Kannagi v. State & Ors.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED:28.07.2009CORAM:THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIACrl.R.C.No.1061 of 2006 andM.P.No.1 of 2006Kannagi ... Petitioner/III Partyvs. 1. State, rep. By the Sub Inspector of Police, All Women Police Station, Arani, Tiruvannamalai District....Respondent/Complainant2. Asokan3. Navaneetham4. Gokulavani5. Balamurugan6. Balaraman... Respondents/Accused 1 to 4 & 6Prayer: Petition filed under Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. againstthe judgment dated 7.3.2006, made in Crl.A.No.21 of 2005 on the fileof the learned District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai against theorder of conviction dated 18.04.2005 in C.C.No.44 of 2002 passed bythe Judicial Magistrate, Arani.For Petitioner : Mr.V.Subramaniyan for M/s Mc Gan Law FirmFor R1 : Mr.R.Muniyapparaj,G.A.(crl.side)For R2 to R6 : Mr.V.Karthik for M/s T.S.Gopalan & Co.----- O R D E RAnimadverting upon the order dated 7.3.2006 passed by thelearned District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai in Crl.A.No.21 of2005 reversing the order of conviction dated 18.04.2005 in C.C.No.44of 2002 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Arani, this criminalrevision is focussed.2. A summation and summarisation of the relevant facts which areabsolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this revisionpetition would run thus:(a) The police laid the police report in terms of Section 173 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Cr.P.C. as against the accused persons, namely, (1) Asokan, (2)Navaneedham, (3) Kokilavani, (4) Balamurugan, (5) Nandhakumar and(6) Balaraman for the offences under Sections 323, 498(A) IPC andSection 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act r/w Sec.34 IPC.(b) Inasmuch as the accused pleaded not guilty, the trial wasconducted and during trial, on the prosecution side, P.Ws.1 to 20were examined and Exs.P1 to P9 were marked. No oral or documentaryevidence was adduced on the side of the accused. (c) Ultimately, the trial Court acquitted A5, and convicted A1to A4 and A6 and sentenced them to undergo the following punishment:----------------------------------------------------------------Case No.AccusedOffence Punishment imposed----------------------------------------------------------------C.C. A1 to u/s 4 of DP Two years R.I., fine amountNo.44/02 A4 andAct. of Rs.5,000/- by each of the A6 accused, in default, to undergo two months simple imprisonment.U/s 498(A) Three years R.I., fine amount of Rs.5,000/- by each of the accused, in default, to undergo three months S.I.(Sentence to run concurrently)------------------------------------------------------------3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of thelower Court, A1 to A4 and A6 filed appeal. The appellate Judgeacquitted all the appellants.4. Animadverting upon such acquittal by the appellate Court,this revision is focussed on various grounds at the instance of thede facto complainant, the warp and woof of them would run thus:The appellate Court was not justified in setting aside the orderof conviction recorded by the learned Magistrate and in acquittingthe accused. The learned Sessions Judge was wrong in his conclusionthat since respondents 2 to 6 were acquitted under Section 323 IPC bythe trial Court, the appellants should have been acquitted of theoffences under Section 498-A and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.The appellate Court ignored the evidence relating to dowry demandmade by the appellants before the appellate Court. The appellateCourt is prejudiced for the reason that it remarked that the policeare in the habit of registering false FIR as though the accused aredemanding twenty sovereigns of jewels and one Hero Honda vehicle.The appreciation of evidence by the first appellate Court relating toEx.P5 is also untenable. Section 8A of Dowry Protection Act, 1961was not properly taken into account by the appellate Court. Thefirst appellate Court failed to take into consideration the complaintgiven by the petitioner at the hospital and which was forwarded tothe police for registering the FIR on 26.08.2001. Even though theappellate Court arrived at the conclusion that A1 was not amenable to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ live with the petitioner, nonetheless, the trial Court disbelievedthe dowry harassment as imputed against him . Accordingly, sheprayed for setting aside the order of the first appellate Court andfor restoring the judgment of the Magistrate.5. Heard Mr.V.Subramaniyam, learned counsel appearing for therevision petitioner, Mr.R.Muniyapparaj, learned Government Advocate(crl.side) for R1 and Mr.V.Karthik for respondents 2 to 6.6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner by way ofreiterating the grounds of revision would develop his argument to theeffect that the first appellate Court was not justified in acquittingthe appellants/accused on flimsy grounds and that too after givingthe finding that A1 actually harassed and tortured the de factocomplainant. 