Madrasdated High Court · 2009

2. The Assistant Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Erode...R2 in WP.No.19088of 1997 3. The Assistant Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Coimbatore. .. R2 in WP.No.17115 of 19974. The Assistant Commissioner, (Land Reforms),Tiruchirappalli... R2 in WP.No.10192 of 19985. The Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Tiruchirappalli... R2 in WP.No.18446 of 1998 and WP.No.18447 of 19986. The Authorised Officer & Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Erode... R2 in WP.No.4083 of 19997. The Assistant Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Villupuram... R2 in WP.No.18339 of 2000JagadeesanS/o. Late Balasubramania Mudaliar.. R3 in WP.No.18339 of 2000(3rd respondent impleaded as LR of the deceased petitioner herein as 3rd Respondent in the WP.No. 18339/2000 as per Court order dated 04.11.08 in WP.MP.No.1648/08 in WP.No.18339/2000)PRAYER : Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia praying for the issuance of a writ of declaration declaringthat the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) SecondAmendment Act, 1994, Tamil Nadu Act No.11 of 1996 as ultra vires,unconstitutional and strike down the same.For petitioner in W.P.Nos.19088 of 1997,4083 of 1999 & 18339 of 2000 :: Mr.A.SivajiFor petitioner in W.P.Nos.17115 of 1997 &10192 of 1998 :: Mr.C.V.Vijayakumar for Mr.T.R.RajaramanFor petitioner in W.P.Nos.18446 & 18447 of 1998 :: Mr.T.K.Seshadri, SC for Mr.M.S.Sampath For respondents :: Mr.R.P.Kabilan, Addl.A.G. Asstd.byMr.A.Arumugam, Spl.GP https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ O R D E R In these writ petitions, the challenge is to the amendmentbrought in by the Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1996 to the Tamil Nadu LandReforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Second Amendment Act, 1994 anda prayer is sought to declare them as ultra vires andunconstitutional.2. Sections 4 to 6 of the Amendment Act reads as follows:-''S.4. Tamil Nadu Act 58 of 1961, as subsequently modified, tohave effect subject to modifications.- The principalAct shall, on and from the 6th day of April 1960, haveeffect, as if, section 22 had been renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section and after sub-section (1) asso renumbered, the following sub-section had been added,namely:-''2. For the purpose of sub-section (1) if anytransfer or partition has the effect of reducingthe extent of surplus land in excess of theceiling area, such transfer or partition, whetherbona fide or not, shall be construed as defeatingthe provisions of this Act".S.5.Validation.- Notwithstanding anything contained in anylaw for the time being in force or in any judgment,decree or order of any court or other authority, allacts done or proceedings taken in respect of casesfalling under section 22 of the principal Act by theauthorized officer before the date of the publication ofthis Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, which arein conformity with the provisions of section 22 of theprincipal Act, as amended by section 4 of this Act,shall, for all purposes be deemed to be, and to havealways been, validly done or taken in accordance withlaw, as if section 22 of the principal Act as amendedby section 4 of this Act had been in force at allmaterial times when such acts or proceedings were doneor taken.S.6.Reopening of certain cases.- Notwithstanding anythingcontained in any law for the time being in force or inany judgment, decree or order of any court or otherauthority, but subject to the provisions of section 21-Aof the principal Act, any proceeding taken or orderpassed under the principal Act which has been disposedof before the date of the publication of this Act in theTamil Nadu Government Gazette, contrary to theprovisions of section 22 of the principal Act, as https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ amended by Section 4 of this Act, shall be reopened anddisposed of in accordance with the provisions of section22 of the principal Act as so amended:Provided that no such proceeding or order shall bereopened under this section after the expiry of aperiod of five years from the date of the publicationof this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette:Provided further that no such proceeding or ordershall be reopened unless the person affected has had areasonable opportunity of being heard."3. Before the amendment, the original section 22 read asfollows:-''S.22.Transfer or partition made on or after the date ofthe commencement of this Act, but before the notifieddate.