M/S. DHARANI SUGAR & CHEMICALS LTD v. IN WA 539/09 THE MANAGING DIRECTOR

THOZHILALARGAL VIVASAYIGAL SANGAM REP. BY ITS SECRETARY I.PANDIAN PINNALVADI AND POST ELAVANASURKOTTAI- 607 202ULUNDURPET TALUK VILLUPURAM DIST...I RESPONDENT IN W.A.539/09, 527/09,1691/09/ WRIT PETITIONERKRISHNAGIRI MAAVATTA ORUNGINAINTHA KARUMBU VIVASAYIGAL SANGAM REGD.NO.129/2008REP. BY ITS PRESIDENT S.MOORTHI UTHANGARRAI 635 207 KRISHNAGIRI DIST...I RESPONDENT IN W.A.540/09,1696/09/ WRIT PETITIONER TAMIL NADU KARUMBU VIVASAYIGAL SANGAM REGD.NO.19/88REP. BY ITS THATCHAMPATTU DIVISION PRESIDENT M.KODHANADARAMAN THATCHAMPATTU POST,TIRUVANNAMALAI DIST. ..IST RESPONDENT IN W.A.541/09,1697/09/PETITIONER KARUMBU URPATHIALARGAL SANGAM REG.NO.36/95REP BY ITS PRESIDENT R.MUTHUKRISHNAN CHENGAM TIRUVANNAMALAI DIST ...I RESPONDENT IN W.A.542/09, 543/09,1698/09,1700/09/PETITIONERS. JAYAKUMAR..I RESPONDENT IN W.A.544/09, 1701/09/ PETITIONER M.S. NATARAJAN..I RESPONDENT IN W.A.545/09, 1702/09TAMIL NADU KARUMBU VIVASAYIGAL SANGAM REGD.NO.19/88,REP BY ITS ARUMPAVOOR DIVISION SECRETARY N.PALANIVELS/O. NALLIAPPA GOUNDER MALAIYALAPATTI VEPPANTHATTAI TK PERAMBALUR DIST... I RESPONDENT IN W.A.546/09, 1699/09/PETITIONERRASIPURAM TALUKA KARUMBU URPATHIYALARGAL SANGAM REP;. BY ITS PRESIDENT MR.A.RAMASAMY GOUNDER 27/10 KUTHAKAITHARAR THOTTAM R PATTANAM POST RASIPURAM TALUK NAMAKKAL DIST. ..I RESPONDENT IN W.A.547/09, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1690/09/PETITIONERTAMILNADU KARUMBU VIVASAYIGAL SANGAM REGD.NO.19/88 REP BY ITS PASUMBALUR DIVISION PRESIDENTA.K.RAJENDRAN S/O. KULANDAIVELANNALAKSHMI NINAIVAGAM NALLASIVAM NAGAR THURAIMANGAM, PERAMBALUR..I RESPONDENT IN W.A.548/09,W.A.1695/09/PETITIONER K. KULANDAIVELUS/O. KUMARASAMY UDAYAR...I RESPONDENT IN W.A.571/09 1692/09/PETITIONER2. THE DIRECTOR/COMMISSIONER OF SUGAR CANE COMMISSIONER, NO.474, ANNA SALAI, NANDANAM, CHENNAI – 600 035...2ND RESPONDENT IN WA.401/98535,536,537,538,540,541,546,548,571,1456/099TH RESPONDENT IN WA.544/09R3 IN WA.545,547,572/09THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADUREP. BY ITS SECRETARY INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT FORT ST. GEORGE CHENNAI-9...2ND RESPONDENT IN WA.539,572/09, 5TH RESPONDENT IN WA.545/09,1456/09THE SECRETARYMINISTRY OF FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLY AND CONSUMER AFFIARS GOVT OF INDIA KRISHI BHAVAN NEW DELHI 110 001 ..2ND RESPONDENT IN WA.542/09,543/09 4TH RESPONDENT IN WA.1698/09,1700/09A. KUPPUSAMY..2ND RESPONDENT INW.A.544/09THEKALLAKURICHI CO-OP SUGAR MILLS REP. BY ITS SPECIAL OFFICER MOONGILTHURAIPATTU VILLUPURAM DIST...2ND RESPONDENT IN WA.1693/09,1694/09,1697/09, 1703/09A. KUPPUSAMY..2ND RESPONDENT IN WA.1701/09THIRU AROORAN SUGARS LTD.'ELDORADO', 5TH FLOOR,112, NUNGAMBAKKAM HIGH ROAD,CHENNAI – 600 034, REPRESENTED BYSRI R.V.TYAGARAJAN, CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ THE KALLAKURICHI-ICO OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS REP BY ITS SPECIAL OFFICER KATCHIRAYAPALAYAM VILLUPURAM DIST...3RD RESPONDENT IN WA.535/09, 536,537,541/09THE CHIEF EXECUTIVEPERAMBALUR SUGAR MILLS ERAIYUR PERAMBALUR DIST...3RD RESPONDENT IN WA.538/09, 546/09,548/09,571/09, 2ND RESPONDENT IN WA.1692/09, 1695/09,1699/09THE DIRECTOR OF SUGAR ANDCANE COMMISSIONER MOUNT ROAD NANDANAM CHENNAI-35...3RD RESPONDENT IN W.A.539/09THE SPECIAL OFFICERTHIRUPATHUR CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD. KETHANDAPATTI VANIYAMBADI TALUK VELLORE DIST. ...3RD RESPONDENT IN W.A.540/09 2ND RESPONDENT IN W.A.1696/09, 1698/09,1700/09THE STATE GOVT OF TAMILNADUREP BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY FORT ST GEORGE,CHENNAI-9..3RD RESPONDENT IN WA.542,543/09 P. LAXMANAN..3RD RESPONDENT IN W.A.544/09THE MANAGING DIRECTORTHIRUAARURAN SUGAR MILL A-CHITTOOR VIRUDHACHALAM TK CUDDALORE DIST ..3RD RESPONDENT IN W.A.1692/09THE CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR,BANNARI AMMAN SUGARS LTD.,KOLUNDAMPATTU VILLAGE,THANDARAMPATTU TALUK,TIRUVANNAMALAI DISTRICT. ..3RD RESPONDENT IN W.A.NOS.1696, 1697/2009THE MANAGING DIRECTOR,BANNARI AMMAN SUGARS LTD.,REGD. OFFICE 1212, TRICHY ROAD, COIMBATORE - 641 018. ..3RD RESPONDENT IN W.A.NOS.1698, 1700/2009 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ P. LAXMANAN ..3RD RESPONDENT IN WA.1701/2009THE MANAGING DIRECTOR DHARANI SUGARS & CHEMICALS LTD., PGP HOUSE, NUNGAMBAKKAM, CHENNAI-34...3RD RESPONDENT IN.WA.1703/2009SHREE AMBIKA SUGARS LIMITED,'ELDORADO', 5TH FLOOR,112, NUNGAMBAKKAM HIGH ROAD,.. 3RD & 4TH RESPONDENTSCHENNAI – 600 034. IN WA.401/98/RESPONDENTS(R4 IMPLEADED AS PARTYRESPONDENT VIDE ORDER OF COURT DT.08.09.2009,MADE IN WAMP NO.82 OF 2009). THE MANAGING DIRECTOR,THIRUAARURAN SUGAR MILL,A. CHITTOOR,VIRDHACHALAM TALUK,CUDDALORE DISTRICT. ..4TH RESPONDENT IN WA.538/2009THIRU AAROORAN SUGARSNO.112, MOUNT ROAD,CHENNAI-34. ..4TH RESPONDENT IN WA.539/2009THE COMMISSIONER OF SUGARCANE,PERIYAR BUILDING,ANNA SALAI,NANDANAM, CHENNAI 600 035. ..4TH RESPONDENT IN WA.542 & 543/09S. PERIYASAMY ..4TH RESPONDENT IN WA.NOS.544 & 1701/09M/S. DHARANI SUGARS AND CHEMICALSREP. BY ITS SENIOR MANAGER (LEGAL)MR. B. NAGARAJAN ..4TH RESPONDENT INWA.571/2009 5TH RESPONDENT IN WA.NO.572/2009CHENGALRAYAN CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLSPERIYASEVALAI, ULUNDURPET TALUK,VILLUPURAM DISTRICT...4TH RESPONDENT IN WA.572/09 2ND RESPONDENT IN WA.1691/2009 5TH RESPONDENT IN WA.539/2009DHANALAKSHMI SRINIVASAN SUGARS (P) LTD.,REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,UDUMBIYAM VILLAGE,VEPPANTHATTAI TALUK,PERAMBALUR DISTRICT...4TH RESPONDENT IN WA.1456/2009 3RD RESPONDENT IN WA.NOS.1690,1702, 1695,1699/2009 9TH RESPONDENT IN WA.1701/2009 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ DHARANI SUGARS & CHEMICALSREP. BY ITS SENIOR MANAGER (LEGAL)MR. B. NAGARAJAN..4TH RESPONDENT IN WA.NOS.1691 AND 1692/2009 3RD RESPONDENT IN WA.NOS.1693 AND 1694/2009(IMPLEADED AS PER COURT ORDER DATED 01.04.2009 IN WPMP.NO.1308/2008 IN WP.NO.24941/2005.IMPLEADED AS PER COURT ORDER DATED 01.04.2009 IN WPMP. NO.1309/2008 IN WP.NO.1786/2006)THE THIRUPATHUR CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD.,REP. BY ITS SPECIAL OFFICER,KETHANDAPATTI,VELLORE DISTRICT - 635 815. ..5TH RESPONDENT IN WA.542 & 543/09N. THAMARAISELVAM ..5TH RESPONDENT IN WA.544 & 1701/09CHICKKAN ..6TH RESPONDENT IN WA.544 & 1701/09SUBRAMANIYAM ..7TH RESPONDENT IN WA.544 & 1701/09THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENTAGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT,SECRETARIAT, CHENNAI- 9. ..8TH RESPONDENT IN WA.544/2009 1ST RESPNDENT IN WA.1456/09 2ND RESPONDENT IN W.A.NOS.545 & 547/2009SALEM CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD., REP BY SPECIAL OFFICER,MOHANUR, NAMAKKAL DISTRICT...10TH RESPONDENT IN WA.544/09 2ND RESPONDENT IN W.A.1702/09 3RD RESPONDENT IN W.A.NO.1456 & 1690/2009 4TH RESPONDENT IN W.A.NOS.545 & 547/2009 8TH RESPONDENT IN WA.1701/09THE STATE OF TAMIL NADUREP. BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT,SECRETARIAT, CHENNAI-9...11TH RESPONDENT IN WA.544/20091.UNION OF INDIA, REP.BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, DEPT. OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT UDYOG BHAVAN, NEW DELHI-1. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.THE COMMISSIONER OF SUGAR AND CANE COMMISSIONER, 474, ANNA SALAI, NANDANAM, CHENNAI-35.3.THIRU AROORAM SUGARS LTD., “ELDORADO”, 5TH FLOOR, 112 NUNGAMBAKKAM HIGH ROAD, CHENNAI-34, REP. BY ITS DEPUTY GENERAL MANGER (CANE)SRI. S. PANCHAPAKESAN.(R3 IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER OF COURT DATED 7.1.1998 IN WPMP.NO.28/98)4.SHREE AMBIKA SUGARS LIMITED “ELDORADO”, 5TH FLOOR, 112, NUNGAMBAKKAM HIGH ROAD, CHENNAI-34. (R4 IMPLEADED AS PER COURT ORDER DT.8.9.2009 IN WPMP.622/09 IN WP.19322/97) ..RESPONDENTS 1 TO 4 IN WP.19322/971 STATE OF TAMILNADU REP BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, AGRICULTURE DEPT., SECRETARIAT, CHENNAI 9.2 THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU REP BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRIES DEPT., SECRETARIAT, CHENNAI 9.3 COMMISSIONER OF SUGAR AND CANE COMMISSIONER, NANDANAM, CHENNAI 35.4 SALEM COOPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD, REP BY ITS SPECIAL OFFICER, MOHANUR, NAMAKKAL DISTRICT.5 DHANALAKSHMI SRINIVASAN SUGARS (P) LTD, REP BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, UDUMBIYAM VILLAGE, VEPPANTHATTAI TALUK, PERAMBALUR DISTRICT ..RESPONDENTS 1 TO 5 IN WP.24057/091 THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, CHENNAI-9.2 COMMISSIONER OF SUGAR AND CANE COMMISSIONER, NANDANAM, CHENNAI-35.3 SALEM CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD, REP. BY ITS SPECIAL OFFICER, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ MOHANUR, NAMAKKAL DISTRICT.4 DHANALAKSHMI SRINIVASAN SUGARS (P) LTD, REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, UDUMBIYAM VILLAGE, VEPPANTHATTAI TALUK, PERAMBALUR DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENTS 1 TO 4 IN WP.24233/091 THE COMMISSIONER OF SUGAR & CANE, PERIYAR BUILDING, ANNA SALAI, NANDANAM, CHENNAI-35.2 THE TIRUPATTUR CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LIMITED, REP. BY ITS SPECIAL OFFICER, KETHANDIPATTI, VELLORE DISTRICT.3 THE KALLAKURICHI-I CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD. REP. BY ITSSPECIAL OFFICER, MOONGILTHURAIPATTU, VILLUPURAM DISTRICT.4 M/S. BANNARI AMMAN SUGARS LTD. REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, 1212, TRICHY ROAD, COIMBATORE-641 018. ..RESPONDENTS 1 TO 4 IN WP.9246/09Prayer in W.A.No.401 of 1998:Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 ofthe Letters Patent Act against the order of this Court dated27.02.1998, passed in W.M.P.No.30285 of 1997 in W.P.No.19322 of 1997.WMP.No.30285/97: To stay all further proceedings of the impugnedorder passed by the 2nd Respondent made in RC.No.23364/D1/94 dated4.12.1997 pending disposal of the above WP.19322/97.WP.No.19322/97: The WP filed under Article 226 of the constitution ofIndia praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus calling forthe entire records relating to the impugned order passed by the 2ndrespondent made in RC.No.23364/D1/94 dated 4.12.1997 and quash thesame in so far as it relates to withdrawal of areas from N.P.K.R.RCooperative Sugar Mills, Thalainayar, Nagapattinam District andConsequently for bear the 2nd respondent from demarcating the areas.W.A.No.535/09 & W.A.No.1703/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.19742/2008: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for therecords of 1st respondent in his proceedings in R.C.No.21938/Cane.1/2007 dated 15.05.08 and quash the same in so far relateto change over the part of Reshivandiyam Firka in respect of thefollowing villages viz. Endal Periapagandai into 3rd respondentsugar mill. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ W.A.No.536/09 & W.A.No.1693/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.18226/2008: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call forthe records of 1st respondent in his proceedings inR.C.No.21938/cane.1/2007 dt 15.5.2008 and quash the same in so farrelate to change over the Tirupalapandal Firka four villagesmadampoondi Aruthungudi Irumbalakurichi and Kuvanur into 3rdrespondent sugar mill.W.A.No.537/09 & W.A.No.1694/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.13413/2008: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call forthe records of 1st respondent in his proceedings inR.C.No.21938/Cane.1/2007 dated 15.5.2008 and quash the same in sofar relate to change over the Thiyagadurgam Firka into 3rd Respondentsugar Mill.W.A.No.538/09 & W.A.No.571/09 & W.A.No.1692/09 against the orderdated 20.4.2009 in W.P.No.1786/2006: Writ Petition filed underArticle 226 of Constitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari,to call for the entire records of 1st respondent in his proceedingsNo RC No. 22677/Cane.1/2003 dated 08.07.2004 and quash the same.WA No.539 & 572/09 & WA.1691/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009in WP.24941/05:Writ petition filed under Article 226 ofconstitution of India to issue writ of Certiorarified Mandamus tocall for the records of the 1st respondent in G.O.(D) No.62,Agriculture (Sugarcane)Department, dated 23.3.2005 and consequentialproceedings in Rc.No.18805/Cane/1/04-IV, dated 20.5.2005 on the fileof II Respondent insofar as it relates to (i) Elavanasurkottai Firkafull (2) Eraiyur Firka Part and (3) Ulundurpet Firka Part ofUlundurpet Taluk and quash the same and direct the 4th respondent toregister the sugar cane relating to the areas of the petitionersSangam.W.A.No.540/09 & W.A.No.1696/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.18153/2008: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to Call for therecords of 1st respondent in his proceedingsNo.R.C.No.2459/Cane.1/2008 dated 6.6.2008 in so far relates tochange over the singarapet and kallavi firkas to the 3rd respondentsugar mill and quash the same.W.A.No.541/09 & W.A.No.1697/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.18930/2008: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for therecords of 1st respondent in his proceedingsNo.R.C.No.2459/Cane.1/2008 dated 6.6.2008 and quash the same insofarrelate to change over the Thatchampattu (Part) Firka into 3rdRespondent Sugar Mill. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ W.A.No.542/09 & W.A.No.1698/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.21006/2008: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for therecords in RC No. 2459/Cane 1/2008 dated 6.6.2008 on the file of the3rd respondent and quash the same.W.A.No.543/09 & W.A.No.1700/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.26517/2008: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call forthe records in RC No.15967/Cane 1/2008 dated 25.8.2008 on the file of3rd respondent and quash the same.W.A.No.544/09 & W.A.No.1456/09 & W.A.No.1701/09 against the orderdated 20.4.2009 in W.P.No.29617/2008: Writ Petition filed underArticle 226 of Constitution of India to issue a Writ ofCertiorarified Mandamus, to call for the records pertaining toG.O.Ms.468 Industries (MICI) Department dated 6.12.1993 andG.O.Ms.No.217 Industries (MICI) department dated 18.8.1997 of the 5threspondent herein and proceedings in R.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008 dated3.6.2008 on the file of 2nd respondent herein and quash the same inso far as the same relates to four firkas viz. 1) Uppliapuram 2)Thuraiyur 3) Erakudi in Thuraiyur Taluk and 4) Thathiankarpet inMusri Taluk and consequently direct the respondents 1 to 3 hereinregister the sugar cane crop of the petitioners herein for supplyingthe same to the Third Respondent during the year 2009-10 and infuture.W.A.No.545/09 & W.A.No.1702/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.30858/08: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, tocall for the records pertaining to G.O.Ms. No. 468 Industries(MICI) department dated 06-12-1993 and G.O.Ms. No. 217 Industries(MICI) Department dated 18-8-1997 of the 5th respondent herein andproceedings in R.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008 dated 03-06-2008 on the fileof the 2nd respondent herein and quash the same in so far as thesame relate Rasipuram Taluk and consequently direct the respondents1 to 3 herein register the sugar cane crop of the petitioner hereinfor supplying the same to the 3rd respondent.W.A.No.546/09 & W.A.No.1699/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.22492/2008: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for therecords of 1st respondent in his proceedingsNo.R.C.No.5972/Cane.1/2008 dated 3.6.2008 in so far relate tochange over the Vengalam Firka in so far relates to Malaiyalapattivillage Kottarakunni Village Gounderpalayam Sasthiripuram M.V.Puram Koraiyar and Chinnamutil into 3rd respondent sugar mill andquash the same.W.A.No.547/09 & W.A.No.1690/09: against the order dated 20.4.09 in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ W.P.No.19350/08: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for therecords of 2nd respondent in his proceedings in R.