Smt.Palaniammal & Ors. v. The Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors.

validity of proviso to Rule 248(1) of the Tamil Nadu Motor VehiclesRules, 1989 and to declare the same as unconstitutional. 2. In the first writ petition, notice of motion was ordered on02.7.1998. The second writ petition was admitted on 17.8.1998 anddirected to be heard along with the first writ petition. On behalfof the respondent State, a common counter affidavit dated 30.8.2006has been filed. 3. Before going into the rival contentions, it is necessary toextract the Rule in question, viz., Rule 248(1), which reads asfollows:-''248. Stage carriage - fixing Schedule of timing. - (1)The Transport Authority may, if no schedule of timings isalready fixed or approved for a stage carriage or aservice of a stage carriages on any route, either on itsown motion or on an application made to it in writing, bya general or special order, fix and approve a schedule oftimings for the particular stage carriage or the serviceof stage carriages in consultation with the applicant andthe persons providing transport facilities on the route orsectors thereof and while approving a schedule of timings,on an application made to it in writing, it may approvethe same with such modification as it deem necessary. Itshall not be necessary for the Transport Authority to sendindividual notice of the timings conference to theoperators concerned and it shall be sufficient complianceof this provision, if the notice giving the existing andproposed schedule of timings and the time, date and placeat which the subject will be discussed, is affixed on thenotice board of the office of the Transport Authority andcopies of the notice sent to the applicant and theconcerned S.T.U.and bus owners Association of the districtthrough which the route passes:Provided that in the case of stage carriages of StateTransport Undertakings tentative timings may be fixed bythe Transport Authority without following the procedurelaid down in the sub-rule in the case of introduction ofthe Stage Carriages on temporary permit." (Emphasis Added)4. Mr.M.Palani, learned counsel for the petitioner submittedthat an application for stage carriage permit is provided undersection 70 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the MV Act').Section 71 provides for the procedure for the Regional TransportAuthority (for short 'RTA') in considering the application for stagecarriage permit. Section 72 provides for the consideration of theapplication and also the guidelines for granting the stage carriage https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ permit by the RTA. Section 87 of the MV Act provides for power tothe RTA as well as the STA to grant temporary permits withoutfollowing the procedure laid down in Section 80 of the MV Act.Therefore, Section 87 exempts the authorities from following theprocedure for grant of permit in terms of section 80. 5. The learned counsel after referring to the provisionssubmitted that fixation of timing is an essential requirement forgrant of permit. But in the guise of the power to frame rulesprovided under the Act, the respondent State had exceeded its limitsand has granted a blanket power to the authorities to grant not onlytemporary permit to the State Transport Undertakings (for short 'theSTUs') but also granted arbitrary power in fixing tentative timingsto the STUs alone. This facility has given a cutting edge to theSTUs and it is clearly arbitrary and unconstitutional. In effect,such a rule making power is not available to the State Government.It virtually deregulates the provisions of the Act whereas the MVAct is conceived to regulate the operation of motor vehicles in theState of Tamil Nadu. Not only the proviso to Rule 248(1) isunconstitutional but it is also ultra vires of the MV Act itself. 6. Per contra, Mr.P.S.Raman, learned Additional AdvocateGeneral appearing for the State contended that the petitioners haveno locus standi to file a writ petition on a mere academic basis.They have not raised a single ground in the affidavits filed insupport of the writ petitions as to how they were prejudiced by theexercise of power under proviso to Rule 248(1) of the MV Rules.Further, not a single instance has been cited by them wherein thegrant of temporary stage carriage permits to an STU had affectedtheir transport operations. The constitutional validity of a legalprovision cannot be challenged on theoretical basis. He furthersubmitted that in case any person aggrieved by an order passed bythe STA or RTA with regard to grant of permit and any other orderwhich has been passed under this Act, an appeal lies to the StateTransport Appellate Tribunal (for short 'STAT') under section 89 ofthe MV Act. Even in cases of where any appeal is not permissible theSTAT has power of revision under section 90 of the MV Act. Section87 (1) of the MV Act clearly lays down that a temporary permit canbe given only for a period of four months and that too for thefollowing occasions which are set out in the Act itself:-(a)for the conveyance of passengers on special occasionssuch as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b)for the purposes of a seasonal business, or(c)to meet