Backward Class Employees Welfare Association of I.I.T.(M) v. The Chairman, The Council of IIT, Ministry of HRD, New Delhi & Ors.

8.Dr.N.Narasimha Murthy,Department of Chemistry,Indian Institute of Technology,Madras-600 036.9.Dr.Ms.Sohini Paldey,Department of Metallurgical Engineering,Indian Institute of TechnologyMadras-600 036..RespondentsWrit Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia for the issue of writ of Declaration declaring that Clauses9.10, 12.1, 12.6, 12.8, 12.10, 15.1 and 15.2 of the statute of IndianInstitute of Technology are arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutionalas the same are violative of Article 14 and Article 16 of theConstitution of India Act 59 of 61 and direct the respondents 1 to 4to cancel all appointments made on ad-hoc basis as TemporaryTechnical Assistants, Temporary Senior Scientific Officer 1, SeniorScientific Officer 1 on contract, Temporary Senior Scientific Officer2, Senior Scientific Officer 2 on contract, Lecturer on contract,Lecturer on ad hoc basis, Assistant Professor on contract, VisitingProfessor on ad-hoc basis, Visiting Faculty on ad-hoc basis,Professors on ad hoc basis, Part-time faculties, Visiting Part-timefaculties, Visiting Part-time professors, Part-time Lecturer, Re-employment of retired staff on contract, re-employment of retiredfaculty as Consultant.For petitioner : Mr.K.Shanmuga KaniFor respondents 1 and 4 : Mr.Vijay Narayan Senior Counsel for Mr.R.ParthibanFor respondents 5 and 6 : Mr.T.SrinivasamoorthyFor respondents 2,3,7 and 9 : Mr.S.Srinivasan ORDERThe Writ Petition is filed by the petitioner associationrepresented by its Secretary. 2.The prayer in the Writ Petition is to declare certainstatutes framed under the Institutes of Technology Act 1961 areunconstitutional and ultra vires. The attack is made against clauses9.10, 12.1, 12.6, 12.8, 12.10, 15.1 and 15.2 of the statutes calledas the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur/ Bombay/ Madras/Kanpur/Delhi Statutes. Apart from the declaration of these statutesas violative of Articles 14 and 16, a consequential prayer forcalling for the records pertaining to the appointments to various https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ faculty positions and quash all the appointments made on ad-hoc basisfor the post of Temporary Technical Assistants, Temporary SeniorScientific Officer 1, Senior Scientific Officer 1 on contract,Temporary Senior Scientific Officer 2, Senior Scientific Officer 2 oncontract, Lecturer on contract, Lecturer on ad-hoc basis, AssistantProfessor on contract, Visiting Professor on ad-hoc basis, Visitingfaculty on ad-hoc basis, Professors on ad-hoc basis, Part-timefaculties, Visiting Part-time faculties, Visiting Part-TimeProfessors, Part-time Lecturer, Re-employment of retired staff onContract, Re-employment of Retired Faculty as Consultant is alsomade.3.In paragraph 6 of the affidavit it has been averred asfollows:"The specific instances of ad hoc appointments andselection through backdoor are elaborated in theannexure appended to this affidavit which when perusedwould reflect the utter disregard and callous attitudeof the respondent to the normal procedure ofappointments contemplated under the Act. I crave leaveto add the affected parties as respondents to the abovewrit petition, as early as I get to know the full listof persons selected under the ad hoc basis and as soonas the said list is furnished to me by the respondents."4.In the annexure though it is stated that a copy of theannexure was appended to the affidavit filed in support of the writpetition, no such annexure was found in the affidavit filed. Thecounsel for the petitioner furnished a copy of the annexure allegedto have been filed along with the writ petition. It containedvarious names of faculties appointed on ad-hoc basis by the secondand third respondents. No attempts were made to implead all thepersons likely to be affected in case the petitioner succeeds in thewrit petition. 5.It is seen from the typed set of papers (page 274) that the7th respondent Dr.P.Bhyrappa was appointed as Assistant Professor oncontract basis for two years in the Chemistry Department with effectfrom 25.9.1997. Similarly, the 8th respondent Dr.N.Narasimha Murthywas appointed on contract basis for two years with effect from8.8.1997 (Page 272). In the same way, the 9th respondent Dr.Ms.SohiniPaldey was appointed as Assistant Professor on contract basis in theMetallurgical Engineering Department with effect from 16.1.1998.Excepting for these three persons, the petitioner association did notmake the affected parties as party respondents to the writ petition.Though it was claimed as soon as they got full list of persons theywill make them parties, in spite of the fact the writ petition waspending for over 10 years no such efforts have been made. The secondportion of the prayer to cancel the appointments in respect of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ persons whose names are found in the annexure cannot be granted. Thewrit petition is liable to be rejected on that ground. 