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008 dated 03.06.2008 and quash the same in so far as the samerelates to five firkas viz. 1) Vennandur 2) Mangalapuram 3)Namagiripettai 4) Rasipuram and 5) Mullikuruchi in Rasipuram Taluk.W.A.No.548/09 & W.A.No.1695/09 against the order dated 20.4.2009 inW.P.No.16266/08: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 ofConstitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for therecords of 1st respondent in his proceedingsNo.R.C.No.5972/Cane.1/2008 dated 03.06.2008 in so far relate tochange over the Pasambalur Firka in so far relates to Agaram VillageTiruvalanthurai Village and Pasambalur Village into 3rd respondentsugar mill and quash the same.Presented under Article 226 of constitution of India to issuewrit of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the entire recordsrelating to the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent made inRC No.23364/D1/94, dated 4.12.1997, quash the same in so far as itrelates to withdrawl of areas from the N.P.K.R.R. Cooperative SugarMills, Thalainayar, Nagapattinam District and consequently for bearthe 2nd respondent and his men from demarcating the areas.(W.P.No.19322/1997)b) Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records pertainingto G.O.Ms. 468 Industries (MICI) department dated 6.12.1993 andG.O.ms.No.217 Industries (MICI) department dated 18.8.1997, of the2nd respondent herein and proceedings in R.C. No. 5972/Cane-1/2008dated 3.6.2008, on the file of the 3rd respondent herein and quashthe same in so far as the same relates to five firkas viz. 1.Uppliapuam 2. Thuraiyur 3. Koppampatti 4. Erakudi in Thuraiyurtaluk and 5.Thathiankarpet in Musri taluk and consequently direct therespondents 1 to 4 herein to register the sugar cane crop of themembers of the petitioner herein for supplying the same to the 4threspondent herein during the year 2009-10 and in fulltime.(w.p.nO.24057 OF 2009) c) Certiorarified Mandamus Calling for the records of the 2ndrespondent herein in his proceedings in R.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008 dated3.6.2008 and quash the same in so far as the same relates topetitioner herein and direct the respondents 1 to 3 to permit thepetitioner to continue to supply sugar cane to the 3rd respondentsugar Mill. (WP No.24233 of 2009)d) Mandamus directing the 1st respondent to ensure that 2nd and3rd respondents are not entitled to register the sugarcane in thearea allotted to the 4th respondent in so far as it relates to thecane growers other than the writ petitioners inW.P.Nos.18153/08,18930/08, 21006/08 and 26517/2008.(WP No.9246/2009)For Appellant/ Petitioner https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ W.A.401/1998 and in W.P.19322/97. Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, for M/s.T.Ravikumar.W.A.535 to 539/09 Mr.A.L.Somayaji Senior Counsel for Mr.V.Bharathidasan WA 540 to 543/09, 571 &572/09 Mr.Aravind Datar SC for Mr.Sathish Parasaran & M/s.Indira RameshMr.Md.Ismail for impleading party in MP.2 of 2009 in W.A.542/09WA.544 to 548/09Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy Senior Counselfor Mr.R.Suresh Kumar WA.No.1456/09, andWP.24057/09Mr.K.Doraisamy Sr Counsel for Mr.V.R.Rajasekaran WP.24233/09Mr.S.MuthukumarWP.9246/09 Mr.Mohana SundararajanWA.1690 to 1703/09 Mr.P.S.Raman Advocate General Assisted by Mr.G.Desingu Spl Government PleaderFor Respondents:R1 in WA.535, 537/09 Mr.S.Udayakumar R1 in 546, 548, 571,& 572/09 Mr.C.Prakasam R1 in WA.540, 542, 543/09 Mr.R.Rajarajan for Mr.G.Rajan R1 in WA.541/09 Mr.G.Rajan for Mr.J.Ramakrishnanproposed R6 in WA.542/09 Mr.R.Parthasarathy and Mr.Sathish Parasaran RR1 to 7 in WA.544,1701 & 1703/09 R1 in W.A.545, 547, 1690,& 1702/09 Mr.K.Doraisamy Sr Counsel for Mr.V.R.Rajasekaran R1 in W.P.19322/97 Mr.M.Devendran SPCG R4 in W.P.9246/09 Mr.Sathish ParasaranR2 in W.P.19322/97R1 in WP.9246/09RR1 to 3 in WP.24057/09RR1& 2 in WP.24233/09,RR1,2,5 in WA.1456/09 R1 in WA.535& 536/09 R2 in WA 537, 538,540,541,546 & 571/09 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ RR2,3 in WA.539/09, 547, 572/09RR3, 4 in WA.542/09, 543/09RR 8, 9, 11 in WA.544/09RR2, 3, 5 in WA.545/09: Mr.P.S. Raman Advocate General Assisted by Mr.G. Desingu Spl. Government PleaderR1 In WA.401/98 and for Union of India in all cases except WP.19322/97. :Mrs.M.Nirmala Devi,ACGSC. RR3 & 4 in WA.401/98 & R3 in WP.19322/97:Mr.C.Natarajan,Senior Counsel for M/s.N.Inbarajan C O M M O N J U D G M E N TF.M.IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.1. The challenge in W.A.Nos.540 to 543, 544 to 548, 571, 572and 1690 to 1703 of 2009 is to the common order of the learned SingleJudge dated 20.04.2009, in W.P.Nos.19350 of 2008 etc., batch.2. W.A.No.401 of 1998, is directed against the interim orderdated 27.02.1998, made in W.M.P.No.30285 of 1997 in W.P.No. 19322 of1997. The challenge in W.P.No.19322 of 1997 is to the order of theCommissioner of Sugar and Cane Commissioner dated 04.12.1997, inRc.No.23364/D1/94, in and by which, certain sugarcane areaspertaining to N.P.K.R.R. Co-operative Sugar Mills was withdrawn andallotted in favour of Thiru Aruran Sugars Limited. By an order dated27.02.1998, passed in W.M.P.No.30285 of 1997, the learned SingleJudge dismissed the W.M.P. by which stay to the order dated04.12.1997, was sought for. 3. As against the said order, writ appeal came to be filed.In the Writ Appeal an interim order was passed on 23.03.1998, to thefollowing effect:"The Writ Appeal and WP.No.19322/93 aredirected to be listed for hearing in the weekcommencing on 8th June, 1998.The growers will be at liberty to enterinto an agreement with the Co-operative SugarMills or with the third respondent according totheir free will.Parties are directed to produce therecords at the time of hearing of the Writ Appealand the Writ Petition." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ The said interim order continue to remain in force even as on date.The writ petitions challenging the order of the Cane Commissionercame to be subsequently allowed by the learned Single Judge by anorder dated 20.04.2009, and the Cane Commissioner was directed togive an opportunity to the cane growers before passing any order ofdemarcation of cane areas to different new mills. 4. As far as W.P.No.19322 of 1997 is concerned, since the saidwrit petition was tagged along with W.A.No.401 of 1998, the same waskept pending and was heard along with other writ appeals inW.A.No.535 of 2009 etc., batch.5. In W.P.No.9246 of 2009, the petitioner which is anassociation of cane growers seeks for issuance of Mandamus to directthe Commissioner of Sugar and Cane Commissioner by way of a directionto ensure that Tirupattur Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited and theKallakurichi-I Co-operative Sugar Mills Limited do not register thesugarcane in respect of cane growers who were allotted to M/s.BannariAmman Sugars Limited other than the writ petitioners inW.P.Nos.18153, 18930, 21006 and 26517 of 2008.6. In W.P.No.24233 of 2009, the challenge is to the order ofthe Commissioner of Sugar and Cane Commissioner dated 03.06.2008, inR.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008, in and by which, the said writ petitionerwho is a cane grower and whose cane area was allotted to the 4threspondent in that writ petition which is a newly started Sugar Mill,while the petitioner's cane area was originally allotted andregistered with the third respondent in that writ petition, which isa Co-operative Sugar Mill.7. In W.P.No.24057 of 2009, an association representing canegrowers seeks to challenge G.O.Ms.No.468, Industries (MICI)Department dated 06.12.1993 and G.O.Ms.No.217, Industries (MICI)Department dated 18.08.1997 of the State of Tamilnadu and the orderdated 03.06.2008, in R.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008 of the Commissioner ofSugar and Cane Commissioner demarcating the cane areas of the saidwrit petitioner's members from the Salem Co-operative Sugar Mills toM/s.Dhanalakshmi Srinivasan Sugars (P) Ltd., who are 4th and 5threspondents respectively in the said writ petition.8. G.O.Ms.No.468, dated 06.12.1993, was issued by the StateGovernment by which the State Government which had earlierconstituted a Committee to revise the area of operation of each sugarmills for getting sugarcane from the farmers in the State ofTamilnadu, constituted a modified committee with a direction tosubmit its recommendations within six months from the delimitation ofarea of operation of the sugar Mills in Co-operative, Public andPrivate Sectors. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

9. By G.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1997, the State Governmentafter examining the proposals of Director of Sugars passed ordersrestoring the power relating to demarcation of areas between theexisting sugar mills as per the provisions of the Sugarcane ControlOrder, 1966. In the same G.O., the State Government directed theArea Delimitation Committee to continue to examine the areademarcation proposal in respect of new sugar mills and sugar mills inprivate sector. The above said two G.Os. as well as the ultimateorder of the State Government delimiting the areas of Co-operativeSugar Mills in favour of a new and private sugar mills is underchallenge.10. By the order impugned in the writ appeals as also thecommon order of the learned single Judge dated 20.04.2009, passed inW.P.19350 of 2008 etc., batch. the challenge is however in respect ofthat part of the order of the learned Single Judge by which thelearned Single Judge has held that the writ petitioners did notchallenge the validity of G.O.Ms.No.468, dated 06.12.1993 andG.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1997. 11. W.A.Nos.1690 to 1703 of 2009, has been preferred by theState of Tamil Nadu challenging the common order of the learnedSingle Judge dated 20.04.2009, passed in W.P.No.19350 of 2008 etc.,batch.12. From the challenges made before the learned Single Judge,which is subject matter of challenge in some of the writ appeals aswell as the other challenges made in the writ petitions dealt with byus, the issues to be decided are:(a) Whether G.O.Ms.No.468, dated 06.12.1993 andG.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1997 are valid in law?(b) Whether the order of the Commissioner of Sugarand Cane Commissioner dated 04.12.1997, inR.S.No.23364/D1/94 and order dated 03.06.2008, inR.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008, in and by which certain caneareas of Co-operative sugar mills were allotted infavour of certain new sugar mills was justified,especially when such orders were passed without givingan opportunity to the concerned cane growers ?(c) Whether the Commissioner of Sugar and CaneCommissioner had jurisdiction to delimit the cane areaof Co-operative Sugar Mills and allot the same infavour of new sugar mills of private sector based onthe recommendations of Area Delimitation Committee ?(d) Whether the Madras Sugar Factories ControlAct, 1949 conflicts with the Sugar Control Order, 1966 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and thereby can it be held that there wasinconsistency as between those two set of provisionsand in which circumstances which should prevail?13. On the above issues, we heard the arguments of Messrs.R.Muthukumarasamy, Aravind P.Dattar, C.Natarajan, AL.Somayaji,learned senior counsel and the learned Advocate General for the Statealong with Mr.Satish Parasaran who appeared for some new mills.14. We also heard Mr.K.Doraisamy, learned senior counsel,Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, Mr.C.Prakasam, Mr.R.Rajarajan for Mr.G.Rajan andMr.Udayakumar for the cane growers.15. The sum and substance of the submissions of the learnedsenior counsel who appeared for the private new mills are that theSugar Cane Control Order, 1966 which is covered by Section 3 of theEssential Commodities Act, 1955 empowers the Cane Commissioner aswell as the State Government for delimiting the cane areas inaccordance with the provisions contained in the Sugarcane ControlOrder and that such power exercised under the Sugarcane Control Orderis in the nature of a legislative function to which the principles ofNatural Justice have no application.16. It is further contended that, it was not a quasi judicialfunction and therefore the principles of Natural Justice have no roleto play in exercise of such powers.17. The functions of Cane Commissioner and the StateGovernment by virtue of the power delegated to them under theSugarcane Control Order, being a legislative mandate, there was noscope for extending any opportunity of hearing to the cane growerswhile passing orders of delimitation of cane areas.18. According to the learned senior counsel, having regard tothe contents of the order passed by the Cane Commissioner, therebeing no prejudice caused to the cane growers, the order ofdelimitation of cane areas by bifurcating the area from Co-operativeSugar Mills to the newly started private Sugar Mills cannot be fondfault with. 19. It is the contention of the learned counsel that thecentric issue while passing orders of delimitation is public interestand the focus was on the functioning of the sugar factories in thelarger interest of the public and therefore there was no question ofhearing the individual cane growers and that the hearing afforded tothe concerned Co-operative sugar mills took care of the interest ofits individual members.20. According to the learned counsel having regard to thescheme of Essential Commodities Act, and Clause 6(1)(a) of the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Sugarcane Control Order, what is considered is a factory and itsrequirements which is paramount for reserving the cane area effacingthe claim of individuals. 21. It is also contended that Section 3 of the EssentialCommodities Act provides a key to public-good and public interest asagainst the claim of individual cane growers. It is thereforecontended that the authorities were entitled to pass orders keepingpublic interest in mind and the requirements of factories, that therewas no question of providing opportunity to individual cane growerswhile making reservation of cane areas and that the exceptionalcircumstances are only where the claims are as between two factories.22. It is contended that since notice was issued to theconcerned Co-operative Societies before passing the order ofdelimitation, the grievance of individual cane growers who are allmembers of the Co-operative Societies cannot claim a right ofopportunity.23. It was contended that by virtue of Section 6 and 16(b) ofthe Essential Commodities Act read with Sugar Cane Control Order, theprovisions contained in the Sugar Cane Control Order would prevail asagainst the provisions contained in the Madras Sugar FactoriesControl Act, 1949.24. It was then contended that when the Co-operative Sugarmills have chosen not to challenge the order of delimitation of caneareas, the individual members who were not in any way prejudiced bysuch delimitation can be heard to state that the impugned ordershould be set aside.25. The learned Advocate General in his submissions contendedthat while the land owners may have the fundamental right either togrow sugarcane or some other crop, once they choose to growsugarcane, then they are bound by the statutory restrictionsincluding the area delimitation. According to him, when Clause 6 ofthe Sugar Cane Control Order was not under challenge, the order ofarea delimitation passed in consonance with the said provision cannotbe questioned. According to him, what was relevant was proximity,prompt payment and proper weighment and so long as those matters areduly taken care of and the cane growers are not put to any seriousprejudice, no fault can be found with the orders of the CaneCommissioner. According to him, the cane growers are not theaffected parties and therefore they have no locus.26. The learned Advocate General also contended that they werenot affected because there was no civil consequence pursuant to theorder of area delimitation in as much as the statutory minimum priceas well as the statutory additional price is fixed and the payment isalso ensured by virtue of the specific provisions contained in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Clauses 3, 3A, 5 and 6 of the Sugar Cane Control Order.27. The learned Advocate General in his submissions statedthat while the decision cannot be questioned and if at all anychallenge can be made it can be only with regard to the decisionmaking process and only if there was any serious flaw committed inthat process.28. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants reliedupon the following decisions in support of their submissions:(1) AIR 1970 SC 1896 (The Purtabpore Co., Ltd., Vs. CaneCommissioner of Bihar)(2) AIR 2000 SC 2783 (Aligarh Muslim University Vs. MansoorAli Khan)(3) (2005) 10 SCC 69 (Union of India Vs. Indian Jute MillsAssociation)(4) AIR 1987 SC 1802 (Union of India Vs. Cynamide IndiaLtd.,)(5) AIR 1970 SC 267 (A.K.Jain Vs. Union of India)(6) AIR 1990 SC 1277 (M/s.Shri Sitaram Sugar Co.Ltd., Vs.Union of India)(7) (2007) 8 SCC 418 (Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd., Vs.State of Uttaranchal)(8) AIR 2004 SC 3697 (U.P. Co-op. Cane Unions FederationsVs. West U.P.Sugar Mills Association)(9) (1985) 2 SCC 670 (Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab)(10) AIR 2007 SC 1723 (Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. DevinderSingh)(11) AIR 1973 SC 106 (Bennett Coleman & Co. Vs. Union ofIndia)(12) AIR 1957 SC 628 (R.M.D.Chamarbaaugwalla Vs. Union ofIndia)(13) AIR 1956 SC 676 (Tika Ramji Vs. State of U.P.)(14) AIR 1996 SC 2384 (Thirumuruga Kirupananda VariyarThavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational andCharitable Trust Vs. State of Tamil Nadu) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (15) AIR 1980 SC 379 (The Tamil Nadu Education DepartmentMinisterial and General Subordinate Services Association Vs.State of Tamil Nadu)(16) (2000) 7 SCC 529 (Aligarh Muslim University Vs. MansoorAli Khan)(17) (2009) 2 CTC 185 (Uma Nath Pandey Vs. State of U.P.)(18) 1991 (190) ITR 101 (Government of India Vs. Maxim A.Lobo)(19) (1995) 4 SCC 104 (State of Tamil Nadu Vs. AdhiyamanEducational & Educational & Research Institute)(20) (1969) 1 SCC 308 (The Purtabpore Co., Ltd., Vs. CaneCommissioner of Bihar)(21) (1998) 1 SCC 318 (State of Tamil Nadu Vs.K.Sabanayagam)(22) (2009) 7 SCC 69 (Commissioner of Income Tax, Simla Vs.Greenworld Corporation)(23) (2008) 4 SCC 127 (Haryana Roadways Vs. Jai Bhagwan)(24) (2007) 8 SCC 449 (Prestige Lights Ltd., Vs. State Bankof India)(25) (1997) 9 SCC 258 (Coal India Ltd., Vs. ContinentalTransport and Construction Corporation)29. As against the above submissions the counsel who appearedfor the cane growers submitted that the cane growers who have gotmajor share in the Co-operative Sugar Mills i.e. to an extent of 73%,in order to ensure that the mills in which they are members aresupplied with sufficient sugarcane and thereby continue to maintainthe viability in the operation of the mill. 30. It is also contended that if the cane area is allotted tonew mills, a cane grower who is a member of the Co-operative mill maycease to be a member of the Society by virtue of certain provisionscontained in the bylaws as well as the Tamil Nadu Co-operativeSociety Rules. 31. It was also contended that since the State and CentralGovernment periodically announce waiver of loans of Co-operativeSocieties, the cane growers who are members of the Co-operativeSociety may be deprived of such benefit if their cane area is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ allotted to new mills.32. It is also contended that when the Area DelimitationCommittee choose to hear the representatives of new mills, there wasno reason why the concerned cane growers should not be heard. It wasalso contended that under the Essential Commodities Act as well asthe Sugar Cane Control Order, while delegation is made to the CaneCommissioner and the State Government, there is no provisionproviding for constitution of a Committee and therefore orders passedbased on the report of the Committee cannot be sustained.33. It was then contended that a reading of Clause 6 ofSugarcane Control Order reveals that there was no statutory exclusionfrom giving opportunity of hearing and in such circumstances, itshould be held that the growers who were directly affected by thearea delimitation should have been offered an opportunity of personalhearing. By referring to the counter affidavit filed on behalf ofthe State Government it was contended that the area delimitationwould cause serious prejudice to the cane growers and therefore anopportunity of hearing should have been afforded to them. It wascontended that the area delimitation has resulted in diversion ofdeveloped areas in favour of the private mills and if an opportunityof hearing had been extended to the cane growers, they would havebeen in a position to highlight the same.34. It was pointed out that the provisions contained in theSugarcane Control Order is not general in nature, on the other hand,it refers to specific areas within the State and therefore it cannotbe called as one of general in character. It was therefore contendedthat diversion of sugarcane area offended Article 19(1)(f) of theConstitution of India and consequently the farmer is entitled to apersonal hearing. It was therefore contended that consequence ofarea delimitation is purely quasi-judicial function andadministrative in character and not legislative. 35. The learned counsel refuted the contention that Rule 11(2)of the Sugarcane Control Order can be invoked to redress thegrievance. It was also contended that under the Tamil Nadu Act,1949in Section 3 and Rule 3 it is specifically provided for Constitutionof Committee whereas under the Central Act as well as the 1966 Orderexcept delegation to Cane Commissioner and State Government, there isno specific provision for constitution of Committee. In the saidcircumstances there being no inconsistency and repugnance and theState Act being Pre-Constitutional one, by virtue of Article 372 ofthe Constitution, in the absence of a specific provision repealingthe Act, the State Act would continue to prevail. It is thereforecontended that even going by the State Act, there should have been anopportunity of personal hearing and on that ground also the order ofthe Cane Commissioner is liable to be set aside. Having regard tothe specific provisions contained in the said Act in particular https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Section 9 of the Act, an opportunity of personal hearing to thegrowers of sugarcane ought to have been provided.36. The learned counsel also referred to the variouscircumstances to show the civil consequence that will follow becauseof the area delimitation and therefore on that ground also anopportunity of personal hearing should have been extended.37. By referring to the demarcation of sugar area for the newsugar mills, it was pointed out that there is likelihood of Co-operative sugar mills being closed due to non-viability.38. It was contended that even if individual cane growers werenot heard atleast the association of cane growers should have beengiven an opportunity. 39. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents reliedupon the following decisions in support of their submissions:- (1) AIR 1956 SC 676 (Tika Ramji Vs. State of U.P.)(2) (2004) 5 SCC 430 (U.P.Cooperative Cane Unions FederationsVs. West U.P.Sugar Mills Assn.)(3) (2007) 2 SCC 181 (Rajesh Kumar Vs. Dy.CIT)(4) (1999) 9 SCC 620 (Belsund Sugar Co.Ltd. Vs. State ofBihar)(5) AIR 1987 SC 1802 (Union of India Vs. Cynamide IndiaLtd.,) (6) AIR 1990 SC 1277 (M/s.Shri Sitaram Sugar Co.Ltd., Vs.Union of India)(7) AIR 1981 SC 818 (Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union ofIndia)(8) AIR 1963 SC 351 (Ram Bux Vs. State of Rajasthan)(9) AIR 1962 SC 745 (M/s.Mathra Parshad & Sons Vs. State ofPunjab)(10) AIR 1970 SC 564 (Rustom Cavasjee Cooper Vs. Union ofIndia)(11) AIR 1973 SC 106 (Bennet Coleman & Co. Vs. Union ofIndia) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (12) AIR 1967 SC 295 (Barium Chemicals Ltd. Vs. Company LawBoard)(13) (1990) 3 SCC 223 (Shir Sitaram Sugar Co.Ltd., Vs. Unionof India)(14) (2009) 5 SCC 641 (Bihar State Electricity Board Vs.Pulak Enterprises)(15) (2009) 2 LW 435 (M/s.Nagarajuna Construction Co. Ltd.,Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh)(16) (2009) 2 CTC 185 (Uma Nath Pandey Vs. State of U.P.)(17) (2009) 2 LW 448 (Pattammal (deceased) & another Vs.Arulmighu Sarntharaikatha Samy Koil and another)40. Before we delve into the core questions to be answered asset out in paragraph No.12, we deem it appropriate to refer tocertain provisions in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as amendedfrom time to time (hereinafter called the 'E.C. Act') as well as theprovisions contained in the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966, the MadrasSugar Factories Control Act, (Madras Act XX of 1949) (hereinaftercalled the 'Madras Act') and the Madras Sugar Factories ControlRules, 1949 (hereinafter called the 'Madras Rules').41. Under Section 2(b) and 2(A) read along with item 7(i) ofits Schedule, crops of sugarcane falls within the definition ofEssential Commodity under the E.C. Act. Sections 3(1) and 3(2)(b) ofthe said Act empowers the State to have control over sugarcanecultivation in order to ensure equitable distribution andavailability at fair price. By virtue of the powers vested with theCentral Government to control the production, supply and distributionof sugarcane and sugar as an 'Essential Commodity' various regulatorymeasures were formulated under the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966.42. Section 6 of the E.C. Act makes it clear that theSugarcane Control Order formulated under Section 3 should have effectnotwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in anyenactment other than the E.C. Act or any instrument having effect byvirtue of any enactment other than the E.C. Act.43. Under Section 16(1)(b) of the E.C. Act, all other laws inforce in any State immediately before the commencement of the E.C.Act, in so far as, such law controls or authorises the control of theproduction, supply and distribution of, any trade and commerce in,any essential commodity stood repealed.44. Clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 empowersthe Central Government to fix the minimum price of sugarcane in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ consultation with such other authorities, bodies or associations asit deem fit having regard to the cost of production, the availabilityof sugar to the consumer at a fair price, the sale price of sugar,the recovery of sugar from sugarcane and such other allied matters.45. Under Clauses 3(8), (9) and (10), it is provided that thevalue of sugarcane is promptly paid to the sugarcane growers and inthe event of any failure on the part of manufacturer, appropriatemachinery and procedure for recovery in order to ensure due paymentto the concerned sugarcane grower.46. Under Clause 6(1)(a) by issuing appropriate Notificationin the Official Gazette, the Central Government is empowered toreserve any area where sugarcane is grown for a factory, havingregard to its crushing capacity, the availability of sugarcane in thereserved area and the need for production of sugar with a view toenable the factory to produce the quantity of sugarcane required byit.47. Once such reservation of area of sugarcane vis-a-vis anyfactory is made under Clause 6(1), such reservation is made bindingon the sugarcane grower or sugar growers Co-operative Society, theconcerned factory as prescribed under Clause 6(2) of the order.48. Clause 11 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order empowers theCentral Government to delegate its powers subject to suchrestrictions, exceptions and conditions by any officer or authorityof the Central Government and by the State Government or any Officeror Authority of the State Government.49. Under Clause 11(2) it is provided that where suchdelegation has been made to any officer or authority of the StateGovernment, every order or direction issued by such officer orauthority can be amended, varied or rescinded by the State Governmentto whom the officer or authority is subordinate and such power to beexercised by the State Government shall be made either suo motu or onan application made within a period of thirty days from the order ordirection. Proviso to Clause 11(2) makes it clear that no orderrevoking a licence or a permit issued to a persons should be madewithout giving such person an opportunity to make a representation. 50. Prior to coming into force of the E.C. Act, there was aState Enactment relating to the production of Sugar in the State ofTamil Nadu which was called the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act,1949 (Madras Act XX of 1949). The object of the Act was to providefor the licensing of factories and regulating the supply of price ofsugarcane used in such factories and for other incidental matters.It was a pre-constitutional enactment. Under Section 3 of the MadrasAct, the State Government was empowered by Notification to constitutean Advisory Committee which should consist of representations of all https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ those interested for the purpose of advising the Government inrespect of matters for which consultation is obligatory under the Actand on such matters on which the Government may refer to it.51. Under Rule 3 of the Madras Sugar Factories Control Rules,1949, it is stipulated that the Advisory Committee apart fromofficial members, in the composition of non-official members itshould have two representatives of sugarcane growers and jaggerymanufacturers nominated by the Government.52. While the Statutory provisions stood thus, the Central andthe State Governments issued certain orders to reserve sugarcaneareas and allied matters for the purpose of fixation of price ofsugarcane. The Central Government published a Notification in theGazette of India dated 04.06.1977, in G.S.R.267 in exercise of thepowers conferred by Clause 11 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 bywhich it directed that the powers conferred on it by Clauses 6,7,8 &9 shall also be exercisable by the Cane Commissioner (Director ofSugar, Tamil Nadu) and also ordered for necessary amendments in itsearlier Notification dated 16.07.1966 in G.S.R.1127, by which theCane Commissioner (Director of Sugar, Tamil Nadu) was also insertedalong with the Director of Industries and Civil Supplies ofRajasthan.53. The State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.468, dated06.12.1993, by which a Committee was constituted to revise the areaof operation of each sugar mills for getting sugarcane from thefarmers in the State of Tamil Nadu. The reconstituted Committee wasdirected to submit its recommendations within six months on thedelimitation of area of operation of sugar mills in the Co-operative,Public and Private Sectors. 54. Subsequently, in G.O.Ms.No.270, dated 18.08.1997 inmodification of its earlier G.Os. in G.O.Ms.No.101, dated 09.08.1992and G.O.Ms.No.468, dated 16.12.1993, a modified procedure as proposedby the Director of Sugar was accepted by the Government. As per thesaid G.O. the State Government directed that the power relating todemarcation of area between the existing sugar mills in Co-operativeand Public sector sugar mills was restored to the Director of Sugarcum Cane Commissioner as per the provisions of Sugarcane ControlOrder, 1966. It also directed that the Area Delimitation Committeecan continue to examine the area demarcation process in respect ofnew sugar mills and sugar mills in private sector.55. By G.O.Ms.No.362, dated 27.11.2006, the Government ofTamil Nadu issued six guidelines for area demarcation of new sugarmills to be established in the State of Tamil Nadu. The AreaDelimitation Committee in its meeting held on 25.03.2008, consideredthe request of M/s.Dhanalakshmi Srinivasan Sugars Pvt. Ltd., for https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ allotment of cane areas for establishment of new sugar mills atUdumbiyam Village in Vengalam Firka of Veppanthattai Taluk,Perambalur District. After considering the application and afterinteracting with the representatives of the applicants who is statedto have agreed to abide by the conditions laid down by G.O.Ms.No.362,dated 27.11.2006, recommended to the Government to allot 19 firkas,which were originally allotted to Perambalur Sugar Mills and SalemCo-operative Sugar Mills to the proposed new sugar mill of M/sDhanalakshmi Srinivasan Sugars Pvt. Ltd., by imposing two conditions.The first condition related to compliance of all the guidelinesstated in G.O.Ms.No.362, dated 27.11.2006 and the second one relatedto acceptance of performance bank guarantee of Rs.1.00 crore by theChief Director (Sugar), Government of India.56. The Commissioner of Sugar and Cane Commissioner in itsorder dated 03.06.2008, considered the recommendations of the AreaDelimitation Committee as well as the Guidelines issued inG.O.Ms.No.362, dated 27.11.2006, directed the publication of aNotification in the State Government Gazette by which the cane areasrecommended by the Area Delimitation Committee were allotted toM/s.Dhanalakshmi Srinivasan Sugars Pvt. Ltd., subject to complianceof the conditions imposed in G.O.Ms.362, dated 27.11.2006, and aftertaking note of the compliance of acceptance of the performance bankguarantee by the Government of India.57. In the above stated statutory provisions and theproceedings and orders of the State and Central Government, theissues that arise for consideration have to be examined.58. In the first place, the question that arises forconsideration is whether G.O.Ms.No.468, dated 06.12.1993 andG.