a particular temporary need, or https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (d)pending decision on an application for the renewal ofa permit: and may attach to any such permit conditionas it may think fit.Provided that a Regional Transport Authority or, as thecase may be, State Transport Authority may, in the case ofgoods carriages, under the circumstances of an exceptionalnature, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant apermit for a period exceeding four months, but notexceeding one year".7. The learned Additional Advocate General also submitted thatthere was nothing wrong in granting temporary permits to the STUs inpublic interest. The situations under which such permits are grantedthemselves have been delineated in section 87 itself and thereforethere can be no arbitrariness in grant of such permits. Since theurgency of the situation requires power to fix such tentativetimings and if the elaborate procedure contemplated in the main ruleis followed, the very purpose of grant of permits for the exigenciesmentioned in section 87 will be lost.8. In this context, learned Additional Advocate General alsoreferred to the averments made by the State found paragraphs 6 to 8of the counter affidavit which may be usefully extracted below:-''Para 6. It is submitted that the writ petitioners havenot mentioned any specific case for having violated theprovisions of rule 248. The allegation of the writpetitioners that temporary permits are being misused bythe State Transport Undertakings without any specificinstance or case is not acceptable.Para 7. It is also submitted that the procedure laid downin rule 248 of Tamil Nadu Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 isbeing followed in all the cases without any deviation. Thefixation of tentative timings is considered only in thecase of temporary permit that too for providing transportfacilities to meet the immediate needs of the travellingpublic.Para 8. It is submitted that the averments made inparagraph 5 of the affidavits are untenable as thetemporary permits are being granted by the transportauthorities under section 87 of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 to State Transport Undertakings just to meet theurgent need arising due to various reasons and in suchcases only tentative timings are fixed according to theproviso to rule 248(1) of the Tamil Nadu Motor VehiclesRules, 1989. The temporary permits are being issued onlyafter justifying the need on the particular route for the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ benefits of the travelling public. Provisions of adequatetransport facilities immediately to the public is theprimary duty of the Transport Authorities, which cannot bequestioned by the petitioners, without quoting thespecific instance by which the petitioners are affected".Based upon these averments, the learned AAG submitted that theclassification made under the proviso to Rule 248(1) is perfectlyvalid besides it is a reasonable classification which is not hit bythe vice of Article 14 of the Constitution.9. Notwithstanding the stand taken by the State, Mr.M.Palani,learned counsel for the petitioner insisted on referring to severaldecisions of this Court and the Supreme Court in support of hissubmissions. The learned counsel referred to the judgment of thisCourt in Balasubramaniam Roadways (Firm) -vs- State of Tamil Naduand others reported in 1980 (1) MLJ 517. In that case, this courtdealt with the scope of a circular issued by the Government dated25.1.1979 (under the provisions of the old Rules) wherein the STAsand RTAs were given discretionary power to fix suitable timings.This Court held that the authorities under the Act are only bound bythe Act and Rules and such a circular cannot bind the authority.That case was also conceded by the then Government Pleader whoappeared before the Court. The said decision has no application tothe facts of the present case where a valid rule has been made underthe provisions of the MV Act.10. Thereafter, the learned counsel referred to the decision ofthe Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Budhan Choudhry andothers -vs- State of Bihar reported in AIR 1955 SC 191. This is forthe purpose of showing the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution.Reliance was placed on paragraph 5 which may be usefully reproducedbelow:-''It is now well established that while Article 14 forbidsclass legislation, it does not forbid reasonableclassification for the purposes of legislation. In order,however, to pass the test of permissible classificationtwo conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that theclassification must be founded on an intelligibledifferentia which distinguishes persons or things that aregrouped together from others left out of the group and(ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to theobject sought to be achieved by the statute in question.The classification may be founded on different bases;namely, geographical, or according to objects oroccupations or the like. What is necessary is that theremust be a nexus between the basis of classification andthe object of the Act under consideration. It is also wellestablished