-(1) Where, on or after the date of the commencement ofthis Act, but before the notified date, any person hastransferred any land held by him by sale, gift (otherthan gift made in contemplation of death), exchange,surrender, settlement or in any other manner whatsoeverexcept by bequest or has effected a partition of hisholding or part thereof, the authorized officer withinwhose jurisdiction such land, holding or the major partthereof is situated may, after notice to such personand other persons affected by such transfer orpartition and after such enquiry as he thinks fit tomake, declare the transfer or partition to be void ifhe finds that the transfer or the partition, as thecase may be, defeats any of the provisions of thisAct."4. The statement of objects and reasons for bringing theamendment as set out in the original Bill may be usefully reproducedbelow:- ''Section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixationof Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act 58 of1961), provides that any transfer or partition, made onor after the date of the commencement of the Act, butbefore the notified date, may be declared to be void bythe authorised officer, if he finds that such transferor partition defeats any of the provisions of the Act.In many cases the authorised officers whileimplementing the Act have passed orders under section22 holding that the transfers or partitions effectedduring the said period as void. The orders passed undersection 22 have been taken on appeal to the Land https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Tribunal and the High Court by parties aggrieved. TheHigh Court in a batch of cases in Civil RevisionPetitions No.1824, 1825/65 and 44/66 has held that thetransfer made during the said period can be declaredvoid only if the authorized officer can come to theconclusion that the transaction is sham, nominal andbogus. The above judgment of the High Court has beentaken on appeal to the Supreme Court by the StateGovernment. However, during the pendency of appealbefore the Supreme Court, the authorized officers andthe Land Tribunals have followed the judgment of theMadras High Court and in many cases the transfereffected during the said period have been held to bevalid.2. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in the appealpreferred by the State Government referred to above andreported in Authorized Officer, Thanjavur -vs-S.Naganatha Ayyar (AIR 1979 SC 1487) has reversed thejudgment of the Madras High Court and interpretedSection 22 of the Act to the effect that if anytransfer defeats the provisions of the Act by reducingthe extent of surplus land in excess of the ceilingavailable from any person such transaction, bona fideor not shall be void in the matter of computation ofpermissible area and the surplus area.3. Based on the said judgment of the Supreme Court,many cases in which orders have been passed earlierholding the transaction as valid, have been reopenedand surplus land has been declared. All the past caseswhich have been re-opened, are now challenged beforethe Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunalon the ground that the Act does not confer any right orpower on the authorized officer to review such caseswhich have reached finality.4. It has, therefore, been decided to amend section22 of the said Act so as to be in consonance with theprinciples laid down by the Supreme Court in the casereferred to above and to make it clear that if anytransfer or partition, has the effect of reducing theextent of surplus land in excess of the ceiling area,such transfer or partition whether bona fide or not,shall be construed as defeating the provisions of thesaid Act.5. It has also been decided to make provisions forvalidating all acts done or proceedings taken by theauthorised officer and to reopen the past cases, based https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ on the said judgment of the Supreme Court. The Bill seeks to give effect to the abovedecision."5. These writ petitions were admitted on various dates and onnotice from this Court, counter affidavits have been filed by theState in all the writ petitions. Pending the writ petitions, in mostof the cases, stay of dispossession was granted by this Court. But,however, liberty was given to proceed with the other proceedings. Insome cases, there was an absolute stay granted by this Court. 6. Initially an objection was raised about the maintainabilityof the writ petitions as the declaratory relief was not made beforethe Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal. Though thedecision of the Supreme Court in L.Chandrakumar -vs- Union of Indiareported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 supports such view, it was contendedthat the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal was nothaving a Judicial Member and was functioning only with anAdministrative Member and, therefore, the Court should not refuse toentertain the writ petition. This Court, by an order dated 11.12.1997permitted the writ petitions to be entertained by this Court in viewof the fractured nature of the Appellate Tribunal. Subsequently itmust also be noted that the Tribunal itself had been abolished.7. In W.P.No.17115 of 1997, a miscellaneous petition was alsofiled seeking to raise certain additional grounds by the petitioner.But till date, no steps were taken to get the petition ordered bythis Court.8. While one set of writ petitions came up for hearing on04.11.2008, W.P.No.4083 of 1999 came up on 19.12.2008. Since in allthe writ petitions, identical contentions have been raised, they wereheard together and a common order is being passed.9. When orders were passed by the Authorised Officer, the saidmatter came up