Swami Sadananda Secretary Vivekananda Higher Secondary School v. The Chief Educational Officer Thallakulam Post Madurai-625 002

rank nor his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the priorapproval of the competent authority. Sub Section (3)(a) states that noperson or teacher employed in any private school shall be placed undersuspension except when there is an enquiry into the gross misconduct ofsuch teacher or person within the meaning of the Code of Conductprescribed under sub section (1) of Section 21. As per sub clause (b),the suspension order shall remain in force for a period of two monthsfrom the date of suspension. If the enquiry is not completed withinthat period for reasons to be recorded in writing, the period ofsuspension could be extended for a further period not exceeding twomonths. There is further a qualification that the competent authoritymust form an opinion that the enquiry could not be completed within thesaid period of two months on grounds attributable to the teacher orother person. Section 23 provides for the appeal remedy against anorder of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. Section 24 refers toa second appeal as against the order passed in the appeal preferredunder Section 23. 7. A reading of the provisions makes it clear that a validpunitive action contemplated must necessarily have its firm footing inthe holding of an enquiry by the School Committee in the mannerprescribed under the Act and the Rules. These provisions are not mereprocedural ones to be taken for a substantive compliance. On the otherhand, the scheme of the provision clearly show that they demand a strictcompliance. 8. Section 22 stipulates that any order of dismissal, removal orreduction in rank would be effective only on the satisfaction of thecompetent authority that there are adequate and reasonable grounds forsuch proposal for dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. Dealing withthe expression "adequate and reasonable ground" required for theauthority to approve the action contemplated, in the decision reportedin 2003 (2) CTC 175 (SECRETARY SCHOOL OF COMMITTEE Vs. GOVERNMENT OFTAMIL NADU), the Apex Court held that "While considering whetheradequate and reasonable ground exist for giving approval, the authorityis certainly required to look into the gravity of the proved charges andwhether the punishment as proposed commensurates with it."9. Touching on the scope of interference with the decision ofthe competent authority, the Apex Court further pointed out that "whenafter consideration of the material, it comes to a conclusionthat then proposed punishment is harsh or disproportionate tothe proved charges, the scope of interference with the finding is ratherlimited. This is because the approving authority has to considerwhether the proved charges on the facts and the materials justify aparticular action. "10. Dealing with the nature of authority exercised by thecompetent authority, in the decision reported in 1996 (II) CTC 577(RUKMANI DEVI,M. Vs. CHIEF EDUCATIONAL OFFICER & 2 OTHERS), a DivisionBench of this Court held that the power of approval is given to thestatutory authority as an essential check on the arbitrary exercise ofpowers of a school management. The Division Bench viewed, the saidprovision really concerns a substantial restriction on the power of themanagement to dispense with the services of the teacher or any personemployed therein. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

11. It is seen that in the decision reported in 2002 (3) CTC 553(SWAMY SADANANDA Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU), a Division Bench of thisCourt rejected the challenge made to the vires of Section 22 on theground that it gave unbridled power to the competent authority asregards the order passed by the School Committee. The said appeal waspreferred by the present appellant herein. Following the decisions ofthe Supreme Court rendered in connection with a similar provision underSection 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972 reported in(1988) 4 SCC 51 (BHARAT SEVASHRAM SANGH Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT) and (1993)1 SCC 645 (UNNIKRISHNAN Vs. STATE OF A.P.), this Court rejected thechallenge to the provisions of Section 22 of the Act and held that thelanguage of sub section (2) of Section 22 clearly showed that thecompetent authority has to give reasons to the satisfaction that thereare adequate and reasonable grounds to confirm or reject the orderpassed by the School Committee. 