High Court · 2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRASDATED : 06.01.2009CORAM:THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH A.S.Nos.867 of 19931.Balakrishnan (died)2.Varalakshmi3.Dharani Sreenivasan4.Govindaraj5.Uthayavathi6.Veenavathi7.Vijayavenkatraman8.Vivekanandan9.Vedhaveni(Appellants 2 to 9 brought on record as L.Rs. of the deceased sole appellantvide order of dated 21.10.2008 made in CMP Nos.17829/05and CMP 1164 and 1165/06) .... AppellantsV.1.K.Jayalakshmi2.D.Thangavel .... Respondents Prayer: Appeal filed against the Judgment and decree made inO.S.No.254 of 1991 dated 17.08.1993 on the file of the SubordinateJudge, Tirupattur, North Arcot Ambedkar District.For Appellants : Mr.A.K.KumarasamyFor Respondents : Mr.J.Saravanavel for R1 No Appearance for R2J U D G M E N TThis appeal is directed against the Judgment and decree passedby the lower Court in O.S.No.254 of 1991 dated 17.08.1993 on thefile of the Subordinate Judge, Tirupattur, North Arcot, AmbedkarDistrict. https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

2.The plaintiff/R1 herein filed her plaint which would runthus:-Originally, the suit property is a self acquired property by thefirst defendant. The plaintiff and the first defendant entered intoan sale agreement dated 25.06.1990 for a sum of Rs.39,500/-. As perthe said agreement, the first defendant received a sum ofRs.15,000/- as advance from the plaintiff and agreed to get theremaining amount of Rs.24,500/-. The first defendant agreed tovacate the tenant in the schedule mentioned property within a periodof one year but he did not perform his part of the contract andtherefore, the plaintiff approached the first defendant severaltimes to return the advance amount. The second defendant had knowingfully well about the agreement existing in between the plaintiff andthe first defendant purchased the schedule mentioned property and hecannot be considered as a bonafide purchaser for the value. Theplaintiff was waiting for the first defendant to come and executethe sale deed on 02.09.1991 at the Sub Registrar Office and she hadcaused notice earlier during the last week of August 1991 to comeand execute the sale deed but the first defendant had purposelyeven without vacating the tenant from the schedule mentionedproperty executed the sale deed in favour of the second defendant.Hence, she filed a suit against the defendants in O.S.No. 254 of1991 for specific performance of agreement entered into between thePlaintiff and the first defendant on 25.06.1990 agreeing to sell theschedule mentioned property in favour of the first defendant for asum of Rs.39,500/-.3.The first defendant filed his written statement, which wouldrun thus:- It is true that the first defendant offered to sell the suitproperty and entered into an agreement. He offered to dispose ofthe property in order to meet certain urgent family necessities andto discharge certain debts as well as to arrange for his daughter'smarriage. The plaintiff agreed to pay the balance within a yearfrom the date of agreement. When he insisted upon the plaintiff topay the balance and get the sale deed registered, she was not in aposition to pay the balance and get the sale deed registered and sheexpressed her inability to pay the balance and get the sale deedregistered. Therefore, he entered into an agreement with the seconddefendant in order to secure money to meet his urgent requirements.The plaintiff has lost all her rights under the agreement and alsoshe forfeited the advance amount under the terms of agreement. Shehas never been ready and willing to perform her part of obligationsunder the agreement. Therefore the plaintiff is not entitled tospecific performance of contract and the suit is vexatious.4.The second defendant had filed his written statement, whichwould run as follows:-The suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts. Whenthe first defendant insisted upon the plaintiff to pay the balanceof consideration as he was in urgent need of money to dischargecertain family debts, she expressed her inability to pay the balanceand she has given up her right under the agreement. He is a bonafide https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ purchaser of the property for valuable consideration. The plaintiffdid not perform her part of obligations under the agreement. Thesecond defendant purchased the property only after the plaintiffrelinquished her rights under the agreement. Therefore, the suit isliable to be dismissed.5. The lower court after considering the submissions made