for consideration in a revision petition before thisCourt. The decision in the Civil Revision was rendered in S.NaganathaAyyar -vs- Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and another reported in(1970) 84 Mad LW 69. This Court while allowing the revision petitionheld that the Land Reforms Act being confiscatory in nature, thepublic authority invested with the power to enquire into and toinvalidate a transfer should act reasonably, and that such a powershould be construed beneficently in favour of the subject who isaffected by the statute. It was also held that the transactionsentered into in anticipation of the Ceiling Act will not be hit bythe provisions preventing such transfers except where they are malafide or colourable. It was also held by this Court that Section 22covers only sham, nominal and bogus transfers. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

10. The relevant passage found in the judgment may be usefullyextracted below:-''..... Section 22 seems to cover only those sham, nominaland bogus transfers which are only intended to defeat theprovisions of the Act. If the Legislative intention is alsoto invalidate all bona fide transactions during therelevant period, it would have made certain consequentialprovisions as to what are the rights of the transferor andthe transferee in relation to the property conveyed, andhow the resultant equities between the transferee and thetransferor have to be worked out. This view that Section 22will cover only transactions of sham, nominal and boguscharacters which are intended only to defeat the provisionsof the Act will not the inconsistent with the objectprovided in Section 7."11. Thus saying all the transactions other than those which comewithin the mischief of the section was allowed to go outside thepurview of section 22. Therefore, any transfer of land which tookplace between 06.4.1960 and 02.10.1962 namely the period between thedate of commencement of the Act and the notified date respectivelycan be declared void by the Authorised Officer only if he found thatthe transfer had defeated any of the provisions of the Act.12. The matter was taken on appeal by the State and heard by theSupreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal preferred by theAuthorised Officer vide its decision in Authorised Officer, Thanjavurand another -vs- S.Naganatha Ayyar and others reported in (1979) 3SCC 466. The Supreme Court in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the saidjudgment held as follows:-Para 11.''The learned Judge seems to take a liberal view thattransactions entered into in anticipation of theCeiling Act will not be hit by the provisionspreventing such transfers except where they are malafide or colourable. The reason partly turns onsemantics and the court argues with lexical support: “The word ‘defeat’ normally means ‘overcome,thwart, evade, frustrate, circumvent, bypass,disappoint, prevent the accomplishment of’ ...the word ‘defeat’ in Section 22 has to be takenas having been used to import sinister motive.Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes,twelfth Edn., after stating that the courtswill not be astute to narrow the language of astatute so as to allow persons within itspurview to escape its net, that the statute hasto be applied to the substance rather than the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ mere form of transactions, thus defeating anyshifts and contrivances which parties may havedevised in the hope of falling outside theAct.”The conclusion categorically reached by the High Courtvirtually emasculates Section 22 as we understand itsobject and import. The learned Judge winds up withthese words: “On a due consideration of the matter, I holdthat under Section 22 of the Act the authorisedofficer is entitled to declare as void onlythose transfers which are sham and nominalentered into with the avowed object ofdefeating the provisions of the Act, withoutany bona fide intention to transfer title. Soin the light of the view expressed above thefacts of each case have to be considered.”Section 22, literally read, leads only to oneconclusion, that any transfer, bona fide executed ornot, is liable to be declared void by the AuthorisedOfficer “if he finds that the transfer defeats any ofthe provisions of this Act”. There is not theslightest doubt that severally and cumulatively theprovisions of the Act seek to make available themaximum extent of land, in excess of the ceiling, tobe vested in Government for fulfilment of itspurposes. Chapter II contains a fasciculus ofprovisions in this behalf and if any transfer carvesout of the surplus area some land, pro tanto, theprovisions of the Act are defeated. Indeed, it is notseriously disputed that such will be the conclusion ifwe do not read into the provisions either thecondition that it does not apply to bone fidetransfers, as Shri Ramamurthi would have it, or doesnot apply to any transfers other than sham, nominal orbogus transfers, as the High Court would have it. Apolicy-oriented interpretation tallies with theliteral construction in the present case. The mischiefrule in Heydon case and the grammatical constructionwhich is the