.It may be true that the letter dated 20.7.2011 addressed byTahsildar, K.Mahtma to the Inspector of Police, Crime branch need notbe looked to, as the same is much before the date of the complaintdated 1.8.2011. When the complaint is filed on 1.8.2011, this courtis at loss to understand how the investigation on the genuineness ofdocuments which are xerox copy of the receipts, is commenced muchearlier on 20.7.2011 and what could be the relevancy and importanceattached to the same. As rightly pointed out by the learned counselfor the petitioners, this court discussed about the authenticity ofthe reply of the Inspector of Police dated 2.7.2011 in earlierCrl.O.P.No.18888 of 2011 arising out of the same crime number ondifferent context and negatived the same and refused to place anyreliance on the reply. But that by itself in my considered view,would not go to reject the allegations raised herein regarding theact of forgery of the kist receipts in toto.42.As already referred to, the kist receipts produced before thecivil court in O.S.No.23 of 2008 and the corresponding kist receiptsbook maintained in the department concerned, are produced for perusalof this court. The glance at kist receipt printed book maintained inthe department reveals that the kist receipts pertaining to C77series bearing serial no.509489 and consecutive two receipts areissued on 25.5.2006, in the name of different individual for falsi1415, corresponding with calender year 2005 and they are issued inthe kist receipts book printed at Madurai during 2003. Whereas, thekist receipts produced herein are prepared by using the same receipt https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ book printed during 2003 and are for faslis 1405, 1406 and 1407corresponding with calender years 1995 to 1997 issued in the name ofdifferent persons. The cursory glance at the disputed kist receiptcopies reveal that out of the 3 receipts, Serial numbers in two kistreceipts are not clearly printed. When the receipt book is printedduring 2003, the same could not have been, except by an act offorgery, used for kist receipts for the previous calender years. Inthat event, allegations regarding the act of forgery, are to be primafacie accepted to be true or at least to be held that it is tooearlier to reject the allegations regarding act of forgery. Havingfound some foul play, it is considered to be fit case, wherein thesame requires detailed investigation to find out the genuineness ofthe receipts produced as plaint document nos.19 to 21 and the personsand the officials at whose instance and by whom the same are forgedetc. 43.As rightly argued by the learned Public Prosecutor, unlikethe cases cited on the side of the petitioners, the act of forgeryalleged herein is in respect of kist receipts obtained from therevenue department and hence, amounts to an act of forgery of publicdocuments and the same cannot hence be brushed aside lightly, butought to have been viewed very seriously. It is rightly argued on theprosecution side that the compromise of personal dispute between theindividuals, who are in no way of concerned with the act of forgeryof kist receipts will have no impact upon criminal proceedingsinitiated for the offences under section 465, 468 and 471 IPC. Evenin the event of the failure on the part of the individuals to deposein support of the allegations regarding the act of forgery of publicdocuments, the same is not likely to affect the case of theprosecution, as the prosecution may still be able to establish thesame through the evidence of the departmental personnel and throughrelevant documents maintained in the department, as such, this courtby applying the view expressed by the Supreme court in the judgmentsreported in (i) Rumi Dhar (smt.) V. State of West Bengal and another(2009 (6) SCC 364), (ii) JT 2012 3 SCC 469 Ashok Sadarangani andanother v. Union of India; (iii)Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau ofinvestigation and another (2011) 5 SCC 708 (iv) CBI v. RavishankarPrasad (2009) 6 SCC 351 and (v)Ram Dhan v. State of UP and another(2012 5 SCC 536), is of the view that the criminal proceedings inrespect of the offences for act of forgery under sections 465, 468and 471 IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of the settlement betweenthe individuals. The Supreme Court has in Ashok Sadarangani casedismissed the petition for quash by observing that "in the case athand, where the emphasis is more on the criminal intend of thepetitioners than on the civil aspect involving dues of the Bank inrespect of which a compromise was worked out". Such observation ofthe Apex court is squarely applicable to the facts of the presentcase. 44.However, the next aspect to be considered herein is as towhether the criminal prosecution for the three offences as referredto above has to go on against both the petitioners. It is sought tobe argued on the side of the petitioners herein that the suit alongwith the documents in question having been filed only by A3 to A7through A2 power of attorney and as the proceedings of the supremecourt having been agitated between A2 to A7 on one hand and the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ individuals on other hand, A1 cannot be involved into the alleged actof forgery of the documents. The attention of this court is alsodrawn to the allegations raised in the FIR and the statement recordedfrom the individuals, which do not point at A1 as the person in anymanner responsible for alleged act of forgery of kist receipts or forproducing it to the court as genuine one. That being the nature ofthe allegations raised herein, the same do not even prima facie makeout any case against A1 for the offences referred to above, as such,the prosecution initiated for the offences under sections 465, 468and 471 IPC is liable to be quashed against A1.45.At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitionerswould raise an