M/s.Calpana Service Station v. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer(Registration Cell) Commercial Taxes Department, Office of the Commissioner(CT)

the resale of the petroleum products. Based on the registrationcertificate issued in favour of the petitioner, it has been runninga petroleum bunk and reselling the petroleum products in Puducherry.The petitioner, as the registered dealer of the petroleum products,has been acting as an agent of the Government by collecting the taxfrom the Consumer public on the price of the petroleum products. Ithas been filing the returns and remitting the tax collected by it,before the assessing authority concerned, regularly. While so,certain discrepancies had been found in the orders of assessment forthe assessment years 2004-05 to 2006-07. 4. It has been stated in the said assessment orders that therewere certain differences noted in the turnover reported in thepetitioner’s returns and in the supply vouchers provided by theIndian Oil Corporation. Further, with regard to the sale oflubricants, the second sale of such lubricants had been treated asfirst sale, by the authorities concerned. In such circumstances, thepetitioner had challenged the said orders before the appellateauthority concerned. It had been further stated that the returnsfiled by the petitioner are correct and the entire admitted tax hasbeen paid. 5. It had been stated that the sale of lubricants should betreated only as second sale, as they had been purchased only fromthe customers' outlet. However, before the assessment orders hadbecome final, as the appeals filed by the petitioner were pendingadjudication, the respondent had cancelled the registration of thepetitioner, by his order, No.800/DCTO/(RC)/2009-10, dated 9.11.2009.The said order had been passed without providing sufficient time tothe petitioner to submit its objections. Pursuant to the orderpassed by the respondent, canceling the registration of thepetitioner, the Indian Oil Corporation had refused to supply fuel tothe petitioner bunk. In such circumstances, the petitioner had fileda writ petition before this Court, in W.P.No.24605 of 2009,challenging the order of the respondent. 6. This Court had allowed the writ petition, by its order,dated 23.12.2009, and had directed the respondent to passappropriate orders, after giving an opportunity to the petitioner tosubmit its reply. Accordingly, the petitioner had submitted itsreply, on 31.12.2009. The respondent had issued a notice, dated27.1.2010, calling for the objections of the petitioner. Thepetitioner has submitted its reply, dated 11.12.2010, stating thatthe appeals filed by the petitioner, against the assessment orders,were still pending and the orders passed by the respondent had notattained finality. Therefore, the registration of the petitionercannot be cancelled on the ground of arrears of tax. However, therespondent, without considering the objections raised by thepetitioner, had passed an order, dated 23.2.2010, canceling theregistration of the petitioner. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7. It had been further stated that the petitioner hadchallenged the order of the respondent, dated 23.2.2010, by way of awrit petition, filed before this Court, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010. Byan order, dated 24.2.2010, this Court had granted an order ofinterim stay of the impugned order of the respondent, in M.P.No.1 of2010. Thereafter, the interim order granted by this Court, on24.2.2010, had been further extended. While so, the petitioner hadsubmitted an application for renewal of the registration, along withthe necessary fee for such renewal. Based on the application filedby the petitioner, the respondent had renewed the registration ofthe petitioner in the month of June, 2010, thereby, impliedlyrevoking the cancellation of the registration of the petitioner.Thereafter, the petitioner had been granted renewal of theregistration, for the year 2010-2011, on 27.6.2010, by the DeputyCommercial Tax Officer, Puducherry. In such circumstances, thepetitioner had submitted before this Court that, in view of therenewal of the registration of the petitioner, by the respondent,the writ petition, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010, has become infructuous.Recording the submissions, made on behalf of the petitioner, thisCourt, by an order, dated 14.7.2010, had dismissed the writpetition, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010, as infructuous. Consequently, theconnected miscellaneous petition, in M.P.No.1 of 2010, had beenclosed. Accordingly, this Court had passed the order, on 14.7.2010,dismissing the writ petition, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010, asinfructuous. 8. After the dismissal of the writ petition by this Court, therespondent, by its order, dated 27.8.2010, had stated that thepetitioner cannot claim itself as a registered dealer, under theprovisions of the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007, and theCentral Sales Tax Act, 1956, and thereby, carry on the resale of thepetroleum products in the union territory of Pudhucherry. He hadstated in the said impugned order that the earlier order, dated23.2.2010, cancelling the registration certificate granted in favourof the petitioner is in operation, in view of the dismissal of thewrit petition, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010. Therefore, the petitioner hadpreferred the present writ petition challenging the order of therespondent, dated 27.8.2010. 