Golden Rule converge to the sameconclusion in the present case. Para 12. The policy of the law of land reform with drasticlimit on holdings often drives large holders to evadeby manouvres. They make gifts, execute sales orsettlements, enter into other dealings to save theirproperties from being taken by the State. May be in afew cases, the owner has real necessity. But why sellonly on the eve of land legislation? Why execute https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ deeds, though for good purposes, only where the billfixing ceilings is round the comer? By and large, thestrategies of extrication of holdings from the arm ofthe law is the reason that prompts sudden affectionfor making gifts, sudden realisation of debts due andsudden awareness of family necessity. The legislature,astute enough not to be outwitted in its objective,puts a blanket ban on transfers which, in effect,defeat its provisions. This may cause hardship to somebut every cause claims martyrs. Individual trauma isinevitable while ushering in a new economic order.This is the rationale of Section 22 of the CeilingAct. To allow the sense of the text and to mix alienconcepts is to debase the statutory metal. Likewise,laws are not value-free and so he reads the symbols ofwords best who projects in the process the values ofthe legislation as distinguished from his own. Readingother values into the legislators’ words mayjudicially demonetize the statute and break the comitybetween constitutional instrumentalities". 13. It was concluded in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the NaganathaAyyar's case and the same may be usefully extracted below:-Para 16. In the interpretation of Section 22 we too are Portiamen. For this reason we reverse the view of the HighCourt that Section 22 will not apply to nullify anytransaction of transfer or partition unless it isfurther shown that it is sham, nominal or bogus. Nordo we agree with Shree Ramamurthi that even if atransaction defeats the ceiling provisions, it maystill be valid if the transfer is, from an individualpoint of view bona fide. The short reply is that fromthe community’s angle, especially the landlesscommunity’s angle hungering for allotment, thealienation, however necessary for the individual, isnot bona fide vis-a-vis the community.Para 17. Therefore, we allow the appeal in the light of theinterpretation we have adopted, restore the Tribunal’sholding and rule that if any transfer defeats theprovisions of the Act by reducing the extent ofsurplus land in excess of the ceiling available fromany person such transaction, bona fide or not, is voidin the matter of computation of the permissible areaand the surplus area. May be, that the transaction maybe good for other purposes or may not be. TheAuthorised Officer is within his power if he ignoresit as void for purposes of Section 22 Section 7 andother ceiling-related provisions." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

14. In order to give effect to the said decision, the impugnedamendment came to be made by the Legislature and it was also made tocome into effect from the date of the principal enactment. In thecounter affidavit filed by the State it is stated that theamendments were given retrospective effect as per the principles laiddown by the Supreme Court in Naganatha Ayyar's case (cited supra). Itis also brought to the notice that the amendments are made to giveeffect to the principles laid down in Article 39(b) and (c) of theConstitution and found in Part IV containing the Directive Principlesof State Policy. As the principal Act was also included in the IXSchedule to the Constitution, it is not liable for any judicialreview on the ground of violation of any of the Fundamental Rights inview of Article 31-B of the Constitution.15. Mr.T.K.Seshadri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for someof the petitioners contended that the amendments are ultra vires theConstitution. In this context, he referred to the judgment of theSupreme Court in P.Sambamurthy and others -vs- State of AndhraPradesh and another reported in (1987) 1 SCC 362. Reliance was placedupon the following passage found in paragraph 4, which may beusefully reproduced below:-Para 4. ''Now if the exercise of the power of judicial reviewcan be set at naught by the State Government byoverriding the decision given against it, it wouldsound the death knell of the rule of law. The ruleof law would cease to have any meaning, because thenit would be open to the State Government to defy thelaw and yet to get away with it. The proviso toclause (5) of Article 371-D is therefore clearlyviolative of the basic structure doctrine".16. For the very same proposition, he also placed reliance uponthe judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96(II) in the matter of : Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal. Thefollowing passage found in paragraph 77 is relevant and it may beusefully reproduced below:-Para 77. ''.............Hence any executive order or alegislative enactment of a State which interfereswith the adjudicatory process and adjudication bysuch Tribunal is an interference with the judicialpower of the State. In view of the fact that theOrdinance in question seeks directly to nullify theorder of the Tribunal passed on June 25, 1991 itimpinges upon the judicial power of the State andis, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