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1997, are valid in law ?59. According to the sugarcane growers, the constitution ofthe Area Delimitation Committee to consider delimitation of thesugarcane area for the existing private and public sector and co-opeartive mills as well as the new sugar mills could not have beenmade. The contention is on the footing that by virtue of theprovisions contained in the E.C. Act read along with the SugarcaneControl Order, the powers vested with the Authorities of the CentralGovernment was delegated only to the Director of Sugar cum CaneCommissioner and the State Government, while so, the constitution ofthe Area Delimitation Committee to determine the delimitation of thesugarcane area for different mills could not have been made. Inother words, when the exercise of determination of sugarcane area forthe sugar mills private, public and co-operative within the State ofTamil Nadu can be validly exercised by virtue of G.S.R.267, dated04.06.1997, and the consequential amendment to the Sugarcane ControlOrder only by the Cane Commissioner (Director of Sugar) and the StateGovernment, the exercise of such power by way of a sub-delegation https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ issued in favour of the Area Delimitation Committee by G.O.Ms.No.468,dated 06.12.1993 and G.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1997, cannot be heldto be valid in law.60. As far as the said contention is concerned, in the orderimpugned in the W.A.Nos.542 to 548 of 2009, as well as, W.A.Nos.535to 539 of 2009 and W.A.Nos.169o to 1703 of 2009, in paragraph 31, thelearned Single Judge has held that since no plea was raised in thewrit petitions challenging the virus of constitution of AreaDelimitation Committee, the learned Judge did not propose to go intothe validity of the constitution of the said Committee. However, itwas pointed out before us that even in the writ petition inW.P.No.29617 of 2008, in paragraph 10(d) a specific contention wasraised that G.O.Ms.No.468, dated 06.12.1993 and G.O.Ms.No.217, dated18.08.1997, conferring the power delegated to the Cane Commissionerunder the Sugarcane Control Order with the Committee was illegal andcontrary to the provisions of Sugarcane Control Order. Thecorrectness of the said contention therefore has to be necessarilyexamined.61. According to the learned senior counsel appearing for thenew mills for whom different cane areas were withdrawn from thepublic sector mills and co-operative sugar mills and allotted tothose new mills, in their submissions stated that the above referredto G.Os. were valid in law and cannot be held to have been passed inviolation of the provisions of Sugarcane Control Order or any otherstatutory provision.62. According to the learned counsel, the constitution of theCommittee by itself cannot be held to be invalid, even as per theabove referred to G.Os. the task entrusted with the Committee wasonly to make a study and submit its recommendations to the competentauthority namely the Cane Commissioner. It was therefore contendedthat when the ultimate order came to be issued only by the CaneCommissioner, no fault can be found with the procedure followed bythe Cane Commissioner and the State Government by issuing the abovereferred to G.Os. constituting the Area Delimitation Committee. 63. As far as the said issue is concerned on a perusal of thestipulations contained in the G.O.Ms.No.468, dated 06.12.1993, wefind that the Government of Tamil Nadu after constituting a Committeerequested it to submit its recommendations on the differentdelimitation of area of operation in the Co-operative, public andprivate sectors. In the subsequent G.O.217, dated 18.08.1997, itdirected that the Area Delimitation Committee can only examine anyarea demarcation proposal in respect of new sugar mills and sugarmills in private sector, while such demarcation of areas between theexisting sugar mills in Co-operative and public sector sugar millscan be considered only by the Director of Sugar cum CaneCommissioner. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

64. Keeping the above stipulations in mind when we examine theminutes of the 43rd Area Delimitation Committee dated 25.03.2008, inparagraphs 10 and 11, it is mentioned that the Area DelimitationCommittee interacted with the applicant mill who wanted to establishan integrated sugar complex at Udumbiyam Village in PerambalurDistrict and that the applicant agreed to abide by the conditionslaid down in G.O.Ms.No.362, dated 27.11.2006 and that the Committeerecommended to the Government to allot 19 firkas i.e. 8 firkas ofPerambalur Sugar Mills and 11 firkas of Salem Co-operative SugarMills to the proposed new sugar mill of M/s.Dhanalakshmi SrinivasanSugars Pvt. Ltd.,65. As far as the 11 firkas of Salem Co-operative Sugar Millis concerned, the question that arises for consideration is whethersuch a recommendations could have been validly made by the AreaDelimitation Committee in the light of the restrictions imposed underG.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1993, which specifically states thatpowers relating to demarcation of areas between an existing SugarMill in the Co-operative and public sector is exclusively vested withthe Director of Sugar cum Cane Commissioner. In fact there is noreference to such demarcation area as between Co-operative sugar milland new sugar mill even with the Cane Commissioner. As far as theArea Delimitation is concerned, the G.O. is specific to the fact thatit can examine any area demarcation proposals in respect of new sugarmills vis-a-vis the sugar mills in private sector.66. In the said circumstances, it is quite apparent, assumingfor a moment that the role of Area Delimitation Committee is only tosuggest any recommendations of area delimitation, having regard tothe specific restrictions imposed in G.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1997,even such a recommendation could not have been made with reference toany area attached with a Co-operative Sugar Mill to be transferred toany new mill to be established in the private sector. But the primecontention of the learned counsel who appeared for the cane growerswas to the basic issue as to whether at all the Area DelimitationCommittee can be invested with any powers to consider demarcation ofcane areas. 67. Having considered the contentions of the learned counselfor the respective parties as well as the learned Advocate General,we are of the view that when an ultimate order dated 04.12.1997 /03.06.2008, of demarcation of areas was passed only by the CaneCommissioner who was competent enough by virtue of powers delegatedto him under Clause 11 of the Sugarcane Control Order by the CentralGovernment, we are of the view that mere constitution of a Committeeto examine the various cane areas with the existing mills private,public and Co0operative for the purpose of making demarcation to theproposed new mills cannot be held to be invalid. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

68. As rightly contended by the learned counsel who appearedfor the newly proposed private mills, in both the G.Os. what wasdirected to be carried out by the Area Delimitation Committee wasonly to examine the claim of the proposed new mills and suggest itsrecommendations. It is not as if that any proposals of AreaDelimitation Committee was binding on the Cane Commissioner or thatonce any such recommendation is made there was no scope for eitherthe Cane Commissioner or the State Government to deviate from suchrecommendations and pass its own orders. 69. In our considered view, the nature of work entrusted withthe Area Delimitation Committee was to consider the existing areasattached with the existing mills and the scope ofdelimitating/demarcating such areas for being attached with theproposed new mills in the light of IEM, acknowledgement obtained bysuch new mills from the Government of India and their preparedness tocomply with the various guidelines specified in G.O.Ms.No.362, dated27.11.2006. Once in Clause 11 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966the Cane Commissioner was delegated with the powers for demarcatingcane areas for different mills, it will have to be held that suchdelegation in its favour would take within its fold as well as theState Government to formulate its own procedure to ascertain thevarious details as regards the location of cane areas, the potentialof sugarcane and content of sugarcane grown in such areas, theproximity and other allied factors, in order to enable the CaneCommissioner/State Government to take a decision as to what areas canbe demarcated from the existing sugar mills for being allotted to thenew sugar mills. 70. In fact the ultimate order dated 03.06.2008, came to bepassed by the Cane Commissioner though after making a detailedreference to the minutes of the Area Delimitation Committee. As faras the role played by the Area Delimitation Committee and whether itsrecommendation was in accordance with the directives contained inG.O.Ms.No.468, dated 16.12.1993 and G.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1997is concerned, that is a matter to be examined while considering thevalidity and justification of the ultimate orders passed by the CaneCommissioner, delimiting the cane areas in favour of the new sugarmills. On that score, it cannot be held that the very constitutionof the Area Delimitation Committee in the above referred to G.Os. areinvalid. We therefore answer the question in the negative.71. With this the next question to be examined is as towhether the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949 (i.e.) theMadras Act will create any conflict with the Sugarcane Control Orderand thereby can it be held that there is any inconsistency as betweenthose two sets of provisions and in which circumstances which shouldprevail.72. The said question arises for consideration in the light of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the submissions made by Mr.K.Doraisamy, learned Senior Counselappearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.24057 of 2009 and Mr.Rajarajanlearned counsel appearing for some of the cane growers in some of thewrit petitions.73. The contention has been raised on the footing that MadrasSugar Factories Control Act, 1949 was a Pre-Constitutionallegislation and in the absence of repealing of the said Actspecifically under the E.C. Act, having regard to Article 372 of theConstitution, the said Statute continue to remain in force andconsequently any violation of the provisions contained in the saidStatute and the Rules framed thereunder while resorting todemarcation of cane areas would render the ultimate orders ofdemarcation / delimitation invalid. In that respect the submissionmade by Mr.K.Doraisamy, learned Senior Counsel and Mr.Rajarajan,learned counsel appearing for the cane growers was that Section 3 ofthe Madras Act specifically provide for constitution of an AdvisoryCommittee which should be represented, as far as possible of all theinterest concerned for the purpose of advising the Government. Thepreamble of the Act specifically makes it clear that the enactmentwas necessitated as it became expedient for providing license tosugar factories and regulating the supply and the price of sugarcaneused in such factories and for other incidental matters. 74. Under Rule 3 of the Madras Sugar Factories Control Rules,1949 in the constitution of the Advisory Committee tworepresentatives of Sugarcane growers and Jaggery manufacturersnominated by the Government were to be included as non-officialmembers. It was therefore contended that when such a statutorystipulation providing for representation of all concerned and thestatutory rules specifically stipulated inclusion of tworepresentatives of cane growers as non-official members, theCommittee constituted under G.O.Ms.No.416, dated 06.12.1993, cannotbe construed as a validly constituted Committee under the provisionsof the enactment which was still holding the field.75. It was therefore contended that any recommendation made bythe Committee constituted under the above referred to G.Os. and theorders passed by the Cane Commissioner dated 04.12.1997 / 03.06.2008based on such an invalid Committee cannot be sustained. In supportof the said submission, reliance was placed upon the decisionreported in (1999) 9 SCC 620 (Belsund Sugar Co.Ltd. Vs. State ofBihar).76. Under Section 6 of the E.C. Act, it is stipulated that anyorder made under Section 3 to control the production, supply anddistribution of an essential commodity will have effectnotwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in anyenactment other than the E.C. Act or any instrument having effect byvirtue of any enactment other than the E.C. Act. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

77. In the first place the said non-ostensible clausecontained in Section 6 of the E.C. Act if applied vis-a-vis theprovision contained in the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949,it cannot be held that there was any inconsistency as between the twoenactments. The absence of any provision in the E.C. Act, Rules orthe Sugarcane Control Order as regards the constitution of anyCommittee by itself cannot be held to be inconsistent with theprovisions of the Madras Act of 1949, where there is a specificprovision under Section 3 for constitution of an Advisory Committee.78. Moreover, when the State of Tamil Nadu thought it fit toconstitute an Area Delimitation Committee for making anyrecommendation for the purpose of demarcation of sugarcane areas asbetween different mills, it will have to be held that such a step ofthe State Government would confirm to the position that a provisioncontained in the Madras Act, 1949 was in tune with the scheme of theprovisions contained in the E.C. Act read along with the SugarcaneControl Order, 1966. Therefore, any inconsistency as between theE.C. Act and Madras Act, 1949 is ruled out.79. Section 16 of the E.C. Act contains the provisions ofrepeal. Under Section 16(1)(b), it is specifically provided that anyother law in force in any State immediately before the commencementof the E.C. Act, in so far as, such law controls or authorises thecontrol of the production, supply and distribution of any trade andcommerce in any essential commodity stood repealed.80. Applying the said provision in its abstract form, one mayhave to hold that the State enactment stood automatically repealed.However, as rightly contended by Mr.K.Doraisamy, learned seniorcounsel for some of the cane growers, by virtue of Article 372(1) ofthe Constitution, unless a provision contained in the State Enactmenthad been altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature,the same would continue to remain in force. Therefore, a conjointedreading of Sections 3, 5, 6 and 16 of the E.C. Act read along withMadras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949 and the Rules framedthereunder as well as Clause 6 of the Sugarcane Control Order, itwill have to be held that an harmonious construction of theprovisions contained in the above Statutes and other connectedenactment have to be applied while taking any measure relating todelimitation/demarcation of sugarcane area in favour of any new sugarmills. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (1999)9 SCC 620 (Belsund Sugar Co.Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar) supports theabove contention of the learned counsel. 81. We therefore hold that no conflict exist as between theMadras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1948 and the Sugarcane ControlOrder, 1966 as well as the E.C. Act, as there was no inconsistency https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and above all the application of both the enactments would be morerelevant and apposite when it comes to the question ofdelimitation/demarcation of sugarcane area in favour of any new sugarmills.82. With this we come to the last question as to whether thepower exercised by the cane commissioner under Clause 6 of theSugarcane Control Order is in the nature of the legislative functionand whether the order of the Commissioner of Sugar cum CaneCommissioner dated 04.12.1997, in R.S.No.23364/D1/94 and order dated03.06.2008, in R.