9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitionerhad submitted that the impugned order of the respondent, dated27.8.2010, is arbitrary, illegal and void. He had submitted that theimpugned order of the respondent is in violation of the principlesof natural justice. The respondent had not issued any notice to thepetitioner before passing the said order. No opportunity of personalhearing had been given before the impugned order had been passed.10. He had submitted that the renewal of the registrationcertificate of the petitioner amounts to an automatic revocation of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the order, dated 23.2.2010. Since, the registration certificate isvalid only for a year, any renewal of the registration certificatewould be like a fresh grant of registration certificate. In fact,the registration certificate granted in favour of the petitioner wasvalid, only from 27.6.2010 to 26.6.2011. Thereafter, when thepetitioner had applied for a further renewal of the registrationcertificate, the respondent had passed the impugned order, dated27.8.2010, stating that the request of the petitioner for therenewal of the registration cannot be granted, as the earlier order,dated 23.2.2010, cancelling the registration certificate granted infavour of the petitioner is in operation. 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitionerhad further submitted that the assessment order in question had notattained finality and therefore, there was no necessity to cancelthe registration granted in favour of the petitioner. The onlyreason for the cancellation of the registration is that thepetitioner is allegedly in arrears, with regard to the payment oftax. The submissions made on behalf of the respondent that noappeals are pending, challenging the assessment order passed againstthe petitioner, is false. The respondent does not have thejurisdiction to decide about the alleged arrears of tax. He cannotact as an assessing authority. Even if there are some arrears in thepayment of tax, by the petitioner, it is open to the authorityconcerned to initiate appropriate action against the petitioner forthe recovery of the same. However, the respondent does not have thepower to stop the petitioner from carrying on its business. Therespondent cannot claim that the writ petition is not maintainabledue to the availability of an alternative remedy, under Section 45of the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007, to the petitioner, asthe impugned order passed by the respondent is contrary to theprinciples of natural justice and the relevant provisions of law.The impugned order of the respondent is infringing the provisionscontained in Articles 19, 21, 265 and 300 of the Constitution ofIndia. The respondent cannot curb the business activities of thepetitioner for non-payment of the disputed tax, especially, when thepetitioner had paid huge sums of money as the admitted tax. 12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitionerhad also submitted that certain other similarly placed persons, asthat of the petitioner, have been permitted to pay the arrears oftax in installments and they have been permitted to run theirbusiness without any impediment. 13. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitionerhad also submitted that the respondent had not stated the actualquantum of the arrears of tax due to be paid by the petitioner.Further, it is not open to the respondent to state in his impugnedorder, dated 27.8.2010, that the registration of the petitionerstands cancelled, both under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ well as the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007. According to Rule9 (1) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules,1957, the notified authority shall provide to the dealer theopportunity of being heard before amending or cancelling thecertificate of registration. However, in the present case, therespondent had cancelled the registration of the petitioner, by wayof the impugned order, dated 27.8.2010, without giving anopportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. Hence, theimpugned order of the respondent, dated 27.8.2010, is invalid in theeye of law. 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitionerhad relied on the decisions in KALRA GLUE FACGTORY Vs. SALES TAXTRIBUNAL (1987) 066 STC 0292 and V.K.BATCHA MOHIDEEN Vs. JOINTCOMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, TIRUCHIRAPALLI TOWN-1 (1971) 028 STC 0450 insupport of his contentions that this Court would have jurisdictionto set aside an order passed by the respondent even if analternative remedy is available to the petitioner, under Section 45of the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007, in case the impugnedorder results in violation of the principles of natural justice,especially, when it infringes the fundamental rights of thepetitioner to carry on its trade, occupation or business. 