12. Dealing with Sections 17 and 18 and Rule 17, in the decisionreported in 1998 W.L.R. 769 (MANAGEMENT OF M.G.R. HIGHER SECONDARYSCHOOL ETC. Vs. NAG BALAJI SINGH & 3 OTHERS), learned single Judge ofthis Court (Justice P.Sathasivam as His Lordship then was), pointed outthat the object of the Act was to provide for the regulation of theconditions of service of teachers employed in private schools. The saiddecision relates to a case where the show cause notice was issued by theSecretary who framed the charges, conducted the enquiry and acted as oneof the School Committee members. Referring to the decisions of the ApexCourt, this Court held that the right to impose penalty carries with itthe duty to act justly and in accordance with the provisions of the Act;that the School Committee could not authorise the Secretary to performits functions. It was further held that as per the Rules, the Secretaryhas to act on the basis of the resolutions passed in the meeting of theSchool Committee and that he could not take the role of the SchoolCommittee. Pointing out to Section 21 on the Code of Conduct and Rule 16that teachers and other persons employed in private schools are governedby the Code of Conduct as specified in Annexure-II to the Tamil NaduPrivate Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974, and that as per Clause 7 inForm VII-A, it is for the School Committee to take action against thedelinquent teacher, this Court held that the functioning of theCommittee could not be performed by the Secretary even by anauthorisation and hence, he could not take the role of the SchoolCommittee. Referring to the decision of this Court inP.S.VENKATARAMANUJAM Vs. NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL TAMBARAM AND ANOTHER inW.A.No.170 of 1978 dated 13.11.1979, this Court held that the provisionsof the Act and the Rules must be complied with in toto. Where theenquiry conducted is not in accordance with law, the termination ordercould not be sustained. This Court referred to the unreported decisionof the Division Bench in extenso which may usefully be extracted heretoo:"... Thus a perusal of paragraph 7 of Form VII-Amakes it clear that a personal hearing or enquiryhas to be conducted by the School Committee, andthere is no provision in Form VII-A for the SchoolCommittee delegating its power to conduct an enquiryto any other person or body. " https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

13. Dealing with the question as to whether the School Committeecould ratify the order of suspension issued by the Secretary, in thedecision reported in (1995) 2 MLJ 488 (VALLIAPPAN Vs. THE MADRAS SEVASADAN HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOL), learned single Judge of this Court(R.Jayasimha Babu,J), held that Section 16(1) of the Act empowers theSecretary to exercise powers and perform such functions as may beprescribed. Rule 13(3) requires the Secretary to function for and onbehalf of the School Committee. Sub Rule (4) empowers the Secretary toact on the basis of the resolutions passed in the meeting of the SchoolCommittee. Hence, as per Section 18, the power to take disciplinaryaction against the teachers and employees is vested only with the SchoolCommittee. Rejecting the contention of the Management that certainamount of flexibility is essential in internal management and a rigidview of the sub rule should not be taken, learned Judge held that thepowers of the Secretary are limited by the Rules framed and thestatutory provisions do not empower the Secretary to suspend theofficials or teachers pending enquiry and that the principles ofratification by the Committee on the action done by the Secretary has noapplication in regard to the exercise of powers conferred under thestatutory provision. The statutory authority could not act beyond thepowers conferred and any action done without power suffers a legalinfirmity that it is ab initio void and cannot be ratified. 14. We are in entire agreement with the view expressed in theaforesaid decision of this Court.15. In the background of these decisions laying down the law onthe scope of the provisions relating to the appointment, disciplinaryproceedings to be taken, the role of the school committee, the extent ofauthority of the Secretary and that of the competent authority, coveredunder Section 17, 18 and 22 and Rules 14, 15 and 17, the followingposition emerges:(i) The meetings of the School Committee have to be in strictcompliance of Section 17;(ii) The Secretary of the School Committee cannot assume the roleof the School Committee and that in terms of Rule 13, the Secretaryhas to carry out the resolutions of the School Committee;(iii) The disciplinary proceedings have to be conducted only bythe School Committee in terms of Rule 16 and Form VII-A;(iv) The charge memo has to be issued by the School Committee;(v) The enquiry has to be conducted by the School Committee;(vi) The copy of the enquiry report has to be furnished to thedelinquent officer.