7. Whereas the learned counsel for the accused would advance andset forth his argument to the effect that the powers of therevisional Court is restricted and that too in the case of revisionas against the order of acquittal. In support of his contention, hewould cite the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. Henceit is just and necessary to refer to those decisions:(I) AIR 1962 SC 1788 [K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of AndhraPradesh], an excerpt from it would run thus:7. It is true that it is open to a High Court inrevision to set aside an order of acquittal even at theinstance of private parties, though the State may not havethought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in ouropinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptionalcases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedureor there is a manifest error on a point of law andconsequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage ofjustice. Sub-section (4) of Section 439 forbids a HighCourt from converting a finding of acquittal into one ofconviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on theHigh Court to see that it does not convert the finding ofacquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method ofordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly convert afinding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. Thisplaces limitations on the power of the High Court to setaside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only inexceptional cases that this power should be exercised. Itis not possible to lay down the criteria for determiningsuch exceptional cases which would cover allcontingencies. We may however indicate some cases of thiskind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court ininterfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. Thesecases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction totry the case but has still acquitted the accused, or wherethe trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which theprosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal courthas wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence hasbeen overlooked either by the trial court or by the appealcourt, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding ofthe offence, which is invalid under the law. These andother cases of similar nature can properly be held to becases of exceptional nature, where the High Court canjustifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and insuch a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that theHigh Court was doing indirectly what it could not dodirectly in view of the provisions of Section 439(4). Wehave therefore to see whether the order of the High Courtsetting aside the order of acquittal in this case can beupheld on these principles.(II) AIR 1968 SC 707 [Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Sarju Singh andanother], an excerpt from it would run thus:7. In revision, the learned Judge in the High Courtwent into the evidence very minutely. He questioned everysingle finding of the learned Sessions Judge and gave hisown interpretation of the evidence and the inferences to bedrawn from it. He discounted the theory that the weapon ofattack was a revolver and suggested that it might have beena shot gun or country made pistol which the villagers inthe position of Kuldip and Sarju could not distinguish froma revolver. He then took up each single circumstance onwhich the learned Sessions Judge had found some doubt andinterpreting the evidence de novo held, contrary to theopinion of the Sessions Judge that they were acceptable.All the time he appeared to give the benefit of the doubtto the prosecution. The only error of law which the learnedJudge found in the Sessions Judge’s judgment was a remarkby the Sessions Judge that the defence witnesses who wereexamined by the police before they were brought as defencewitnesses ought to have been cross examined with referenceto their previous statements recorded by the police, whichobviously is against the provisions of the Code. Except forthis error, no defect of procedure or of law was discoveredby the learned Judge of the High Court in his appraisal ofthe judgment of the Sessions Judge. As stated already byus, he seems to have gone into the