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008, in and by which, certain caneareas of Co-operative sugar mills were allotted in favour of certainnew sugar mills was justified, especially when such orders werepassed without giving an opportunity to the affected cane growers.83. After a detailed consideration of the various contentionsraised and the factors placed before the Court, the learned singleJudge has taken the view that there was violation of principles ofnatural justice, while passing the above orders by the CaneCommissioner, in as much as, the cane growers were not heard beforethe cane areas belonging to them came to be diverted from the Co-operative Sugar Mills to the new Sugar Mills. 84. The Grievance of the cane growers were manifold and suchgrievance related to the very constitution of the Area DelimitationCommittee, the competency of the members of the Committee, the partplayed by the co-operative sugar mills in relation to the farmers whoare its members, the proximity of the sugarcane area surrounding theCo-operative sugar mills, the non-fulfilment of the variousrequirements contained in Clause 6(1)(a) of the Sugarcane ControlOrder, the rights of the sugarcane growers in the co-operative sugarmills as its members, in as much as, nearly 73% of the shares areheld by them, the periodical Government announcement waiving theloans borrowed from the co-operative society, the possibility ofsugarcane growers losing their membership of the co-operative sugarmills if their cane areas are diverted to other private mills, theabsence of representatives of the cane growers in the AreaDelimitation Committee, the absence of any statutory prohibition tobe a representative in the Area Delimitation Committee, the action ofthe Area Delimitation Committee in having allowed the representativesof the applicant new mills to make their say in the committeeproceedings, the non consideration of various relevant factors suchas demarcation of fully developed cane areas to the private millsdiverting it from the Co-operative sugar mill, the availability ofpower under Clause 11(2) with the State Government only after thepassing of the order by the Cane Commissioner which cannot be said toprovide a proper opportunity before the passing of the initial orderitself and that when the order of delimitation resulted in seriouscivil consequence, there was every justification in the claim of thesugarcane growers that failure to give such an opportunity before the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ passing of the impugned orders would render those orders invalid inlaw.85. The learned counsel for the cane growers thereforecontended that the contention of the new mill owners that theimpugned orders of the Cane Commissioner is in the nature of thelegislative function has no meaning and the said submission cannot beaccepted. The learned counsel therefore contended that the orderspassed by the Cane Commissioner without giving an opportunity to thecane growers is in violation of principles of natural justice andtherefore the order of the learned Single Judge does not call forinterference.86. As against the above submissions, the learned seniorcounsel appearing for the new mills and the learned Advocate Generalsubmitted that the power exercised by the Cane Commissioner underClause 6 of the Sugarcane Control Order is in the nature oflegislative function to which the principles of Natural Justice willhave no application. 87. It is also contended that it cannot also be construed asan exercise of a quasi judicial function. According to the learnedcounsel unless the Cane growers complain that they get a lesser pricein the sugarcane or there was any other disadvantage caused to themwhile demarcating their cane areas to the new sugar mills and therebeing no prejudice caused, the impugned orders cannot be interferedwith.88. According to the learned counsel, the Sugarcane ControlOrder covers every aspect of sugarcane industry which was formulatedunder the provisions of the E.C. Act and therefore the orders passedunder Clause 6 of the Sugarcane Control Order is nothing but astatutory function and that being so, there is no question ofviolation of principles of natural justice in order to interfere withthe orders impugned in the writ petitions.89. According to the learned counsel, the demarcation ofsugarcane area in favour of new mills under the impugned orders doesnot create any difference in treatment of any of the sugarcanegrowers in the matter of supply of sugarcane to the respectivefactories, in as much as, the price is determined by the StateGovernment, the transportation charges are borne by the respectivesugar mills and that in any event the respective Co-operative sugarmills with which the cane growers were attached were heard by theDelimitation Committee and therefore the individual members cannothave any grievance. 90. It is further contended that the E.C. Act being a socioeconomic legislation and the Cane Commissioner exercise the power andwhose action consequently decides the price of sugar, such is the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ omnipresence in character, no individual can be expected to expressany personal grievance for the purpose of passing any orders.91. It was lastly contended that in any event having regard tothe remedy available under Clause 11(2) of the Sugarcane ControlOrder, those who have got any grievance can approach the StateGovernment and seek for the redressal of their grievances. It wasalso contended that since irrespective of the character of the mills,be it existing private mill, public mill, Co-operative sugar mill ornew mill there being no difference in the cane price and thetransport charges are borne by the concerned mills, no civilconsequence would arise by demarcating the cane areas and thereforethe orders impugned cannot be interfered with.92. It was also contended that the provisions contained inSections 6 to 13 of the E.C. Act conflicts with the Madras Act, 1949,there was implied repeal of the said Act and there being norepugnance, the Central Act should prevail. It was further contendedthat since the guidelines imposed in G.O.362, dated 27.11.2006,provide sufficient safeguard to any prejudice that may be caused tothe cane growers and in the event of the said guidelines not beingcomplied with, the very allocation of cane area would stand withdrawnautomatically and the impugned orders should be upheld.93. Having considered the rival submissions, at the veryoutset, we have to note what is meant by civil consequence in orderto arrive at a just conclusion based on the respective submissions ofthe learned counsel.94. What is a civil consequence has been succinctly stated bythe Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in (1978) 1 SCC405 (Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner) JusticeV.R.Krishna Iyer, speaking for the majority has stated:" 'Civil Consequence' undoubtedly coverinfraction of not merely property or personalrights but of civil liberties, materialdeprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In itscomprehensive connotation, everything thataffects a citizen in his civil life inflicts acivil consequence."95. Going by the broad definition stated by the Hon'bleSupreme Court as to what is 'civil consequence' when we test thegrievances expressed on behalf of the sugarcane growers, suchgrievance can be listed out as under:-(a) The cane growers were not representedin the Area Delimitation Committee. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (b) As part of Co-operative sugar millvarious helps extended to them through suchsociety will stand deprived off.(c) The distance between the cane area andthe new sugar mills varies from 15 to 120kilometres.(d) As most of the cane growers have theirown tractors and used to transport theirsugarcane to the sugar mills and get thetransportation charges, after the bifurcation,due to the distance factor they are not in aposition to use their own tractors instead theywill have to go in for hired vehicles by whichthey will be deprived of sufficient income.(e) Being the members of the Co-operativesugar mills, and having regard to the concept ofCo-operative movement, by virtue of thedelimitation, they will be forced to supply toprivate new mills in which they have no right ofownership. According to the cane growers, theywould be too willing to supply to their own Co-operative mills in which they are members.(f) As a member of the Co-operative sugarmills whatever loan they borrow, they gain anadvantage of periodical waiver of loans announcedby the State Government.(g) There is likelihood of ceasing ofmembership of the Co-operative sugar mill whentheir cane area is allowed to private mills.(h) Even as per the counter statement ofthe Government, serious prejudice is caused tocane growers and therefore they should be heardbefore any delimitation takes place.(i) By the impugned orders, the developedareas have been allotted to private new millsdiverting it from the Co-operative sugar mills toits prejudice.(j) Diversion of sugarcane area willoffend Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution andconsequently an hearing should have been affordedto the farmers. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ (k) By referring to certain clauses in thebylaws of Thirupathur Co-operative sugar mill ithas been pointed out that if a sugarcane growerceases to be a producer member, he will lose thebenefit of membership of the mill which will haveserious consequence.(l) It was also pointed out that thecrushing capacity of Co-operative sugar mill inthe case of the respondent in S.A.No.540 of 2009,the proposed capacity of the proposed new sugarmill is 5 lakhs MT and that the cane area of Co-operative sugar mill if diverted that wouldseriously impair the crushing operations of theCo-operative sugar mill which would in turnresult in extrication of the very Co-operativesugar mill itself.(m) It was further pointed out that byvirtue of the stipulations relating to the newsugar mills wherein the sugarcane growers areexpected to bear the 10% of the cost of the selfgenerating power supply unit, that wouldseriously impinge upon the rights of the canegrowers.(n) It was also pointed out that in thedetails of payments contained in the statementissued by the new sugar mills deduction by way oftransport charges and dividend has been madewhich deduction was never made by the Co-operative sugar mill.(o) In respect of Kallakurichi sugar millit was pointed out that already Kallakurichisugar mill was bifurcated into two and a furtherbifurcation of sugarcane areas to DhanalakshmiSrinivasan Sugars (P) Ltd. will cause further setback in the functioning of the Kallakurichi SugarMills, which may ultimately result in closure ofthe said mill.(p) When the Area Delimitation Committeein its proceedings has specifically recorded thatthey heard the representatives of the New SugarMills, there was no justification in notaffording such an opportunity to the sugar canegrowers. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

96. The above grievances listed out on behalf of the canegrowers are intrinsically connected and are germane in nature. Inthis context the statutory prescriptions of the Madras SugarFactories Control Act, 1949, assumes greater significance. Whenstatutorily it was though fit to include two of the representativesof cane growers in the Advisory Committee, and when the competentAuthority namely, the Cane Commissioner and the State Governmentthought it fit to constitute the Area Delimitation Committee mainlyto consider the bifurcation of the cane areas, it was imperative thatthe representatives of the cane growers should have been given anopportunity to participate in the proceedings of the AreaDelimitation Committee.97. In this context, what has been held by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in the decision reported in (1999) 9 SCC 620 (Belsund SugarCo.Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar) can be usefully referred to. Though thesaid decision was rendered in a different context what has beenstated about simultaneous operation of certain provisions inidentical Statutes which does not conflict with one another has beenacknowledged. In that case, the two identical enactment wereSugarcane Control Order, 1966 enacted under the provisions of Section3 of the E.C. Act, 1955 and the Sugar Cane Act of 1981, enacted bythe Bihar State Legislature. The issue related to the claim of Stateof Bihar, that Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 will haveprevalence over the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply andPurchase) Act, 1981, as well as, the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966.Dealing with that question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as underin paragraph 62 and 64 :"62. It has to be appreciated that theaforesaid provisions of the Sugarcane (Control)Order operate in the same field in which theBihar legislative enactment, namely, theSugarcane Act operates and both of them arecomplementary to each other. When takentogether, they wholly occupy the field ofregulation of price of sugarcane and also themode and manner in which sugarcane has to besupplied and distributed to the earmarked sugarfactories and thus lay down a comprehensivescheme of regulating purchase and sale ofsugarcane to be supplied by sugarcane-growers tothe earmarked sugar factories. It is, however,true that a comprehensive procedure or machineryfor enforcing these provisions is found ingreater detail in the Sugarcane Act of the BiharLegislature. But on a combined operation of boththese provisions, it become at once clear thatthe general provisions of the Market Act so faras the regulation of sale and purchase of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ sugarcane is concerned get obviously excluded andsuperseded by these special provisions.*****64.....Consequently on a conjoint readingof the Sugarcane Order as well as the SugarcaneAct, an inevitable conclusion has to be reachedthat the regulation of sale and purchase ofsugarcane in the entire market area for which thegeneral Act, namely, the Market Act is enacted,is fully governed and highlighted by these twospecial provisions harmoniously operating in thevery same field. Therefore, there would remain nooccasion for the State authorities to rationaliseand reasonably visualise any need for regulatingthe purchase, sale as well as storage ofsugarcane in the market area concerned. The widesweep of the general notification of Section 3 ofthe Market Act, therefore, will have to be readdown by excluding from its general sweepsugarcane and its products as the definition of"agricultural produce" as noted earlier wouldotherwise include not only the primary produce ofagriculture but also any other commodityprocessed or manufactured out of such primaryagricultural produce........" (Emphasis added)98. The above extracted portion of the judgment of the Hon'bleSupreme Court makes it amply clear that a harmonious construction ofthe provisions contained in the E.C. Act along with the SugarcaneControl Order and the Madras Act, 1949 made it clear that they can besimultaneously applied and in the same analogues, the stipulationcontained in the Madras Act, 1949 and the Rules framed thereunder forinclusion of two representatives of the cane growers in the AdvisoryCommittee should have been followed and thereby provided anopportunity to the cane growers also to be part of the AreaDelimitation Committee constituted by the State Government underG.O.Ms.No.468, dated 06.12.1993. 99. Therefore, by virtue of the statutory implications whichis prevailing under the Madras Act, 1949, it was obligatory on thepart of the respondent State to have heard the representatives of thecane growers before taking any decision on delimitation of cane areaswhich were already existing with the co-operative sugar mills.100. In that context, at the risk of repetition, it would beworthwhile to refer to Section 3 of the Madras Act which specificallystates that the Government should by Notification constitute in suchmanner as may be prescribed an Advisory Committee which shall berepresented as far as possible of all the interest concerned on allmatters on which consultation with the Committee is obligatory under https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the Act as well as the Rules made thereunder and on such othermatters as the Government may refer to it. Under Rule 3(i)(e) of the1949 Rules it is specified that two representatives of sugarcanegrowers and jaggery manufacturers should be nominated by theGovernment. In exercise of the powers conferred under Clause 6 ofthe Sugarcane Control Order, the State Government thought it fit toconstitute Area Delimitation Committee and the role to be played bysuch Committee was nothing but advisory in nature and the issue to beconsidered by the said Committee having been referred by the StateGovernment which would fall squarely within the prescriptioncontained under Section 3 of the Madras Act, 1949, the non-inclusionof the representatives of the sugarcane growers would render theproceedings of the Committee invalid. 