(vii) The decision on the disciplinary action taken must be by theSchool Committee after observing the procedure of giving anopportunity to the teacher or the employee to defend himself;(viii) The School Committee cannot authorise the Secretary toperform its functions nor can it validate the action taken by theSecretary;(ix) Where the procedure contemplated are not followed, which aremandatory in character, any order passed in violation thereof wouldbe void ab initio;(x) The competent authority is required to look into the gravity of theproved charges whether the punishment as proposed is commensurate https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ with the charges established and the competent authority has torecord whether there are adequate and reasonable grounds existingfor giving his approval to the action taken;(xi) Where the competent authority applies his mind to thematerials to the proposed action and records his reasons forapproval or disapproval, the scope of interference with the findingis limited. The above-said position of law flowing from the settled principles oflaw, from the various decisions referred to above and relied on by thelearned senior counsel for the third respondent, certainly tilt the casein favour of the third respondent. Before considering the merits of thecontentions of the appellant herein, the facts leading to the filing ofthe writ petition need to be noted and are as follows:16. The third respondent was appointed as Headmaster in theappellant/writ petitioner – Vivekananda Higher Secondary School,Thiruvedagam West, Madurai District. The allegation is that the thirdrespondent had issued transfer certificates to five students who hadfailed in their respective annual examinations as though they had passedtheir respective annual exams. The Chief Educational Officer visitedthe school on 30.3.1995. After going through the counterfoils of therespective candidates' transfer certificates, the Chief EducationalOfficer pointed out that though the candidates had failed in theirexams, the third respondent had issued the Transfer Certificates asthough they had passed their exams. Hence in the letter dated18.4.1995, addressed to the school management, the Chief EducationalOfficer directed that stringent disciplinary action be taken against thethird respondent. The third respondent was placed under suspension on5.4.1995. A show cause notice dated 5.4.1995 was issued framing fourcharges for enquiry. After receiving the explanation from the thirdrespondent, the Secretary issued a revised charge memo dated 5.5.1995,containing five charges. 17. The charges under the first show cause notice dated 5.4.1995framed were that the third respondent had entrusted the work ofpreparing the Transfer Certificates to the Watchman of the schoolinstead of entrusting the work to a Clerk. The second, third and fourthcharges related to the certificate of transfer issued to three studentsas though they had passed their respective exams, whereas, as per theschool records, they had failed in their final exams. Apart fromincluding the first four charges, the second charge memo dated 5.5.1995included a fifth charge that the letters given by two studentsG.Ramaswamy and Kasilingam were unauthorisedly kept by the Headmaster,the third respondent herein, in his custody. It is seen that an enquirywas held on 16.6.1995, wherein, the third respondent participated.After conducting the enquiry and furnishing a copy of the evidencerecorded and giving an opportunity to the third respondent, the SchoolCommittee decided to dismiss the third respondent from service. An orderdated 8.8.1995 was passed to that effect under the signature of theSecretary as the Secretary and President of the Committee. The approvalof the first respondent, namely, the competent authority, was soughtunder Section 22 of the Act. By order dated 6.12.1995, the firstrespondent refused to grant the approval, holding that the SchoolCommittee meeting was not properly conducted and that the Secretary wasnot competent to hold the enquiry and to preside over the meeting of theSchool Committee. Even on merits, the Chief Educational Officer https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ rejected the prayer. On a further appeal preferred by the Secretary, byorder dated 25.6.1996, the Joint Director of School Education confirmedthe order of the Chief Educational Officer by dismissing the appeal.Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred a revision beforethe Government under Section 45(1) of the Tamil Nadu Recognised PrivateSchools (Regulation) Act, 1973. It is stated that by letter dated8.9.1996, the first respondent, namely, the Chief Educational Officer,directed the appellant herein to restore the third respondent to thepost of Headmaster. Since no orders were passed by the Government onthe representation, writ petition was filed before this Court by theSecretary of the School, the writ appellant herein, challenging theorder of the second respondent herein that there was no violation to theprovisions of the Act or the principles of natural justice in giving anadequate opportunity to the third respondent to defend himself. Thewrit petitioner/appellant stated that the third respondent had notdenied the fact of having issued the transfer certificates indicatingthat the candidates had passed, whereas, the counterfoils clearly statedthat the candidates had failed; as such there was a breach of the Codeof Conduct warranting termination of the services of the thirdrespondent. 