C.Sababathy v. Salem Steel Plant Management

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATE:16-11-2009CORAMTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.JAICHANDRENSecond Appeal No.785 of 1995C.Sababathy.. Appellant / PlaintiffVersus1.Salem Steel PlantManagement represented bythe Executive Director,Salem-13.2.The Chairman,Steel Authority of India,New Delhi... Respondents / Defendants PRAYER:Appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 24.11.1993,made in A.S.No.24 of 1993, on the file of the I Additional DistrictJudge, Salem, reversing the judgment and decree, dated 11.11.1992,made in O.S.No.1606 of 1987, on the file of the Additional DistrictMunsif, Salem.For Appellant : Mr.R.SingaravelanFor Respondents : Mr.A.ElangoJ U D G E M E N TThis second appeal has been filed against the judgment anddecree, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993, on the file ofthe first Additional District Court, Salem, reversing the judgmentand decree, dated 11.11.1992, made in O.S.No.1606 of 1987, on thefile of the Additional District Munsif Court, Salem.2. The plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.1606 of 1987 is theappellant in the present second appeal. The defendants in the suitare the respondents herein. The plaintiff had filed the suit, inO.S.No.1606 of 1987, praying for a declaration to declare that theresignation of the plaintiff was not voluntary and that it isillegal and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants toreinstate the plaintiff in service, with retrospective effect andfor costs. 3. The plaintiff had stated that he was an officer under thedefendant management. He was working as an Assistant Manager, https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ Electrical, in the Salem Steel Plant, having joined in service, on1.1.1979, as a Junior Manager. Thereafter, on 1.1.1983, he waspromoted as an Assistant Manager. Even though the plaintiff was duefor a promotion some of the executives of the first defendant weregiven promotion, overlooking the claim of the plaintiff. Onenquiry, the plaintiff had been informed that the cut off date foreligibility for promotion had been fixed as 30.12.1985. Whereas theplaintiff had become eligible only on 1.1.1986. 4. The plaintiff had further stated that he was assured of hispromotion in the month of June, 1986. However, he was not calledfor the interview when certain others were given the promotions, inspite of the fact that the plaintiff had done more commendable workthan those who had been promoted. In spite of his attempts to meetthe executive director, to make a personal representation, he wasnot permitted to do so. However, by a well calculated and pre-planned move, he was victimized and the details of the episode hadbeen given in the letter, dated 1.5.1987, sent to the seconddefendant. 5. While so, on 13.9.1986, the plaintiff was compelled,coerced and threatened to write a letter which, the plaintiff hadfound, to his dismay, was treated as a resignation letter. Theobtaining of the letter from the plaintiff was in gross violationof the service rules and the principles of natural justice andtherefore, it has no legal validity. The resignation letter, saidto have been written by the plaintiff, was not voluntary, as it hadbeen written under coercion from the defendants and their officers.In the terms and conditions of service it had been clearlymentioned that three months notice is to be given, by either party,before the termination of the service or three months pay, in lieuthereof, was to be paid by the employer to the employee before suchtermination could take effect. Since such a procedure had not beenfollowed, the alleged resignation by the plaintiff is non est inlaw. 6. In the written statement filed by the first defendant ithas been stated that it is not correct on the part of the plaintiffto claim that he was given an opportunity for undergoing a specialtraining in appreciation of his hard and honest work. In fact, themanagement had deputed the plaintiff for training in the usualcourse. He was given the promotion, as an Assistant Manager, in thenormal course, as per the rules applicable to his service. It isfactually not correct on the part of the plaintiff to state that hewas to be promoted as a Deputy Manager, on 1.1.1986. Some of theexecutives working under the first defendant had been givenpromotions, based on their merit. The cut off date for beingeligible for promotion had been correctly fixed by the defendants,contrary to the allegations made by the plaintiff. The promotionfrom the post of Assistant Manager to the post of Deputy Manager isgiven only as per the existing rules. 7. The claim that the plaintiff had been assured of hispromotion in the month of June, 1986, is not true. It is also https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ incorrect to allege that certain others had been given theirpromotion even though there was no vacancy. No pre-plannedconspiracy had taken place to victimize the plaintiff, as allegedby him, in his letter, dated 1.5.1987, addressed to the seconddefendant. The said letter is a concocted document created to suitthe convenience of the plaintiff. It is false to allege that thegeneral manager of the Salem Steel Plant had coerced the plaintiffto sign the resignation letter. In fact the plaintiff had submittedhis resignation letter, voluntarily, on his own free will. Therewas no compulsion or coercion, as alleged by the plaintiff. If theallegations made by the plaintiff were true he could have withdrawnhis resignation letter, on 14.9.1986. In fact, in his letter, dated17.9.1986, the plaintiff had mentioned about the mode of settlementof his dues by the defendant company. 