6.The Supreme Court vide judgment in PRABODH VERMA AND OTHERSV. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS reported in 1984 (4) SCC page251 in paragraphs 28 and 50.1 held as follows:"28.The real question before us, therefore, isthe correctness of the decision of the High Court inthe Sangh case. Before we address ourselves to thisquestion, we would like to point out that the writpetition filed by the Sangh suffered from two serious,though not incurable, defects. The first defect wasthat of non-joinder of necessary parties. The onlyrespondents to the Sangh's petition were the State ofUttar Pradesh and its concerned officers. Those whowere vitally concerned, namely, the reserve poolteachers, were not made parties.-not even by joiningsome of them in a representative capacity, consideringthat their number was too large for all of them to bejoined individually as respondents. The matter,therefore, came to be decided in their absence. A HighCourt ought not to decide a writ petition under Article226 of the Constitution without the persons who wouldbe vitally affected by its judgment being before it asrespondents or at least by some of them being before itas respondents in a representative capacity if theirnumber is too large, and therefore, the Allahabad HighCourt ought not to have proceeded to hear and disposeof the Sangh's writ petition without insisting upon thereserve pool teachers being made respondents to thatwrit petition, or at least some of them being maderespondents in a representative capacity, and had thepetitioners refused to do so, ought to have dismissedthat petition for non-joinder of necessary parties."50.To summarize our conclusions:(1)A High Court ought not to hear and dispose of a writpetition under Article 226 of the Constitution withoutthe persons who would be vitally affected by itsjudgment being before it as respondents or at leastsome of them being before it as respondents in arepresentative capacity if their number is too large tojoin them as respondents individually, and if thepetitioners refuse to so join them, the High Courtought to dismiss the petition for non-joinder ofnecessary parties."Therefore, it is liable to be rejected on the short ground. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7.With reference to the prayer regarding invalidation ofvarious statutes listed out in the prayer it is necessary to extractthe impugned statutes for better appreciation of the facts involvedin this case and they are as follows:"9.10 - In exceptional cases, subject to theavailability of funds, the Director shall have the power tocreate temporary posts with the approval of the Chairman,of not more than two years' duration on approved scales ofpay under report to the Board, provided that no such post,of which the Director is not the appointing authority,shall be so created.12.1 - All posts at the Institute shall normally befilled by advertisement, but, the Board shall have thepower to decide, on the recommendations of the Director,that a particular post be filled by invitation or bypromotion from amongst the members of the staff of theInstitute.12.6 - Where a post is to be filled on contract basisor by invitation, the Chairman, may, at his discretion,constitute such ad hoc Selection Committees, ascircumstances of each case may require.12.8- Notwithstanding anything contained in theseStatues, the Board shall have the power to makeappointments of persons trained under "approved" programmesin such manner as it may deem appropriate. The Board willmaintain a schedule of such "approved" programmes.12.10- The Selection Committee shall examine thecredentials of all persons who have applied and may alsoconsider other suitable names suggested, if any, by amember of the Selection Committee or brought otherwise tothe notice of the Committee. The Selection Committee mayinterview any of the candidates as it thinks fit and shall,at the discretion of its Chairman, cause a written test ortests to be held for all or some of the candidates as thechairman may think fit, and shall make its recommendationsto the Board or the Director, as the case may be, the namesof the selected candidates being arranged in order ofmerit.15.1- Notwithstanding anything contained in theseStatutes, the Board may, in special circumstances, appointan eminent person on contract for a period not exceedingfive years, with a provision of renewal for further period,provided that every such appointment and the terms thereofshall be subject to the prior approval of the Visitor. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