by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law butalso by a law of procedure. The contention now put forwardas to the invalidity of the trial of the appellants has,therefore to be tested in the light of the principles solaid down in the decisions of this Court."11. The learned counsel also submitted that while the SupremeCourt itself has allowed certain advantages to the STUs, but inrespect of Chapter IV of the MV Act (old Act), there is no suchadvantage given to them. And if for any permit under Chapter IV theywill have to compete along with other transport operators. For thispurpose, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the SupremeCourt in Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society Limited -vs- TheRegional Transport Authority, Aurangabad and others reported in AIR1960 SC 801. Reliance was placed on paragraph 9 of the judgment,which may be usefully reproduced below:- ''9. Now the position here is different. The Governmenthas of course the power to do any business it likes andtherefore the business of running stage carriages. Wehave earlier drawn attention to the change made in clause(a) of Section 42(3) by the amendment of 1956.Previously, it was not necessary for the Government toobtain permits under Section 42(1) for buses that itintended to run as stage carriages. Since the amendmentthe Government can no longer run transport vehicles forcommercial purposes without obtaining permits underSection 42(1). Now the plying of buses as stage carriagesis a commercial enterprise and for such buses, therefore,under the sections as they stand, the Government wouldrequire permits as anyone else. That being so, thesections clearly contemplate that the Government mayapply for and obtain permits for its buses run as stagecarriages. The rule applied in Nazir Ahmad case1 does notpermit the ordinary meaning of Section 42 sub-section (1)and sub-section (3) clause (a) to be cut down because ofthe provisions of Chapter IV-A. The Act lays down twoindependent sets of provisions in regard to the runningof buses by the Government, one under Chapter IV and theother under Chapter IV-A. Chapter IV-A was intended togive the Government, a special advantage. When theGovernment chooses to proceed under that chapter, itbecomes entitled as a matter of right under Section 68-F(1) to the necessary permits. Under Chapter IV theGovernment does not have any such advantage; it has tocompete with other applicants, to secure permits to beable to run its buses. The powers under the two Chaptersare therefore different. To such a case the principle ofNazir Ahmad case1 cannot be applied. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

12. But, however, in the present Act, both section 87 of the MVAct as well as Rule 248(1) of the MV Rules provides for temporarypermit not only for the STUs but also for private operators.Therefore, there is no discrimination in the matter of grant oftemporary permits. However, in view of the exigencies for whichtemporary buses will have to be operated. In many circumstances, theprivate operator may not come forward to operate a bus either onaccount of lack of spare buses or on account of lack of business.The STUs may come forward to operate buses because it is state ownedand profit making may not be the only criteria when they are made tooperate on such routes arising out of public interest. Therefore,the decision relied on by the learned counsel has no application tothe facts of the present case. 13. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of theSupreme Court in Bombay Dyeing & Mfg.Co. Ltd. (3) -vs- BombayEnvironmental Action Group and others reported in (2006) 3 SCC 434.This is for the purpose of showing the scope of judicial review overa subordinate legislation. The learned counsel placed reliance uponparagraphs 104 and 117, which may be reproduced below:-''Para 104. A policy decision, as is well known, shouldnot be lightly interfered with but it is difficult toaccept the submissions made on behalf of the learnedcounsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that thecourts cannot exercise their power of judicial review atall. By reason of any legislation, whether enacted by thelegislature or by way of subordinate legislation, theState gives effect to its legislative policy. Suchlegislation, however, must not be ultra vires theConstitution. A subordinate legislation apart from beingintra vires the Constitution, should not also be ultravires the parent Act under which it has been made. Asubordinate legislation, it is trite, must be reasonableand in consonance with the legislative policy as alsogive effect to the purport and object of the Act and ingood faith.Para 117. Unreasonableness is certainly a ground ofstriking down a subordinate legislation. A presumption asto the constitutionality of a statute is also to beraised but it does not mean that the environmentalfactors can altogether be omitted from consideration onlybecause the executive has construed the statuteotherwise". 