T.S.Ganesan v. Smt.Parvatham Ammal

and for the relief of permanent injunction to restrain the defendantfrom executing any document in favour of any person.4. It is the case of the plaintiff that he is the son of thedefendant, namely, Parvatham Ammal. The plaintiff's father SethuramaIyer had executed a Will, on 4.9.1979, bequeathing the properties hehad got under the partition along with certain other properties. According to the recitals of the registered Will, the suit house isto be enjoyed by the defendant during her life time and thereafter, it was to be enjoyed by the plaintiff, absolutely. Sethurama Iyer thefather of the plaintiff had died and the plaintiff has been inenjoyment of the suit house in accordance with the recitals in theWill. Due to the misunderstandings that had arisen between theplaintiff and the defendant in respect of the issues relating to theproperties certain Court proceedings are pending. While so, thedefendant, with the wrongful intention of creating loss to theplaintiff, was attempting to settle the suit property in favour ofher other son Venkatesan. The defendant has only a life interest inthe suit property and therefore, she does not have any right toalienate the same. Even if it was found that the defendant hadalienated the suit property before the filing of the present suit, itwould be non est in law as it would be illegal. In such circumstancesthe suit had been filed praying for the relief of permanentinjunction restraining the defendant from in any way alienating thesuit property. The plaintiff had further prayed for the relief ofdeclaration that even if the property had already been alienated itwould not bind the plaintiff in any way. 5. In the written statement filed by the defendant it has beenstated that the suit is not maintainable both in law and on facts. The suit has been filed with a view to get unlawful gain and it isspeculative and vexatious. Though the relationship of the parties isadmitted and the fact that the will had been executed by SethuramaIyer, on 4.9.1979, is also admitted, the interpretation given by theplaintiff regarding the Will has been denied as incorrect. The houseproperty belongs to the defendant, absolutely. As per the HinduSuccession Act, 1956, even if only a life interest has been conferredin accordance with the terms of the Will it would enlarge into a fullestate. Hence, the defendant is competent to deal with the houseproperty as she likes. The provisions of Section 25(d) of the TamilNadu Court Fee and Suits and Valuation Act, 1955, cannot be appliedin the present case. The relief asked for by the plaintiff relates toan immovable property which was worth more than one lakh of rupees. The plaintiff's right and title in the suit property is denied. Theplaintiff ought to have valued the suit according to the market valueof the suit property. The description, door number and serial numberof the suit property are all incorrect. The plaintiff has filed thesuit only with the intention of taking away all the belongings of thedefendant and to leave her in indigent circumstances. The suit is notproperly valued and the proper Court fee has not been paid. The suithas not been framed properly and it has not been filed in the properforum. There is no cause of action for the suit and the plaintiff isnot entitled to get any relief as prayed for in the suit. Hence, the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ suit has to be dismissed in limini, with costs. 6. Based on the averments made in the plaint and in the writtenstatement, the trial Court had framed the following issues forconsideration:i)Is the plaintiff entitled to the relief of declarationand permanent injunction as prayed for in the suit?ii) Has the Court fee for the suit been paid properlyand correctly?iii) To what other reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to?7. The plaintiff had examined himself as P.W.1. Eight documentshave been marked in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant hadexamined herself as D.W.1. No document has been marked on the side ofthe defendant. 8. Based on the averments of the plaintiff as well as thedefendant and in view of the evidence available, the trial Court hadfound that certain facts were admitted by both the parties. Theadmitted facts are that Sethurama Iyer had two sons, namely,T.S.Ganesan, the plaintiff in the suit and the second respondent inthe present second appeal. Sethurama Iyer had four daughters, apartfrom his two sons. Sethurama Iyer and his two sons had partitionedall the properties in the year 1973. By the said partition, noproperty was allotted, either to his wife Parvatham Ammal or to hisdaughters. After the said partition Sethurama Iyer had got someproperties from her step mother Valambal under a settlement deedmarked as Ex.A-2. By a Will, dated 4.9.1979, marked as Ex.A-1,Sethurama Iyer had bequeathed a life interest in the suit house tohis wife Parvatham Ammal, the defendant in the suit. 9. The trial Court had found that Sethurama Iyer, the husband ofthe defendant Parvatham Ammal, had given the suit house to her forher occupation and enjoyment as part of her maintenance. Even thoughonly a limited life interest has been created by Sethurama Iyer infavour of his wife Parvatham Ammal, as found in the Will executed byhim, since the suit house has been given to the defendant asmaintenance, the defendant would have absolute interest in the saidproperty, in accordance with Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act,1956 and the cases decided by the Courts of law. 10. The trial Court was of the view that when a life interest iscreated in a residential property in favour of a woman as part of apre-existing right for her maintenance, the limited interest enlargesinto an absolute interest in the said property. Thus, the trial Courthad dismissed the suit by its judgment and decree, date 25.4.1994. 11. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, theplaintiff had preferred an appeal on the file of the Additional SubCourt, Mayiladuthurai, in A.S.No.51 of 1994. The First AppellateCourt had framed the following points for consideration: https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1) Whether the life interest given to the defendantover the suit property by way of the will, dated 4.9.1979,has become an absolute right, as per Section 14(1) of theHindu Succession Act, 1956.2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs ofdeclaration and permanent injunction as prayed for in thesuit?3) What appropriate relief, the plaintiff/appellant isentitled to?12. While confirming the conclusions arrived at by the trialCourt, the First Appellate Court had held that when a husband had gota property, whether as an ancestral or as an absolute property, hiswife has a prior right of maintenance from such a property of herhusband. From Ex.A-1, executed by Sethurama Iyer, it is clear that alife interest had been created in favour of the defendant. The saidright had been converted into an absolute right by the operation ofSection 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 13. The First Appellate Court did not accept the contention ofthe plaintiff that Sethurama Iyer had conveyed only a life interestin the suit property in favour of the defendant and that it did notenlarge into an absolute interest in view of the fact that by Ex.A-1some other properties were also given to the defendant, which weresufficient for her maintenance. Since there was a pre-existing rightof maintenance the life interest created in the suit property infavour of the defendant had enlarged in accordance with Section 14(1)of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The customary rights of womenwhich were existing prior to the enactment of the Hindu SuccessionAct, 1956, would mature into statutory rights after the Act had comeinto force. Thus, the First Appellate Court had confirmed thefindings of the trial Court. 14. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First AppellateCourt, dated 15.2.1996, the present second appeal has been filedbefore this Court. 15. The substantial questions of law arising for considerationare as follows:"(1) Whether the Courts below committed an error inholding that the suit property was bequeathed to ParvadamAmmal in lieu of her maintenance especially in the absenceof any recital in the Will dated 4.9.79 and in the absenceof any pleading to the effect that the property was givento Parvadam Ammal in lieu of maintenance?(2) Whether the Courts below committed an error inholding that in respect of the suit property the right ofParvadam Ammal got enlarged into an absolute estate?"16. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant hadcontended that both the Courts below had wrongly proceeded on thefooting that there was a pre-existing right of maintenance in the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ defendant and that the said right had enlarged into an absolute rightin respect of the suit house. It was further contended that no suchplea had been raised in the written statement and also that it hasnot been established by available evidence. No documents were markedon behalf of the defendant. The Will, dated 4.9.1979, marked as Ex.A-1, is also silent about this aspect. 17. The defendant, who is well acquainted with the legalposition and status of the Will, dated 4.9.1979, had clearly admittedthat she was given only a life interest in the property in question.It is also clear from the release deed, dated 29.01.1983, marked asEx.A-8, through which she has released her life interest in theproperty in favour of her grand son. From Ex.A-8, it is clear thatthe life interest created in the suit property in favour of thedefendant is not in lieu of maintenance. Further, there is no pre-existing right of maintenance vested in the defendant. No such pre-existing right has been mentioned, either in the Will or in thewritten statement filed by the defendant. When the pre-existing rightof maintenance is a question of fact, it should have been pleaded andproved in the manner known to law. Presumption of such a fact, notpleaded by the defendant, cannot be made. 18. The learned counsel for the appellant had contended that thedecision of the Supreme court in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and others V.Vaddeoyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs. (AIR 1977 SC 1944) does notapply to the facts of the present case. There is no enlargement ofthe life interest, bequeathed to the defendant by the Will, dated4.9.1979, into an absolute interest. Section 14(2) of the HinduSuccession Act, 1956, will be applicable to the facts of the presentcase. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, would not beapplicable since it would be applicable only when there was a pre-existing right in lieu of maintenance. Further, Section 14(2) of theHindu Succession Act, 1956, did not prohibit any male Hindu toexecute a Will with a limited interest or estate. 19. In the present case the property in question is the separateproperty of the step mother of Sethurama Iyer. She had settled theproperty by a settlement deed, marked as Ex.A-2, in the year 1975.The separate property of Sethurama Iyer, which is the property inquestion in the suit O.S.No.364 of 1986, had been bequeathed to thedefendant as a life interest and after her death it was to go to theplaintiff, absolutely. There is no ambiguity in the Will or in itsinterpretation. According to the Will, dated 4.9.1979, marked asEx.A-1, the properties of Sethurama Iyer were given to three persons, namely, the plaintiff, T.S.Ganesan, Son of Sethurama Iyer, ParvathamAmmal, Wife of Sethurama Iyer, who is the defendant in the suit, andSrikanth, Son of Venkatesan and the grand son of Sethurama Iyer. Under the said Will, the defendant was given two coconut thopes and1/3rd share of the income from the Mill. Thus, the defendant was welland sufficiently provided for leading a decent life. Through Ex.A-8,the defendant had released her 1/3rd share in the Mill in favour ofher grandson Srikanth, son of Venkatesan. The second respondent, namely, Venkatesan, had created the situation in order to deprive the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ plaintiff from the benefits that had accrued to him through the Will, dated 4.9.1979, marked as Ex.A-1. In fact, the funeral of Valambalwas performed by the plaintiff as per Hindu law as Sethurama Iyer hadpre-deceased her. This fact was admitted by the defendant in herevidence. Thus, even as per the Hindu Law, the plaintiff hadperformed his duties. 20. It was also contended by the learned counsel for theappellant that the cases relied on by the learned counsel for therespondents relate to the facts arising before the enactment of theHindu Succession Act, 1956, and they may not be applicable to thepresent case. Whereas the facts of the present case have arisen afterthe passing of the said Act. 21. It was also contended that the Will, dated 4.9.1979, hasbeen executed 13 years after the commencement of the Hindu SuccessionAct, 1956. The principles of social justice would not be relevant tothe present case as Women's Rights were codified by a separateenactment, namely, The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.Hence, the defendant who is the beneficary under the Will, dated4.9.1979, can have only a life interest in the suit property andafter her demise the plaintiff, who is her son, has an absoluteinterest in the suit property. 22. The succession had opened only after the testator of theWill had died in the year 1980. The family circumstances of theparties to the suit would clearly show that the defendant wassufficiently provided for and that she was leading a decent life, till she died in the year 2000. The Will, dated 4.9.1979, was notexecuted in recognition of any pre-existing right or in lieu ofmaintenance. There is no ambiguity with regard to the terms of theWill and it is clear that only a life interest has been conferred onthe defendant. 23. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh Vs.Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others (2006(4) CTC 773) would beapplicable to the present case. Thus, Section 14(1) of the HinduSuccession Act, 1956, will not be applicable to the present case. Only Section 14(2) of the said Act would apply. In such circumstancesthis Court ought to allow the Second appeal, setting aside thejudgment and decree of the Courts below. 24. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondentshad contended that every Hindu female has got a right to maintenanceagainst her husband. A Hindu male is under a legal obligation tomaintain his wife even if he does not have any property. The right tomaintenance is a pre-existing right and the suit property bequeathedby Sethurama Iyer to the defendant was in lieu of maintenance. Themaintenance would include food, clothing, shelter, medical and otherneeds as well. The right to maintenance existed in the customary lawand it has received a statutory recognition under the Hindu Adoptionand Maintenance Act, 1956. Therefore, if a Hindu male gives a limitedinterest or a life estate in his dwelling house to his wife, either https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ under a Will or by any other device, it should be taken to be arecognition of her pre-existing right of maintenance. In suchcircumstances, the limited interest or the life estate vested in herwould blossom into an absolute estate, as per