THE HONOURABLE MR v. The Special Offier,Sri Petharanaswmy,Sri Mariamman Sri Poonkaliamman Devastanam,Keezhavanjoor T.R.Patinamhaving office at Deputy

was entered into on 1.4.1992 between the plaintiff and the then SpecialOfficer of the said Devasthanam. The defendant had received a sum ofRs.800/- towards advance. And the monthly rent agreed was Rs.200/- andunder the said lease agreement the plaintiff was permitted to manufacturewindows and other works with in cement. Under the lease deed the plaintiffwas permitted to raise a temporary structure for the said purpose. Theplaintiff continues in possession of the suit property even after expiryof the lease deed till today. The then Special Officer by nameSingaravelu died on 29.9.1993 and the present Special Officer had takencharge during June, 1994. When the defendant was approached by theplaintiff to pay the rents for the suit property the same was refusedwithout any sufficient reason. The plaintiff then issued a lawyer'snotice on 8.7.1994 along with demand draft for Rs.2,000/- which is therent for the period September-1993 to June-1994. The defendant receivedthe notice and also the demand draft. On 3.7.1994 the defendant hadauctioned the properties belonging to the Devesthanam in Mela Vanjoorvillage excepting the suit property. Subsequently, the plaintiffapproached the defendant for paying rents for the month of July 1994 thedefendant refused to receive the same. But on 12.10.1994 the defendanthad chosen to issue circular dated 12.10.1994 claiming that the plaintiffhad encroached on the suit property. In which he had admitted the leasedeed executed by his predecessor. A lawyer's notice was issued on27.10.1994 stating all the facts along with demand draft for a sum ofRs.600/- being the monthly rent for the period July to September. Thedefendant received this demand draft also. The plaintiff had taken waterconnection and electricity connection to the suit property. He had beenregularly paying the taxes in respect of the same. Thereafter thedefendant has issued a lawyer's notice on 22.12.1994. The defendant on26.2.1995 came to the suit property along with some henchmen and attemptedto dispossess the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also stored propertiesworth about Rs.40,000/- in the suit property and had also raised atemporary structure woth about Rs.5,000/- in the suit property. 3. In the written statement the defendant would contend as follows:The plaintiff is a lessee under the Devasthanam under a leasedeed dated 1.4.1992 for a period of two years. The said lease deed hasbeen registered on 2.4.1992. The monthly rent agreed is Rs.200/- and itis also true that an advance amount of Rs.800/- was paid by the plaintiff.Under the said lease agreement the defendant's devasthanam can evict theplaintiff after giving three months notice if the suit property isrequired for the administration of the temple. The plaintiff is not astatutory tenant in respect of the suit property. He has no right toraise a super structure. The suit property was leased only for thepurpose of manufacturing articles with cement. Once the lease period isover the plaintiff has to vacate the suit property and therefore hispossession of the suit property is a wrongful one. It is true a demanddraft for Rs.2,000/- was issued along with notice dated 8.7.1994 by theplaintiff and the defendant had received the same and had credited thesaid amount towards rental arrears. The defendant's devasthanam had https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ auctioned properties only at Keelavanjoor village and the suit propertywas not auctioned since there is a proposal to raise a Kalyanamandapam inthe said place. Further the lease deed had expired by 31.3.1994 itselftherefore the plaintiff cannot continue to be in possession of the same.Therefore the circular issued on 1.4.1994 is in order. It is true thatthe defendant had received the notice dated 27.10.1994 along with a demanddraft for Rs.6,000/-. The defendant never attempted to evict theplaintiff by wrongful method. Under the above circumstances, the suit isliable to be dismissed. The suit is bad for non issuance of notice underSection 80 of CPC.4. On the above pleadings the learned trial Judge has framed fiveissues. On the side of the plaintiff, plaintiff has examined himself asP.W.1 and marked Ex.A.1 to A.9. The defendant has examined himself asD.W.1 and no exhibits were marked on the his side.5. After going through the oral and documentary evidence available onrecord the learned trial Judge has decreed the suit thereby passed anorder of permanent injunction with a direction that except being evictedunder due process of law. Aggrieved by the findings of the learned trialJudge, the defendant preferred an appeal in A.S.No.2/1996 on the file ofthe Court of Additional District Judge, Pondicherry, Karaikal. The firstappellate Court has allowed the appeal thereby setting aside the decreeand judgment in O.S.N.165/1995. Hence the plaintiff has preferred thissecond appeal.6. The substantial questions of law involved in this second appealare as follows:-i) Was the Lower appellate Court justified in holding thatExhibit.A1 was unenforceable and not acted upon after havingobserved that the truth and enforceability of Ex.A.1 being aregistered lease deed