8. The allegation of the plaintiff that three months noticeought to have been given to him, before the defendant managementhad accepted the resignation letter of the plaintiff, cannot beaccepted. In fact, it had been made clear, in W.P.No.2564 of 1987,that the defendant management had waived the notice period. Assuch, if an employee resigns from his post or from his job it couldbe accepted, with immediate effect. As a consequence of hisresignation, the plaintiff had been asked to vacate his quartersand his car loan account had been foreclosed. The defendants hadfollowed all procedures prescribed by law, while accepting theresignation of the plaintiff and in initiating the consequentialactions, thereafter. In such circumstances, the suit filed by theplaintiff is not maintainable in law.9. In view of the averments made on behalf of the plaintiff,as well as the defendants, the trial Court had framed the followingissues for consideration:“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefsprayed for in the suit?2. Whether the suit is maintainable before thisCourt?3. What other reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to?”10. Before the trial Court the plaintiff had examined himselfas P.W.1. Exs.A-1 to A-10 had been marked on behalf of theplaintiff. Exs.B-1 to B-6 had been marked on behalf of thedefendants. No witness was examined on the side of the defendants. 11. The trial Court had noted that the main contention of theplaintiff is that the alleged resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986,marked as Ex.B-1, was not submitted, voluntarily, by the plaintiff,as it had been obtained by threat and coercion by the defendantsand their officers. The plaintiff had also contended that thecondition that three months notice or three months pay in lieu ofthe notice had to be given, by either party, before the terminationof the service of an employee of the first defendant company, had https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ not been followed even though it was part of the terms andconditions in the order of appointment of the plaintiff, dated11.12.1978, marked as Ex.A-1. Therefore, the alleged resignationletter is not valid. 12. With regard to the issue as to whether the suit filed bythe plaintiff is maintainable, the trial Court had concluded thatthe suit is maintainable since the issue does not relate to removalof the plaintiff from service. The question as to whether theresignation letter, said to have been submitted by the plaintiff tothe defendants, is voluntary or that it has been given under threatand coercion is an issue that could be decided in the present civilproceedings. The trial Court had found that the defendants had notproduced any evidence to show that the resignation of the plaintifffrom his service was due to his personal reasons. According to theappointment order, dated 11.12.1978, marked as Ex.A-1, it is clearthat three months notice ought to have been given, by either party,before the service of an employee could be terminated. Further, ithad been seen that the pre-conditions prescribed for suchtermination had not been waived before the resignation lettersubmitted by the plaintiff had been accepted by the defendants. 13. The trial Court had also found that the resignationletter, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, had been handwritten bythe plaintiff in his own handwriting. No reason has been shown bythe defendants to show as to why it had been handwritten eventhough the plaintiff is a highly placed official. Further, thedefendants had not given any reason, as to why the resignationsubmitted by the plaintiff had been accepted by them, at once. Theunusual speed in which the letter had been accepted would show thatthe said letter could not have been submitted by the petitioner,voluntarily. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff that he hadsubmitted his letter, dated 13.9.1986, due to threat and coercionby the defendants and their officials could be believed. 14. Further, no evidence is available, with regard to the timewhen the resignation letter had been written. In fact, there is nospecific denial of the claims made by the plaintiff, by way ofevidence. Since the plaintiff had been compelled to submit hisresignation letter, under coercion, in the presence of thedefendants and their officers, there could not have been anyindependent witness to support the claims made by the plaintiff.The officials who have been present at the relevant point of timehad not subjected themselves to cross examination. In the absenceof sufficient evidence to show that the defendants had followed theprocedure, as per the terms and conditions and the rules applicableto the service in accepting the resignation letter submitted by theplaintiff and when no reason has been given as to why the plaintiffhad come forward to submit his resignation letter, the trial Courthad come to the conclusion that the resignation letter obtainedfrom the plaintiff was under threat and coercion. In suchcircumstances, the trial Court had held that the claims made by theplaintiff are valid and sustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly,the trial Court had decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, by https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ its judgment and decree, dated 11.11.1992, made in O.S.No.1606 of1987.15. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court,dated 11.11.1992, made in O.S.No.1606 of 1987, the defendants hadfiled an appeal, on the file of the First Additional DistrictCourt, Salem, in A.S.No.24 of 1993. The first Appellate Court hadframed the following point for consideration:“Whether the plaintiff/respondent is entitled to therelief of declaration and permanent injunction, as prayedfor by the plaintiff, in the appeal?”16. The first Appellate Court had set aside the judgment anddecree of the trial Court stating that the reasons cited by theplaintiff for submitting his resignation letter are unacceptable,as he had failed to prove that the letter of resignation, dated13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, had been obtained from him undercoercion. The first Appellate Court had also come to the conclusionthat the resignation letter would come into force from the momentit was accepted, irrespective of the terms and conditions found inthe order of appointment, dated 11.12.1978, marked as Ex.A-1. Thefirst Appellate Court had also found that if the claim of theplaintiff that his resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, marked asEx.B-1, had been obtained under coercion is true, then there wouldhave been no necessity for the plaintiff to have written a letter,dated 17.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-2, requesting the defendants to payhis retiral benefits due to him. 17. The first Appellate Court had come to the conclusion thatsince the letter of resignation had been sent by the plaintiff tothe General Manager of the first defendant company it need not havebeen sent through any other proper channel, as stated by theplaintiff. Further, it had been noted that by a letter, dated3.10.1986, marked as Ex.A-2, the plaintiff had requested thedefendant management to reinstate him in service. In the reply sentby the first defendant, dated 13.10.1986, marked as Ex.A-3, it hadbeen stated that the plaintiff had been relieved from service, ashe had, submitted a letter of resignation, voluntarily. Further,from Ex.B-2, dated 17.9.1986, it was found that the plaintiff hadrequested the first defendant to adjust the car loan and the otherloans availed by the plaintiff, with the gratuity and the providentfund amounts due to him. 18. The first Appellate Court had also found that theplaintiff had not stated clearly as to why there was a necessityfor the defendants to obtain a letter of resignation from theplaintiff. Further, the plaintiff had not produced any evidence toshow that the defendant management had acted in a mala fide mannerto deny promotion to the plaintiff, even though certain otherpersons had been promoted, over looking the claims of theplaintiff. The first Appellate Court had also found that there wasno substance in the allegation made by the plaintiff in his replystatement that the personal assistant of the first defendant had https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ demanded money for considering the plaintiff for promotion. Thereis nothing stated on behalf of the plaintiff as to who had actedagainst him to deny him the promotion that he was eligible to geton merit. 19. Based on the oral, as well as the documentary evidenceavailable on record, the first Appellate Court had found that theplaintiff had failed to prove that he had been coerced by theofficers to submit the resignation letter, marked as Ex.B-1. Infact the resignation letter had been handwritten by the plaintiffand there was nothing to show that the said letter had beenwritten, under threat or coercion. As such, the first AppellateCourt had come to the conclusion that the claim of the plaintiffthat he had submitted his resignation under coercion cannot beaccepted. In such view of the matter, the first Appellate Court hadreversed the findings of the trial Court, by its judgment anddecree, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993.20. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the firstAppellate Court, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993, theplaintiff had filed the present second appeal. This Court hadadmitted the second appeal on the following substantial questionsof law:"1) Whether the resignation letter (Ex.B1) wasobtained from the appellant/plaintiff under threat andcoercion and so it is vitiated and cannot be acted upon?2) Whether the acceptance of the resignation on thevery date of the resignation itself and relieving theappellant/plaintiff from service on the same date,without stipulating three months notice or three monthspay in lieu of notice, offends condition No.12(b) of theappointment order (Ex.A.1) is vitiated?"21. The learned counsel for the appellant had submitted thatthe first Appellate Court had erred in reversing the wellconsidered judgment of the trial Court, without properlyappreciating the pleadings and the evidence on record. The learnedcounsel had also submitted that the first Appellate Court ought tohave accepted the interpretation of the trial Court, with regard tocondition No.12(b) of the appointment order, according to whichthree months notice ought to have been given by either party, inwriting, before the service of an employee could be terminated.Therefore, the acceptance of the resignation letter of theplaintiff, dated 13.9.1986, by the defendant management, withoutgiving three months time, is arbitrary and illegal and contrary tocondition No.12(b) of the appointment order. The first AppellateCourt ought to have held that the resignation letter, dated13.9.1986, submitted by the plaintiff had been obtained by threatand coercion and therefore, it is inoperative and invalid in theeye