C.N. Krishnan (deceased)2 v. The Management of Indra Cotton Mills (P) LimitedChromepetChennai – 600 0442

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED:10.04.2007CORAMTHE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA&THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. DHANAPALANW.A. No.1334 of 19981C.N. Krishnan (deceased)2K. Indrani 3K. Selvam 4Ellammal 5K. Kannan 6K. Muthiah 7S. Valarmathi 8Pushpa @ Malarvizhi 9Poongothai @ PoongodiAppellants(RR 2 to 9 who are wife, sons and daughters of the deceased soleappellant are impleaded as his legal heirs vide order of this Courtdated 14.02.2005 made in W.A.M.P. No.886 of 2005)vs.1The Management of Indra Cotton Mills (P) LimitedChromepetChennai – 600 0442The Presiding OfficerII Additional Labour CourtMadrasRespondentsWrit Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challengingthe order dated 11.09.1998 passed by a learned Single Judge of thisCourt in W.P. No.13639 of 1989 confirming the order dated 19.11.1986Writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India, theissuance a writ certiorari calling for the records connected with theorders of the II Additional Labour Court, madras in CP.No.628/1987 dated4.5.1989 and to quash the said order in so far as it has disallowed theclaim of the petitioner towards backwages to an extent of Rs.20,185/-and it has allowed the counter claim of the first respondent for paymentof Rs.9884/- as compensation to the petitioner in lieu of reinstatementand for gratuity of Rs.10,390/- and to pass such further orders passedby the second respondent in C.P. No.628 of 1987. For appellantMr.V.Gangatharan for Mr.R.GanesanFor 1st respondentMr. D. Meenakshisundaram https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ JUDGMENT(Judgment of the court was delivered by V. DHANAPALAN, J.)Challenge to this writ appeal is the order dated 11.09.1998 passedby a learned Single Judge of this Court in and by which the order dated19.11.1986 of the second respondent Labour Court in C.P. No.628 of 1987is confirmed.2.Subsequent to filing of this writ appeal, the appellant hasdied and his legal heirs, viz., wife, sons and daughters have beenimpleaded in this writ appeal as appellants 2 to 9.3.The facts giving rise to this writ appeal, are, as follows:The first appellant who was employed under the firstrespondent for 25 years, was issued a Charge Memo17.04.1982, on two grounds, viz., for being negligent inwork and for speaking in an indifferent manner to hissupervisor. He was placed under suspension on 15.04.1982and was subsequently terminated from service on04.10.1982. Aggrieved by his termination, the firstappellant raised an Industrial Dispute and the secondrespondent Labour Court passed an award on 19.11.1986,quashing the order of dismissal passed by the firstrespondent and further directed reinstatement of thefirst appellant with back-wages and other attendantbenefits. Since the first appellant did not comply with the awardof the second respondent Labour Court by reinstating thefirst appellant in spite of his sending two lettersexpressing his willingness to join duty, the firstappellant filed a Claim Petition in C.P. No.628 of 1987seeking back-wages, leave wages, arrears of wages andbonus, altogether amounting to Rs.81,757/- withoutprejudice to his right to reinstatement. In the counterfiled by the first respondent, it was contended that ithad lost its confidence in the first appellant and assuch, the first appellant could not be reinstated intoservice. Instead, the first respondent offered to paydamages to the first appellant in lieu of reinstatementalong with gratuity. The second respondent Labour Courtaccepted the plea of first respondent to pay damages inlieu of reinstatement and computed the total money valueas follows:S.NoParticularsAmount (Rs.)1Back-wages from April 82 to June 8748,9122Leave Salary3,6603Bonus for the years 82-83, 83-84 &84-856,6004Bonus advance for 1985-861,0005Damages in lieu of reinstatement9,9846Gratuity for 25 years of service10,390Total80,546 https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Challenging the above order of the second respondentLabour Court insofar as disallowance of his claim forbackwages and also with regard to allowing the counterclaim of the first respondent, the first appellant fileda writ petition in W.P. No.13639 of 1989. A learnedSingle Judge of this Court, in the impugned order dated11.09.1998, as far as the claim of the first appellantwith regard to payment of back-wages and other benefitsis concerned, by referring to paragraph 11 of theaffidavit accompanying the writ petition, held that thefirst appellant is satisfied with the same. The learnedSingle Judge further concurring with the finding of thesecond respondent Labour Court that the first appellantand first respondent are at loggerheads and as such, itmay not be possible for them to maintain coordination,endorsed the findings of the second respondent LabourCourt in accepting the counter claim made by the firstrespondent. Questioning the findings of the learned Single Judge onthe above two points, viz., non-interference in the moneyvalue computed by the second respondent Labour Court withregard to back-wages and other benefits and endorsementof the acceptance of the counter-claim of the firstrespondent by the second respondent Labour Court, thefirst appellant has filed the present writ appeal.4.Mr. V. Gangatharan, learned counsel for the appellant, bydrawing our attention to Section 33(C) 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act,1947, has contended that the learned Single Judge ought to have quashedthe order of the second respondent Labour Court on the ground that ithas no jurisdiction to accept the counter-claim made by the firstrespondent. His further contention is that the learned Single Judgeshould have held that the second respondent Labour Court has nojurisdiction to determine Gratuity amount under the Payment of GratuityAct.5.Per contra, Mr. D. Meenakshisundaram, learned counsel for thefirst respondent has contended that the first appellant is not in thegood books of the Management of the first respondent in view of his pastill record and also his initiation of legal proceedings against thefirst respondent and as such, the order of the learned Single Judge inconfirming the order of the second respondent Labour Court in acceptingthe counter claim of the first respondent, is perfectly in order andhence, need not be interfered with.6.We have given our careful thought to the submissions made bythe learned counsel on either side and have perused the order of thelearned Single Judge which is impugned in this writ appeal. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7.The points which demand consideration in this appeal are asfollows:a.whether the learned Single Judge is correct in not interferingwith the award of the second respondent Labour Court when thelatter has accepted the counter-claim of the firstrespondent , i.e. payment of damages in lieu of reinstatement?b.Whether the learned Single Judge has erred in not holding thatthe second respondent Labour Court is not the proper authorityto compute the Gratuity amount payable to the first appellant?8.While answering the first point, some useful reference couldbe made to Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whichreads as follows:“Where any workman is entitled to receive from theemployer any money or any benefit which is capable ofbeing computed in terms of money and if any questionarises as to the amount of money due or as to theamount at which such benefit should be computed, thenthe question may, subject to any rules that may be madeunder this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as maybe specified in this behalf by the appropriateGovernment within a period not exceeding three months.”9.From a plain reading of the above provision, it is clear thatit is nowhere mentioned that the Labour Court should not accept counterclaim by the respondent. That being the case, the contention of thecounsel for the appellant that the second respondent Labour Court has nojurisdiction to accept the counter-claim as per Section 33(C)(2), doesnot deserve consideration and as such, the same is brushed aside. Thatapart, it is to be noted that the first appellant had filed the writpetition when he was left with only eight years of service and at thetime of final hearing of the writ petition, he had attained the age ofsuperannuation. Therefore, the learned Single Judge, while consideringthe question of jurisdiction of the Labour Court in entertaining thecounter-claim of the first respondent, has opined that if it is heldthat there is no jurisdiction for the second respondent Labour Court toconsider the counter-claim, then, the matter has to be remitted todecide whether the first appellant was entitled to back-wages till thedate of super-annuation. In this context, it may be stated that inorder to render substantial justice, the High Court is not powerless topass any order in consonance with the principles of justice, equity andgood conscience. In that view of the matter, we find no reason tointerfere with the finding of the learned Single Judge in confirming theorder of the second respondent Labour Court with regard to itsjurisdiction in entertaining the counter-claim of the first respondent. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

10.Coming to the second point for determination as to whether thesecond respondent Labour Court can determine the amount of Gratuitypayable, it is not at all in dispute that the first appellant wasemployed under the first respondent for a period 25 years. Yet anotheraspect to be noted is that the first appellant was not employedelsewhere subsequent to his termination by the first respondent. Thoughthe first respondent has contended that the first appellant was inemployment elsewhere, there was no evidence let in on its side to proveits claim. Further, it is seen that the second respondent Labour Court,while arriving at the Gratuity payable, has taken into consideration, 25years of service put in by the first appellant and his 15 days salaryper year of service which is nothing but the usual method of calculatingGratuity payable. Thus, it is seen that no injustice is caused to thefirst appellant by the action of the second respondent Labour Courtwhile calculating the Gratuity amount payable and hence, the learnedSingle Judge has categorically held that in the interest of justice, theaward of the second respondent Labour Court need not be interfered with.11.Furthermore, it appears that the first respondent Managementand the first appellant were not having a cordial relationship, as foundby the Labour Court which has observed that a congenial atmosphere wouldnot prevail if the first appellant was reinstated. Taking this aspectinto consideration, the learned Single Judge has held that the LabourCourt, in the interest of justice and to bring about peaceful settlementbetween the first appellant and the first respondent, has accepted thecounter-claim of the first respondent to pay damages in lieu ofcompensation and this finding of the learned Single Judge is quitejustifiable as the High Court can exercise not only constitutionaljurisdiction but also equitable jurisdiction. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case andthe discussion made above, we are of the considered view that the orderof the learned Single Judge which is impugned in this writ appeal, isperfectly in order and as such, does not warrant any sort ofinterference by us. Accordingly, the writ appeal which is devoid of anymerit, stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.cadSd/-Asst.Registrar/true copy/ Sub Asst.RegistrarToThe Presiding OfficerII Additional Labour CourtMadras+1 cc to R.Ganesan, Advocate Sr.No.23071.VRK(CO)dcp/19.4.07W.A. No.1334 of 1998