matter as if an appealagainst acquittal was before him making no distinctionbetween the appellate and the revisional powers exercisableby the High Court in matters of acquittal except to theextent that instead of convicting the appellant he onlyordered his retrial. In our opinion the learned Judge wasclearly in error in proceeding as he did in a revisionfiled by a private party against the acquittal reached inthe Court of Session.8. The practice on the subject has been stated by thisCourt on more than one occasion. In D. Stephens v.Nosibolla only two grounds are mentioned by this Court asentitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal in a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ revision and to order a retrial. They are that there mustexist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court ofSession ordering the acquittal or there must be a grossmiscarriage of justice. In explaining these twopropositions, this Court further states that the High Courtis not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law istaken by the Court of Session or if even there ismisapprehensions of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v.Shri Polailal Biswas, this Court points out that the HighCourt is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal ifthere is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of theevidence at all. This Court observes that it is notsufficient to say that the judgment under revision is“perverse” or “lacking in true correct perspective”. It ispointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice isloaded against the accused, because however much the HighCourt may caution the Subordinate Court, it is alwaysdifficult to reweigh the evidence ignoring the opinion ofthe High Court. Again in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State ofAndhra Pradesh, it is pointed out that an interference inrevision with an order of acquittal can only take place ifthere is a glaring defect of procedure such as that thecourt had no jurisdiction to try the case or the court hadshut out some material evidence which was admissible orattempted to take into account evidence which was notadmissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although thelist given by this Court is not exhaustive of all thecircumstances in which the High Court may interfere with anacquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in thejudgment under revision must be analogous to those actuallyindicated by this Court. As stated, not one of these pointswhich have been laid down by this Court was covered in thepresent case. In fact on reading the judgment of the HighCourt it is apparent to us that the learned Judge hasreweighed the evidence from his own point of view andreached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judgeon almost every point. This we do not conceive to be hisduty in dealing in revision with an acquittal whenGovernment has not chosen to file an appeal against it. Inother words, the learned Judge in the High Court has notattended to the rules laid down by this Court and has actedin breach of them.(III) 1973 SCC (cri) 903 [Akalu Ahir and others v. Ramdeo Ram],an excerpt from it would run thus:This Court then proceeded to observe that the HighCourt is certainly entitled in revision to set aside theorder of acquittal even at the instance of private parties,though the State may not have thought fit to appeal, but itwas emphasised that this jurisdiction should be exercisedonly in exceptional cases when “there is some glaringdefect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on apoint of law and consequently there has been a flagrant https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ miscarriage of justice”. In face of prohibition in Section439(4) CrPC for the High Court to convert a finding ofacquittal into one of’ conviction, it makes all the moreincumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convertthe finding of acquittal into one of conviction by theindirect method of ordering re-trial. No doubt, in theopinion of this Court, as criteria for determining suchexceptional cases which would cover all contingencies forattracting the High Court’s power of ordering re-trial canbe laid down. This Court, however, by way of illustration,indicated the following categories of cases which wouldjustify the High Court in interfering with a finding ofacquittal in revision:(i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try thecase, but has still acquitted the accused;(ii) Where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidencewhich the prosecution wished to produce;(iii) Where the appellate court has wrongly held theevidence which was admitted