17. Based upon these two judgments, the learned Senior Counselsubmitted that since the Authorised Officer has the trappings of aCourt and already orders have been passed by the said Officer, whichhad become final, the same cannot be reopened. The decision renderedby the Authorised Officer is a judicial order and the amendment,inasmuch as the impugned Act gives power to reopen such of thosecases, should be declared as unconstitutional.18. Mr.Vijayakumar, learned counsel appearing forM/s.T.R.Rajaraman, submitted that invalidating a bona fide transferthat too by a retrospective amendment is wholly illegal. The StateLegislature lacks legislative competence for enacting such anamendment. For this purpose, he placed reliance upon the judgment ofthe Supreme Court in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and another -vs-Broach Borough Municipality and others reported in (1969) 2 SCC 283.19. He also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court inS.R.Bhagwat and others -vs- State of Mysore reported in (1995) 6 SCC16. After referring to paragraphs 15, 17 and 18, he submitted thatonce a decision made by the authority has become final and the Statehas not challenged the said decision before a competent Court, thelegislative power cannot be pressed into service to undo the bindingeffect of such orders passed by the Court. 20. He also placed reliance upon the judgment of the SupremeCourt in State of Tamil Nadu -vs- Arooran Sugars Ltd. reported in(1997) 1 SCC 326 and wanted to emphasize that even if the Legislaturehas power to make a retrospective legislation, it cannot invalidatethe decisions which were rendered already.21. For the very same purpose, he also placed reliance upon thejudgment of the Supreme Court in Commr. Karanataka Housing Board-vs- C.Muddaiah reported in (2007) 7 SCC 689. Reliance was placedupon paragraph 20 of the said judgment, which reads as follows:-Para 20. ''In that case also, it was contended by the Statethat the petitioners were not entitled toconsequential benefits in view of legislativeprovision and overriding effect under Section 11 ofthe Act. The Court, however, negatived thecontention. It observed that it is open to acompetent legislature to remove a defect in alegislation. Such enactment or validating statutecould not be held unconstitutional or ultra vires.But it is equally well settled that a bindingjudicial pronouncement between the parties cannotbe made ineffective or inoperative with the aid oflegislative power by making a provision which, insubstance and in reality, overrides and overrules adecision rendered by a competent court. Such https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ process virtually renders a judicial decisionineffective by indirectly exercising appellatepower over a judicial forum which isimpermissible....." 22. Mr.A.Sivaji, learned counsel appearing for some of thepetitioners thereafter contended that since the principal Act wasincluded in the IX Schedule, the Supreme Court in Naganatha Ayyar'scase (cited supra) did not go into the violation of FundamentalRights. To his knowledge, the Amended Act had not been included inthe IX Schedule and, therefore, there is no impediment for this Courtto go into the constitutional validity of the amendment and have afresh look on the same. 23. For this proposition, he relied upon the Division Benchjudgment of this Court in Rajasheriff -vs- Government of Tamil Naduand another reported in 2001 (4) CTC 577. The learned counsel statedthat though the said judgment was rendered in the context of Section23A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 brought in by a Tamil NaduAmendment Act, the reasoning given therein is applicable to theimpugned amendment also. 24. The learned counsel also submitted that the retrospectivenature and effect of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in its decision inR.Rajagopal Reddy (dead) by LRs and others -vs- PadminiChandrasekharan (dead) by LRs reported in (1995) 2 SCC 630. Therethe Supreme Court held that the Act will not have any retrospectiveoperation and will not apply to pending suits already filed andentertained prior to the coming into force of Section 4 of the BenamiTransactions (Prohibition) Act. He also stated that when adeclaration is made by the Legislature it is not conclusive and attimes it may be amending the law and, therefore, need not beretrospective in character.25. Therefore, all the learned counsel for the petitioners havesubmitted that since in the respective cases as there were no findingby the Authorised Officer that the transfers effected were not bonafide and those orders were not under challenge in the manner known tolaw, the amendment cannot create any right on the part of the Stateto reopen the concluded orders. Hence to the extent the impugned lawshould be struck down as invalid. 