15.2 -Subject to the provisions contained in Act, theBoard may appoint any person on contract in the prescribedscales of pay and on the terms and conditions applicable tothe relevant post for a period not exceeding five yearswith a provision of renewal for further period. For makingsuch appointments, the Chairman may, at his discretion,constitute such ad hoc Selection Committees, as thecircumstances of each case may require.”8.Mr.K.Shanmuga Kani, learned counsel for the petitionersubmitted that the third respondent was constituted by the Institutesof Technology Act 1961 and in terms of Section 25 all appointments ofthe staff except that of the Directors shall be made in accordancewith the procedure laid down in the statutes. Section 25 reads asfollows:"Section 25 - All appointments on the staff of anyInstitute, except that of the Director, shall be made inaccordance with the procedure laid down in the Statutes,by-(a)the Board, if the appointment is made on theacademic staff in the post of Lecturer or above or if theappointment is made on the non-academic staff in any cadrethe maximum of the pay-scale for which exceeds six hundredrupees per month;(b)by the Director, in any other case.”9.The learned counsel also made emphasis to Section 7(1)which is as follows:"7(1) Every Institute shall be open to persons ofeither sex and of whatever race, creed, caste or class, andno test or condition shall be imposed as to religiousbelief or profession in admitting or appointing members,students, teachers or workers or in any other connectionwhatsoever."10.The counsel submitted that disregarding the Act and theStatutes the third respondent Director started making severalappointments and during the period from 1986 to 1997, 180 ad hocappointments to various faculty positions under 17 heads ofdepartments have been made and 80 of such appointees have been madepermanent subsequently. By making such appointments the chances ofappointment or promotion to members belonging to the Backward Classesand SC/ST sections have been given a go by. Out of 400 facultymembers, persons belonging to SC/ST are only 2 and those belonging tobackward community are only 40. Therefore, perverting theconstitutional mandate of Article 16(4) of the Constitution therespondents have filled up the posts arbitrarily. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

11.The specific contention regarding clause 12.1 of theStatutes is that it gives power to the Board to decide on therecommendation of the Director that a particular post to be filled byinvitation or by promotion and such a clause is likely to beexercised arbitrarily. Similarly, under clause 12.6 of the Statutes,if the post was to be filled on contract basis or by invitation theChairman can at his discretion constitute an ad-hoc selectioncommittee as the circumstances may warrant. Similarly, clause 12.8gives power to make appointments of persons trained under approvedprogrammes as it may deem appropriate. Under clause 12.10 theSelection Committee so nominated can consider names of personsincluding of its own suggestions or brought otherwise to the noticeof the Committee. Under Clause 9.10 in exceptional cases subject toavailability of funds the Director shall have the power to createtemporary posts with the approval of the Chairman of not more thantwo years’ duration in approved scales of pay. 12.Under clause 15.1 the Board has been given power to appointeminent persons on contract basis for a period not exceeding 5 yearswith a provision of renewal for a further period and suchappointments will be subject to prior approval of the Visitor. Underclause 15.2 power has been given to the Board to appoint any personon contract on such terms and conditions for a period not exceeding 5years with a provision of further renewal. Power has also been givento the Chairman to constitute Selection Committee for making suchappointment. Therefore the learned counsel submitted that by misusingthese powers the posts have been packed up with candidates of thechoice of the Director and thus the Board had disregarded the mandateof Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Hence, the present writpetition has been filed in public interest. 13.Notice of motion was ordered on the writ petition on16.3.1998. It was stated by this Court that the respondents cannot berestrained if they do according to law and they can do according tolaw. 