18. By order dated 29.1.2007 in W.P.No.16064 of 1996, learnedsingle Judge rejected the writ petition holding that the SchoolCommittee had not been constituted as contemplated by the provisions ofthe Act and that the findings of fact by the appellate authorities couldnot be disturbed. Learned single Judge rejected the plea of the writpetitioner, taking the view that no specific ground was raised either inthe appeal before the second respondent or in the writ petition that thepetitioners were not afforded an opportunity to defend their case.Consequently, this Court rejected the writ petition. Aggrieved of thesame, the present appeal is filed before this Court by the writpetitioner. 19. Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy, learned senior counsel appearing forthe appellant/writ petitioner, referred to the scheme of the Act and theprovisions relating thereto extensively, particularly to Section 17, andcontended that in the absence of the President, the Secretary in chargechaired the meeting with the approval of the President. He insistedthat the requirement of the President presiding over the meeting or, inhis absence, a person chosen by the members present at the meeting,could not be viewed as a mandatory requirement. Consequently, there isno illegality in the conduct of the proceedings. Learned senior counselpointed out that there has been a substantial compliance of theprovisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder and that it couldnot be denied that the meeting was held by the School Committee. Hesubmitted that on the mere score of the president not presiding over themeeting or a member chosen by the members present not presiding over,the decision of the Committee could not be faulted with or be held asvoid and in contravention of the provisions of the Act.20. Learned senior counsel submitted that in the absence of thePresident, rightly the Secretary took the chair. In any event, therequirement under Section 17(2) that in the absence of the President,any member chosen by the members present shall preside over the meetingshould not be read as a mandatory requirement and that the Secretarypresiding over the meeting was in fitness of things; as such, the view https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of the authorities below and of the learned single Judge were erroneous. 21. We do not agree with the line of submission of the learnedsenior counsel appearing for the appellant.22. A reading of Section 17 does not give any room for suchinterpretation. As already noted in the preceding paragraphs, thedecisions of this Court are to the effect that as per the statutoryscheme, the power to take disciplinary action is vested only with theSchool Committee. The role of the Secretary is clear-cut and laid inthe Rules framed under the Act. Learned senior counsel appearing forthe appellant could not point out any provision which empowers theSecretary to preside over the meeting of the School Committee, more soin a case dealing with disciplinary action. A reading of the Rulesrelating to the role of the Secretary makes it plain that the Secretaryfunctions for and on behalf of the School Committee and the educationalagency. He acts on the basis of the resolutions passed at the meetingof the School Committee. Although the Secretary is nominated from outof the representatives of the educational agency, it does notautomatically make him a second in command in the absence of thePresident being present and a member authorised to preside over themeeting of the School Committee. A reading of Section 17 leaves no roomfor any doubt, but only to reveal the anxiety and a note of cautionintended, that in the absence of the President presiding over themeeting, the person to preside over the meeting shall be a member chosenby the members present and none else. Admittedly, no materials wereplaced before the authorities below or before this Court at any stage ofthe proceedings to show that the Secretary was authorised to presideover the meeting in the absence of the President. The role of theSecretary thus circumscribed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules,and in the absence of any material to substantiate the submission asregards the compliance of Section 17(2), we do not find any ground toaccept the plea of the learned senior counsel on this score. As such,any action or resolution emanating from the Secretary certainly affectsthe legality of the proceedings, be it at the stage of the show causenotice or in the matter of presiding over the Committee meeting.23. As regards the merits of this case, learned senior counselappearing for the appellant pointed out that disciplinary action wastaken pursuant to the Chief Educational Officer's letter dated 7.4.1995pointing out to the issuance of the transfer certificate stating thatthe candidates had passed their exams which is contrary to the noting inthe counterfoils that the students had failed in their exams. 