byeither side decreed the suit and directed the plaintiff to pay thebalance of consideration within one week and directed the defendants1 and 2 to execute the sale deed to the plaintiff within 3 months.Aggrieved against the said order, the second defendant approachedthis court and filed the present appeal.6. The lower Court had considered the evidence of P.W.1 thePlaintiff, D.W.1 (the first defendant), D.W.2 (the second defendant)and D.W.3 (the third defendant) and also considered the documentsproduced by the plaintiff in Exs.A1 to A4 and Ex.C1 theCommissioner's report and Ex.C2 the sketch had come to theconclusion of decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Thesuit was filed by the plaintiff for specific performance ofagreement entered into between the Plaintiff and the first defendanton 25.06.1990 agreeing to sell the schedule mentioned property infavour of the first defendant for a sum of Rs.39,500/-.7. The lower Court had framed seven issues which are as followsand had accepted the case of the plaintiff and decreed the suit:-" i) Whether the Plaintiff and the first Defendant jointly entered into the sale agreementdated 25.06.1990?ii)Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specificperformance? iii) Whether the plaintiff had lost all her rightsas per agreement? iv) Whether the plaintiff had right to receive the advance amount? v) Whether the case is maintainable? vi) Whether the second defendant was a bonafide purchaser for value? vii) To what other reliefs the plaintiff isentitled to?8. On a careful perusal of the pleadings submitted by both theparties and the evidence adduced on either side and the Judgment anddecree of the lower Court and the grounds raised in the appeal memo,I am of the opinion that the following points are necessary for thepurpose of dismissal of this appeal:-i)Whether the Plaintiff was all along ready and willing on hispart to perform his part of the contract dated 25.06.1990?ii) Whether the suit filed by the Plaintiff is liable to bedismissed for want of pleadings and proof in respect ofreadiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff? https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ iii) Whether the appellant/second defendant was a bonafidepurchaser for value and to what relief the parties areentitled to?iv)To what relief the appellant is entitled to? 9. Heard Mr.A.K.Kumarasamy learned counsel for theappellant/Second Defendant and Mr.J.Saravanavel, learned counsel forthe first respondent/Plaintiff. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant/D2 would submit inhis arguments that the second defendant was a bonafide purchaser forvalue and he had purchased the property from the first defendantonly on the assurance given by the plaintiff that she was not goingto buy the schedule mentioned property from the first defendant andtherefore, he purchased the said property from the first defendant.He would further submit in his arguments that the Plaintiff was notall along ready and willing on her part to purchase the propertyfrom the first defendant as per agreement of sale dated 25.06.1990entered into between them. He would further submit that thePlaintiff did not plead that she was all along ready and willing toperform her part of contract by paying the remaining sum ofRs.24,500/- payable to the first defendant and get the sale deedexecuted from him and the said readiness and willingness should havealso been proved congently by the plaintiff but she had miserablyfailed to plead and prove the sale. He would also submit that sincethe plaintiff was not willing to buy the schedule mentioned propertyfrom the first defendant as the first defendant was badly in need ofmoney. He would also submit that there was talk of compromise inbetween the parties to return the advance received by the firstdefendant from the plaintiff and since the plaintiff was demandingenormous interest on the said amount, it could not be concluded. Hewould draw the attention of the Court to various decisions of ourSupreme Court reported ini)(1995) 5 SCC 115, N.P.THIRUGANANAM (DIED) V. DR.R.JAGAN MOHANAND OTHERSii)(2000) 2 SCC 428, RAM AWADH V. ACHHAIBAR DUBEYiii) (2002) 9 SCC 582, PUSHPARANI S.SUNDARAM V. PAULINE MANOMANIJAMESiv) (2003) 10 SCC 390, MANJUNATH ANANDAPPA V. TAMMANASA v) (2004) 7 SCC 251, PUKHRAJ D.JAIN AND OHTERS V. G.GOPALAKRISHNA vi) (2004) 8 SCC 689, SWARNAM RAMACHANDRAN (SMT) AND ANOTHER V. ARAVACODE CHAKUNGAL JAYAPALAN, to thePrinciple that the readiness and willingness on the part of theplaintiff should have been pleaded and