101. A conjointed reading of Section 3 of the E.C. Act,Section 3 of the Madras Act, 1949 and Clause 6 of the SugarcaneControl Order read along with Rule 3 of the 1949 Rules, makes itabundantly clear that such constitution of the Committee without therepresentatives of the sugarcane growers would be in violation ofstatutory prescriptions and consequently any order passed based onsuch an invalid Committee would be nonest in law. 102. De hors the above, when we consider the other grievancevoiced on behalf of the sugarcane growers, the various grievancelisted out in paragraph No.95, will be of far reaching consequence onthe sugarcane growers and consequently they would fall within thedefinition of 'civil consequence' as set out by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in the decision reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 (Mohinder SinghGill Vs Chief Election Commissioner). Since we have held that theinclusion of representatives of cane growers has to be necessarilymade as a statutory requirement, the submission of learned counselfor the new mills to the effect that the impugned order of the CaneCommissioner passed under Clause 6 of the Sugarcane Control Order islegislative in character fades into insignificance.103. In the light of our above conclusions, we are not in aposition to accept the submissions of Mr.C.Natarajan, learned seniorcounsel appearing for the respondent in W.A.No.401 of 1998, whostrenuously contended that the thrust in the E.C.Act, the SugarcaneControl Order in determining the price factor of sugar which wascorrelated with the factory and that while carrying out the exercisein contemplation of such factor, the paramount interest would be ofthe public at large and consequently the whole exercise waslegislative in character. Having regard to our conclusions based onvarious other factors, even by applying the provisions contained inthe E.C.Act, the Sugarcane Control Order and the Madras Act, we arenot impressed with the said submission of the learned senior counsel.When once statutorily as of right the cane growers are entitled to beincluded as representatives in the Advisory Committee namely the AreaDelimitation Committee, the failure to include them in the said https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Committee by itself would invalidate the order of the CaneCommissioner.104. Therefore, the arguments of the learned counsel for theappellants in W.A.Nos.540 of 2009 etc., batch filed by the new millsthat the order of the Cane Commissioner is in the nature oflegislative function cannot be accepted. 105. In fact, in the decision reported in (1969) 1 SCC 308 :AIR 1970 SC 1896 (The Purtabpore Co., Ltd., Vs. Cane Commissioner ofBihar) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it clear that theproceedings of the Cane Commissioner is undoubtedly a quasi judicialproceedings and it is obligatory on the authority to hear the personsconcerned. It also held that in as much as the aggrieved party wasnot given an opportunity of hearing that would vitiate the order ofthe Cane Commissioner. That was also a case of bifurcation of caneareas from one mill to another mill and the grievance was expressedby the sugar mill whose cane area was diverted to some other sugarmill. What was stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the saiddecision in regard to the proceedings of the Cane Commissioner whoexercised his powers under Clause 6 of the Sugar Cane Control Order,mutatis mutandis apply to the order impugned in the writ petitionsand applying the ratio laid down in the said decision, it will haveto be held that the orders of the Cane Commissioner dated 04.12.1997and 03.06.2008 are violative of the principles of Natural Justice andconsequently the same were rightly set aside by the learned singleJudge. The contention of the learned counsel for the mills todistinguish the said decision on the ground that the dispute in thesaid case was as between two mills cannot be accepted. The law laiddown in the said decision is applicable to all situations wheredemarcation of sugarcane area is made. Therefore, applying the ratioof the said decision, it will have to be held that failure to give anopportunity of hearing to the sugarcane growers would render theimpugned order invalid in law.106. The reliance placed upon by the learned counsel for theappellants in the decision reported in AIR 2000 SC 2783 (AligarhMuslim University Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan) particularly paragraph 23 isalso of no assistance to the appellants. In paragraph 23 the Hon'bleSupreme Court in the above case has stated the proposition of lawthat in addition to breach of Natural Justice, prejudice must also beproved. In the case on hand apart from violation of the principlesof Natural Justice, the cane growers have demonstrated how in theevent of an opportunity of hearing had been given they would haveexplained the various circumstances which would cause seriousprejudice to them because of the bifurcation of the cane area. Thosecircumstances listed out in paragraph 95, cannot be simply brushedaside. Those circumstances are all intertwined with the supply bycane growers and their right to avail the various benefits apart fromthe cost of cane supplied by them to the sugar factories. Therefore, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ when such serious consequence would follow due to bifurcation of thecane area from the co-operative sugar mills to the new private mills,it was imperative that a proper hearing should have been afforded tothem before the passing of the orders impugned in the writ petitions.107. Reliance was placed upon (2005) 10 SCC 69 (Union of IndiaVs. Indian Jute Mills Association) in particular paragraph 23 tosupport the contention that an opportunity of hearing to the canegrowers under Clause 6 of the Sugarcane Control Order is notcontemplated. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealtwith a case arising under Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory Use inPacking Commodities) Act, 1987. The question of law raised waswhether the Standing Advisory Committee constituting of only theSecretaries representing various departments without associating thejute industry or its representatives was void, was rejected by theHon'ble Supreme Court. In the earlier decision reported in (1996) 10SCC 104 (Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd., Vs. Union of India), theHon'ble Supreme Court however directed the Standing AdvisoryCommittee to afford a hearing to the representatives of the growersand the workers producing raw jute and jute packaging materials.While upholding the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court heldthat the provisions do not provide for inclusion of representativesof the jute manufactures in the Standing Advisory Committee. The saiddecision will have no application in the light of the specificprovision contained in the Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory Usein Packing Commodities) Act, 1987. In the case on hand, we havenoted that the E.C. Act, the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 and theMadras Act, 1949 read along with the 1949 Rules specifically mandateinclusion of the representatives of the cane growers in the AdvisoryCommittee. Therefore, the reliance placed upon (2005) 10 SCC 69 isof no assistance to the appellants.108. Reliance placed upon the decision reported in AIR 1987 SC1802 (Union of India Vs. Cynamide India Ltd.,) relates to pricefixation under the Drugs (Price Control) Order 1949, the Hon'bleSupreme Court held that the price fixation is neither the functionnor the forte of the Court. It also held that it is in the nature ofseparate legislation where applicability of the principles of NaturalJustice has no role to play. Having regard to the nature andcontents of the statutory provisions relating to price fixation underthe Drug Control Order which by no stretch of imagination isanalogous to the E.C. Act, the Sugarcane Control Order and theprovisions contained in the Madras Act, 1949, we find no scope toapply the said decision to the facts of this case.109. Reliance was placed upon AIR 1970 SC 267 (A.K.Jain Vs.Union of India) in particular paragraph 6 to 8, which also does notsupport the case of the appellants. As against the position statedin the said decision that a provision contained in the Bihar Sugar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Factories Control Act which is a pre-Constitutional legislation rancontrary to the provisions contained in the Sugarcane Control Order,1955 and the E.C. Act and therefore by virtue of Article 372 of theConstitution, the said Act stood repealed on the advent of E.C. Act,1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order also of 1955 cannot be comparedwith the case on hand, where we have found that the details in regardto the right of representation of the sugarcane growers in theAdvisory Committee as provided under Section 3 read along with theRule 3 of the Madras Act, 1949 and the Rules framed thereunder doesnot in any way conflict with any of the provisions contained in E.C.Act or Clause 6 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966. The saiddecision is therefore of no assistance nor it supports the view thatby virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution, the Madras Act, 1949cannot be held to be repealed. 110. Reliance was placed upon the Constitutional BenchJudgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 2004 SC 3697(U.P. Co-op. Cane Unions Federations Vs. West U.P.Sugar MillsAssociation) in particular paragraphs 118, 119 and 137, to contendthat the various provisions contained in the U.P. Sugarcane(Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Rules framedthereunder and the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulations of Supply andPurchase) Order 1954 makes it clear that the object to be achievedwas to ensure that the sugar factories which normally runs in shiftsfor the whole day during the crushing seasons needs the continuoussupply of freshly harvested sugarcane depending upon its dailycrushing capacity and that such supply should be provided in order toensure that the production operation is not affected throughout thecrushing seasons and thereby the arrangement does not allow themarket forces to operate and thereby completely avoid competitionamongst the sugar factories which would lead to escalation in sugarprice.111. The said decision came to be rendered in the backgroundof a situation where the legal status and binding nature of StateAdvised Price, the power of the State Government to fix sugarcaneprice under the U.P.Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase)Act, 1953 and when such power accepted and exercised, whether theState law fixing the price was repugnant to the Central Law namelythe Sugarcane Control Order, 1966. While dealing with the abovequestions, the majority view expressed in paragraph 137 is to theeffect that the reservation or assignment of area is made for thebenefit of a sugar factory and the agreements executed by the canegrowers or cane growers' co-operative society in favour of occupierof a factory are also for the benefit of the sugar factory in as muchas such agreements assures continuous supply of freshly harvestedsugarcane so that there may not be any problem in getting optimumquantity of raw materials throughout the crushing season. Whileholding so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that having regard to theadvantages derived by the sugar factories, they are fully bound by https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the agreement wherein the State Advised Price may be mentioned and itis not open to them to assail the clause relating to price of thesugarcane on the ground that their consent was not voluntary or wasobtained under some kind of duress. 112. The conclusion stated in the said decision to the effectthat reservation or assignment of area is made for the benefit of thesugar factory will have to be therefore understood in the context inwhich it was stated and the same cannot be taken to mean that evenbefore the assignment of area is made, everything else should be heldin favour of the factory unmindful of the 'civil consequence' thatwould arise while making such area demarcation. We therefore do notfind any support in favour of the appellants from the said decision.113. The decision reported in (1985) 2 SCC 670 (Daman SinghVs. State of Punjab) was relied upon for the proposition that once aperson becomes a member of the Co-operative Society, he loses hisindividuality qua the Society and he has no independent rights exceptthose given to him by the Statute and the by-laws and that he canonly speak and act through the society or rather the society alonecan act and speak for him qua rights or duties of the Society as abody, therefore no individual notice was required to be given to themembers. That was a case where one Co-operative Society wasamalgamated with another Co-operative Society under Section 13(8) ofthe Punjab Co-operative Societies Act. The above statement of lawwas made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that situation ofamalgamation of one society with another society wherein it was heldthat the right of the individual member has no role to play. Incontrast to the case on hand, where it comes to the question ofbifurcating the cane area owned by the individual member, the noticeissued to the Co-operative sugar mill in which the owner of the canearea is a member derives far different rights than what has beenstated in relation to amalgamation of one Society with anotherSociety. We therefore do not find any scope to apply the ratio laiddown in the said decision to the facts of this case. 114. For the very same reason, the decision reported in AIR2007 SC 1723 (Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh) which hasfollowed the Constitutional Bench judgment reported in (1985) 2 SCC670 also does not help the appellants.115. The decision reported in AIR 1956 SC 676 (Tika Ramji Vs.State of U.P.) was cited to contend that Madras Act of 1949 and theprovisions contained therein relating to the right of representationof the Sugarcane growers cannot be claimed in the light of theprovisions contained in the E.C. Act and the Sugarcane Control Order,1966 which does not contain such a provision. In other words, havingregard to Sections 6 and 16 of the E.C. Act, the provisions containedin the Madras Act, 1949 should be held to have been impliedlyrepealed. The statement of law stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ in the decision reported in AIR 1956 SC 676, we do not find anysupport for such a submission made on behalf of the appellant. Onthe other hand it supports the stand of the respondent sugarcanegrowers. In the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court whileconsidering the E.C. Act, 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955vis-a-vis the U.P.Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase)Order, 1954 held as under at Pg.704 :"Suffice it to say that none of theseprovisions do overlap the Centre being silentwith regard to some of the provisions which havebeen enacted by the State and the State beingsilent with regard to some of the provisionswhich have been enacted by the Centre. There isno repugnance whatever between these provisionsand the impugned Act and the rules framedthereunder as also the U.P.Sugarcane Regulationof Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 do not trenchupon the field covered by Act 10 of 1955.There being no repugnance at all,therefore no question arises of the operation ofArt.254(2) of the Constitution and no provisionof the impugned Act and the rules made thereunderis invalidated by any provision contained in Act65 of 1951 as amended by Act 26 of 1953 or Act 10of 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955issued thereunder."116. Having regard to the above statement of law and in thelight of the decision reported in (1999) 9 SCC 620 there being norepugnancy as between the E.C. Act, Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 andthe Madras Act, 1949 and the rules framed thereunder, there would beno difficulty in making a harmonious construction of both theenactment and apply the provisions. We therefore do not find anysupport for the appellants based on the above decision.117. In the decision reported in 2009 (2) CTC 185 (Uma NathPandey Vs. State of U.P.