14. But in the very same judgment in paragraph 96, the SupremeCourt had laid down that a statute must be read as a whole and itssubordinate legislation has to be read in the light of theprovisions of the Act whereunder it has been made. It must also be https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ read having regard to the purpose and object for which the statuteis made. 15. The learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment ofthe Supreme Court in John Vallamattom and another -vs- Union ofIndia reported in (2003) 6 SCC 611. In the aforesaid judgment, theSupreme Court dealt with the vires of section 118 of the IndianSuccession Act, 1925 and struck it down as it discriminated againstChristians. The learned counsel placed reliance upon the passagesfound in paragraphs 27 and 28, which may be usefully extractedbelow:-''Para 27. ... ... ... ... Testators constitute ahomogeneous class and they cannot be divided arbitrarilyon the basis of duration of their survival which isunrelated to the purpose of executing a Will. In thatview of the matter, the period of twelve months has nonexus with the object of performing a philanthropic act.Thus, the impugned provision is violative of Article 14of the Constitution. Para 28. The provision relating to making of testamentarydisposition by the citizens of India vis-à-vis thoseprofessing the religion of Christianity must be judged onthe touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution ofIndia. It is true that they form a class by themselvesbut ex facie I do not find any justifiable reason to holdthat the classification made is either based onintelligible differentia or the same has any nexus withthe object sought to be achieved. In fact, the respondenthas failed to show that there exists any such object." 16. In the impugned rules, in respect of the grant of temporarypermit, both the private operators as well as the STUs have beentreated in the same manner. Only in the case of grant of timing, theauthorities have been empowered to grant tentative timings withoutnotice. The petitioner had not pointed out any case where theauthorities have ignored the relevant circumstances and dealt withthe grant of timing in an arbitrary manner. 17. The learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the SupremeCourt in Dr.Mahachandra Prasad Singh -vs- Chairman, BiharLegislative Council and others reported in (2004) 8 SCC 747. Heplaced reliance upon the passages found in paragraph 13, which maybe usefully reproduced below:-''Para 13. It may be noted that under Paragraph 8, theChairman or the Speaker of a House is empowered to makerules for giving effect to the provisions of the TenthSchedule. The rules being delegated legislation are https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ subject to certain fundamental factors. Underlying theconcept of delegated legislation is the basic principlethat the legislature delegates because it cannot directlyexert its will in every detail. All it can in practice dois to lay down the outline. This means that the intentionof the legislature, as indicated in the outline (that isthe enabling Act), must be the prime guide to the meaningof delegated legislation and the extent of the power tomake it. The true extent of the power governs the legalmeaning of the delegated legislation. The delegate is notintended to travel wider than the object of thelegislature. The delegate’s function is to serve andpromote that object, while at all times remaining true toit. That is the rule of primary intention. Power delegatedby an enactment does not enable the authority byregulations to extend the scope or general operation ofthe enactment but is strictly ancillary. It will authorisethe provision of subsidiary means of carrying into effectwhat is enacted in the statute itself and will cover whatis incidental to the execution of its specific provision.But such a power will not support attempts to widen thepurposes of the Act, to add new and different means ofcarrying them out or to depart from or vary its ends. (SeeSection 59 in chapter “Delegated Legislation” in FrancisBennion’s Statutory Interpretation, 3rd Edn.) Theaforesaid principle will apply with greater rigour whererules have been framed in exercise of power conferred by aconstitutional provision. No rules can be framed whichhave the effect of either enlarging or restricting thecontent and amplitude of the relevant constitutionalprovisions. Similarly, the rules should be interpretedconsistent with the aforesaid principle". 18. For the very same proposition, the learned counsel referredto the judgment in Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union -vs-State of Kerala and others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 327 and reliedupon the passages found in paragraphs 17 and 28, which may beusefully extracted below:-''Para 17. A rule is not only required to be made inconformity with the provisions of the Act whereunder it ismade, but the same must be in conformity with theprovisions of any other Act, as a subordinate legislationcannot be violative of any plenary legislation made byParliament or the State Legislature.Para 28. The Rules in terms of sub-section (1) of Section29 of the Act, thus, could be framed only for the purposeof carrying out the provisions of the Act. Both the power https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ to frame rules and the power to impose terms andconditions are, therefore, subject to the provisions ofthe Act. They must conform to the legislative policy. Theymust not be contrary to the other provisions of the Act.They must not be framed in contravention of theconstitutional or statutory scheme". 