objection regarding the locus standi ofindividual/defacto complainant to lodge any complaint in respect ofany offence punishable under sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC. It iscontended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitionersthat the offence under section 471 IPC is the punishment section forfraudulently or dishonestly using the document or electronic recordas genuine and the manner of taking cognisance is dealt with undersection 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C, as per which, the offence shall not betaken cognisance except on the complaint given in writing of that bysuch officer of the court, as the court may authorise in writing inthis behalf, or some other court to which that court is subordinate.It is argued that as the act of forgery is in respect of thedocuments being produced into court to make the court believe thesame to be genuine one for obtaining an order in favour of theplaintiffs, the individual has no locus standi to file a complaintand it is for the court or officer of the court with the permissionof the court alone has the locus standi to file a complaint. 46.Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor would by relyingupon the judgments reported in Iqbal Singh Marwah case ((2008) 15 SCC667) and Ram Dhan case ((2012) 5 SCC 536) and Sushil Suri case((2011) 5 SCC 708) argue that section 195(1)(b)(ii) is applicable toany act of forgery in respect of the documents already producedbefore the court and it is not applicable to any document, which isforged elsewhere and thereafter produced before the court as genuine.This court, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme courtin the cases cited supra, is inclined to agree with such argumentadvanced by the learned Public Prosecutor. 47.In Iqbal Singh Marwah and another v. Meenakshi Marwah andanother, 2005 Crl LJ 2161, the larger bench of the Supreme court hasdealt with identical question as involved in the present case. Thedocument involved in the other case is Will and the question relatingto genuineness of the same is the issue before the District Court inprobate proceedings. The contesting parties filed the criminalcomplaint before the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, NewDelhi for prosecution of the opposite party on the ground that Willwas a forged and fictitious document and the complaint was dismissedon the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(i) and (ii) Cr.P.C operated as abar for taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 192, 193,463, 464, 471, 475 and 476 IPC. Aggrieved against the order, thedefacto complainant filed criminal revision before the Sessions courtand the Sessions Judge, by relying upon the judgment reported inSachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1998 SCC 1121 held that "the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C would not apply whereforgery of a document was committed before the saiddocument was produced in court. The revision petition was accordinglyallowed and the matter was remanded to the court of ChiefMetropolitan Magistrate for proceeding in accordance with law. Thatorder was challenged by the person arrayed as accused by filing apetition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which was again, by following thesame Supreme Court judgment, dismissed by Delhi High Court. The orderof the Delhi High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court. TheSupreme court dismissed the appeal as totally lacking in merit. TheSupreme court, while interpreting the expression, “in respect of adocument produced or given in evidence” in para 5 referred to theprincipal controversy in issue that "when such offence is alleged tohave been committed in respect of a document produced or given inevidence in a proceeding in any Court" occurring in Clause (b)(ii) ofsub section (1) of Section 195 Cr.P.C. The Supreme court has, afterhaving detailed analysis of all the earlier cases upon the issue,held in para 25 of its judgment, that Sachida Nand singh case iscorrectly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Theother judgments referred to therein are (i)AIR 1996 SC 1592 SurjitSingh v. Balbir Singh (ii)AIR 1998 SC 1121 Sachida Nand Singh (iii)AIR 1931 Allahabad 443 (Full Bench) Emperor v. Kushal Pal Singh (iv)AIR 1971 SC 1935 (3 judges bench) Patel Lalji Bhai Somabhai v. Stateof Gujarat (v) AIR 1973 SC 1100 Raghunath v. State of UP (vi) AIR1974 SC 299 Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (vii) AIR 1976 SC 2225Government of West Bengal v. Haridas Mundra (viii)AIR 1994 SC 1549Mahadev Bapuji Mahajan v. State of Maharastra (ix) AIR 1983 SC 1053Gopalkrishna Menon v. D.Raja Reddy (x) AIR 1988 SC 419 Sushil Kumarv. State of Haryana. 48.The discussion of the Supreme court in the above judgmentwould reveal that except Surjit Singh case and GopalKrishna Menoncase, in all other cases, the supreme court has laid down the ratiothat "Section 195 (1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C would be attracted only whenoffences enumerated in the said provision have been committed withrespect to the document, after it has been produced or given inevidence in the proceeding in any court during trial, when thedocument was in custodia legis". For better appreciation andunderstanding, the relevant paragraphs of the full bench decision ofthe supreme court are extracted hereunder:"5.In Sachida Nand Singh after analysis of therelevant provisions and noticing a number of earlierdecisions (but not Surjit Singh), the Court recorded itsconclusions in paras 11, 12 and 23 which are beingreproduced below: “11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged inSection 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether anyoffence affecting administration of justice has beencommitted in respect of a document produced in court orgiven in evidence in a proceeding in that