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held asunder in paragraph 15:"15. Concept of natural justice hasundergone a great deal of change in recent years.Rules of natural justice are not rules embodiedalways expressly in a statute or in rules framedthereunder. They may be implied from the natureof the duty to be performed under a statute.What particular rule of natural justice should beimplied and what its context should be in a givencase must depend to a great extent on the fact https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and circumstances of that case, the frame-work ofthe statute under which the enquiry is held. Theold distinction between a judicial act and anadministrative act has withered away. Even anadministrative order which involves civilconsequence must be consistent with the rules ofnatural justice. Expression 'civil consequences'encompasses infraction of not merely property orpersonal rights but of civil liberties, materialdeprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In itswide umbrella comes everything that affects acitizen in his civil life." (Emphasis added)118. Applying the above principles to the facts of this case,we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order resulted incivil consequence adverse to the interest of the cane growers andconsequently the orders passed without giving an opportunity ofhearing to the writ petitioners rendered the impugned orders invalidin law.119. In the decision reported in (2007) 8 SCC 418 (DhampurSugar (Kashipur) Ltd., Vs. State of Uttaranchal) the issue related tothe claim of sugar manufacturing company in challenging the licencesgranted in favour of another company for power driven machinery forthe manufacture of khandsari sugar. On an earlier occasion such anapplication was rejected on the ground that the manufacture ofkhandsari sugar was in the reserved area of sugar mill of theappellant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and therefore no suchlicence could have been granted. In that context the Hon'ble SupremeCourt held as under in paragraphs 37, 39 and 43 :"37. The High Court also noted that theremay be occasions when one sugar factory is notable to crush the entire sugarcane available inassigned or reserved area and at the same timeanother sugar factory is having the shortage ofsugarcane in its reserved area during thecrushing season. In such situations, theSugarcane Commissioner can very well assign anyspecified area out of the reserved area of theformer factory to the latter factory. The Courtobserved that reserved area of a sugar factory isnot of permanent nature and no sugar factory canclaim that the area reserved for a particularyear would remain with it for all the time. Thereserved area is allocated to a particular sugarfactory for a “crushing season” which can bechanged or modified by the Sugarcane Commissionerin the next crushing season. If exigencies ofsituation require, the Sugarcane Commissioner can https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ change the area even during the same crushingseason.*****39. The High Court, in our opinion, wasright in considering the facts and circumstancesin their entirety and in holding that the actionof Respondents 1 to 3 could not be said to beillegal or otherwise objectionable. It is, nodoubt, true that earlier an application made byRespondent 4 came to be rejected but it wasbecause of the policy then in force. Since thepolicy was thereafter changed, grant of licencein favour of Respondent 4 could not be objectedto by the appellant.*****43. To us, the High Court is right inholding that whether or not the sugar factory ofthe appellant has been adversely affected isessentially a question of fact. Such question,therefore, in our considered opinion, can beraised by the appellant before the authoritiesunder the Act, and it cannot be decided inproceedings under Article 226 or Article 136 ofthe Constitution. The appellant can also in thisconnection rely on additional Condition 3 imposedon Respondent 4 that no permission could begranted to the unit of Respondent 4 to purchase“bonded cane”."In paragraph 54 of the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Courtreferred to certain observations contained in its earlier decisionrelating to Shri Ganesh Sugar Works case (1987) 4 SCC 604. Theextracted portion of the said judgment in paragraph 54 is to thefollowing effect:"54.The Court also made the followingobservations: (Shri Ganesh Sugar Works case, SCCpp.607-08, para 4)“4. We may mention that while theCommissioner is now the licensingauthority, the State Government is theappellate authority. It is a matter ofcommon knowledge that the SugarcaneControl Order was made in the interestsof growers of sugarcane primarily andalso in the interests of the sugarfactories, that is, factories engagedin the manufacture of sugar by thevacuum pan process and in the ultimateanalysis in the interests of theconsumers by making sugarcane available https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ for sugar production........."(Emphasis added)A reading of the above extracted part of the judgment, it can besafely held that while the power of the Cane Commissioner inallotting the cane area of existing sugar mills in favour of theproposed new sugar mill cannot be questioned, having regard to thedefinite finding that the Sugarcane Control Order was made in theinterest of growers of sugarcane primarily it will have to be heldthat if such interest of the sugarcane growers are to be protected,necessarily in a situation like this, where the sugarcane area isbifurcated from the Co-operative sugar mill for the purpose ofallotting it in favour of the new mills in the private sector, thebasic requirement of affording an opportunity of personal hearing isimperative.120. In the decision reported in (1991) 190 ITR 101(Government of India Vs. Maxim A. Lobo) the Division Bench of thisCourt has held as under at Pg.114:".....Fair hearing is a postulate ofdecision making by a statutory authorityexercising quasi-judicial powers. Of course,undue expansion of natural justice withoutreference to the administrative realities andother factors of a given case is not desirable,but the fact remains that it is "untenable heresyto lock-jaw the victim or act behind his back" bytempting invocation of administrative necessity.Even where there is a clearest case of publicinterest or public injury, there is nojustification for non-observance of even anabridged form of fair hearing, preferably pre-decisional or, at any rate, post-decisional wherepre-decisional hearing for practical reasonscannot be granted. A hearing, an essentialattribute of a quasi-judicial action, would ceaseto be fair, if apprising the affected is wanting.One principle which is now well-settled bya catena of authorities is that even if thestatute is silent with regard to grant of hearingto the person affected but the decision taken bythe authority involves civil consequences oradverse consequences, at least a minimal hearingis essential, and not only desirable. An ordersuffering from non-observance of the principlesof natural justice would, under thecircumstances, be void and a nullity....."(Emphasis added) https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

121. Since in the decision reported in AIR 1970 SC 1896 theHon'ble Supreme Court has held that the proceedings of the CaneCommissioner is a quasi judicial function, having regard to the abovelegal position stated by the Division Bench of this Court, it can besafely held that the failure to give an opportunity to the sugarcanegrowers in matters relating to bifurcation of cane area to the newmill from the existing Co-operative sugar mill would render theimpugned order a nullity.122. On behalf of the cane growers reliance was placed uponthe decision reported in (1995) 4 SCC 104 (State of Tamil Nadu Vs.Adhiyaman Educational & Educational & Research Institute) inparticular paragraph 30, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held asunder:"30......Thus, so far as these matters areconcerned, in the case of the institutesimparting technical education, it is not theUniversity Act and the University but it is theCentral Act and the Council created under itwhich will have the jurisdiction. To that extent,after the coming into operation of the CentralAct, the provisions of the University Act will bedeemed to have become unenforceable in case oftechnical colleges like the engineering colleges.As has been pointed out earlier, the Central Acthas been enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 ofList I to coordinate and determine the standardsof technical institutions as well as under Entry25 of List III. The provisions of the UniversityAct regarding affiliation of technical collegeslike the engineering colleges and the conditionsfor grant and continuation of such affiliation bythe University shall, however, remain operativebut the conditions that are prescribed by theUniversity for grant and continuance ofaffiliation will have to be in conformity withthe norms and guidelines prescribed by theCouncil in respect of matters entrusted to itunder Section 10 of the Central Act."123. In the decision reported in (1998) 1 SCC 318 (State ofTamil Nadu Vs. K.Sabanayagam) wherein in paragraphs 22 & 30, theHon'ble Supreme Court has stated the legal principle as under:"22. But there may be a third category ofcases wherein the exercise of conditionallegislation would depend upon satisfaction of thedelegate on objective facts placed by one classof persons seeking benefit of such an exercisewith a view to deprive the rival class of persons https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ who otherwise might have already got statutorybenefits under the Act and who are likely to losethe existing benefit because of exercise of sucha power by the delegate. In such type of casesthe satisfaction of the delegate has necessarilyto be based on objective consideration of therelevant data for and against the exercise ofsuch power. Maybe such an exercise may not amountto any judicial or quasi-judicial function, stillit has to be treated to be one which requiresobjective consideration of relevant factual datapressed into service by one side and which couldbe tried to be rebutted by the other side whowould be adversely affected if such exercise ofpower is undertaken by the delegate. In such athird category of cases of conditionallegislation the legislature fixes up objectiveconditions for the exercise of power by thedelegate to be applied to past or existing factsand for deciding whether the rights orliabilities created by the Act are to be deniedor extended to particular areas, persons orgroups.........*****30. On the aforesaid conclusion of ours wemust hold that the ultimate decision of the HighCourt on Point No. 3 that the impugned exemptionnotifications issued under Section 36 from yearto year by the State of Tamil Nadu were null andvoid, has to be upheld not on the ground thathearing, personal or otherwise, was not given tothe employees but on the ground that theprocedure indicated by us hereinabove regardingthird category of cases of exercise of powers ofconditional legislations was admittedly notfollowed by the appellant-State while passing theimpugned orders of exemption in favour of theHousing Board. The third point for determinationis, therefore, answered in the affirmative in theaforesaid terms."124. In the light of the above decisions it is imperative thatthe Cane Commissioner as a delegated authority while proceeding topass orders of delimitation, which would impinge upon the canegrowers ought to have extended a fair opportunity of hearing. Moreso, when the ultimate orders passed by the Cane Commissioner resultedin serious civil consequences affecting the rights of the canegrowers.125. In the decision reported in (2007) 2 SCC 181 (Rajesh https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Kumar Vs. Dy.CIT) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under inparagraph 20, 23, 31, 48 and 53:"20.Principles of natural justice are basedon two basic pillars:(i) Nobody shall be condemned unheard (audialteram partem).(ii) Nobody shall be judge of his own cause (nemodebet esse judex in propria sua causa).*****23. We, however, need not dilate on the saidquestion being not very necessary for the purposeof this case. But it is beyond any cavil thatordinarily unless excluded by operation of astatute, the superior courts while exercisingpower of judicial review shall proceed on thebasis that assignment of reasons is imperative incharacter. When an authority, be itadministrative or quasi-judicial adjudicates on adispute and if its order is appealable or subjectto judicial review, it would be necessary tospell out the reasons therefor. While applyingthe principles of natural justice, however, thecourt must also bear in mind the theory ofuseless formality and the prejudice doctrine.*****31. In Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C.Mazdoor Congress16 Ray, J. opined: (SCC p.706,para 202)“It is now well settled that the ‘audialteram partem’ rule which in essence,enforces the equality clause in Article14 of the Constitution is applicable notonly to quasi-judicial orders but toadministrative orders affectingprejudicially the party in questionunless the application of the rule hasbeen expressly excluded by the Act orregulation or rule which is not the casehere. Rules of natural justice do notsupplant but supplement the rules andregulations. Moreover, the rule of lawwhich permeates our Constitution demandsthat it has to be observed bothsubstantially and procedurally.”(See also Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ University17 and Uptron India Ltd. v. ShammiBhan.)*****48. In any event, when civil consequencesensue, there is hardly any distinction between anadministrative order and a quasi-judicial order.There might have been difference of opinions atone point of time, but it is now well settledthat a thin demarcated line between anadministrative order and quasi-judicial order nowstands obliterated (see A.K. Kraipak v. Union ofIndia and Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging v.State of Mysore and S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan).*****53. The factors enumerated in Section 142(2-A) of the Act, thus, are not exhaustive. Onceit is held that the assessee suffers civilconsequences and any order passed by it would beprejudicial to him, principles of natural justicemust be held to be implicit. The principles ofnatural justice are required to be applied interalia to minimise arbitrariness."126. The above principles stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Courtwhen applied to the facts of this case, makes it explicit that theimpugned order passed by the Cane Commissioner without affording anopportunity of hearing to the cane growers could render the impugnedorders null and void.127. By referring to the decision reported in AIR 1987 SC 1802(Union of India Vs. Cynamide India Ltd.,) which related to the issueof price fixation of an essential commodity and AIR 1990 SC 1277(M/s.Shri Sitaram Sugar Co.Ltd., Vs. Union of India) which alsorelated to fixation of price of sugar and contended that in thosecases the exercise of price fixation is of general applicationthroughout the country as compared to the delimitation of sugarcanearea which relates to individual sugarcane growers vis-a-vis thesugar factories. What has been stated in those decisions is to theeffect that price fixation is neither the function nor the forte ofthe Court. As rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing forthe cane growers the law laid down in these decisions to the effectthat such price fixation is by way of legislative function wherethere is no scope to apply the principles of natural justice incontrast to the case on hand, where by the impugned orders, the CaneCommissioner interfered with the individual rights of cane growerswhen it wanted to demarcate such cane areas belonging to them andallow the same to the newly started sugar factories without givingany opportunity to the cane growers. Certainly such an action of thedelegated authority can be held to be invalid as held by the learned https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ single Judge.128. In the decision reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 (SwadeshiCotton Mills Vs. Union of India) the Hon'ble Supreme Court afterreferring to the view of Prof.De.Smith in paragraph 41 has laid downthe general principle as under in paragraph 42:"41. Prof. de Smith, the renowned authorof Judicial Review (3rd Edn.) has at p. 170,expressed his views on this aspect of thesubject, thus: “Can the absence of a hearing before adecision is made be adequatelycompensated for by a hearing ex postfacto? A prior hearing may be betterthan a subsequent hearing, but asubsequent hearing is better than nohearing at all; and in some cases theCourts have held that statutoryprovision for an administrative appealor even full judicial review on themerits are sufficient to negative theexistence of any implied duty to hearbefore the original decision is made.The approach may be acceptable wherethe original decision does not causeserious detriment to the personaffected, or where there is also aparamount need for prompt action, orwhere it is impracticable to affordantecedent hearings.”42. In short, the general principle — asdistinguished from an absolute rule of uniformapplication — seems to be that where a statutedoes not, in terms, exclude this rule of priorhearing but contemplates a post-decisionalhearing amounting to a full review of theoriginal order on merits, then such a statutewould be construed as excluding the audi alterampartem rule at the pre-decisional stage.Conversely, if the statute conferring the poweris silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and theadministrative decision taken by the authorityinvolves civil consequences of a grave nature,and no full review or appeal on merits againstthat decision is provided, Courts will beextremely reluctant to construe such a statute asexcluding the duty of affording even a minimalhearing shorn of all its formal trappings and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage,unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralysethe administrative progress or frustrate the needfor utmost promptitude. In short, this rule offair play “must not be jettisoned save in veryexceptional circumstances where compulsivenecessity so demands”. The court must make everyeffort to salvage this cardinal rule to themaximum extent possible, with situationalmodifications. But, to recall the words ofBhagwati, J., the core of it must, however,remain, namely, that the person affected musthave reasonable opportunity of being heard andthe hearing must be a genuine hearing and not anempty public relations exercise."129. Applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order ofthe Cane Commissioner resulted in adverse civil consequence againstthe cane growers and in the interest of justice it would be just andproper to set aside those orders and direct the Cane Commissioner togive an opportunity to the cane growers before passing any orders ofarea delimitation.130. In the decision reported in (1990) 3 SCC 223 (ShirSitaram Sugar Co.Ltd., Vs. Union of India) the Hon'ble Supreme Courthas laid down the principles as under in paragraph 27, 32 and 47:"27. The petitioners contend that althoughthe government has the discretion to fixdifferent prices for different areas or fordifferent factories, or for different kinds ofsugar, such wide discretion has to be reasonablyexercised. It is, of course, a well acceptedprinciple that any discretion conferred on theexecutive has to be reasonably exercised.Nevertheless, it is a discretion which the courtwill not curtail unless the exercise of it isimpeachable on well accepted grounds such as‘ultra vires’ or ‘unreasonableness’.*****32. Judicial decisions are made accordingto law while administrative decisions emanatefrom administrative policy. Quasi-judicialdecision are also administrative decisions, butthey are subject to some measure of judicialprocedure, such as rules of natural justice. Todistinguish clearly legislative and https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ administrative functions is “difficult in theoryand impossible in practice”. Referring to thesetwo functions, Wade says:“They are easy enough to distinguish atthe extremities of the spectrum: an Actof Parliament is legislative and adeportation order is administrative.But in between is a wide area whereeither label could be used according totaste, for example where ministers makeorders or regulations affecting largenumbers of people....”Wade points out that legislative power is thepower to prescribe the law for people in general,while administrative power is the power toprescribe the law for them, or apply the law tothem, in particular situations. A scheme forcentralising the electricity supply undertakingsmay be called administrative, but it might bejust as well legislative. Same is the case withministerial orders establishing new towns orairports etc. He asks: “And what of ‘directionsof a general character’ given by a minister to anationalised industry? Are these various orderslegislative or administrative?” Wade says thatthe correct answer would be that they are both.He says: “...there is an infinite series ofgradations, with a large area of overlap, betweenwhat is plainly legislation and what is plainlyadministration”. Courts, nevertheless, forpractical reasons, have distinguished legislativeorders from the rest of the orders by referenceto the principle that the former is of generalapplication. They are made formally bypublication and for general guidance withreference to which individual decisions are takenin particular situations.*****47. Power delegated by statute is limitedby its terms and subordinate to its objects. Thedelegate must act in good faith, reasonably,intra vires the power granted, and on relevantconsideration of material facts. All hisdecisions, whether characterised as legislativeor administrative or quasi-judicial, must be inharmony with the Constitution and other laws ofthe land. They must be “reasonably related to thepurposes of the enabling legislation”. See LeilaMourning v. Family Publications Service. If they https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ are manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageousor directed to an unauthorised end or do not tendin some degree to the accomplishment of theobjects of delegation, court might well say,“Parliament never intended to give authority tomake such rules; they are unreasonable and ultravires”: per Lord Russel of Killowen, C.J. inKruse v. Johnson.Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, we areconvinced that the order of the Cane Commissioner calls forinterference as held by the learned Single Judge.131. In the decision reported in (2009) 5 SCC 641 (Bihar StateElectricity Board Vs. Pulak Enterprises) the Hon'ble Supreme Courthas stated what could be a legislative function or non-legislativefunction and in the event of exercise of power which affectsindividuals without giving opportunity such actions can be interferedwith. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles inparagraph 29 and 37 which reads as under:"29.The significance of the question as towhether fixing the rate of fuel surcharge is alegislative function or a non-legislativefunction is that if the function is held to belegislative, in the absence of any provision inthat regard the principles of natural justicewould not be applicable and the scope of judicialreview would also be limited to plea ofdiscrimination i.e. violation of Article 14 ofthe Constitution of India. As a generalproposition, the law on the point is settled.*****37. Where the fixation of rate ordetermination of the amount is made individually,depending on the context in which this is to bedone, there may be justification or necessity togive opportunity of hearing to the person orpersons concerned. But where the rate is fixedfor persons at large the only way by which suchopportunity can be given is to notify the ratesand then invite objections. There is no suchprovision. In the absence of any mechanismprovided in the tariff notification, it would notbe feasible at all. Whenever the statutecontemplates giving such an opportunity, amechanism, such as for fixing rates of municipaltaxes, while it is not so in the case of incometax or other taxes." https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Applying the ratio of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court tothe facts of this case, we are of the view that the impugned order ofthe Cane Commissioner in determining the rights of individual canegrowers resulting in adverse consequences calls for interference.132. In the decision reported in 2009 2 LW 435 (M/s.NagarajunaConstruction Co. Ltd., Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh) the Hon'bleSupreme Court has explained the principle of Natural Justice as underin paragraph 33, 35, 36 and 39:"33.Natural justice is another name forcommonsense justice. Rules of natural justiceare not codified canons. But they are principlesingrained into the conscience of man. Naturaljustice is the administration of justice in acommonsense liberal way. Justice is basedsubstantially on natural ideals and human values.The administration of justice is to be freed fromthe narrow and restricted considerations whichare usually associated with a formulated lawinvolving linguistic technicalities andgrammatical niceties. It is the substance ofjustice which has to determine its form.*****35. The adherence to principles of naturaljustice as recognized by all civilized States isof supreme importance when a quasi-judicial bodyembarks on determining disputes between theparties, or any administrative action involvingcivil consequences is in issue. These principlesare well settled. The first and foremostprinciple is what is commonly known as audialteram partem rule. It says that no one shouldbe condomned unheard. Notice is the first limbof this principle. It must be precise andunambiguous. It should appraise the partydeterminatively the case he has to meet. Timegiven for the purpose should be adequate so as toenable him to make his representation. In theabsence of a notice of the kind and suchreasonable opportunity, the order passed becomeswholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential thata party should be put on notice of the casebefore any adverse order is passed against him.This is one of the most important principles ofnatural justice. It is after all an approvedrule of fair play. The concept has gainedsignificance and shades with time. When the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215,the first statutory recognition of this principlefound its way into the "Magna Carta". Theclassic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of naturaljustice requies to "vocate interrogate andadjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v.Wandsworth Board of Wroks (1963 (143) ER 414),the principle was thus stated:"Even God did not pass asentence upon Adam, before he wascalled upon to make his defence."Adam" says God, "where art thou hasthou not eaten of the tree whereof Icommanded thee that though should noteat."Since then the principle has been chiselled,honed and refined, enriching its content.Judicial treatment has added light and luminosityto the concept, like polishing of a diamond.36. Principles of natural justice arethose rules which have been laid down by theCourts as being the minimum protection of therights of the individual against the arbitraryprocedure that may be adopted by a judicial,quasi judicial and administrative authority whilemaking an order affecting those rights. Theserules are intended to prevent such authority fromdoing injustice.*****39......Even an administrative order whichinvolves civil consequence must be consistentwith the rules of natural justice. Expression'civil consequences' encompasses infraction ofnot merely property or personal rights but ofcivil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comeseverything that affects a citizen in his civillife."The rules of natural justice thus stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Courtsquarely applies to the facts of these cases where there is totaldenial of opportunity to the cane growers before their cane areaswere demarcated and allotted in favour of the new private sugarmills.133. Having regard to our above conclusions, we uphold theorder of the learned single Judge, the impugned orders of demarcationand allotment of areas to various private sugar mills passed by theSugar Commissioner cum Cane Commissioner in the order dated https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

04.12.1997, in R.S.No.23364/D1/94 and order dated 03.06.2008, inR.C.No.5972/Cane-1/2008 are set aside. The directions issued by thelearned single Judge in paragraph 90 is upheld. We only add anddirect the State of Tamil Nadu to pass appropriate orders includingtwo of the representatives of cane growers in the Area DelimitationCommittee and that we also make it clear that the Area DelimitationCommittee shall confine its consideration relating to demarcation inrespect of new sugar mills and sugar mills in private sector whilethe Director of Sugar cum Cane Commissioner shall exercise its powerrelating to demarcation of areas between existing sugar mills in co-operative and public sector as directed in the order of theGovernment in G.O.Ms.No.217, dated 18.08.1997.134. We also hold that till such time final orders are passedby the Cane Commissioner, the areas allotted to various sugar millsshall remain as free will area in so far as the members of the co-operative sugar mills. The writ petitions are disposed of on theabove terms.135. W.A.No.1456 of 2009 and W.P.24057 of 2009 as well asW.P.No.24233/ 2009 and W.P.No.9246 of 2009 stands allowed. 136. W.A.401 of 1998 stands disposed off. W.P.No.19322 of1997 stands allowed and the impugned order is set aside. W.A.Nos.535to 539, 540 to 543, 544 to 548, 571 and 572 stands dismissed.W.A.No.1690 to 1703 of 2009 stands dismissed. All miscellaneouspetitions are closed. In the facts and circumstances of the case,there will be no order as to costs. Sd/-Asst.Registrar/True Copy/Sub.Asst.RegistrarkkTo1. THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU,AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, CHENNAI-9.2. THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU,INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, CHENNAI-9.3. THE COMMISSIONER OF SUGAR AND CANE,PERIYAR BUILDING, ANNA SALAI, NANDANAM,CHENNAI - 35.4.THE SPECIAL OFFICERTHIRUPATHUR CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ KETHANDAPATTI,VANIYAMBADI TALUK VELLORE DIST.5. THE SPECIAL OFFICER,KALLAKURICHI-I CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTDKACHIRAPALAYAM, KALLAKURICHI TALUK,VILLUPURAM DISTRICT.6. THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,MINISTRY OF FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLY AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS,KRISHI BHAVAN, NEW DELHI - 110 001.7. THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU,FORT.ST.GEORGE, CHENNAI-9.8. THE SPECIAL OFFICER,KALLAKURICHI-I CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS,MOONGILTHURAIPATTU,SANKARAPURAM TALUK, VILLUPURAM DISTRICT.9. THE SPECIAL OFFICER,THE KALLAKURICHI-II CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS,KATCHIRAYAPALAYAM, KALLAKURICHI TALUK,VILLUPURAM DISTRICT.10. THE DIRECTOR/COMMISSIONER OF SUGAR CANE,NANDANAM, CHENNAI - 35.11. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE,PERAMBALUR SUGAR MILLS,ERAIYUR, PERAMBALUR DISTRICT.12. THE SECRETARYUNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY,DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT,UDYOG BHAVAN, NEW DELHI – 110 001.13.THE SPECIAL OFFICER,SALEM CO-OPERATIVE SUGAR MILLS LTD., MOHANUR, NAMAKKAL DISTRICT https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ + 5 CCs to Mr.R.Suresh Kumar,Advocate,SR.40486 to 40490+ 1 CC to Mr.V.R.Rajasekaran,Advocate,SR.40540+ 1 CC to Mr.G.Rajan,Advocate,SR.40454+ 1 CC to Mr.J.Ramakrishnan,Advocate,SR.40413+ 1 CC to Mr.T.Ravikumar,Advocate,SR.40411+ 1 CC to Mr.S.Udayakumar,Advocate,SR.40406+ 2 CCs to Mr.N.Inbarajan,Advocate,SR.40364+ 1 CC to Mr.S.Mohanasundarajan,Advocate,SR.40285+ 1 CC to Mr.V.Bharathidasan,Advocate,SR.40694+ 5 CCs to M/s.Satish Parasaran,Advocate,SR.40607+ 1 CC to Government Pleader,SR.40544W.A.Nos.401 of 1998, 535 to 539of 2009, 540 to 543 of 2009, 544 to 548 of 2009, 571 & 572 of 2009, 1456of 2009, 1690 to 1703 of 2009, C.M.P.No.4381 of 1998, W.P.Nos.19322 of1997, 24057, 24233 & 9246 of 2009and connected Miscellaneous PetitionsCK(CO)EM,GSK,SR,KM,KK, RH,TP/10.6.10