24. It is seen that the first charge sheet was issued on5.4.1995, containing four charges which are as follows:(i) Contrary to entrusting the work of preparing T.C. to a clerkin the school, he actually entrusted the work to one ThiruS.Manoharan, a Watchman of this school.(ii)G.Ramasamy, a student of Standard VIII during 1993-94 did notget the required percentage of marks for a pass. According torequest of that student, a T.C. informing that he is eligible forpromotion was issued by the Headmaster.(iii)During the year 1993-94, a student by name S.Kasilingam whostudied in Standard IX actually failed in the class. But a T.C. wasissued to him enabling him to join in Standard X. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (iv)During 1993-94, students by name S.Suresh Kumar, M.KumarasamyRaja and R.Sivakumar failed in the classes in which they studied.But T.C. were given to them as if they have been promoted to the nextclasses.25. This first charge sheet was issued on 5.4.1995 by theCommittee under the signature of Swami Sadananda, as President andSecretary of the School Committee. Admittedly, the said Swami Sadanandais the Secretary of the School Committee. 26. Learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondentpointed out that for the first charge memo issued on four grounds, thethird respondent had already replied seeking permission to peruse therecords of the school; but after considering the explanation issued, afresh charge memo dated 5.5.1995 containing five charges was issued,which are as follows:(i)That Thiru M.Pannirselvam, Headmaster, Vivekananda HigherSec. School, Tiruvedagam West under suspension, when he was acting asthe Headmaster of the school entrusted the responsible work ofpreparing the Transfer Certificates of pupils to one Thiru Manoharanwho was working as the Watchman of the school, instead of entrustingthis work to the Junior Assistant of the school.(ii) Since one Thiru G.Ramaswami who was studying in Standard VIIIduring 1993-94 and who did not secure the required marks was in therange to continue his studies in Standard VIII only. But acceptingthe request of Ramaswami, Transfer certificate has been given toG.Ramaswami, as if he has passed Standard VIII.(iii) S.Kasilingam who studied Standard IX during the year 1993-94 didnot secure the required percentage of marks for promotion to higherstandard. In the counterfoil of the transfer certificate maintainedin the school, it is noted as "Detained" against column 11. But inthe Transfer Certificate given to S.Kasilingam, it is noted as"promoted" to IX standard. (iv)That in the counterfoil of the Transfer certificate relatingto S.Suresh Babu, S.Kumaraswamiraja and R.Visvakumar who studied inStandard IX during the year 1993-94 and failed in the same standardhas been noted in Col.11 of the Transfer certificate given to thestudent that they are promoted to the next standard. (v) That instead of keeping the two letters said to have been given byG.Ramaswami and Kasilingam in the school, the Headmaster hasunauthorisedly taken the letters at his custody. 27. Learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondenthas a serious objection to the kind of proceedings taken and submittedthat in terms of Form VII-A, read with Rule 15, the Secretary, as such,has no authority under any one of the provisions of the Act, to issuethe charge memo. Learned senior counsel appearing for the thirdrespondent pointed out that no resolution of the meeting had been placedas regards the second charge memo. The fundamental absence of authorityfor the Secretary to issue the show cause notices goes to the root ofthe matter and hence, the very notice was rightly held to be contraryto the provisions of the Act. The absence of authority goes even asregards the conducting of an enquiry. We agree with the submission ofthe learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent as wellsupported by the decision of this Court in the decision reported in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (1995) 2 MLJ 488 (VALLIAPPAN Vs. THE MADRAS SEVA SADAN HIGHER SECONDARYSCHOOL). In the face of the admitted position that the charge memo hadnot emanated from the School Committee presided over by the President orin his absence, by a member chosen by the members present in themeeting, but by the Secretary and under his signature, and further thereappears no deliberation of the School Committee on the charges levelledunder the second show-cause notice, we are not in a position to acceptthe contention of the appellant herein as to the validity of theinitiation of the proceedings against the third respondent.28. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant pointedout that the third respondent had not denied the fact that the transfercertificates were issued in respect of the candidates who had failed inthe examinations. The counterfoils support this fact. It is furtherpointed out that the third respondent had not denied that preparing ofthe transfer certificates was entrusted to the Watchman instead of beingdone by a Clerk in the school. In view of the total violation andbreach of the Code of Conduct, the interest, prestige and the name ofthe school needs to be protected. He made particular reference to thedecision of the Apex Court reported in (2007) 1 SCC 386 at 400(SECRETARY, MALANKARA SYRIAN CATHOLIC COLLEGE Vs. T.JOSE) as to the roleof the Principal in maintaining the prestige of the institution and inthe proper conduct of the affairs of the school. In the face of theadmitted facts on the violation, he submitted that no exception could betaken to the disciplinary proceedings taken. 29. A reading of the order of the first respondent shows thatthere was no material to indicate approval from the Committee as regardsthe second charge sheet formulating the fifth charge. The firstrespondent pointed out that the Secretary acted on his own in violationof Section 12(3). Dealing with the allegation on the four charges thatthe students who had not passed out of their exams were granted transfercertificates stating that they had passed their examinations, the ChiefEducational Officer pointed out that the said certificates were issued,taking into consideration the statement of the District EducationalOfficer based on the circular that students who had secured 25% in thequarterly and half yearly exams would get a pass certificate, eventhough they might not have secured 25% marks in the final examination.The Chief Educational Officer further pointed out that the allegationslevelled against the third respondent could not be solely placed on thethird respondent alone. The members of the School Committee were alsoresponsible for that. It was stated by the third respondent that thecertificates were issued on account of the pressure from one Narasimhan,Member of the School Committee. The definite case of the thirdrespondent is that the said Narasimhan insisted the third respondent toissue the transfer certificates indicating that the students had passedand he wrote in a small paper without his signature dated 25.4.1994 andinsisted on the issuance of the certificate. The noting by the saidNarasimhan reads as follows:" H.M. for all decision taken by the Swamiji, it isenough if yourself and Swamiji sign. I need notsign."It was seen that the signature tallied with the signature of Narasimhanfound in the School Committee resolution. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

30. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant pointedout that no evidence was let in to examine the said Narasimhan and thatthe copy of the circular was also not given; as such, the authoritiesbelow erred in deciding the issue by mere acceptance of the statement ofthe third respondent. It may be noted that there is no denial of thefact that the writing in the hand of the said Narasimhan and signaturetallied with the signature of Narasimhan in the School Committeeresolution. It is not stated by the appellant that the signature wassomebody else's signature or that Narasimhan was not a School CommitteeMember. No steps were taken by the appellant herein to disown thisletter or the signature. It is seen that no allegations were also madeagainst the third respondent alleging that the noting was a createddocument to suit the purpose of the third respondent. In the face ofthe uncontroverted fact that the said writing was by Narasimhan, andwith a substantial proof available on the compulsion exerted over thethird respondent, we do not find any reason to accept the submission ofthe appellants that in the absence of any examination of the saidNarasimhan, the plea of the third respondent on the pressure exertedcould not be accepted. The facts clearly show that the explanation bythe third respondent as regards the course of conduct adopted by himcould not be rejected. It is no doubt true that the said Narasimhan wasnot examined by either of the parties. Yet, the substantial proofavailable in the noting, and that it is in the handwriting of the saidNarasimhan, supports the case of the third respondent in a fair measurethat the pressure exerted by one of the Members of the School Committeewas the cause for issuance of the Transfer Certificates stating that thecandidates had passed the exam. Quite apart from this, the circularissued by Deputy Inspector of Schools dated 20.6.1994 that the marksobtained in the quarterly and half yearly exams could be taken forpromoting a student, strengthens the case of the third respondent. Inthe background of the facts available as stated above to lend support tothe contention of the third respondent, we do not find any merit in thecontention of the appellant as to the reasoning of the authoritiesbelow on the issuance of the transfer certificates. 