15. Per contra, the learned Special Government Pleaderappearing on behalf of the respondent had submitted that thepetitioner cannot ask for the renewal of registration in its favour,as a matter of right. As the petitioner is in heavy amount ofarrears of tax, the registration certificate of the petitioner hadbeen cancelled. 16. He had further submitted that the petitioner had obtainedan order of interim stay of the order passed by the respondent, on23.2.2010, cancelling the registration certificate of thepetitioner, in M.P.No.1 of 2010, W.P.No.3904 of 2010. In view of thependency of the said writ petition and in view of the order ofinterim stay granted by this Court, the respondent had renewed theregistration of the petitioner for the year 2010-2011, on 27.6.2010.Subsequently, for reasons best known to the petitioner the writpetition, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010, it had been submitted before thisCourt that the writ petition has become infructuous. In view of thesubmissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of thepetitioner, this court had dismissed the writ petition, asinfructuous, by its order, dated 14.7.2010. Consequently, theconnected miscellaneous petition had also been closed. Thereafter,the petitioner had made a request for the renewal of itsregistration, for the year 2011-2012. In such circumstances, therespondent had issued the order, dated 27.8.2010, stating that theearlier order, dated 23.2.2010, cancelling the registrationcertificate granted in favour of the petitioner is in operation.Hence, the petitioner cannot claim itself to be a registered dealer https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ under the provisions of the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007,and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Therefore, the request of thepetitioner for renewal of the registration cannot be granted. Thesaid order, being a mere intimation of a prevailing factualposition, with regard to the registration of the petitioner, cannotgive right to a cause of action to the petitioner to challenge thesame. 17. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalfof the respondent had also submitted that the petitioner, by evadingpayment of tax, had misappropriated large sums of public money.Therefore, no sympathy can be shown by this Court in favour of thepetitioner. The renewal granted in favour of the petitioner, for theyear 2010-2011, can only be in respect of the Puducherry Value AddedTax Act, 2007, and therefore, there cannot be a renewal under thePondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 1967. In view of the dismissal ofthe writ petition filed by the petitioner, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010,by an order, dated 14.7.2010, stating that the writ petition wasdismissed, as infructuous, the interim renewal granted in favour ofthe petitioner is a nullity. As such, the earlier order passed bythe respondent, on 23.2.2010, cancelling the registration of thepetitioner would revive, automatically. No fresh cause of actionwould arise due to the order passed by the respondent, on 27.8.2010,since, it is only a reiteration of the existing legal situation. 18. He had also submitted that no renewal of registration couldhave been validly granted in favour of the petitioner, as per Rule 8of the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007, in view of the pendencyof the writ petition, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010. However, on thedismissal of the said writ petition, the registration granted infavour of the petitioner stood cancelled. As such, the writpetition filed by the petitioner is devoid of merits and therefore,it is liable to be dismissed with costs. 19. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalfof the respondent had relied on the following decisions in supportof his contentions:19.1. In GANGABAI GOPALDAS MOHATA Vs. FULCHAND (1997) 10 SCC386, the Supreme Court had held as follows: "In view of the fact that the appellant's servicewas terminated after an enquiry in which the appellantchose not to participate, we are of the view that theappellant cannot assail his termination on merits, evenassuming that the writ petition filed by him in the HighCourt was maintainable. For this reason, it is notnecessary to examine the correctness of the High Court'sview that the writ petition was not maintainable. Thedismissal of the appeal by this Court, is, therefore, not https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to be construed as an expression of any opinion on themerits of the view taken by the High Court on the questionof maintainability of the writ petition." 