was not questioned by the defendant andwhen there was no pleading specifically in the written statementfiled by the defendant questioning the validity of Ex.A.1?ii) Was the Lower Appellate Court correct in considering theearlier auction alone for dismissing the suit regardless of thesubsequent agreement entered into between the parties as perEx.A.1?iii) Whether the dismissal of suit by the Lower AppellateCourt ignoring Ex.A.1 admittedly executed between the parties wastenable?iv) Whether the appellant can be dispossessed without dueprocess of law?v) Whether the decree and judgment of the lower appellateCourt are liable to be set aside for not considering the relevantevidence available on record?vi) Whether notice under Section 80 of CPC is necessarybefore filing the suit against a temple represented by SpecialOfficer? https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

7. The Points:-7(a) The learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondentwould confined his argument only to Ex.A.1 & A.2. The learned GovernmentPleader would contend that the suit property admittedly belongs toPoonkaliamman Devasthanam and that it is a public property and theplaintiff is a lessee under the temple and in the public auction held on1.8.1991 the suit property was leased out in favour of theplaintiff/appellant for a period of two years that is till 31.7.1993 andthat the lease has come to an end by efflux of time and there is no needfor issuing a notice under Section 106 or 116 of the Transfer of PropertyAct. The learned Government Pleader would further contend that underEx.A.1-lease agreement, the plaintiff cannot claim any right because thelease is subsisting during 1.4.1992 and hence the plaintiff under Ex.A.1cannot claim lease hold right or possession in respect of the suitproperty for another period of two years from 1.4.1992 as per Ex.A.1.Ex.A.2 is the notice. The respondent has not filed any lease agreement orany other document related to the public auction said to have beenconducted on 1.8.1991 which ended in his(plaintiff) favour. 7(b) According to the plaintiff in pursuance of Ex.A.1 subsequentrents have been received by the defendant thereby recognizing theplaintiff's possession in respect of the suit property.7(c) P.W.1 in his evidence would contend that he tendered therent through drafts, but those drafts under Ex.A.7 to A9 were returned bythe defendant. According to the plaintiff he is in legal possession ofthe property under Ex.A.1 and that even after the tenancy period is overhe is in possession of the suit property as a tenant holding over. Thedefendant is the Special Officer of the Temple(defendant). He would admitthat there was an agreement entered into between the plaintiff and hispredecessor who was working as a Special Officer in the temple-defendantand that as per Ex.A.1 the period of lease is only for two years and thesuit property was leased out to the plaintiff for doing cement work in thesaid place. According to D.W.1, the plaintiff was in arrears of paymentof rent and that the defendant has not making any attempt to dispossessthe plaintiff. In the cross-examination he would admit that hispredecessor viz. Special Officer died and no one was appointed to hold theadditional charge of Special Officer to collect the rent for the period ofeight months and that he took charge only in July 1994 and that Ex.A.5 isthe letter sent by him(D.W.1) demanding payment of rent for seven months.But P.W.1 did not approach him to pay the rent. He would depose that hehad received the rent and credited the same towards the arrears of rent. 7(d) The learned Government Pleader relying on (2006) 1 SCC 228(C.Albert Morris Vs. K.Chandrasekaran and others) and contended that themere fact that the land lord received the rent will not amount to renewalof the lease. The short facts of the said case are as follows:-"The appellant was running a retail outlet of petrol as adealer of Respondent 2 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., ona site obtained on lease from Respondent 1. The lease was for aperiod of ten years and the purpose of the lease as mentioned in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the lease deed was the running of a petrol bunker. TheGovernment of Pondicerry had granted no-objection certificateunder Rule 144(1) of the Petroleum Rules, 1976 for theinstallation of retail outlet of petrol and HSD on that site.During the currency of the lease, Respondent 1 filed an evictionsuit against the appellant but later withdrew the same withliberty to file a fresh suit. After the expiry of the leaseperiod, Respondent 1 issued a notice to the appellantdetermining the lease and demanding possession of the site. Afew months later, Respondent 1 approached the licensingauthority seeking cancellation of the permission granted to theappellant for the storage of petroleum. He also approached thedistrict authorities seeking to revoke the no-objectioncertificate. Meanwhile Respondent 1 filed a writ petitionbefore the High Court seeking a direction that the licence ofthe appellant to carry on the petrol bunk should not be renewed.His contention was that the appellant had lost his right to thesite and hence the licence was liable to be cancelled under Rule153(1) of the Petroleum Rules, 1976. The writ petition