court. In otherwords, the offence should have been committed during thetime when the document was in custodia legis.......12. It would be a strained thinking that any offenceinvolving forgery of a document if committed far outside https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the precincts of the court and long before its productionin the court, could also be treated as one affectingadministration of justice merely because that documentlater reached the court records..........23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that thebar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is notapplicable to a case where forgery of the document wascommitted before the document was produced in a court.”6. On a plain reading clause (b)(ii) of sub-section (1)of Section 195 is capable of two interpretations. Onepossible interpretation is that when an offence described inSection 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 orSection 476 IPC is alleged to have been committed in respectof a document which is subsequently produced or given inevidence in a proceeding in any court, a complaint by thecourt would be necessary. The other possible interpretationis that when a document has been produced or given inevidence in a proceeding in any court and thereafter anoffence described as aforesaid is committed in respectthereof, a complaint by the court would be necessary. Onthis interpretation if the offence as described in thesection is committed prior to production or giving inevidence of the document in court, no complaint by courtwould be necessary and a private complaint would bemaintainable. The question which requires consideration iswhich of the two interpretations should be accepted havingregard to the scheme of the Act and object sought to beachieved......7........8........9.The scheme of the statutory provision may now beexamined. Broadly, Section 195 CrPC deals with threedistinct categories of offences which have been described inclauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to (1)contempt of lawful authority of public servants, (2)offences against public justice, and (3) offences relatingto documents given in evidence. Clause (a) deals withoffences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC whichoccur in Chapter X IPC and the heading of the Chapter is— “Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public Servants”.These are offences which directly affect the functioning ofor discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause(b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI IPC which is headedas — “Of False Evidence and Offences Against PublicJustice”. The offences mentioned in this clause clearlyrelate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making afalse declaration in any judicial proceeding or before acourt of justice or before a public servant who is bound orauthorised by law to receive such declaration, and also tosome other offences which have a direct correlation with theproceedings in a court of justice (Sections 205 and 211IPC). This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 195 viz. that the offence should be such which hasdirect bearing or affects the functioning or discharge oflawful duties of a public servant or has a directcorrelation with the proceedings in a court of justice, theexpression “when such offence is alleged to have beencommitted in respect of a document produced or given inevidence in a proceeding in any court” occurring in clause(b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offenceafter the document has actually been produced or given inevidence in the court. The situation or contingency where anoffence as enumerated in this clause has already beencommitted earlier and later on the document is produced oris given in evidence in court, does not appear to be in tunewith clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with thescheme of Section 195 CrPC. This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumeratedtherein are committed with respect to a document subsequentto its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding inany court.10. Section 195(1) mandates a complaint in writing tothe court for taking cognizance of the offences enumeratedin clauses (b)(i) and (b)(ii) thereof. Sections 340 and 341CrPC which occur in Chapter XXVI give the procedure forfiling of the complaint and other matters connectedtherewith. The heading of this Chapter is — “Provisions asto Offences Affecting the Administration of Justice”.Though, as a general rule, the language employed in aheading cannot be used to give a different effect to clearwords of the section where there cannot be any doubt as totheir ordinary meaning, but they are not to be treated as ifthey were marginal notes or were introduced into the Actmerely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. Theyconstitute an important part of the Act itself, and may beread not only as explaining the sections which immediatelyfollow them, as a preamble to a statute may be looked toexplain its enactments, but as affording a better key to theconstructions of the sections which follow them than mightbe afforded by a mere preamble. (See Craies on Statute Law,7th Edn., pp. 207, 209.) The fact that the procedure forfiling a complaint by court has been provided in ChapterXXVI dealing with offences affecting administration ofjustice, is a clear pointer to the legislative intent thatthe offence committed should be of such type which directlyaffects the administration of justice viz. which iscommitted after the document is produced or given inevidence in court. Any offence committed with respect to adocument at a time prior to its production or giving inevidence in court cannot, strictly speaking, be said to bean offence affecting the administration of justice........Paras 11 to 15........16.As mentioned earlier, the words “by a party to anyproceeding