14.On notice from this Court, the second respondent has fileda detailed counter affidavit dated NIL (August 1998). It was statedthat the petitioner association was an unrecognised association andthey have no right to file a writ petition questioning theappointments made by the I.I.T., Madras. It was also stated that thepetitioner's contention that the 180 ad hoc appointments to variousfaculties made are incorrect. The further submission that from out ofthose ad-hoc appointments 80 have been made permanent was alsodenied.15.In paragraph 29 of the counter affidavit it was averred asfollows:"This respondent further submits that the Board of Governors in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ their 135th meeting held on 29th November 1991 resolved to approve inprinciple the filling up of faculty positions of the Institute byProvisional appointment of Visiting Faculty. The Board requested theDirector to place the details of the applicants for Visiting Facultypositions shortlisted by the Dean (Academic Research) and Dean(Administration) after recommendations from the concernedDepartmental Committees before the Sub-committee of the Board ofGovernors of the Institute consisting of the Director as the Chairmanand two members. The Board authorised the Chairman to approve suchappointments on the recommendations of the sub-committee of the Boardon suitable remunerations commensurate with the qualifications,experience etc. Further the Board in its 150th Meeting resolved to approveappointment of Assistant Professors and AssociateProfessors on contract basis for a period not exceedingthree years and authorised the Director to process theapplications through a Selection Committee constituted withoutside experts and recommend to the Board of Governors."16.They also contended that there was no denial of themandate of reservation in favour of Backward and SC/ST communities inview of these contract appointments. The power of Board to make suchappointments have been circumscribed by the Statutes and the personswho are manning the Board are men of eminence with integrity. 17.Based on these divergent facts Mr.K.Shanmuga Kani, learnedcounsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to thejudgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC 479 (STATE OFGUJARAT V. S.TRIPATHY AND OTHERS). This is for the purpose ofshowing that if the allegations raised in the affidavit were not metimmediately in such circumstances the Supreme Court came down heavilyon the Government for filing a counter affidavit after four years inthat case. In the present case the counter was filed after 10 years.18.The learned counsel also placed reliance upon the judgmentof the Supreme Court in DR.KRUSHNA CHANDRA SAHU AND OTHERS V. STATEOF ORISSA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 352. This isfor the purpose of showing that in the absence of any guidelines aSelection Committee cannot act on its own and select candidates. TheSelection Committee does not have any inherent jurisdiction to laydown norms and clauses for selection and no such power can be assumedby implication. If the Selection Committee is allowed suchjurisdiction it would amount to clothe them with the power ofenacting a rule for selection. 19.Thereafter the learned counsel placed reliance upon thejudgment of the Supreme Court in PRAVEEN SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB ANDOTHERS reported in AIR 2001 SC 152. Reliance was placed on thefollowing passage found in para 8. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ".....While it is true that the administrative orquasi judicial authority clothed with the power ofselection and appointment ought to be left unfettered inadaptation of procedural aspect but that does not howevermean and imply that the same would be made available to anemployer at the cost of fairplay, good conscience andequity. This Court in the case of J.P.Kulshreshtha v.Chancellor, Allahabad University, AIR 1980 SC 2141:(1980Lab IC 692 : 1980 All LJ 571)did recognise the undetectablemanipulation of results being achieved by remote controltacits and masked as viva voce test resulting (in)thesabotaging of the purity of proceedings. This Court held"interviews as such are not bad but polluting it to attainillegitimate ends is bad." 20. The learned counsel also drew the attention of this Courtto the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR INDIA v. NERGESH MEERZAAND OTHERS reported in 1981 (4) SCC page 335. Reliance was placedupon paragraphs 29 and 70 which may be usefully extracted below.Para."29.The most apposite decision on the subject isthe case of All Indian Station Masters' & Assistant StationMasters' Association v. General Manager, Central Railwayswhere the law on the subject was succinctly stated by DasGupta,J., who speaking for the Court as follows:So multifarious are the activities of theState that employment of men for the purpose ofthese activities has by the very nature of thingsto be in different departments of the State andinside each department, in many different classes.For each such class there are separate rulesfixing the number of personnel of each class,posts to which the men in that class will beappointed, questions of seniority, pay ofdifferent posts, the manner in which promotionwill be effected from the lower grades of pay tothe higher grades, e.g., whether on the result ofperiodical examination or by seniority, or byselection or on some other basis-and other cognatematters. Each such class can be reasonablyconsidered to be a separate and in many mattersindependent entity