Section 14(1) of theHindu Succession Act, 1956. This proposition has been recognised bythe supreme Court in its decision rendered in Mangat Mal (dead) andanother Vs. Punni Devi (Smt) (Dead) and others (1995(6) SCC 88),wherein it was held as follows:"Maintenance, necessarily must encompass a provisionfor residence. Maintenance is given so that the lady canlive in the manner, more or less, to which she wasaccustomed. The concept of maintenance must, therefore, include provision for food and clothing and the like andtake into account the basic need of a roof over the head. Provision for residence may be made either by giving a lumpsum in money, or property in lieu thereof. It may also bemade by providing, for the course of the lady's life, aresidence and money for other necessary expenditure. Whereprovision is made in this manner, by giving a life interestin property for the purposes of residence, that provisionis made in lieu of a pre-existing right to maintenance andthe Hindu lady acquires far more than the vestige of titlewhich is deemed sufficient to attract Section 14(1). TheHindu Adoption and Maintenance Act defines maintenance inSection 3(d) to include "(i) in all cases, provision forfood, clothing, residence, education and medical attendanceand treatment."Thus a presumption can be drawn that when a Hindu male gives lifeinterest in a property to his wife for her residence, it wouldnecessarily enlarge into an absolute estate. The property of a Hindumale need not be an ancestral property to attract Section 14(1) ofthe Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The property given to the wife may bea self-acquired or a separate property of the husband as the word"property" mentioned in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,1956, includes all kinds of property as noted by the Supreme Court inVaddeboyina Tulasamma and others V. Vaddeoyina Sesha Reddi (dead) byL.Rs. (AIR 1977 SC 1944), wherein it was held as follows:"......the word `any property' even without anyamplification large enough to cover any or every kind ofproperty......."It was further held as follows:"Sub-section (1) of Section 14 is large in itsamplitude and covers every kind of acquisition of propertyby a female Hindu including acquisition in lieu ofmaintenance and where such property was possessed by her atthe date of commencement of the Act or was subsequentlyacquired and possessed, she would become the full owner ofthe property. Sub-section (2) is more in the nature of aproviso or exception to sub-section (1). It excepts certain https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ kinds of acquisition or property by a Hindu female from theoperation of sub section (1) and being in the nature of anexception to a provision which is calculated to achieve asocial purpose by bringing about change in the social andeconomic position of woman in Hindu society, it must beconstured strictly so as to impinge as little as possibleon the broad sweep of the ameliorative provision containedin sub-section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a mannerwhich would rob sub-section (1) of its efficacy and deprivea Hindu female of the protection sought to be given to herby sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in thecontext of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scopefor operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired bya female Hindu for the first time as a grant without anypre-existing right, under a gift will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restrictedestate in the property. Where, however, property isacquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu ofright of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existingright and such an acquisition would not be within the scopeand ambit of sub-section (2), even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes arestricted estate in the property."A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Mangat Mal(dead) and another Vs. Punni Devi (Smt) (Dead) and others (1995(6)SCC 88). Thus, Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,would apply not only to ancestral properties but also to separate andself-acquired properties.25. The learned counsel for the respondents had also contendedthat the pre-existing right of maintenance has received the statutoryrecognition by the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, as heldby the Supreme Court in C.Masilamani Mudaliar and others Vs. Idol ofSri Swaminathaswami swaminathaswami Thirukoil and others (1996(8) SCC525), wherein it was held that Section 14 of the Hindu SuccessionAct, 1956, should be construed harmoniously, consistent with theconstitutional goal of removing gender based discrimination andeffectuating economic empowerment of Hindu females. Further, theobject, scope and applicability of Section 14(1) of Hindu SuccessionAct, 1956, has been elaborately considered by the Supreme Court inVaddeboyina Tulasamma and others V. Vaddeoyina Sesha Reddi (dead) byL.Rs. (AIR 1977 SC 1944).26 It was also submitted by the learned counsel for therespondents that the contention of the appellant that there are nopleadings or recitals in Ex.A-1 and therefore, the life estate givento the defendant by her husband is not in recognition of her right tomaintenance cannot be countenanced in view of the categoricalpronouncement of the Courts below and the decisions rendered in https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Thota Sesharathamma and another Vs. Thota Manikyamma (dead) by LRsand others (1991(4) SCC 312), E.S.R.Packirisamy Pillai V.Vijayalakshmi and another (1993(1) MLJ 105) and M.Shanmugha Udayar V.Sivanandam and others (AIR 1994 Madras 123).27. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for therespondents that the contention of the appellant that the defendantin the suit had not stated that the limited interest in the suitproperty was given to her in lieu of her maintenance and therefore, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has no applicationcannot be countenanced for the following reasonsi) If a Hindu male gives a life interest in theproperty to his wife there would be a presumption that itwas given only for her maintenance, unless it is provedotherwise. Further, if a dwelling house is given to her forher residence, it would be presumed that the property wasgiven only in lieu of maintenance.ii) The defendant had specifically stated inparagraph-3 of the written statement that though only alife interest was given to the defendant under Ex.A-1, ithad enlarged into an absolute estate as per the provisionsof the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Such a pleading by thedefendant would be sufficient to claim her absolute rightsin the suit property.iii) It is a well settled proposition that legalterminologies need not be used in the pleadings to claimthe necessary reliefs. Further, it has been held by theSupreme Court in Des Raj and others Vs. Bhagat Ram (dead)by LRs and others (2007(2) CTC 838) that mofussil pleadingsare to be construed liberally and that the pleadings mustbe considered as a whole. Therefore, it was not necessaryfor the defendant to state in the written statement thatthe property was given to her in lieu of maintenance.iv) When each of the parties had understood the caseof the other and had adduced evidence to support theirrespective claims, it is not open to allege that certainpleadings with regard to a particular issue were notavailable. The Supreme Court in Baba Mungipa MedicalCollege and Research Centre Students Guardian Forums andanother (1997(8) SCC 682) had held as follows:"When the issue framed by the trial Court is wide andparties understood the scope thereof and adduced suchevidence as they wanted to, then there can be no prejudiceand a contention regarding absence of a detailed pleadingcannot be countenanced."v) For attracting Section 14(1) of the HinduSuccession Act, 1956, the Hindu female need not be inpossession of the property on the date of the commencementof the Act. The relevant date on which a female Hindushould be possessed of the property in dispute must be thedate on which the question of applying the provisions ofSection 14 (1) of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, arises. If on https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the said date, the property is possessed by the femaleHindu it would be held that she is the full owner of theproperty and not merely a limited owner. Such a questionmay arise in her own life time or may arise subsequentlywhen succession to a property opens on her death, as heldby the Supreme Court in Mangal Singh and others Vs.Smt. Rattno (dead) by her legal representatives and another(AIR 1967 SC 1786).vi) Even if a Hindu male dies after the commencementof the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the life interest givento his wife under any Will or device will enlarge into anabsolute estate. Therefore, the contention of the appellantthat when a Hindu male dies after the commencement of theAct, his wife will inherit his estate as a Class I heir andif any restriction is made in any instrument, the saidrestriction will have effect and Section 14 (2) will applycannot be countenanced in law, Since the said view of theSupreme Court in Gumpha (Smt) and others Vs. Jaibai (1994(2) SCC 511) has been overruled by a three Judge Bench ofSupreme Court in C.Masilamani Mudaliar and others Vs. Idolof Sri Swaminathaswami swaminathaswami Thirukoil and others(1996(8) SCC 525).28. The decision rendered in Sadhu Singh Vs. Gurdwara SahibNarike and others (2006(4) CTC 773), relied on by the appellant iscontrary to the decision rendered by the three Judge Bench of theSupreme Court. In Sadhu Singh Vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others(2006(4) CTC 773), it was held that for invoking Section 14(1) of theHindu Succession Act a Hindu women should be possessed of theproperty in dispute on the date of the commencement of the Act and ifthe male Hindu dies after the commencement of the Act, Section 14(1)will not normally apply and only Section 14(2) of the Act wouldapply. The said reasons given by the Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh Vs.Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others (2006(4) CTC 773), are contrary tothe three Judge Bench judgments, reported in Mangal Singh and othersVs. Smt. Rattno (dead) by her legal representatives and another (AIR1967 SC 1786) and C.Masilamani Mudaliar and others Vs. Idol of SriSwaminathaswami swaminathaswami Thirukoil and others (1996(8) SCC525).. Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court in Sadhu Singh Vs.Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others (2006(4) CTC 773) cannot apply tothe facts of the present case.29. It was also submitted that it has been held by the SupremeCourt that if two judgments of the Supreme Court are conflicting witheach other, the decision of the larger bench, whether earlier orlater in point of time is binding on the High Courts and the otherCourts, as held in Union of India Vs. Subramanian (1997 (1) SCR 87).The said decision of the Supreme Court has been followed by theMadras High Court in its decision reported in C.Kailaschand Jain andtwo others V. Mohamed Kasim (1995(1) CTC 47).30. It is also submitted that in a recent decision of this Courtin T.Sivagnanam (died) and others Vs. Muthu Backialakshmi @ Chellam https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ and another (2007 (4) MLJ 21), the decision reported in VaddeboyinaTulasamma and others V. Vaddeoyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs. (AIR1977 SC 1944) has been followed in preference to Sadhu Singh Vs.Gurdwara Sahib Narike and others (2006(4) CTC 773), while decidingthe status of a property bequeathed by the husband of a female Hindufor her maintenance.31. Thus, the learned counsel for the respondents had contendedthat the findings of the Courts below that the suit property wasgiven to the defendant by her husband only in recognition of her pre-existing right to maintenance are in accordance with law and thebinding decisions of the Supreme Court. Both the Courts below haverightly held that the limited interest given to the defendant in thesuit property by her husband under Ex.A-1, dated 4.9.1979, hadenlarged into an absolute estate, under Section 14(1) of the HinduSuccession Act, 1956. Therefore, in view of the concurrent findingsof the Courts below the second appeal is to be dismissed asunsustainable, both in law and on facts. 32. Further, the learned counsel for the respondents had reliedon the decision of the Supreme Court in Shakuntla Devi Vs. Kamla andothers (2005(5) SCC 390), wherein it was held, following V.TulasammaV. Sesha Reddy (1977 (3) SCC 99), that by virtue of Section 14(1) ofthe Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the limited right of life interestobtained by the Hindu wife under the Will of her husband getsenlarged as an absolute right in the suit property. Even if there aredeclaratory decrees to the contrary, if they are in conflict with thelaw laid down by the Supreme Court in Tulasamma's case, they wouldnot be of any assistance to the appellant.33. The learned counsel had also relied on the decision of theSupreme Court in Santhosh and others Vs. Saraswathi and another (2008(3) MLJ 530), wherein it was held as follows:"The right of the first wife to possess the land hasbeen accepted in the consent decree itself. After death ofher husband she became one of the co-owners of theproperty. If she had a right to possess the said land as aco-owner, the question of divesting her of the said rightby invoking sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the HinduSuccession Act, 1956, would not arise. Only Section 14(1)will apply."34. Considering the rival contentions advanced on behalf of theparties concerned and in view of the substantial questions of lawarising for consideration and in the light of the decisions of theCourts of law cited before this Court it is clear that the lifeinterest in the suit property bequeathed to the defendant, namely, Parvatham Ammal, by her husband Sethurama Iyer, would enlarge into anabsolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,1956, as held by both the Courts below. 35. The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant are not https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ acceptable as they are in conflict with the propositions of law laiddown by the Supreme Court by way of a number of binding decisionscited in support of the contentions raised on behalf of therespondents. It is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court inC.Masilamani Mudaliar and others Vs. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswamiswaminathaswami Thirukoil and others (1996(8) SCC 525) that the lawlaid down by the Supreme Court in Gumpha (Smt) and others Vs. Jaibai(1994(2) SCC 511) has been overruled. Relying on the decisions of theSupreme Court in Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University (1996 (3) SCC545) the Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had held that if theacquisition of the property attracts sub-section (1) of Section 14,sub-section (2) does not come into play. If the acquisition is forthe first time, without any vestige of pre-existing right, under theinstrument, document or device, then sub-section (2) of Section 14 ofthe Hindu Succession Act, 1956, gets attracted. Sub-section (2) beingin the nature of an exception, it does not engulf and wipe out theoperation of sub-section (1). The right to dispossession of propertyby a Hindu under Section 30 of the Act, is required to be understoodin its proper perspective. If any attempt is made to put arestriction upon the property possessed by a Hindu female under aninstrument, document or device, though executed after the Act hadcome into force, it must be interpreted in the light of the facts andcircumstances of the case under consideration. Both sub-sections (1)and (2) of Section 14 has to be given their full play withoutrendering either as otiose or aids as means of avoidance. The SupremeCourt has placed emphasis on the right to equality and the dignity ofa person enshrined in the Constitution of India. Such rights areenshrined in the preamble of the Constitution, the fundamental rightsand the Directive Principles which are a trinity intended to removediscrimination or disability on grounds only of a person's socialstatus or gender. Since the right to equality is a fundamental rightforming a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, theParliament has enacted the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, containingSection 14 with the clear intention of removing the pre-existingdisabilities fastened on the Hindu female limiting her right toproperty without full ownership thereof. The discrimination is soughtto be remedied by Section 14(1) of the Act, enlarging the scope ofacquisition of the property by a Hindu female. 36. Section 14(1) of the Act is intended to give full effect toArticle 21 of the Constitution of India to live life in its fullmeasure. It has been enacted to create equality and equal opportunityfor human development. Women are entitled to enjoy economic, social, cultural and political rights without discrimination. Property is oneof the important endowments or natural assets to accord anopportunity, to be independent and to enjoy the right of equal statuswith dignity and to develop a person's personality. Section 14(1) ofthe Act has been enacted to create an opportunity of eliminatinggender based discrimination. Since human rights are derived from thedignity and the inherent worth of a human person, the female Hindudeserves sufficient protection of her right to property. In such viewof the matter, there can be no doubt that Section 14(1) of the HinduSuccession Act, 1956, is intended to enlarge the limited interest https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ vested in a female Hindu into an absolute estates when she has beengiven a property by her husband in recognition of her pre-existingright to maintenance.37. From the facts of the case, it is clear that the suitproperty, which a residential house, has been given to the defendantby her husband to reside therein. In such circumstances, there is astrong presumption that it is given to her in recognition of herright to maintenance. Section 14(1) of the Act will apply not only toancestral properties but also to separate and self-acquiredproperties as seen from the decision of the Supreme Court inTulasamma's case. It is also clear that the pre-existing right tomaintenance has received the statutory recognition in the HinduAdoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, as noted by the Supreme Court inC.Masilamani Mudaliar and others Vs. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswamiswaminathaswami Thirukoil and others (1996(8) SCC 525). If theintention of the Legislature is to recognise the rights of a Hindufemale in the property given to her by her husband in recognition ofher pre-existing right of maintenance by way of enacting a statute, it cannot be said that the provisions of such a statute could beconsidered to limit or abridge the prevalent customary rightsexisting prior to such an enactment. 38. If the concept of social justice has to be given its fullmeaning, especially, in the context of eliminating genderdiscrimination, a liberal approach is required in interpreting thestatutory provisions recognising the rights of a female Hindu in theproperties given to her as a limited estate in order to allow such aright to enlarge into an absolute estate. Restricting the meaning, scope and applicability of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,1956, would be counter productive to the avowed purpose ofalleviating the status of a women in the Indian society byextinguishing the evil of gender discrimination. 39. In the light of the above observations, the substantialquestions of law arising for consideration in the present secondappeal are answered in favour of the respondents. Accordingly, thesecond appeal stands dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree ofthe Courts below. No costs.Sd/-Assistant Registrar/true copy/Sub Assistant Registrarcsh1.The Additional Subordinate Judge, Mayiladuthurai.2.The District Munsif, Mayiladuthurai. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

#3. The Section Officer, V.R. Section, High Court, Madras.+ 1 cc to Ms.E.Uma Shankar Advocate SR No.27837+ 1 cc to Mr. A.Muthukumar, Advocate SR No.27595S.A.No.1673 of 1996CK(CO)JJM(08.07.08)