proved as per the mandatoryrequirement envisaged in Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.He would also submit that the lower Court had not considered thesaid point and miserably failed to dismiss the relief of specificperformance and to award the return of the advance amount to theplaintiff. He would also submit that the plaintiff did not evenconstructively plead the readiness and willingness to perform hispart of the contract in the plaint nor did the plaintiff prove thesame by way of adducing evidence. Therefore, the case of theplaintiff that he was ready and willing to perform his part of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ contract cannot be accepted and the relief of the specificperformance ought to have been refused. He would therefore requestthe Court to allow the appeal and to pass suitable orders in thecircumstances of the case to return the advance money, only.11.The learned counsel for the first respondent/Plaintiff wouldsubmit in his arguments that the Plaintiff had proved her readinessand willingness to perform her part of the contract by adducingcogent evidence and was throughout ready to pay the said balanceamount of Rs.24,500/- to the first defendant but it was the firstdefendant who had agreed to vacate the tenant in the schedulementioned property within a period of one year who did not performhis part of the contract and therefore, the claim of theappellant/second defendant cannot be acceded to. He would alsosubmit that the second defendant had knowing fully well about theagreement existing in between the plaintiff and the first defendant,purchased the schedule mentioned property and he cannot beconsidered as a bonafide purchaser for the value. He would furthersubmit that the plaintiff was waiting for the first defendant tocome and execute the sale deed on 02.09.1991 at the Sub RegistrarOffice and it could be proved by her attestation made in Ex.A4registered mortgage in between the third parties on that date andshe had caused notice earlier during the last week of August 1991demanding the first defendant to come and execute the sale deed butthe first defendant had wantonly, even without vacating the tenantfrom the schedule mentioned property, executed the sale deed infavour of the second defendant. The plaintiff had averred herreadiness and willingness throughout the plaint and had also spokento that effect and therefore, the Judgments referred to by theappellant's counsel are not applicable to the present case. Hewould also refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reportedin (2005) 7 SCC 534, (ANIGLASE YOHANNAN V. RAMLATHA AND OTHERS) tothe effect that the readiness and willingness which is mandatory tobe pleaded in the plaint, when mentioned with essential facts itcould be inferred from the averments made in the plaint. He wouldalso submit that the said readiness and willingness was also provedby examining the plaintiff herself. Therefore, there is noinfirmity in the judgment passed by the lower court and therefore,the appeal is to be dismissed. 12. I have given anxious thoughts to the argumentsadvanced on either side. The points 1 and 2 which are to be decidedin this appeal could be disposed together. The admitted case ofboth sides are that the plaintiff and the first defendant hadentered into an agreement of sale on 25.06.1990 in respect of thesuit property that the first defendant agreeing to sell to theplaintiff for a sum of Rs.39,500/- and had received a sum ofRs.15,000/- as advance on that day and to pay the remaining sum ofRs.24,500/- at the time of registering the sale deed and the tenantwho was in occupation of the said property should be vacated withina period of one year and the plaintiff had to pay the remaining sumof Rs.24,500/- and to get the sale deed registered. The said saleagreement was produced by the Plaintiff as Ex.A1. It would go toshow that the period for execution of the sale deed has been https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ mentioned as follows:-"kPjp U:gha;fs; 24.500 ,Ugj;jp ehd;fhapuj;J IE}W) fpuagj;jpuk; vGjp hp$p!;jh; bra;a[k;nghJ (mjhtJ ,e;j brhj;jpy;thliff;F FoapUe;JtUk; egh; fhyp bra;J vd; RthjPdk; tpl;lcld; mjhtJ xU tUr fhyj;jpw;Fs;) bgw;Wbfhs;Stjhfxd;W ,yf;fkpl;lth; rk;kjpj;Js;shh;/"13. Therefore, we could understand that the tenant was to bevacated and the payment of Rs.24,500/- to be made at the tune ofregistration within a period of one year as fixed by the parties inthe said agreement. It was argued on the side of the appellant thatthe lower court had wrongly come to