with its own rules ofrecruitment, pay and prospects and otherconditions of service which may vary considerablybetween one class and another. It is clear that as between the members of thesame class the question whether conditions of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ service are the same or not may well arise. Ifthey are not, the question of denial of equalopportunity will require serious consideration insuch cases. Does the concept of equal opportunityin matters of employment apply, however, tovariations in provisions as between members ofdifferent classes of employees under the State?In our opinion, the answer must be in thenegative."Para"70.For these reasons, therefore, the argument ofMr.Setalvad that the conditions of service with regard toretirement, etc, amount to discrimination on the ground ofsex only is overruled and it is held that the conditions ofservice indicated above are not violative of Article 16 onthis ground." In the light of the same, the learned counsel wanted the statutesimpugned in the writ petition to be declared as ultra vires of theConstitution.21.Mr.Vijay Narayan, the learned Senior Counsel sought toquestion the maintability of the writ petition on the ground thatthere was no personal right of the representatives or its members areaffected. It is only in cases where a writ is in the nature of Quo-warranto the concept of locus standi could have wider basis. In thiscontext he relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of thisCourt in NADAR MAHAJANA SANGAM, V. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA reported in2006 (4) M.L.J. page 385. The counsel placed reliance upon thefollowing passage found in para 9 wherein the earlier decision of theSupreme Court was referred to and followed:-"9.In Vinoy Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2001SC 1739 : 2001 (4) SCC 734, the Supreme Court observed (videpara 2):"2: Generally speaking, a person shall haveno locus standi to file a writ petition if he isnot personally affected by the impugned order orhis fundamental rights have neither been directlyor substantially invaded nor is there anyimminent danger of such rights being invaded orhis acquired interests have been violatedignoring the applicable rules. The relief underArticle 226 of the Constitution is based on theexistence of a right in favour of the personinvoking the jurisdiction. The exception to thegeneral rules is only in cases where the writapplied for is a writ of habeas corpus or quowarranto or filed in public interest. It is a https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ matter of prudence, that the Court confines theexercise of writ jurisdiction to cases wherelegal wrong or legal injuries caused to aparticular person or his fundamental rights areviolated, and not to entertain cases ofindividual wrong or injury at the instance ofthird party where there is an effective legal aidorganization which can take care of such cases.Even in cases filed in public interest, the Courtcan exercise the writ jurisdiction at theinstance of a third party only when it is shownthat the legal wrong or legal injury or illegalburden is threatened and such person ordetermined class of persons is, by reason ofpoverty, helplessness or disability or sociallyor economically disadvantaged position, unable toapproach the Court for relief.10.In State of Orissa v. Ram Chjandra Dev andAnother, AIR 1964 SC 685, The Supreme Court observed (videpara 8):"8.But though the jurisdiction of the High Courtunder Article 226 is wide in that sense, theconcluding words of the Article clearly indicatethat before a writ or an appropriate order can beissued in favour of a party, it must beestablished that the party has a right and thesaid right is legally invaded or threatened. Theexistence of a right is thus the foundation of apetition under Article 226".11.Similarly, in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Governmentof Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828:(1966) 2 MLJ (SC)87:1966(2) An.W.R.(SC)87 (vide para 8) the Supreme Courtobserved:"The right that can be enforced underArticle 226 also shall ordinarily be the personalor individual right of the petitioner himselfthough in the case of some of the writs likehabeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may haveto be relaxed or modified.”22.After referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court thedivision bench in Nadar Mahanaja Sabha's case also observed in para10 which is as follows:- "10.The writ petition filed by the appellant cannothave any personal grievance in the matter and at best, only https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ its members can have any grievance. It is well settledthat ordinarily a writ petition can only be filed bysomeone who is personally aggrieved. The powers underArticle 226 of the Constitution of India should besparingly used and only