wasallowed by a Single Judge and the writ appeal was dismissed by aDivision Bench. Hence the appellant moved the Honourable Apex Court,wherein it has been held as follows:-We are, therefore, of the opinion that mere acceptanceof rent by the landlord, the first respondent herein, fromthe tenant in possession after the lease has beendetermined either by efflux of time or by notice to quitwould not create a tenancy so as to confer on the erstwhiletenant the status of a tenant or a right to be inpossession."7(e) The learned Government Pleader relied on AIR 1981 SC 1550(Smt.Shanti Devi Vs. Amal Kumar Banerjee) and contended that no notice hascontemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, isnecessary, in a case where the lease period has expired by efflux of timeif there is no allegation of tenant holding over. The learned GovernmentPleader further contended that a notice under Section 106 is not necessaryfor determination of lease where the lease is for a definite term itexpires by efflux of time by reason of 111(a) of the Transfer of PropertyAct. The short facts of the above said case are as follows:"By an indenture of lease dated March 19,1956, theappellant who was the plaintiff, demised a cinema theatre knownas 'Shanti House' situate at Sainthia under Anchal Panchayat indistrict Birbhum, to the respondent-defendant for a term of fouryears with a covenant of two renewals of three years each. Thelease of this cinema theatre was to commence from the date onwhich the defendant was able to procure a licence. On May 2,1970, the plaintiff brought a suit for ejectment on the groundthat the lease had expired by efflux of time and also pleaded in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the alternative that he had sent a notice dated April 3, 1970to the defendant both at his Calcutta address and at hisSainthia address determining the tenancy with the expiry of themonth of April, 1970. The defendant contested the plaintiff'sclaim on various grounds. The defendant pleaded, inter alia,that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Acthaving been served upon him, the suit was not maintainable. TheHigh Court and the Courts below have confined their attention tothe question whether any valid quit notice had been served onthe defendant without entering into the controversy whether sucha notice was necessary or not. Both the learned SubordinateJudge as well as the learned District Judge, upheld theplaintiff's claim that the lease had been validly determined byservice of a quit notice and accordingly decreed his suit. TheHigh Court, however, reversed the decision of theirs holdingthat service of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer ofProperty Act on the defendant had not been proved and therefore,held that the plaintiff's suit for ejectment was notmaintainable.There can be no doubt that the High Court and the Courtsbelow have without applying their mind as to the questionwhether Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act wasapplicable or not proceeded to deal with the question as to thevalidity of the notice, on the assumption that the lease was alease from month to month. They have completely overlooked thefact that the lease was for a term of four years with a covenantfor renewal for two terms of three years each, i.e., a lease fora definite duration of ten years. The Courts below have apparently been misled by theaverments in paragraph 3 of the plaint that because thedefendant could not fulfil the condition regarding obtaining ofa licence, the grant made by the indenture of lease did not andcould not take effect as also that in paragraph 7 that thetenancy of lease was from month to month. The parties could notby their pleadings alter the intrinsic character of the lease orbring about a change of the rights and obligations flowingtherefrom. The lease was a lease for a definite term and,therefor, expired by efflux of time by reason of S.111(a) of theTransfer of Property Act. That being so, the service of a noticeunder Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was notnecessary.Undoubtedly, Section 111(a) of the Transfer of PropertyAct, which deals with determination of a lease by efflux oftime, has to be read with Section 116 of the Act. But in thepresent case there is no allegation by the defendant that he wasa tenant holding over within the meaning of Section 116 of theAct. Now, in order that a lease should be deemed to have beencontinued in favour of the defendant it was necessary to showthat he remained in possession of the premises demised after the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ determination of the lease granted to him and the plaintiff hadexpressly or by necessary implication assented to his continuedpossession. "The plaintiff in the plaint has not specifically pleaded that he is tenantholding over. But the case of the plaintiff is that in pursuance ofEx.A.1-registered lease agreement dated 1.4.1992 he is in continuouspossession of the suit property. Under such circumstances as contended bythe learned Government Pleader for the respondent, as laid down in theabove dictum, it cannot be said that the defence set up by the defendantthat there is no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Actis necessary in a case like this where the tenancy has come to an end byefflux of time as per section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. 