31. The third respondent pointed out that there was no materialto show that the enquiry was conducted in the presence of the SchoolCommittee. There are no records to show that the signature of theSchool Committee Member was also obtained as regards the conduct of theenquiry. He also alleged that no enquiry report was furnished to thethird respondent. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellantwas fair enough to admit that except for furnishing a copy of theevidence recorded, no enquiry report was furnished to the thirdrespondent. The order of the first respondent show that the thirdrespondent was not granted sufficient opportunity to produce hiswitnesses to support his cause and there was a denial of fairopportunity to the third respondent. It was further pointed out thatthe mistake committed by the third respondent was solely attributable tothe pressure exerted by the Management, for which, the third respondentcould not be penalised, apart from the fact that the conduct of theproceedings was not in tune with the provisions of the Act. Learnedsingle Judge confirmed the view of the authorities that the proceedingswere in violation of the provisions of the Act. We agree with the viewof the learned single Judge on this score too. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

32. As regards the allegation on the Watchman filling up theTransfer Certificates, the third respondent submitted that although thesaid person was appointed as a Watchman, right from the date of hisappointment, he was not assigned the work of a Watchman. He had statedthat in spite of his bringing this to the attention of theadministration as to the state of affairs, he was directed to act by theinstructions of one Narasimhan, Member of the School Committee. Thecompetent authority accepted this plea of the third respondent as in theother charges relating to the issue of Transfer Certificates.Considering the reasoning of the authorities below on this front, we donot find any ground to interfere with the findings in this regard.33. As already seen, the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation)Act, 1973, contains elaborate procedures to be observed in the matter ofdisciplinary proceedings. The role of the School Committee and that ofthe competent authority clearly spell the rigorous procedure to beobserved before terminating or dismissing the services of theteacher/employee. The action of the School Committee goes for approvalbefore the competent authority, who has a duty to consider the action ofthe School Committee as justifiable to visit the teacher or the employeeconcerned with a punishment, and further, whether the proposedpunishment was proportionate to the charges proved. 34. In the background of the provisions, the jurisdiction ofthis Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India needs to beseen. 35. It is a well settled principle of law that the scope ofjudicial review under Article 226 against the order of the lowerauthorities has been a subject matter of numerous decisions of the ApexCourt. The parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226are well settled to declare that this Court's jurisdiction under Article226 is not that of a court of appeal; that however extensive thejurisdiction may be, it is not so large as to enable the High Court tosit as a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of thedecisions challenged and to declare what would be the proper view to betaken. The jurisdiction under Article 226 is only to correct errors ofjurisdiction involving erroneous assumption of jurisdiction or action inexcess of jurisdiction, where there is erroneous assumption or excess ofjurisdiction. 36. Dealing with the approach to be adopted in matters relatingto orders made in disciplinary proceedings, in the decision reported in(2003) 3 SCC 583 (LALIT POPLI Vs. CANARA BANK), the Supreme Court held"" In the case of disciplinary enquiry, the technicalrules of evidence have no application. The doctrineof "proof beyond doubt" has no application.Preponderance of probabilities and some material onrecord are necessary to arrive at the conclusionwhether or not the delinquent has committedmisconduct. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 ofthe Constitution, the High Court does not act as anappellate authority. Its jurisdiction iscircumscribed by limits of judicial review to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ correct errors of law or procedural errors leadingto manifest injustice or violation of principles ofnatural justice. Judicial review is not akin toadjudication of the case on merits as an appellateauthority. "37. While dealing with orders relating to disciplinary action,in the decision reported in 2003 (2) CTC 175 (SECRETARY, SCHOOL OFCOMMITTEE Vs. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU), the Apex Court pointed out thatwhile considering whether there existed adequate and reasonable groundsfor giving approval, the authority concerned has to look into thegravity of the proved charges and whether the punishment as proposed wascommensurate with it. When on a consideration of the material, the factfinding authority comes to a conclusion that the materials do notjustify a particular action and reasons therefor have been given by thecompetent authority on the consideration of materials, there is no scopeof interference with such facts on a petition under Article 226 of theConstitution of India. Thus the jurisdiction under Article 226 notbeing that of an appellate Court, the power of judicial review is notconcerned with the correctness of the findings of fact. So long as thefindings are reasonable, supported by material evidence and are arrivedat based on materials, it is not open to this Court to sift the evidenceas an appellate Court to arrive at a finding by exercising jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand,judicial review is confined to the examination of the decision makingprocess. In the decision reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759 (APPAREL EXPORTPROMOTION COUNCIL Vs. A.K.CHOPRA), the Apex Court held that "whileexercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normallyspeaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of thedelinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar asimposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishmentor penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellateauthority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscienceof the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion andimpose some other punishment or penalty. "38. In the background of the jurisdiction of this Court thusexplained in the various decisions of the Apex Court, we do not find anyground to persuade us to allow this appeal to interfere with the ordersof the authorities. 39. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant pointedout that in the proceedings dated 18.7.1995, there is a specificreference that the third respondent was directed to appear before theSchool Committee on 16.6.1995 for an enquiry and that the SchoolCommittee had its meeting on 18.7.1995 to consider the evidence andexplanation given by the third respondent. Hence, it is not open to thethird respondent to contend, and for that matter, the authorities below,to hold that the proceedings were not conducted in accordance with therequirements of law. He submitted that even if the revised notice isignored, the violation as framed under the first notice could not beignored. We do not agree with the said submission. A perusal of therecords show that the show-cause notice was issued by the Secretary.Issuing show-cause notice is not part of the job of the Secretary.Quite apart, no materials were placed before this Court to show how thesaid Secretary was authorised by the School Committee to issue the said https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ notices. There are no records to substantiate the contention that theenquiry was done by the School Committee. The copy of the depositioncarry no reference to the enquiry conducted before the School Committee.Except for furnishing the copies of the deposition, admittedly, noenquiry report was given to the third respondent. There are nomaterials placed before this Court to show how the Secretary wasauthorised to preside over the School Committee meeting to deal withthe disciplinary proceedings in the absence of the President presidingover the School Committee meeting. 40. In the light of the facts found by the authorities below,confirmed by the learned single Judge, we do not find any error in theorder to call for an interference to allow this appeal. In the face of the fundamental legal flaw in the conduct of theproceedings, whatever might have been the strength of the allegationsmade, even if there be one which we fail to see, we do not find anyacceptable or convincing ground to allow the appeal. In thecircumstances, the writ appeal stands dismissed. No costs. ConnectedM.P.No.1 of 2007 is also dismissed. ksvSd/- Asst.Registrar/true copy/ Sub Asst.RegistrarTo:1. The Chief Educational Officer Thallakulam Post Madurai-625 002.2. The Joint Director of School Education Higher Secondary Chennai-600 006.+1 cc to Mr.A.Sankarasubramanian, Advocate Sr.No.3288.+1 cc to The Government Pleader Sr.No.3241.+1 cc to Mr.N.Suramani, Advocate Sr.No.2785.SA(CO)DCP/31.1W.A.No.1001 of 2007