26. Before venturing into the rival submission by the State, itmust be stated that the proviso to Section 6 of the Amended Actimpugned in the writ petition as extracted above clearly sets outthat by virtue of the amendment no proceeding or order shall bereopened under the section after the expiry of the period of fiveyears from the date of publication of this Act in the Tamil NaduGovernment Gazette. The Act was published in the Tamil Nadu https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Government Gazette (Extraordinary) Issue No.224 on 10.5.1996.Further, the Authorised Officer must also give reasonable opportunityto the affected parties before reopening a case. Therefore, theLegislature itself thought it fit to safeguard the interest andprevent any uncertainty by enabling the Authorising Officer to reopenthe orders made already. They are necessary legislative safeguardsmade by the State. 27. Mr.R.P.Kabilan, learned Additional Advocate Generalsubmitted that the amendment was made only to give effect to theSupreme Court judgment in Naganatha Ayyar's case (cited supra).During the relevant period, by virtue of the decision of the DivisionBench, the Authorised Officers were forced to accept all transfersunless there was fraudulent transaction. Once the Supreme Courtrendered a judgment upholding a particular provision, it is as if thesaid provision was always in the statute book. The judgment did notmake any prospective overruling. Therefore, section 22 as enacted inthe year 1961 and interpreted by the Supreme Court will apply to actsof parties. The amendment is a mere reiteration of the judgment ofthe Supreme Court. Therefore, no one can claim that any right vestedon them was taken away by the impugned amendment.28. In this context, the learned Additional Advocate Generalreferred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana andothers -vs- Karnal Co-operative Farmers' Society Limited and othersreported in (1993) 2 SCC 363. This is for the purpose of showing thatthe Legislature has legislative power to render ineffective theearlier judicial decision by removing or altering or neutralising thelegal basis in the unamended law on which such decisions were foundedeven retrospectively. He also submitted that this is not a case wherethe earlier judicial decisions have been rendered ineffective byusing legislative power. 29. The learned Additional Advocate General also referred to thejudgment of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat -vs- VoraSaiyedbhai Kadarbhai and others reported in (1995) 3 SCC 196. Theargument was that a social welfare legislation even if it affectssome citizens, will not make the law unconstitutional. In the lightof the same, he sought for dismissal of the writ petitions.30. It must be stated that the Supreme Court in its judgment inState of Tamil Nadu -vs- Arooran Sugars Limited reported in (1997) 1SCC 326 in paragraph 16 held as follows:-Para 16. The scope of a non obstante clause and of ValidatingAct has been examined by this Court from time totime. Reference in this connection be made to thejudgment in the case of Shri Prithvi Cotton MillsLtd. v. Broach Borough Municipality (1969) 2 SCC 283,where Hidayatullah, C.J. speaking for the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Constitution Bench said: (SCC pp.286-87, para 4)“When a legislature sets out to validate a taxdeclared by a court to be illegally collectedunder an ineffective or an invalid law, thecause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must beremoved before validation can be said to takeplace effectively. The most important condition,of course, is that the legislature must possessthe power to impose the tax, for, if it doesnot, the action must ever remain ineffective andillegal. Granted legislative competence, it isnot sufficient to declare merely that thedecision of the court shall not bind for that istantamount to reversing the decision in exerciseof judicial power which the legislature does notpossess or exercise. A court’s decision mustalways bind unless the conditions on which it isbased are so fundamentally altered that thedecision could not have been given in thealtered circumstances. Ordinarily, a court holdsa tax to be invalidly imposed because the powerto tax is wanting or the statute or the rules orboth are invalid or do not sufficiently createthe jurisdiction. Validation of a tax sodeclared illegal may be done only if the groundsof illegality or invalidity are capable of beingremoved and are in fact removed and the tax thusmade legal. Sometimes this is done by providingfor jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not beenproperly invested before. Sometimes this is doneby re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legaltaxing provision and then by fiction making thetax already collected to stand under the re-enacted law. Sometimes the legislature gives itsown meaning and interpretation of the law underwhich the tax was collected and by legislativefiat makes the new meaning binding upon courts.The legislature may follow any one method or allof them and while it does so it may neutralisethe effect of the earlier decision of the courtwhich becomes ineffective after the change ofthe law.’’The same view