19.2. In SHIV KUMAR SHARMA Vs. SANTOSH KUMARI (2007) 8 SCC600), the Supreme Court had held as follows:"26. In England, the court of equity exercisesjurisdiction in equity. The courts of India do not possessany such exclusive jurisdiction. The courts in Indiaexercise jurisdiction both in equity as well as law butexercise of equity jurisdiction is always subject to theprovisions of law. If exercise of equity jurisdictionwould violate the express provisions contained in law, thesame cannot be done. Equity jurisdiction can be exercisedonly when no law operates in the field.27. A court of law cannot exercise its discretionaryjurisdiction dehors the statutory law. Its discretion mustbe exercised in terms of the existing statute.28. In Shamsu Suhara Beevi v. G. Alex (2004) 8 SCC569) this Court, while dealing with a matter relating togrant of compensation by the High Court under Section 21of the Specific Relief Act in addition to the relief ofspecific performance in the absence of prayer made to thateffect, either in the plaint or amending the same at anylater stage of the proceedings to include the relief ofcompensation in addition to the relief of specificperformance, observed: (SCC p. 576, para 11)“11. … Grant of such a relief in the teeth of expressprovisions of the statute to the contrary is notpermissible. On equitable considerations court cannotignore or overlook the provisions of the statute. Equitymust yield to law"19.3. In LIC Vs. ASHA RAMCHHANDRA AMBEKAR (1994) 2 SCC 718),the Supreme Court had held as follows:11. At this juncture we may usefully refer to MartinBurn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta (AIR 1966 SC 529).At page 535 of the Report the following observations arefound:“A result flowing from a statutory provision isnever an evil. A Court has no power to ignore thatprovision to relieve what it considers a distressresulting from its operation. A statute must ofcourse be given effect to whether a Court likes theresult or not.” https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The courts should endeavour to find out whether aparticular case in which sympathetic considerations areto be weighed falls within the scope of law.Disregardful of law, however, hard the case may be, itshould never be done. In the very case itself, there areregulations and instructions which we have extractedabove. The court below has not even examined whether acase falls within the scope of these statutoryprovisions. Clause 2 of sub-clause (iii) of Instructionsmakes it clear that relaxation could be given only whennone of the members of the family is gainfully employed.Clause 4 of the circular dated January 20, 1987interdicts such an appointment on compassionate grounds.The appellant Corporation being a statutory Corporationis bound by the Life Insurance Corporation Act as wellas the Statutory Regulations and Instructions. Theycannot be put aside and compassionate appointment beordered."19.4. In PRESTIGE LIGHTS LTD Vs. STATE BANK OF INDIA (2007) 8SCC 449, the Supreme Court had held as follows:33. It is thus clear that though the appellantCompany had approached the High Court under Article 226 ofthe Constitution, it had not candidly stated all the factsto the Court. The High Court is exercising discretionaryand extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution. Over and above, a court of law is also acourt of equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessitythat when a party approaches a High Court, he must placeall the facts before the Court without any reservation. Ifthere is suppression of material facts on the part of theapplicant or twisted facts have been placed before theCourt, the writ court may refuse to entertain the petitionand dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter.35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy isnot a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power,therefore, a writ court will indeed bear in mind theconduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. Ifthe applicant does not disclose full facts or suppressesrelevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleadingthe court, the court may dismiss the action withoutadjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved inlarger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigantsfrom abusing the process of court by deceiving it. Thevery basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure oftrue, complete and correct facts. If the material factsare not candidly stated or are suppressed or aredistorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ become impossible."19.5. In PEPSU RTC Vs. RAWEL SINGH (2008) 4 SCC 42, theSupreme Court had held as follows:"15. With regard to supply of documents, recordreveals that the documents had been supplied to theworkman and the said fact had been admitted by him. Hiscase, however, was that due to heavy rain, all thedocuments were destroyed which necessitated supply offresh documents. But as observed by the enquiry officer,the workman was asked as to whether he required anydocument but the workman replied in the negative. In ouropinion, he could have continued to appear before theenquiry officer, got the documents, if he wanted, andparticipated in the enquiry. He, however, deliberately didnot do so. It is alleged by the Corporation that therespondent intentionally remained absent as he was workingwith private bus operators and wanted to take a chance ifenquiry proceedings are quashed and set aside on the pleaof violation of principles of natural justice. We