in those clear cases where therights of a person have been seriously infringed and he hasno other adequate and specific remedy available to him.The relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiais based on the existence of a right in favour of a personinvoking the writ jurisdiction. The exception to thegeneral rule is only in cases where the writ applied for iswrit of habeas corpus or quo warranto or filed in publicinterest.”23.The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that theappointments have been made by expert bodies and no singleappointment has been challenged before this Court. He also submittedthat a rule cannot be invalidated on the ground that it is likely tobe abused. Only when a particular appointment is under challenge thequestion of going into the merits or demerits of such appointments aswell as the infringement of rule relating to appointment can be goneinto by this Court. The omnibus prayer made by the petitionerassociation is clearly misconceived. He has stated that the SupremeCourt struck a note of caution in interfering the decision of theacademic bodies by the Court. 24.In this context a reference was made to the judgment of theSupreme Court in P.M.BHARGAVA V. UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSIONreported in 2004 Vol.6 SCC page 661. The following passages found inparagraph 13 and 14 were pressed into service and they may beextracted below."13........The courts are not expert in academicmatters and it is not for them to decide as to what courseshould be taught in universities and what should be theircurriculum. This caution was sounded in University ofMysore v. C.D.Govinda Rao wherein Gajendragadkar, J.(as HisLordship then was) speaking for the Constitution Bench heldthat it would normally be wise and safe for the courts toleave the decisions of academic matters to experts who aremore familiar with the problems they face than the courtsgenerally can be. In this case challenge was made tocertain appointments and the Bench held that what the HighCourt should consider is whether the appointment made by theChancellor on the recommendation of the Board hadcontravened any statutory or binding rule or ordinance, andin doing so, the High Court should show due regard to theopinion expressed by the Board and its recommendations onwhich the Chancellor has acted. This principle wasreiterated in J.P.Kulshrestha (Dr.) v. Chancellor, Allahabad https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ University wherein it was held as under : (SCC p.426, para17) While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule ofprudence that courts should hesitate to dislodgedecisions of academic bodies. But universityorgans, for that matter any authority in our system,are bound by the rule of law and cannot be law untothemselves. If the Chancellor or any otherauthority lesser in level decides an academic matteror an educational question, the court keeps itshands off; but where a provision of law has to beread and understood, it is not fair to keep thecourt out.14.The abovementioned principle has beenconsistently followed by this Court and it is not necessaryto burden this judgment by giving references of thosecases."25.He also submitted that in any university or higherinstitution of learning, appointments by invitation or by contractare not unknown. All the University Acts in this country have aprovision to appoint persons of eminence by invitation or oncontract. A challenge in this regard questioning the appointment oninvitation or by contract and the Selection Committee introducing aname on its own without application was repelled by the DivisionBench of this Court in S.NAGARAJAN V. BHARATHIDASAN UNIVERSITY ANDANOTHER reported in 1987 WLR page 620. Reliance was placed to thefollowing passage found in paragraphs 21, 22 and 23."21.We have already reproduced S.62 of the UniversityAct which vests in the Syndicate to invite a person of highacademic distinction and professional attainments to accepta post of Professor in the University. Now, it has to beremembered that it is the function of the Syndicate todecide, who, according to them, is a person of highacademic distinction. If prima facie the decision of theSyndicate that a particular person is of a high academicdistinction does not appear to be perverse or biased, theCourt must be slow to interfere with such selections,because academicians alone can evaluate properly theachievements of an academician in the appropriate field.In so far as the affairs of the educational institutions inthe academic field are concerned, the Courts must be slowto interfere unless it is found that decisions are clearlymala fide or based on extraneous considerations.22.In the very decision which is relied upon by thelearned counsel for the petitioner in Dr.M.C.Gunta and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ others v. Dr.Arun Kumar Gupta and