in any court” occurring in Section 195(1)(c) of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the old Code have been omitted in Section 195(1)(b)(ii)CrPC. Why these words were deleted in the correspondingprovision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 will beapparent from the 41st Report of the Law Commission whichsaid as under in para 15.39:“15.39. The purpose of the section is to bar privateprosecutions where the course of justice is sought to beperverted leaving to the court itself to uphold itsdignity and prestige. On principle there is no reason whythe safeguard in clause (c) should not apply to offencescommitted by witnesses also. Witnesses need as muchprotection against vexatious prosecutions as parties andthe court should have as much control over the acts ofwitnesses that enter as a component of a judicialproceeding, as over the acts of parties. If, therefore,the provisions of clause (c) are extended to witnesses,the extension would be in conformity with the broadprinciple which forms the basis of Section 195.”Since the object of deletion of the words “by a partyto any proceeding in any court” occurring in Section 195(1)(c) of the old Code is to afford protection to witnessesalso, the interpretation placed on the said provision in theearlier decisions would still hold good.........para 17.........18.In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC thecourt is not bound to make a complaint regarding commissionof an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as thesection is conditioned by the words “court is of opinionthat it is expedient in the interests of justice”. Thisshows that such a course will be adopted only if theinterest of justice requires and not in every case. Beforefiling of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminaryenquiry and record a finding to the effect that it isexpedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should bemade into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court byweighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the personaffected by such forgery or forged document, but havingregard to the effect or impact, such commission of offencehas upon administration of justice. It is possible that suchforged document or forgery may cause a very serious orsubstantial injury to a person in the sense that it maydeprive him of a very valuable property or status or thelike, but such document may be just a piece of evidenceproduced or given in evidence in court, where voluminousevidence may have been adduced and the effect of such pieceof evidence on the broad concept of administration ofjustice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court maynot consider it expedient in the interest of justice to makea complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassedby learned counsel for the appellants, would render thevictim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Anyinterpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ a crime is rendered remediless, has to bediscarded...........19. There is another consideration which has to be keptin mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 CrPC contemplatesholding of a preliminary enquiry. Normally, a direction forfiling of a complaint is not made during the pendency of theproceeding before the court and this is done at the stagewhen the proceeding is concluded and the final judgment isrendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against anorder directing filing of the complaint. The hearing andultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time.Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a court trying thecomplaint to adjourn the hearing of the case if it isbrought to its notice that an appeal is pending against thedecision arrived at in the judicial proceeding out of whichthe matter has arisen. In view of these provisions, thecomplaint case may not proceed at all for decades speciallyin matters arising out of civil suits where decisions arechallenged in successive appellate fora which are time-consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is noprovision of appeal against an order passed under Section343(2), whereby hearing of the case is adjourned until thedecision of the appeal. These provisions show that, inreality, the procedure prescribed for filing a complaint bythe court is such that it may not fructify in the actualtrial of the offender for an unusually long period. Delay inprosecution of a guilty person comes to his advantage aswitnesses become reluctant to give evidence and the evidencegets lost. This important consideration dissuades us fromaccepting the broad interpretation sought to be placed uponclause (b)(ii)........20. An enlarged interpretation to Section 195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said provision wouldalso operate where after commission of an act of forgery thedocument is subsequently produced in court, is capable ofgreat misuse. As pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh afterpreparing a forged document or committing an act of forgery,a person may manage to get a proceeding instituted in anycivil, criminal or revenue court, either by himself orthrough someone set up by him and simply file the documentin the said proceeding. He would thus be protected fromprosecution, either at the instance of a private party orthe police until the court, where the document has beenfiled, itself chooses to file a complaint. The litigationmay be a prolonged one due to which the actual trial of sucha person may be delayed indefinitely. Such an interpretationwould be highly detrimental to the interest of the societyat large.21. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that thecourts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a criminalcomplaint and such a course is rarely adopted. It will not https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ be fair and proper to give an interpretation which leads toa situation where a person alleged to have committed anoffence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is eithernot placed for trial on account of non-filing of a complaintor if a complaint is filed, the same does not come to itslogical end. Judging from such an angle will be inconsonance with the principle that an unworkable orimpracticable result should be avoided. In StatutoryInterpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), para 313, theprinciple has been stated in the following manner:“The court seeks to avoid a construction of anenactment that produces an unworkable or impracticableresult, since this is unlikely to have been intended byParliament. Sometimes, however, there are overridingreasons for applying such a construction, for example,where it appears that Parliament really intended it or theliteral meaning is too strong.”The learned author has referred to Sheffield City Councilv. Yorkshire Water Services Ltd.12, WLR at p. 71, where itwas held as under:“Parliament is taken not to intend the carrying out ofits enactments to be unworkable or impracticable, so thecourt will be slow to find in favour of a constructionthat leads to these consequences. This follows the pathtaken by judges in developing the common law. ‘… thecommon law of England has not always developed on strictlylogical lines, and where the logic leads down a path thatis beset with practical difficulties the courts have notbeen frightened to turn aside and seek the pragmaticsolution that will best serve the needs of society’.”In S.J. Grange Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Commrs. whileinterpreting a provision in the Finance Act, 1972, LordDenning observed that if the literal construction leads toimpracticable results, it would be necessary to do littleadjustment so as to make the section workable. Therefore, inorder that a victim of a crime of forgery, namely, theperson aggrieved is able to exercise his right conferred bylaw to initiate prosecution of the offender, it is necessaryto place a restrictive interpretation on clause (b)(ii).....Paras 22 to 24.........25.In view of the discussion made above, we are of theopinion that Sachida Nand Singh2 has been correctly decidedand the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offencesenumerated in the said provision have been committed withrespect to a document after it has been produced or given inevidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the timewhen the document was in custodia legis."Thus, the aforesaid ratio laid down by the supreme court isapplicable to the facts of the present case in full force. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

49.In this case, the allegations raised herein are for theoffences under Sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC. It is the specific casealleged in the complaint that the forged documents are producedbefore the court for obtaining order of status quo and theallegations are not to the effect that documents in question areproduced before the court and are thereafter forged with an intentionto use the same as genuine. In that event, the observation of thesupreme court in Ram Dhan case (2012) 5 SCC 536 is to be applied,wherein the nature of offences involved are under sections 177, 181,182 and 195 IPC and the Supreme court has, while dealing withapplicability of sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C, held that having regardto the composite nature of the offences under sections 177 and 182which deal with the cases totally outside the court, the provisionsof Section 195 Cr.P.C is not attracted. The Supreme Court has, byfollowing the earlier decision of the Supreme court in Sachida NandSingh case, held that section 195 Cr.P.C is not attracted. Whiledoing so, it is observed that "it is not necessary that thefabrication of false evidence takes place only inside the court as itcan also be fabricated outside the court though has been used in thecourt. Thus, viewing from both the angles, the complaint lodged bythe individuals in respect of the document allegedly forged outsideand produced in a proceeding before the court is maintainable”. Thus,applying the same view, the objection regarding maintainability ofthe complaint on locus standi issue has to be necessarily negatived.The defacto complainant is but competent person to set in motioncriminal law against the offenders for act of forgery alleged. 50.In view of the discussion held above, this court, havingnegatived the contentions raised on the side of the petitioners, isof the considered view that there is no other factual or legalimpediment to keep alive and to proceed with the criminalinvestigation against A2 for the offences under Sections 465, 468 and471 IPC in Crime No.758 of 2011.51.In the result, Crl.OP.Nos.21714 and 24938 of 2011 are orderedas prayed for, thereby the criminal proceedings in CC.No.293/11 onthe file of Judicial Magistrate, Ambathur arising out of Crime No.834of 2011 dated 24.08.2011 on the file of V7 Nolambur Police Station isquashed. 52.In the result, Crl.OP.No.23140/2011 is partly ordered therebyFIR registered in V7 Nolambur Police Station Cr.No.758 of 2011 isquashed in its entirety in so far as first petitioner/A1-Ranganathanis concerned and the same is quashed for the offences under Section147, 148, 387, 427, 447, 420 IPC and 506(ii) IPC in so far as the 2ndpetitioner/2nd accused is concerned and the Crl.O.P. is partlydismissed in respect of other offences insofar as the 2ndpetitioner/A2 is concerned. Consequently, all the Miscellaneouspetitions are closed.Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ rk/tshTo1. The Judicial MagistrateAmbattur, Chennai2. The Inspector of PoliceV7 Nolambur Police Station,Chennai -37.3.The Public Prosecutor,High Court, Madras.Crl.OP.Nos.21714, 24928 and 23140 of 2011KGK(CO)SRA(18/11/2012)