by the trial court to beinadmissible;(iv) Where the material evidence has been overlooked only(either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and(v) Where the acquittal is based on the compounding of theoffence which is invalid under the law.These categories were, however, merely illustrative and itwas clarified that other cases of similar nature can alsobe properly held to be of exceptional nature where the HighCourt can justifiably interfere with the order ofacquittal. In Mahendra Pratap Singh (supra), the positionwas again reviewed and the rule laid down in the threeearlier cases reaffirmed. In that case the reading of thejudgment of the High Court made it plain that it had re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and reachedinferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge onalmost every point. This Court pointed out that it was notthe duty of the High Court to do so while dealing with anacquittal of revision, when the Government had not chosento file an appeal against it. “In other words” said thisCourt, “the learned Judge in the High Court has notattended to the rules laid down by this Court and has actedin breach of them”.(IV) 1975 SCC (cri) 543 [Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju andothers v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another], an excerpt from itwould run thus:"3. It is clear from these decisions that therevisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ because the lower court has not appreciated theevidence properly. The High Court has in its judgmentreferred to the decisions of this Court but in applyingthose decisions it has transgressed the limits of itsrevisional powers."(V) AIR 1997 SC 2485 [Kaptan Singh and others v. State of M.P.and another], an excerpt from it would run thus:"5. ......The trial Court is then required to baseits conclusion solely on the evidence adduced duringthe trial; and it cannot rely on the investigation orthe result thereof, since this is an elementaryprinciple of criminal law, we need not dilate on thispoint any further."Placing reliance on those decisions, the learned counsel for theaccused would submit that virtually as against the judgment ofacquittal, the Court should be reluctant to interfere unless there isperversity in applying the law and rendering the judgment ofacquittal; simply because there is wrong appreciation of evidence oreven wrong understanding of the law, it would not enure to thebenefit of the de facto complainant to file a revision so as to getsuch order of acquittal set aside. 8. At this juncture, my mind is redolent and reminiscent of thefollowing decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:(i) 2002(6) SCC 650- Bindeshwari Prasad Singh aliasB.P.Singh and Others vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another;an excerpt from it would run thus:"13. The instant case is not one where any suchillegality was committed by the trial court. In theabsence of any legal infirmity either in theprocedure or in the conduct of the trial, there wasno justification for the High Court to interfere inexercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It hasrepeatedly been held that the High Court should notreappreciate the evidence to reach a findingdifferent from the trial court. In the absence ofmanifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage ofjustice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in suchcases is not warranted.14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the HighCourt was not justified in interfering with the orderof acquittal in exercise of its revisionaljurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It maybe that the High Court on appreciation of theevidence on record may reach a conclusion differentfrom that of the trial court. But that by itself isno justification for exercise of revisionaljurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal.We cannot say that the judgment of the trial court inthe instant case was perverse. No defect of procedurehas been pointed out. There was also no improperacceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there anydefect of procedure or illegality in the conduct ofthe trial vitiating the trial itself. (ii) 2005 Supreme Court Cases (cri) 276 – Sathyajit Banerjee andOthers vs. State of W.B.and others, an excerpt from it would run thus:"22. The cases cited by the learned counsel show thesettled legal position that the revisional jurisdiction, atthe instance of the complainant, has to be exercised by theHigh Court only in very exceptional cases where the HighCourt finds defect of procedure or manifest error of lawresulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice."A bare perusal of the said precedents would demonstrate and displaythat the revisional court is not expected to interfere with thefindings given by both the courts below and if there is anyperversity or non-application of law on the part of both the courtsbelow, the question of revisional court interfering with thefindings would arise. 