are notentering into correctness or otherwise of the allegationsof the Corporation. One thing, however, is certain that inspite of service of show-cause notice, the respondentfailed to appear at the enquiry and the enquiry officerhad to proceed with the enquiry in absence of therespondent.16. Apart from that it is also clear from the recordthat so far as the charge as to unauthorised absence ofthe respondent is concerned, the same is duly establishedfrom the record. The enquiry officer, in our opinion,rightly observed that Charges (ii) and (iii) wereconsequential in nature and based on Charge (i) and henceall the charges can be said to have been proved againstthe respondent. In our judgment, the Labour Court waswholly wrong in holding that enquiry was not fair. To us,it is not a case of not extending an opportunity to theemployee but not availing of opportunity by the employee.Therefore, the finding recorded by the Labour Court thatthe enquiry was vitiated being violative of naturaljustice and fair play is based on “no evidence” and mustbe set aside."19.6. In H.P.TRANSPORT CORPN Vs. K.C.RAHI (2008) 11 SCC 502,the Supreme Court had held as follows:"8. In the instant case we have been taken throughvarious documents and also from the representation dated19-10-1993 filed by the respondent himself it would https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ clearly show that he knew that a departmental enquiry wasinitiated against him yet he chose not to participate inthe enquiry proceedings at his own risk. In such eventplea of principle of natural justice is deemed to havebeen waived and he is estopped from raising the questionof non-compliance with principles of natural justice. Inthe representation submitted by him on 19-10-1993 thesubject itself reads “DEPARTMENTAL ENQUIRIES”. It isstated at the Bar that the respondent is a law graduate,therefore, he cannot take a plea of ignorance of law.Ignorance of law is no excuse much less by a person who isa law graduate himself."19.7. In COMMR. OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE Vs. HONGO INDIA (P)LTD., (2009) 5 SCC 791, the Supreme Court had held as follows:"30. In the earlier part of our order, we haveadverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides forappeals and revisions to various authorities. ThoughParliament has specifically provided an additional periodof 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, itis silent about the number of days if there is sufficientcause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.Also an additional period of 90 days in the case ofrevision by the Central Government has been provided.However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court underSection 35-G and reference application to the High Courtunder Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180 daysand no further period for filing an appeal and makingreference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act."19.8. In RAJ KUMAR SHIVHARE Vs. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT(2010) 4 SCC 772, the Supreme Court had held as follows:31. When a statutory forum is created by law forredressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, awrit petition should not be entertained ignoring thestatutory dispensation. In this case the High Court is astatutory forum of appeal on a question of law. Thatshould not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigantfor invoking the forum of judicial review of the HighCourt under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with greatrespect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciatingthis aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed thewrit petition on the ground of lack of territorialjurisdiction. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

35. In this case, liability of the appellant is notcreated under any common law principle but, it is clearlya statutory liability and for which the statutory remedyis an appeal under Section 35 of FEMA, subject to thelimitations contained therein. A writ petition in thefacts of this case is therefore clearly not maintainable.39. In the instant case none of the aforesaidsituations are present. Therefore, principle laid down inRatan case (2003) 5 SCC 399 applies in the facts andcircumstances of this case. If the appellant in this caseis allowed to file a writ petition despite the existenceof an efficacious remedy by way of appeal under Section 35of FEMA this will enable him to defeat the provisions ofthe statute which may provide for certain conditions forfiling the appeal, like limitation, payment of court feeor deposit of some amount of penalty or fulfilment of someother conditions for entertaining the appeal. It isobvious that a writ court should not encourage theaforesaid trend of bypassing a statutory provision."19.9. In UNITED BANK OF INDIA Vs. SATYAWATI TONDON (2010) 8 SCC110, the Supreme Court had held as follows:43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked thesettled law that the High Court will ordinarily notentertain a petition under Article 226 of theConstitution if an effective remedy is available to theaggrieved person and that