19. He further placed reliance upon the decision of the SupremeCourt in State of Kerala and others -vs- Unni and another reportedin (2007) 2 SCC 365. The passages found in paragraphs 32, 34 and 35are relied upon by the learned counsel, which may be usefullyextracted below:-''Para 32. If by reason of the rule-making power, theState intended to impose a condition, the same wasrequired to be a reasonable one. It was required toconform to the provisions of the statute as itsviolation would attract penal liability. It was expectedto be definite and not vague. Indisputably, the Statehaving regard to the provisions of Article 47 of theConstitution of India, must strive hard to maintainpublic health. While, however, imposing conditions inregard to the prescription of norms, it was expected ofthe State to undertake a deeper study in the matter. Itshould have undertaken actual experiments. It shouldhave specified mode and manner in which the percentageof ethyl alcohol can be found out by the licensee. Asubordinate legislation can be questioned on variousgrounds. It is also well known that a subordinatelegislation would not enjoy the same degree of immunityas a legislative Act would. (See Vasu Dev Singh v. Unionof India4.) Para 34. Unreasonableness is one of the grounds ofjudicial review of delegated legislation. Reasonablenessof a statute or otherwise must be judged having regard tothe various factors which, of course, would include theeffect thereof on a person carrying on a business.Para 35. While we are not oblivious of the fact thatnobody has any fundamental right to carry on business intoddy or liquor, but all the licensees are entitled to betreated equally. If the matter of validity or otherwiseof the subordinate legislation is to be considered,Article 14 of the Constitution of India shall beattracted. (See State of Punjab v. Devans ModernBreweries Ltd.6, Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit (I)7 and AshokLanka v. Rishi Dikshit (II)8.) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

20. Lastly, the learned counsel also placed reliance upon thejudgment of the Supreme Court in State of T.N. and another -vs-P.Krishnamurthy and others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 517. The learnedcounsel relied on paragraphs 15 and 16, which may be usefullyreproduced below:- ''Para 15. There is a presumption in favour ofconstitutionality or validity of a subordinatelegislation and the burden is upon him who attacks itto show that it is invalid. It is also well recognisedthat a subordinate legislation can be challenged underany of the following grounds:(a) Lack of legislative competence to make thesubordinate legislation.(b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed underthe Constitution of India.(c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution ofIndia.(d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it ismade or exceeding the limits of authority conferred bythe enabling Act.(e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, anyenactment.(f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to anextent where the court might well say that thelegislature never intended to give authority to makesuch rules).Para 16. The court considering the validity of asubordinate legislation, will have to consider thenature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and alsothe area over which power has been delegated under theAct and then decide whether the subordinate legislationconforms to the parent statute. Where a rule isdirectly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of thestatute, then, of course, the task of the court issimple and easy. But where the contention is that theinconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not withreference to any specific provision of the enablingAct, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act,the court should proceed with caution before declaringinvalidity". 21. There is no quarrel over the legal propositions laid downin the aforesaid judgments cited by the learned counsel for thepetitioners. The only question is whether they have any application https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in impugning the proviso to Rule 248(1) of the MV Rules. It hasalready been stated that in the grant of temporary permits there areno discrimination between private operators and the STUs. Theproviso only enables the authorities to fix the tentative timings inrespect of STUs alone as the situation that is contemplated insection 87 warrants such exclusion of notice. As rightly contendedby the learned AAG, an aggrieved person in terms of an order passedunder Rule 248(1) can always invoke the revisional remedies beforethe STAT. It is one thing to say that the power conferred isarbitrary and it is another thing to hold that in a particular casepower has been exercised improperly. If the petitioners areaggrieved, they have remedies in terms of the latter grievance. 