was reiterated in the cases of WestRamnad Electric Distribution Co. Ltd. v. State ofMadras AIR 1962 SC 1753; Udai Ram Sharma v. Union ofIndia AIR 1968 SC 1138; Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath v.State of U.P. (1973) 3 SCC 585; Krishna ChandraGangopadhyaya v. Union of India (1975) 2 SCC 302;Hindustan Gum & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (1985) 4 SCC 124; Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P)Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1987) Supp SCC 751; D. Cawasji& Co v. State of Mysore 1984 Supp SCC 490 andBhubaneshwar Singh v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 77.It is open to the legislature to remove the defectpointed out by the court or to amend the definition orany other provision of the Act in questionretrospectively. In this process it cannot be said thatthere has been an encroachment by the legislature overthe power of the judiciary. A court’s directive mustalways bind unless the conditions on which it is basedare so fundamentally altered that under alteredcircumstances such decisions could not have been given.This will include removal of the defect in a statutepointed out in the judgment in question, as well asalteration or substitution of provisions of theenactment on which such judgment is based, withretrospective effect. This is what has happened in thepresent case. The judgment of the High Court in WritPetition No. 1464 of 1974, dated 8-10-1976 was solelybased on the amendments which had been introduced byAct 7 of 1974. If those amendments so introduced havebeen effaced by Act 25 of 1978 with retrospectiveeffect saying that it shall be deemed that no suchamendments had ever been introduced in the PrincipalAct, then full effect has to be given to the provisionsof the later Act unless they are held to be ultra viresor unconstitutional". (Emphasis Added)31. Therefore, from the above it is clear that the legislaturehas a power to enact a retrospective legislation for the purpose ofclarifying certain ambiguity that has been created by the judgment ofthe Court. It is only with a view to neutralise the decision renderedin this regard. In the present case, the decision of the DivisionBench in Naganatha Ayyar's case (cited supra) was reversed by theSupreme Court which gave the true nature of Section 22. Once such adecision is rendered it must be deemed that it has always been in thestatute book as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The presentamendment did not make a new amendment to the provision but only gavestatutory backing to the interpretation given by the Supreme Court inNaganatha Ayyar's case (cited supra). 32. Therefore, if an Authorised Officer had given an order infavour of any of the petitioners ignoring the legal provision, suchan order can only be a nullity as it had not taken note of the truelegislative meaning as well as the intent and purport of section 22.Section 22(2) as amended by the impugned Amendment Act has restoredthe correct meaning and the spirit of the Act. The petitioners cannotattack the said amendment as if it has taken away their vested right. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The truth of the matter is that they have no vested right in making atransfer to defeat the very purpose of the legislative injunctionover such transfers. Further, the amendment itself has put an embargoby prescribing a limitation for reopening the issues beyond fiveyears from the date of the gazette notification. Hence, it cannot besaid that the legislation is arbitrary or it had taken away judicialdecisions.33. After the nine Judges' bench judgment of the Supreme Courtin J.R.Coelho (dead) by LRs -vs- State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2007AIR SCW 611, it has been held that notwithstanding Article 31-B ofthe Constitution, any legislation included in the IX Schedule stillcan be judicially reviewed if it infringes basic structure of theConstitution. But in the present case, no such argument was advancedto go into the immunity conferred by Article 31-B.34. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for thepetitioners referred to above do not advance the cause of thepetitioners. In the light of the above, the challenge to the impugnedamendment stands rejected. All the writ petitions will standdismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. All themiscellaneous petitions stand closed.Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.JsTo1. The Secretary to Government, Law Department, Fort St.George, Chennai-9. 2. The Assistant Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Erode. 3. The Assistant Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Coimbatore. 4. The Assistant Commissioner, (Land Reforms),Tiruchirappalli. 5. The Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Tiruchirappalli. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

6. The Authorised Officer & Assistant Commissioner (Land Reforms), Erode. 7. The Assistant Commissioner, (Land Reforms), Villupuram.+ 1 CC to Mr.T.K.Bhaskar,Advocate,SR.7743W.P.Nos.19088 & 17115 of 1997, 10192, 18446,18447 of 1998, 4083 of 1999 & 18339 of 2000SGL(CO)EM/17.3.09