Messrs.Precot Mills Ltd v. India

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED: 18.01.2010CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.MURUGESANANDTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.P.S.JANARTHANA RAJAW.A.No.981 of 1999 Messrs. Precot Mills Ltd.,rep. by its Managing DirectorSarath Chandran ..Appellant -Vs-1. Central Board of Direct Taxes Government of India Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue New Delhi2. Union of India rep.by the Secretary Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue Central Secretariat New Delhi3. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax Special Range II Race Course, Coimbatore..RespondentsAppeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 17.9.98 made in W.P.No.14628 of 1994 to quash the communication dated 7.1.93 issued by the first respondent in fileNo.400/21/92-IT(B) (Annexure 'c') and to direct the first respondent to consider the application dated 12.12.91 of the petitioner afresh, after giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner (Annexure 'b') or any other appropriate writ, direction or order as this Hon'ble Court may in the interest of justice deem fit.

For Appellant::Mr.Srinath SridevanFor Respondents::Mr.J.Naresh KumarSenior Standing Counsel for Income Tax Dept. for R3Others – No appearance https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ JUDGMENT(Judgment of the Court was delivered by D.MURUGESAN, J.) This writ appeal raises a common question as to whether in exercise of the power under Section 119(2)(a) of the Income TaxAct, the Central Board of Direct Taxes would be entitled to entertain application from an individual assessee against the order of the assessing officer declining the waiver of interest chargeable under Section 234-C of the Income Tax Act and if so, whether the Board should give reasons while considering and passing orders on such application? 2. The facts giving rise to the above two issues are as follows. The appellant is a public limited company and they filed the return of income on 31.12.90 for the assessment year 1990-91.As the company did not have any taxable income for the said year under the normal provisions of the Income Tax Act, by virtue of Section 115-J of the Act, the book profit was disclosed in thereturn of income.

The assessee has also paid advance tax for the financial year 1990-91 in the following manner, namely, a sum ofRs.16,00,000/- on 14.9.89, a sum of Rs.60,00,000/- on 14.12.89 anda sum of Rs.23,00,000/- on 30.3.90. At a later point of time, theassessee claimed the waiver of interest. We are not elaborating in detail the above subsequent events, as our consideration is very limited in this petition. 3. The assessee filed an application on 12.12.91 before the Central Board of Direct Taxes (for short, "the Board") seeking for waiver of interest. That application was rejected by the following communication: "Annexure 'C'F.No.400/21/92-IT(B)Government of IndiaMinistry of FinanceDepartment of RevenueCentral Board of Direct TaxesNew Delhi, the 7th January, 1993ToThe Vice President (Finance)Precot Mills Ltd.,Suprem, P.B.No.3888Race Course, Coimbatore 641 018 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Sub: Request for waiver of interest chargeable u/s 234C of the Income Tax Act, 1961.---Sir,I am directed to refer to your letterNo.CO/P/VPF dated 12th December, 1991, regarding waiver of interest chargeable u/s 234C of the IncomeTax Act and to state that the Board regrets its inability to intervene in the matter.

Yours faithfully, Sd/-(Rajesh Chandra) Under Secretary to the Government of India"4. The said communication was questioned by the assessee in the writ petition primarily on the ground that the said communication did not contain any reason whatsoever. The challenge to the said communication before the learned single Judge did not find favour with the assessee. According to the learned Judge, the provisions of Section 119(2)(a) relates to the power of the Boardto issue from time to time general or special orders in respect of any class of income or class of cases by way of relaxation of any of the provisions mentioned thereunder including Sections 234-A,234-B and 234-C for the purpose of proper and efficient management of the work relating to assessment or collection of revenue. According to the learned Judge, in contrast to clauses (b) and (c)of Section 119(2) of the Act, the Board need not give any reasons while dealing with an application made by the assessee under Section 119(2)(a) of the Act.

5. Mr.Srinath Sridevan, learned counsel appearing for theappellant-assessee would submit that while the application is entertained by the Board and it is considered and disposed of, the Board acts as a quasi-judicial functionary. If that be so, the Board should certainly give reasons for rejecting the application. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel would rely upon an unreported judgment of a learned single Judge of this Courtmade in a batch of writ petitions in W.P.Nos.2528 of 1993 etc.,dated 13.12.93 (M/s Sivanandha Steels Limited, Coimbatore v.Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi & others). The learned counsel would submit that though the said judgment was cited before the learned single Judge, it was distinguished on the ground that the difference between the provision of Section 119(2)(a) and Section 119(2)(b) & (c) of the Act was not at all consideredthereunder. Hence, the learned counsel would submit that as the issues raised in this appeal are squarely covered by the said judgment, the order under appeal is liable to be interfered with.