22. It is also necessary to refer to the scope of the judicialreview in this regard. A reference may be made to the decision ofthe Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Board of S.H.S.E -vs-Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth reported in (1984) 4 SCC 27. Thepassages found in paragraphs 14 and 28 may be usefully reproducedbelow :- ''Para 14. ... ... ..In our opinion, this approach madeby the High Court was not correct or proper because thequestion whether a particular piece of delegatedlegislation — whether a rule or regulation or othertype of statutory instrument — is in excess of thepower of subordinate legislation conferred on thedelegate has to be determined with reference only tothe specific provisions contained in the relevantstatute conferring the power to make the rule,regulation, etc. and also the object and purpose of theAct as can be gathered from the various provisions ofthe enactment. It would be wholly wrong for the Courtto substitute its own opinion for that of theLegislature or its delegate as to what principle orpolicy would best serve the objects and purposes of theAct and to sit in judgment over the wisdom andeffectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down bythe regulation-making body and declare a regulation tobe ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the viewof the Court, the impugned provisions will not help toserve the object and purpose of the Act. So long as thebody entrusted with the task of framing the rules orregulations acts within the scope of the authorityconferred on it, in the sense that the rules orregulations made by it have a rational nexus with theobject and purpose of the statute, the court should notconcern itself with the wisdom or efficaciousness ofsuch rules or regulations. It is exclusively within theprovince of the Legislature and its delegate to https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions ofthe statute can best be implemented and what measures,substantive as well as procedural would have to beincorporated in the rules or regulations for theefficacious achievement of the objects and purposes ofthe Act. It is not for the Court to examine the meritsor demerits of such a policy because its scrutiny hasto be limited to the question as to whether theimpugned regulations fall within the scope of theregulation-making power conferred on the delegate bythe statute. Though this legal position is well-established by a long series of decisions of thisCourt, we have considered it necessary to reiterate itin view of the manifestly erroneous approach made bythe High Court to the consideration of the question asto whether the impugned clause (3) of Regulation 104 isultra vires. Para 28. As pointed out by a Constitution Bench of thisCourt in Fatehchand Himmatlal v. State of Maharashtra7“the test of reasonableness is not applied in vacuumbut in the context of life’s realities”. ... ... ..." 23. It may also be useful to refer to the decision of theSupreme Court in Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co.Ltd. -vs- State ofAssam reported in (1989) 3 SCC 709 with reference to the applicationof Article 14 of the Constitution in testing the validity of alegislation. The passages found in paragraphs 118 and 120 arerelevant and they may be usefully extracted below:- ''Para 118. The courts strongly lean against anyconstruction which tends to reduce a statute tofutility. The provision of a statute must be soconstrued as to make it effective and operative, on theprinciple “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. It is, nodoubt, true that if a statute is absolutely vague andits language wholly intractable and absolutelymeaningless, the statute could be declared void forvagueness. This is not in judicial review by testingthe law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness underArticle 14; but what a court of construction, dealingwith the language of a statute, does in order toascertain from, and accord to, the statute the meaningand purpose which the legislature intended for it. InManchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co.22Farwell J. said: (pp. 360-61)“Unless the words were so absolutely senselessthat I could do nothing at all with them, I should https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ be bound to find some meaning and not to declarethem void for uncertainty.”Para 120. It is, therefore, the court’s duty to makewhat it can of the statute, knowing that the statutesare meant to be operative and not inept and the nothingshort of impossibility should allow a court to declarea statute unworkable. In Whitney v. IRC24 Lord Dunedinsaid: (AC p. 52)"24. In the light of the above, the two writ petitions aremisconceived, devoid of merits and accordingly they deserve to bedismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.sd/-Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrar jsTo1. The Secretary to Government, Home (Tr.) Department, Fort St.George, Chennai-600 009.2. The State Transport Authority, Ezhilagam, Chepauk, Chennai-5. + 1 c.c. to Mr. M. Palani, Advocate. S.R.No.1666. order in W.P.Nos.8986 and 9743 of 1998RSY (CO)GSK 27.01.2009.