7(f) The learned Government Pleader relying on AIR 2005 MADRAS264 (DCW Ltd., Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and others), contended that inrespect of the public land a lease shall be only by public auction and notby any other mode. The short facts of the above said case are as follows:-"The State of Tamil Nadu had originally leased out a vastarea of land to M/s.Wimco Limited measuring 28.765 acres ofswamp and promboke lands in Vedaranyam Taluk. NagapattinamDistrict and Thiruthuraipoondi Taluk. Thanjavur District byG.O.Ms.No.625 Revenue, Dated 14.2.1863. The lease was for aperiod of 40 years commencing from 1963 and ending in 2003 forthe purpose of manufacture of salt for use in the factory to beset up. M/s.Wimco Limited surrendered a major portion of theland of 16.500 acres to the first respondent. Thereafter, by aG.O. the first respondent ordered resumption of unutilised landmeasuring 9044.47 acres leaving a balance of 3185.53 acres forutilization by M/s.Wimco Limited for setting up of a factory forthe manufacture of salt and its by-products. Since M/s.WimcoLimited found its enterprise not giving adequate income it hadsought permission of the first respondent/State of Tamil Nadufor transferring the leasehold rights over the salt lands to thepetitioner herein. M/s.Wimco Limited filed an application inthe year 1990 requesting the first respondent to consider itsrequest for transfer of its leasehold rights over the salt landsin favour of the petitioner herein. The first respondent byG.O.Ms.No.603, Revenue, dated 15.4.1991 permitted thepetitioner, a major producer of salt, to take over the leaseholdrights and passed necessary orders.Pursuant to the above G.O. leasehold rights was transferredin favour of the petitioner from M/s.Wimco Limited. The firstrespondent fixed the period of lease as 12 years as per theorders issued in G.O.Ms.No.1106, Revenue, dated 13.6.1988 andthe lease rent was fixed at Rs.2/- per acre per annum and themaximum royalty was fixed at Rs.25/- per acre per annum.Pursuant to the aforesaid G.O.Ms.No.603 dated 15.4.1991 theState Government permitted the transfer of the leasehold rightsfrom M/s.Wimco Limited to the petitioner, and an Indenture oflease dated 13th May 1991 was executed between the State of Tamil https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Nadu/first respondent and the petitionr covering 3185.53 acresof land in Vedaranyam Taluk under Survey No.193 at villagekandinayayal, Survey No.143 at village Ayakkarambulam and SurveyNo.193 at Village Pannal. In terms of the decision of theGovernment in G.O.Ms.No.1106 dated 18th June 1998, the said leasewas to be valid for a period of 12 years expiring on 31st March2003.The lease came to an end on 31 March, 2003. The petitionerapplied to the District Collector, Nagapattinam, for renewal ofthe said lease in his favour for a further period of 40 years.Despite payment of the entire demand, the Government did nottake any action for renewal of the lease amount. By letter dat6.10.2003, the petitioner addressed a letter to the secondrespondent requesting him to renew the lease in favour of thepetitioner for a further period of 20 year. It is alleged thaton 23.10.2003, the Tahildar, Vedaranyam raised a demand forRs.1,18,08,849/- alleging that the same was the balance amountdue from the petitioner towards rent and roylty and threatenedto repossess the land and take revenue recovery proceedingsagainst the petitioner if the amount was not repaid withimmediate effect. The petitioner came forward to pay the aboveamount without prejudice to the rival claims in W.P.No.29539 of2003. On payment of the above said amount, this Court passed anorder restraining the respondents from repossessing the land.Despite payment of the lease amount, the application of thepetitioner for extension of lease is still pending. Hence, thepetitioner knocked at the doors of the High Court Madras,wherein it has been held as follows:-"It is well settled in the aforesaid decisions thatproperty belonging to the Government or an instrumentalityof the State is not private property, and hence it cannotbe disposed off at the sweet will of the authorities inany manner they choose. Such property can only be givenby the State or instrumentality of State ordinarilythrough public auction/public tender as held inSelvarani's case [2005(1) CTC 81]. Public property isnot largesse which can be given by the Government toanybody. Since the appellant was given the grant only astemporary occupation for a period of twelve years, theycannot insist that the grant be continued even aftertwelve years as of right. If the appellant has made anyinvestment on the said land they should have realized thatafter twelve years they have to vacate the land, and it isnot that they have a right to continue in possession ofthe land till eternity. The appellant has no monopoly overthe said land, which belongs to the Government. Afterexpiry of the lease the public property should be put topublic auction/public tender after advertising it inwellknown newspapers having wide circulation, so that https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ there is transparency in the matter and all eligiblepersons can apply. In this way, Article 14 of theConstitution of India will be complied with, otherwise itwill be violated. We are surprised that although the grant in favour of theappellant expired about two years ago. The appellant has tillcontinued in possession of the said land, which was whollyillegal and unauthorized. The appellant has been in occupationof the land in question illegally after the grant had expiredabout two years ago. The appellant should have vacated the landon the expiry of the period of the grant and should not havecontinued in occupation thereof, thereafter. It may bementioned that the indenture deed dated 13.5.1991 itself statesthat the grant is for 'temporary occupation'. Surely the word'temporary' does not mean 'permanent'. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Once a contract has been granted for aspecific period, then on the expiry of that period there is noquestion of automatic renewal of the grant (unless permitted bythe deed of grant itself), and there must be a fresh publicauction/public tender after which alone a fresh grant can begiven, otherwise article 14 of the Constitution will beviolated, and a monopoly may be created. If it is held thateven if the period of the contract has expired there can beautomatic and unilateral extension of the contract thenlogically it would mean that a contract can go on for term afterterm and can be extended for 100 years or even more. This wouldcreate a monopoly in favour of a party, which would be violativeof Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, vide State of RajasthanVs. Mohnalal Vyas (AIR 1971 SC 2068) (vide paragraphs 6 & 7).It would also, be against the interest of the State because in apublic auction the State may get a higher amount of royalty forthe grant. In fact granting such extension creates animpression that there is some collusion between the grantee andthe authorities. There should be transparency in such matters,otherwise public confidence will be shaken.Ultimately it has been held that the petitioner has noright to continue his possession and it has been furtherdirected that the public property shall be put to publicauction/public tender."7(g) The learned Government Pleader relying on 2005(2) LW 355(M/s.Hinustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Devraj Chordia and others),contended that after the expiry of a lease period the leasee has no rightto continue in possession. The relevant observation in the above saidjudgment runs as follows:-"One would have expected that after 1989 the appellantherein like an honourable person would have vacated the suitproperty since its leasehold right ceased to exist after 1989.However, unfortunately, in our country, what is often seen is https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that people continue to remain in illegal possession of aproperty even for several years after their right to occupy thesame ceased to exist. This practice has now become rampant inour country and the time has come when it must be curbed. Anhonourable person should vacate the property over which hislease or licence has expired and hand over possession of thesame on the date of expiry of the lease or licence to thelandlord/owner unless there is a fresh mutual agreement whichpermits him to continue in possession. It is to be noted withdeep distress that the appellant which is a well known PublicSector Undertaking has blatantly violated the law and continuedin possession of the suit property for 16 years beyond the termof its lease. We are indeed very sad to note that a PublicSector Undertaking has behaved in this manner. In this countrythe rule of law prevails and Public Sector Undertakings aresubordinate to law and not above the law. In this case, theappellant which is a Public Sector Undertaking has taken the lawinto its own hands, which was most unfortunate and unjustified."7(h) The learned Government Advocate of the respondent in supportof his contentioned that in a case of lease which come to an end due toefflux of time there is no necessity to issue a notice under Section 106of the Transfer of Property Act, relied on a dictum in 2001(1) MLJ 777(Thulasibalan and another Vs. Rajesh), wherein it has been held asfollows:-"Ultimately, when once the period of lease agreed upon bythe parties has come to an end, a a new lease can come aboutonly if the parties thereto agree to such renewal. While thepayment and acceptance of rents may be one of the factors toprove the creation of a new lease that factor will not amount toa renewal. There must be indicators in the conduct of theparties which show that there was an offer to renew the lease byone party and assent to such renewal on the side of the other.Without such an offer and an implied or explicit acceptance thenew contract of lease cannot be held to have been created." 