of law. 22. The learned counsel had further submitted that there wasno proper explanation from the respondents as to why the https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, submitted by the appellant,marked as Ex.B-1, had been accepted by the Chief Personnel Managerof the first respondent company, with such great urgency. From theorder of acceptance, marked as Ex.B-6, it is clear that it had notbeen issued by the competent authority. It was also clear that theresignation of the appellant had not been given effect to in letterand spirit, as it was subject to the clearance of all payments duefrom the appellant to various agencies. As such, the respondentmanagement ought to have accepted the letter of the appellant,dated 3.10.1986, marked as Ex.A-2, withdrawing his earlier letterof resignation, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, when the serviceof the appellant had been terminated by the respondents byaccepting his letter of resignation, without following conditionNo.12(b) of the appointment order, dated 11.12.1978, according towhich three months notice ought to have been given beforeterminating the service of the appellant. Therefore, the judgmentand decree of the first Appellate Court, dated 24.11.1993, made inA.S.No.24 of 1993, is liable to be set aside. 23. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant had reliedon the following decisions in support of his contentions:1. J.N.Srivastava Vs. Union of India (1998(9) SCC559)2. Kulwant Kaur V. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001(4) SCC262)3. Shambhu Murari Sinha V. Project and DevelopmentIndia Ltd. (AIR 2002 SC 1341)24. Per contra the learned counsel appearing on behalf of therespondents had submitted that the letter of resignation, dated13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, submitted by the appellant, had beenaccepted by the respondent management, as requested by theappellant, with immediate effect. The contention that three monthsnotice ought to have been given to him before accepting his letterof resignation cannot be countenanced, as the said issue hadalready been decided, in W.P.No.2564 of 1987, by an order, dated6.4.1987. The main issue that had to be decided is with regard tothe claim of the appellant that he had submitted his letter ofresignation due to the coercion by the defendants and the officers.The first Appellate Court was right in coming to the conclusionthat the appellant had submitted the resignation letter,voluntarily and that it was not due to coercion or threat by thedefendants and their officers. The first Appellate Court had foundthat there was no evidence shown by the appellant to substantiatehis claim. Since there is no substantial question of law to bedecided by this Court, in the present second appeal, the secondappeal filed by the appellant is liable to be dismissed, as devoidof merits. 25. The learned counsel for the respondent had relied on thefollowing decisions in support of his contentions. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ 1) Hamida and others V. Md.Kahlil (2001(3) MLJ 60)2) A.K.Bindal V. Union of India (AIR 2003 SC 2189)3) Christopher Barla V. Basudev Naik (AIR 2005 SC 1020)4) Commr. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment V. P.Shanmugama (AIR 2005 SC 770)5) Hero Vinoth (Minor) V. Seshammal (AIR 2006 SC 2234)6) Chand Mal Chayal V. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2006 SC 3340)7) EID Parry (India) Ltd. V. M.N.Padmanabhan (2008(3) CTC 746)26. In view of the submissions made by the learned counselsappearing on behalf of the appellant, as well as the respondents,and on a perusal of the evidence available on record and in view ofthe decisions cited before this Court it is clear that theappellant has not shown sufficient cause or reason to interferewith the findings of the first Appellate Court, in its judgment anddecree, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993. The firstAppellate Court had found that the appellant had not adduced anyevidence, either oral or documentary, in support of his contentionthat the resignation letter, dated 13.9.1986, marked as Ex.B-1, hadbeen submitted by the appellant due to coercion from therespondents and their officers. The appellant had also failed toshow that the respondent management ought to have given 30 daysnotice to the appellant before accepting the resignation lettersubmitted by the appellant. In fact, the appellant had requestedthe defendant management to accept his resignation letter, dated13.9.1986, with immediate effect. While so, it would not be open tothe appellant to state that the defendant management had acceptedthe resignation letter of the appellant, with undue haste and thatit was obtained under threat or coercion. Further, from thecontentions raised by the learned counsels appearing for theparties concerned, this Court is not convinced that substantialquestions of law have arisen for consideration in the presentsecond appeal, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court,reported in Gurdev Kaur and others Vs. Kaki and others (2007 (1)CTC 334). 27. In such view of the matter, the judgment and decree of thefirst Appellate Court, dated 24.11.1993, made in A.S.No.24 of 1993,is confirmed. Accordingly, the second appeal stands dismissed. Nocosts. Sd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ cshTo1) The I Additional District Judge, Salem2) The Additional District Munsif, Salem.3) The Section Officer, VR Section, High Court, Madras.1 cc To Ms.M.Srividhya, Advocate, SR.61642Second Appeal No.785 of 1995TS(CO)sra 23.12.2009