this rule applies with greaterrigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess,fees, other types of public money and the dues of banksand other financial institutions. In our view, whiledealing with the petitions involving challenge to theaction taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. theHigh Court must keep in mind that the legislationsenacted by Parliament and State Legislatures forrecovery of such dues are a code unto themselvesinasmuch as they not only contain comprehensiveprocedure for recovery of the dues but also envisageconstitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal ofthe grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in allsuch cases, the High Court must insist that beforeavailing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, aperson must exhaust the remedies available under therelevant statute. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we areconscious that the powers conferred upon the High Courtunder Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to anyperson or authority, including in appropriate cases, anyGovernment, directions, orders or writs including thefive prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of therights conferred by Part III or for any other purposeare very wide and there is no express limitation onexercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannotbe oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraintevolved by this Court, which every High Court is boundto keep in view while exercising power under Article 226of the Constitution.45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion ofalternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not oneof compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reasonwhy the High Court should entertain a petition filedunder Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interimorder ignoring the fact that the petitioner can availeffective alternative remedy by filing application,appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislationcontains a detailed mechanism for redressal of hisgrievance.48. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State ofOrissa (1983) 2 SCC 433) a three-Judge Bench consideredthe question whether a petition under Article 226 of theConstitution should be entertained in a matter involvingchallenge to the order of the assessment passed by thecompetent authority under the Central Sales Tax Act,1956 and corresponding law enacted by the StateLegislature and answered the same in the negative bymaking the following observations: (SCC pp. 440-41, para11)“11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is ahierarchy of authorities before which the petitioners canget adequate redress against the wrongful acts complainedof. The petitioners have the right to prefer an appealbefore the prescribed authority under sub-section (1) ofSection 23 of the Act. If the petitioners are dissatisfiedwith the decision in the appeal, they can prefer a furtherappeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23of the Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon aquestion of law for the opinion of the High Court underSection 24 of the Act. The Act provides for a completemachinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged bythe mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition underArticle 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognisedthat where a right or liability is created by a statutewhich gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedyprovided by that statute only must be availed of. Thisrule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. inWolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford (1859) 6CBNS 336 in the following passage: (ER p. 495)‘… There are three classes of cases in which aliability may be established founded upon a statute. … Butthere is a third class viz. where a liability not existingat common law is created by a statute which at the sametime gives a special and particular remedy for enforcingit. … The remedy provided by the statute must be followed,and it is not competent to the party to pursue the courseapplicable to cases of the second class. The form given bythe statute must be adopted and adhered to.’The rule laid down in this passage was approved by theHouse of Lords in Neville v. London Express NewspapersLtd. 1919 AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the PrivyCouncil in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v.Gordon Grant & Co. Ltd. (1935 AC 532(PC) and Secy. ofState v. Mask & Co. (1939-40) 67 IA 222. It has alsobeen held to be equally applicable to enforcement ofrights, and has been followed by this Court throughout.The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing thewrit petitions in limine.”19.10. In SUDHIR KUMAR CONSUL Vs. ALLAHABAD BANK (2011) 3 SCC486, the Supreme Court had held as follows:"31. We have sympathies for the appellant but, in asociety governed by the rule of law, sympathies cannotoverride the Rules and Regulations. We may recall theobservations made by this Court while considering theissue of compassionate appointment in public service."20. In view of the contentions raised by the learned counselsappearing on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent and in viewof the decisions cited above, this Court is of the considered viewthat the registration granted in favour of the petitioner ought notto have been cancelled by the respondent, either by his earlier,order dated 23.2.2010, or by the subsequent order, dated 27.8.2010.It is clear that the respondent had exceeded his jurisdiction bycancelling the registration granted in favour of the petitioner,without affording a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing tothe petitioner. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