9. As such, a cumulative reading of all the decisions citedsupra would undoubtedly and unambiguously highlight and spotlight thefact that the acquittal of the accused by the lower Court is inreinforcement of the innocence of the accused and in such a case, therevisional Court should be reluctant to interfere with such finding.Absolutely there is no quarrel over such a proposition. At thisjuncture it is just and necessary to see whether the order ofacquittal by the first appellate Court warrants interference or not.10. The following excerpts from the judgment of the firstappellate Court are extracted hereunder for ready reference:(1) ////// g";rhaj;jpy; jdJ tpUg;gg;go fy;ahzk;bra;Jf;bfhs;stpy;iy vd;W Kjy; vjpuhsp brhd;dhh;/ m/rh/1 cld;thH KoahJ vd;W Kjy; vjpuhsp brhd;dhh;/ g";rhaj;jpy; Kjy; vjpuhspvd; tpUg;ggo vdf;F jpUkzk; bra;J itf;ftpy;iy vd;Wk;. mth;mg;ght[ld; rz;il nghl;Lf;bfhz;lhh;@ vd;W Twpa[s;shh;/ ,e;jrhl;rpfspd; rhl;rpa';fis ghh;f;Fk; nghJ Kjy; vjpuhspf;F mtUilatpUg;gg;go mtUila je;ij 6Mk; vjpuhsp jpUkzk; bra;J itf;ftpy;iyvd;gJk;. Kjy; vjpuhspf;F m/rh/1I mtuJ tpUg;gj;jpw;F khwhf jpUkzk;bra;J itf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ vd;gJk;. mjd; fhuzkhfj;jhd; Kjy;vjpuhsp m/rh/1 cld; ,ize;J thHtpy;iy vd;W bjs;sj;bjspthfpwJ/ ///////(2) /////// nkw;brhd;d rhl;rpfspd; rhl;rpa';fspy; g";rhaj;jpy;m/rh/1I jdJ tpUg;gj;jpw;F khwhf 6tJ vjpuhsp jdf;F jpUkzk; bra;J https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ itj;jjhf vjpuhsp jdJ je;ijia jpl;oapUg;gija[k; ghh;f;Fk;nghJKjy; vjpuhspf;F m/rh/1I jpUkzk; bra;J itf;Fk;nghJ mtuJtpUg;gj;jpw;F khwh jpUkzk; bra;J itj;Js;sdh; vd;gJk;. Kjy;vjpuhspapd; jpUkzj;jpw;F vjpuhf m/rh/1I jpUkzk; bra;J itj;jjhy;m/rh/1d; kPJ mtUf;F btWg;g[ Vw;gl;Ls;sJ vd;gJk;. mjdhy; mth;m/rh/1 cld; nrh;e;J thH mth; xj;JiHf;ftpy;iy vd;gJk; g[ydhfpwJ/////////(3) ///////// mLj;jjhf m/rh/1I Kjy; vjpuhspapd; tpUg;gj;jpw;F khwhfmtUf;F jpUkzk; bra;J itf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ/ ,e;j ,uz;LTw;Wf;fSk; muRj;jug;g[r; rhl;rpfspd; rhl;rpa';fspypUe;Jk;.Mtz';fspypUe;Jk; bjs;sj; bjspthfpwJ/ ,jid ghh;f;Fk;nghJ.jdf;F gpof;fhj m/rh/1I jdf;F jpUkzk; bra;J itj;J tpl;lhhfs;vd;W btWg;ig fhl;Lk; tifapy; jhd; m/rh/1 cld; Kjy; vjpuhspmof;fo rz;il bra;J te;Js;shh; vd;gJ muRj;jug;g[ rhl;rpfspd;rhl;rpa';fs; kw;Wk; Mtz';fpspypUe;J bjhpa tUfpwJ/ ///////(4) //////// nkYk; m/rh/4. mtuJ rhl;rpaj;jpy;. mtUf;F m/rh/1 vGJk;fojj;jpy; m/rh/1I jpUkzk; bra;jjpypUe;J jhpj;jpuk; gpoj;Jtpl;ljhft[k;.ntW xU bgz;iz jpUkzk; bra;ag;nghtjhft[k;. m/rh/1d; fzth;mog;gjhft[k;. bts;isg;ngg;ghpy; ifbaGj;J th';fpajhft[k;Fwpg;gpl;oUg;ggjhf TwpapUg;gij ghh;f;Fk;nghJ. Kjy; vjpuhsp. mtUf;FtpUg;ggl;l xU bgz;iz jpUkzk; bra;tjw;fhfj;jhd; bts;isngg;ghpy; ifbaGj;J nghl;Lf;bfhLf;Fk;go Jd;g[Wj;jpajhf bjhpatUfpwnjad;wp ////@Those excerpts would display and evince that the first appellateCourt while exonerating the accused relating to the imputation andallegation of dowry harassment, gave a categorical finding that A1,the husband of the de facto complainant harassed the latter ongeneral grounds. However, after giving such a finding, he simplyacquitted the accused. No doubt, the learned counsel for the accusedinvited the attention of this Court to various portions of thejudgment of the first appellate Court and highlighted that the firstappellate Court without mincing words gave a finding that P.W.1 was awitness who indulged in embellishment from stage to stage and assuch, her evidence was not worthy of credence; there is also acategorical finding by the appellate Court that the very allegationof dowry harassment as against A1 and others had no legs to stand; insuch a case, simply because the learned appellate Judge remarked hereand there while writing the judgment that A1 might have harassed thecomplainant for some other reason, so to say, because he did not likeher even at the time of marriage, it should not be taken note of bythis revisional Court and on that ground only the judgment of theappellate Court need not be set aside and the matter remitted back tothe first appellate Court or to the trial Court. 11. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ accused that the trial Court had not given infact any finding basedon general cruelty de hors dowry harassment. Once the appellateCourt held that there was no dowry harassment and consequently nocruelty, then there ends the matter, as the first appellate Court'sfinding was reversed by the appellate Court and nothing more remains;had the trial Court atleast gave a finding that de hors dowryharassment, there was generally harassment, then there would be somescope for interference, but in this case, the trial Court itselfnever gave any finding that apart from dowry harassment, there wasalso generally harassment attracting Section 498(A) of IPC. 12. I would like to point out that the appellate Court is thelast Court of facts. The trial Court, after considering the evidenceat length, generally found that the accused committed the offenceattracting Section 498(A) IPC. However, it is the first appellateCourt which concentrated only on dowry harassment, so to say, theingredients as found exemplified under sub clause (b) of theexplanation appended to Section 498(A) IPC and held that there was nodowry harassment and consequently, no offence under Section 498(A)IPC made out. There is sub clause (a) under the explanation appendedto Section 498(A) IPC, which contemplates general harassment de horsdowry harassment. As has been already highlighted supra, in not lessthan four places in the appellate Court's judgment, the appellateCourt referred to the general harassment meted out to the de factocomplainant by A1 and when such is the position, he has not appliedhis mind as to whether sub clause (a) of the explanation appended toSection 498(A) was attracted or not, which displays and demonstratesthe non-application of mind on the part of the first appellate Courtwhile acquitting the accused warranting interference to this limitedextent.13. The precedents cited supra would in no way be an embargo forthis Court to exercise jurisdiction in matters of this nature and itis quite obvious and axiomatic. The learned counsel for the accusedwould submit that only retrial could be ordered by the revisionalCourt and it cannot simply direct the first appellate Court toreconsider the matter; if done so, it would amount to actuating andaccentuating, mandating and compelling the first appellate Court torecord conviction as against A1 under Section 498(A) invoking subclause (a) of the explanation appended to Section 498(A) IPC.14. I cannot countenance such an argument for the reason that ifsuch a view is taken, then no revision worth the name could beentertained by the Court at all and even in the numbering stageitself, it should be rejected. Of course, it is for the revisionalCourt not to give any conclusive finding on re-appreciation ofevidence. Here my discussion supra would show that I have notventured to look into the evidence of the witness and re-evaluate it,but what I could find from the judgment of the first appellate Courtis that the first appellate Court applied it mind on only one aspectof the matter and left the other aspect in toto as set out supra,warranting interference by this Court. 15. Accordingly, I would like to interfere with the judgment of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ acquittal passed to the limited extent of acquittal relating to A1and that too concerning the offence under Section 498(A) IPC. Withthis, I would like to remit back the matter to the first appellateCourt to see as to whether in the wake of sub clause (a) of theexplanation appended to Section 498(A) IPC any case is found proved.It is open for him to hear both sides and also look into otherevidence available as to whether such offences based on generalcruelty and torture is attracted or not.16. The learned counsel for the accused also would submit thatcertain directions may be given to the appellate Court not to becarried away by this remand order. I make it clear that theappellate Court need not have the apprehension that this Courtremanded the matter for recording a conviction. It is for thelearned Judge of the first appellate Court to apply his mind and cometo an independent conclusion either to acquit or convict him as thefacts and the circumstances might warrant. The appellate Court shallsee that within a period of three months, the matter is disposed of.Accordingly, this criminal revision case is disposed of. Sd/- Asst.Registrar/true copy/ Sub Asst.RegistrarTo1. District & Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai.2. -do- Through the Principal Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai3. Judicial Magistrate, Arani.4. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvannamalai5. The Public Prosecutor, High Court,Madras.6. The Sub Inspector of Police, All women Police Station, Arani, Thiruvannamalai District.7. The Section Officer, Criminal Section, High Court, Madras.+1 cc to Mr.T.S.Gopalan & Co, Advocate, SR.No.32565+1 cc to Mr.Mcgan Law firm, Advocate, SR.No.34961 Crl.R.C.No.1061 of 2006PKB {CO}TP/21.8.2009.