6. On the other hand, Mr.J.Naresh Kumar, learned SeniorStanding Counsel for the revenue would submit that there is no https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ obligation cast on the Board to entertain any application from the individual assessee for its consideration. However, the Board, asa matter of practice, entertains the application filed by theassessee and in exercise of the power under Section 119(2)(a)passes orders and in that process, the Board is not expected to give any reasons. Hence the learned standing counsel would submit that the order under appeal need not be interfered with.7. We have considered the rival submissions. The provisions of Section 119(2)(a), (b) & (c) read as under:-"119 (1).....(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power:--(a) the Board may, if it considers it necessary or expedient so to do, for the purpose of proper and efficient management of the work of assessment and collection of revenue, issue, from time to time (whether by way of relaxation of any of the provisions of sections [115P, 115S, 115WD,115WE, 115WF, 115WG, 115WH, 115WJ, 115WK],[139], 143, 144, 147, 148, 154, 155,[158BFA] [sub-section (1A) of section 201,sections 210, 211, 234A, 234B, 234C, 271and 273 or otherwise), general or special orders in respect of any class of incomes[or fringe benefits] or class of cases, setting forth directions or instructions(not being prejudicial to assessees) as to the guidelines, principles or procedures tobe followed by other income-tax authorities in the work relating to assessment or collection of revenue or the initiation of proceedings for the imposition of penalties and any such order may, if the Board is of opinion that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, be published and circulated in the prescribed manner for general information; (b) the Board may, if it considers it desirable or expedient so to do for avoiding genuine hardship in any case or class of cases, by general or special order, authorise [any income-tax authority, not being a Commissioner (Appeals)] to admit an application or claim for any exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief under this Act after the expiry of the period specified by or under this Actfor making such application or claim and deal with the same on merits in accordance with law; https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (c) the Board may, if it considers it desirable or expedient so to do for avoiding genuine hardship in any case or class of cases, by general or special order for reasons to be specified therein, relax any requirement contained in any of the provisions of Chapter IV or Chapter VI-A,where the assessee has failed to comply with any requirement specified in such provision for claiming deductionthereunder, subject to the following conditions, namely:--(i) the default in complying with such requirement was due to circumstances beyond the control of the assessee; and(ii) the assessee has complied with such requirement before the completion of assessment in relation to the previous year in which such deduction is claimed: Provided that the Central Government shall cause every order issued under this clause to be laid before each House of Parliament.]"8.

As far as the provisions of Section 119(2)(b) & (c) are concerned, the finding in the order under appeal itself is that the Board, under those provisions, acts as quasi-judicial functionary. To this extent, there is no dispute. The controversy is only in respect of Section 119(2)(a) of the Act as to whether an application can be made by the assessee as a matter of right to the Board and that if such application is entertained, the Board is obligated to consider the same and pass orders giving its reasons. While exercising the power under Section 119(2)(a), the Board, by issuance of guidelines, is also entitled to consider the principles or procedures to be followed by the other income-tax authorities in the work relating to assessment or collection of revenue or the initiation of proceedings for the imposition of penalties, etc. That power of the Board conferred under the said provision includes the power to issue guidelines, principles and procedures to be followed in matters of initiation of proceedings for imposition of penalties, will necessarily include the waiver of interest as well.

When a grievance is made before the Board by way of an application and when once that application is entertained, certainly, the Boardshould consider whether the request was for either against imposition of penalty or waiver of interest and pass orders giving its reasons. In the judgment relied upon by the learned counselfor the appellant in W.P.Nos.2528 of 1993 dated 13.12.93, the learned single Judge had also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in H.S.Anantha Ramaiah v. Central Boardof Direct Taxes and others (1993) 201 ITR 526, where the DivisionBench has held that while an application is considered and disposed https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ of by the Board under Section 119(2), the Board acts as quasi-judicial authority. We are entirely in agreement with the finding rendered in the said judgment. It is not in dispute that such applications from individual assessees are also entertained by the Board and disposed of.

In our opinion, no difference could be seen from either of the clauses (a), (b) & (c) of Section 119(2) of the Act for the reason that even though Section 119(2) only relates to the power of the Board to issue certain guidelines and principleson specific matters, while it entertains the application and disposes of the same, it acts as quasi-judicial authority and if that be so, a quasi-judicial authority is expected in law to give reasons on consideration of the materials available before it. Astatutory discretion or power, whether it be administrative orquasi-judicial, is subject to certain implied conditions or limitations. Any violation of these conditions or limitations can give rise to judicial review. The conditions are based on the solemn principle that the person on whom the power is conferred must exercise the same in good faith for furtherance of the objectof the statute and the decision should not amount to arbitrariness, unfairness and summary disposal.

In Ridge v. Baldmin (1963) 2 AllE.R. 66 (HL), it has been held that conferment of quasi-judicialpower further implies that the person concerned must follow the rule of natural justice. In Wireman v. Boreman (1963) 3 All.E.R.275 (HL), it has been held that quasi-judicial authority, while discharging his functions as such, must give reasons for making the order which he is empowered to make. The Apex Court has also laid down the above principles in the judgment in Menaka Gandhi v. Unionof India, AIR 1978 SC 597. We may also observe that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, is required to record the reasons for its decision, as this requirement can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice. The duty to give reasons is the function of due process and therefore of justice.

Itencompasses itself two principal aspects, namely, fairness and the application of mind by the authorities. To support the above, we may refer to the judgments of the Apex Court in Vasudeo ViswanathSaraf v. New Education Institute, AIR 1985 SC 2105 and inS.N.Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984.9. As we have held that the Board while disposing an application under Section 119(2)(a) is acting as quasi-judicialauthority, it should certainly give reasons even though the provision does not explicitly refer to the provision of such reasoning in the order. 10. Of course, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for therevenue would rely upon a judgment of the Apex Court in CarborandumUniversal Ltd., v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi, (1989)180 ITR 171. In our opinion, that judgment relates to a claim for personal hearing before an application that has been entertained by the Board is disposed of.

W.A.No.981 of 1999