21. Even if it can be said that an alternative remedy isavailable to the petitioner, under Section 45 of the PuducherryValue Added Tax Act, 2007, to challenge the order of the respondentcancelling the registration, in cases where the principles ofnatural justice are violated, this Court can exercise its powers,under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to grant the reliefto the petitioner, by setting aside the impugned order, especially,when a fundamental right of a person to carry on its trade,occupation or business is infringed. It is not open to therespondent to claim that his impugned order, dated 27.8.2010, isonly a statement of the factual position, as it existed on the dateof the passing of the said order. 22. It is seen that during the pendency of the writ petition,in W.P.No.3904 of 2010, filed by the petitioner, challenging theearlier order passed by the respondent, on 23.2.2010, cancelling theregistration, the renewal of the registration had been granted forthe year 2010-2011. Therefore, the petitioner had rightly statedbefore this Court that the writ petition, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010,had become infructuous. In view of the said submission, this Court,by its order, dated 14.7.2010, had dismissed the said writ petition.Thereafter, it is not open to the respondent to contend that theearlier order, dated 23.2.2010, gets revived and the renewal of theregistration granted in favour of the petitioner, on 27.6.2010, isinvalid. The respondent cannot blow hot and cold at the same time. 23. It is also noted that the petitioner had requested for therenewal of registration, for the year 2011-12, by paying thenecessary fee. It is also seen that the petitioner had made arequest for renewal of the registration by a representation, dated29.4.2011, along with the fee payable for such registration, by wayof a demand draft. However, the renewal of registration had not beengranted to the petitioner, till date. 24. It is also seen that, as per Sub Section 9 of Section 23 ofthe Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 1967, no application forregistration and no renewal under the Section shall be refused, andno order shall be made cancelling, modifying or amending anyregistration of the certificate, unless the concerned dealer hadbeen given an opportunity of being heard. Further, cancellation ofthe registration can be made only in the prescribed manner, undersection 12 of the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007. 25. Further, under Rule 8 of the Puducherry Value Added TaxAct, 2007, the registering authority shall have to immediatelyreturn the registration certificate, with due endorsement ofrenewal, unless such reason for withholding the registrationcertificate and such reason shall be recorded. However, it is seen https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that the respondent had not followed the procedures prescribed forthe refusal to renew the registration certificate of the petitioner.26. It is also noted that, by an order, dated 16.9.2010, theDeputy Commercial Tax Officer (Registration), Puducherry, had statedthat the registration made in favour the petitioner is active.Therefore, the petitioner was permitted to file the return and topay the tax. It had also been stated that there was no instructionor order for the deactivation of the registration certificate in thecomputer system and therefore, the petitioner can carry on itsregular business, based on the interim stay granted by this Court,in M.P.No.1 of 2010, in W.P.No.3904 of 2010. As such, the claim ofthe respondent on the request of the petitioner for the renewal ofthe petitioner, for the year 2011 -2012, cannot be countenanced. 27. In such view of the matter the impugned order of therespondent, dated 27.8.2010, is set aside. The respondent isdirected to consider the representation of the petitioner, dated29.4.2011, for the renewal of the registration and to passappropriated orders thereon, on merits and in accordance with law,after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, within aperiod of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of thisorder. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. No costs. ConnectedM.P.No.1 of 2010 is closed.lanSd/-Asst. Registrar//True Copy//Sub Asst. RegistrarTo:The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer(Registration Cell) Commercial TaxesDepartment, Office of the Commissioner(CT), PuducherryNR(CO)SR/15.11.2011Writ Petition No.20000 of 2010