others, the Supreme Courthas made the following significant observations:"When selection is made by the Commissionaided and advised by experts having technicalexperience and high academic qualifications inthe specialist field, probing teaching/researchexperience in technical subjects, the Courtsshould be slow to interfere with the opinionexpressed by experts unless there are allegationsof mala fides against them. It would normally beprudent and safe for the Courts to leave thedecision of academic matters to experts who aremore familiar with the problems they face thanthe Courts generally can be. Undoubtedly, evensuch a body if it were to contravene rules andregulations binding upon it, the court inexercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to enforcerule of law, may interfere in a writ petitionunder Art.226. Even then, the Court, whileenforcing the rule of law, should give due weightto the opinions expressed by the experts and alsoshow due regard to its recommendations on whichthe State Government acted. If therecommendations made by the body of experts,keeping in view the relevant rules andregulations, manifest due consideration of allthe relevant factors, the Court should be veryslow to interfere with such recommendations."These observations, in our view, highlight theinadvisability of Courts disregarding the views of expertsin the academic field when a decision of a body like theSyndicate of University is challenged."23...........In our view, the mere facts of puttingthe offer of respondent No.2 before the SelectionCommittee will not render the decision of the Syndicateinvalid. Indeed, if the Selection Committee consistingof experts recommends that there was an academician whocould be invited, that would really furnish a reasonablebasis for the Syndicate to invite respondent No.2. Thereis, in our view, no manner of doubt that the appointmentof respondent No.2 is in pursuance of the powerindependently available to the Syndicate under S.62 ofthe University Act. If that power has been exercised bythe University and if a body of experts considers thatrespondent No.2 should be invited, the Court could notinterfere with such a decision.................In ourview, if the appointing authority was satisfied that the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ respondent No.2 was an academician of distinctionqualified to be invited for appointment under S.62 of theUniversity Act, interference in the exercise ofjurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution of Indiaby this Court would not be justified. It is unfortunatethat the petitioner has not been selected, but that byitself would not be a ground for interfering with theappointment of respondent No.2, which is made expresslyin accordance with the power under S.62 of the UniversityAct."26.The contentions raised by the respondents meritsacceptance. It is not shown to the satisfaction of the Court therewas either infraction of the statutes or that the statutes were ultravires of Articles 14 and 16(4) of the Constitution and thus becameunconstitutional. The premier institution like I.I.T. must have somefree play in the joints for taking decisions. What is important is todraw the best talent for teaching the students of the institution.Unless a decision is demonstratively illegal or the provisions areshown to be unconstitutional so that the resultant decision has to beinvalidated, the Courts will normally lay its hands off in dealingwith such decisions of such academic institutions. Going by thecaution expressed by the Supreme Court it is not a fit case wherethis Court can strike down the impugned statutes. Further exceptingthe adding respondents 7 to 9 as party respondents it was not shownas to how their appointments were invalid. Further it was agreed byboth sides those respondents are no longer in the service of I.I.T.No other names have been shown to enable the Court to consider thenature of their appointments by this Court.27.In the light of the above, this Court is not persuadedeither to strike down the impugned statutes or to cancel the ad-hocappointments as found in the annexure to the writ petition.Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. However there willbe no order as to costs. Consequently, connected pendingmiscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.salTo1.The Chairman,The Council of IIT,Ministry of HRD, New Delhi. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.The Chairman,Board of Governors,Indian Institute of Technology,Chennai-600 0363.The Director,Indian Institute of Technology,Chennai-600 036.4.The Registrar,Indian Institute of Technology,Chennai-600 036.5.The Chairman,National Commission for Backward Classes,Govt. of India,West Block-1, 2nd Floor,Wing No.3, R.K.Puram, New Delhi.6.The Chairman,National Commission for SC/ST'sGovt.of India,New Delhi. W.P.NO.3570 of 1998W.M.P.Nos.5354 and 5355/1998KA(CO)EM/14.3.09