7(i) The learned counsel appearing for the appellant relying on1997(3) SCC 169 (Anamallai Club Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others),contended that only under Ex.A.1 the plaintiff is in possession of theplaint schedule property and hence he can be evicted under due process oflaw. The exact observation of the Honourable Apex Court in the above saidcase runs as follow:-"It was open to the State to take appropriate legal actionfor the purpose. It was also held that the State could notremove them reiterated by this Court in State of UP Vs. MaharajaDharamander Prasad Singh [1989 (2) SCC 505] thus:"A lessor, with the best of title, has no right toresume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from alessee, even after the expiry of earlier termination of thelease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 're-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resume possession. Under law, thepossession of a lessee, even after the expiry or itsearlier termination is juridical possession and forcibledispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be ispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In thepresent case, the fact that the lessor is the State doesnot place it in any higher or better position. On thecontrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemmingfrom the requirement that all actions of government andGovernmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree". InBishan Das Vs. State of Punjab [1962 (2) SCR 69 : AIR 1961SC 1570] this Court said:We must, therefore, repel the argument based on thecontention that the petitioners were trespassers andcould be removed by an executive order. The argument isnot only specious but highly dangerous by reason of itsimplications and impact on law and order ...............Therefore, there is no question in the present case of theGovernment thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed byGovernment only in manner known to or recognized by law.It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accordancewith law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited fromtaking possession otherwise than in due course of law."In Lallu Yeshwant Singh Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh [1968 (2) SCR 203 :AIR 1968 SC 620] a Bench of this Court had considered the samequestion after reviewing the case-law in that behalf and heldthat the Government cannot take possession of the land except inaccordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act. In thatcase, recourse to the provisions under Section 9 of the SpecificRelief Act (Section 6 of the present Specific Relief Act, 1963)was upheld. The question was also considered by this Court byone us(K.Ramaswamy, J.) in East India Hotels Ltd. V. syndicateBank) [1992 Supp (2) SCC 29]. It was held in that case asfollows:They must obtain such possession as they are entitled to byproper course. In our jurisprudence governed by rule of laweven an unauthorised occupant can be ejected only in themanner provided by law. The remedy under Section 6 issummary and its object is to prevent self-help and todiscourage people to adopt any means fair or foul todispossess a person unless dispossession was in due courseof law or with consent."What is meant by due course of law? Due course of law in eachparticular case means such an exercise of the powers by dulyconstituted tribunal or court in accordance with the procedureestablished by law under such safeguards for the protection of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ individual rights. A course of legal proceedings according tothe rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection ofprivate rights. To give such proceedings any validity, theremust thus be a tribunal competent by its constitution, that is bylaw of its creation, to pass upon the subject-matter of the suitor proceedings; and, if that involves merely a determination ofthe personal liability of the defendant, it must be broughtwithin its jurisdiction by service of process within the State,or his voluntary appearance. Due course of law implies the rightof the person affected thereby to be present before the tribunalwhich pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty orproperty in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, bytestimony or otherwise, and to have the right determination ofthe controversy by proof, every material fact which bears on thequestion of fact or liability be conclusively proved or presumedagainst him. This is the meaning of due course of law in acomprehensive sense."7 (j) From the above discussion I am of the considered view that eventhough the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief by way of an order ofinjunction as righty held by the learned first appellate Court inA.S.No.2/1996 on the file of the Court of Additional District Judge,Pondicherry, Karaikal, the plaintiff's possession in respect of the suitproperty can be dispossessed only under due process of law. Points areanswered accordingly.8. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed, confirming thedecree and judgment in A.S.No.2/1996 on the file of the AdditionalDistrict Judge, Pondicherry at Karaikkal, with a direction that theappellant shall not be dispossessed from the suit property except underdue process of law. No costs. Sd/-Asst. Registrar./true copy/Sub Asst. Registrar.ssv https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ To, 1. The Addl. District Judge, Pondicherry at Karaikal.2. The Principal District Munsif, karaikal.3. The Record Keeper, VR Section, High Court, Madras.+ 1 CC To Mr. Srinath Sridevan, Advocate SR NO. 5914+ 1 CC To Senior Govt. Pleader Pondicherry SR NO.5255S.A.No.323 of 1997sr[co]gp/21.2.