the conclusion that the periodof one year would start only after the tenant vacating the schedulementioned property. We could see through the evidence adduced oneither side that notice calling the first defendant to execute thesale deed was caused by the plaintiff on 22.08.1991 in Ex.A2. Inthe said notice, the Plaintiff had demanded the execution of thesale deed from the first defendant after receiving the sum ofRs.24,500/- from her as he had not vacated the tenant within aperiod of one year. There is no dispute regarding the fact that thesuit property was subsequently sold by the first defendant in favourof the second defendant on 02.09.1991 and the tenant was not vacatedtill such time and the tenant was subsequently vacated by the seconddefendant himself. The evidence of the plaintiff as well as thesecond defendant would amply prove the same. Therefore, it is notcorrect to say that the one year period has been fixed in betweenthe parties only after the first defendant vacating the tenant fromthe suit property. It is evident from the evidence of the plaintiffthat she was waiting in the Sub Registrar Office to get the saledeed executed even without the first defendant vacating the tenant.All these circumstances would go to show that the period fixed inbetween the parties for execution of sale deed, was one year fromthe date of agreement i.e., 25.06.1990 and within the said time, thefirst defendant should vacate the tenant from the suit property andget the sale deed executed after paying money. Therefore, the saledeed should have been got executed in between the parties within aperiod of one year notwithstanding that the tenant vacating the suitproperty. However, the time fixed in between the parties is notessential part of the contract to claim specific performance beforethe court of law as the law of limitation permitting the plaintiffto file the suit within 3 years after the lapse of the said one yearperiod calculated from the date of agreement.14. Now, the point for consideration is whether the plaintiffwas all along ready and willing to perform her part of the contractfrom the date of agreement till the date of filing of the suit. Itis patent that the plaintiff has not specifically pleaded that shewas always ready and willing to perform her part of contract fromthe date of agreement till the date of filing of the suit. However,she had spoken in her evidence that she was ready and willing toperform her part of the contract and was waiting at the SubRegistrar Office on 02.09.1991 as mentioned in her notice dated https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/

23.08.1991 (Ex.A2). Whether this will suffice the requirement underSection 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act. According to thesubmissions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiff/firstrespondent, the plaintiff had pleaded her readiness and willingnesswith essential facts throughout in the plaint and therefore, thereis no necessity of pleading specifically as required under Section16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act. 15. Reliance made by the learned counsel for theplaintiff/first respondent in (2005) 7 SCC 534 made in a casebetween ANIGLASE YOHANNAN V. RAMLATHA AND OTHERS would lead asfollows:-"The basic principle behind Section 16(c) read withExplanation (ii) is that any person seeking benefit ofthe specific performance of contract must manifestthat his conduct has been blemishless throughoutentitling him to the specific relief. The provisionimposes a personal bar. The Court is to grant reliefon the basis of the conduct of the person seekingrelief. If the pleadings manifest that the conduct ofthe plaintiff entitles him to get the relief onperusal of the plaint he should not be denied therelief."The said dictum would guide us to the fact that if the plaintiff haspleaded the essential facts as to the readiness and willingness toperform her part of the contract by the plaintiff and had compliedwith the same that is sufficient statutory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.16. Regarding the Judgment cited by the learned counsel for theappellant/second defendant, we could see the principles laid down byall the said judgments are to the effect that the mandatoryrequirement under section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act isessential in a suit for specific performance. The relevant passageas mentioned in the judgment of our Apex Court reported in (2003) 10SCC 390, MANJUNATH ARANTHAPPA VS. TAMMANASA, paragraph No.27 wouldrun as follows:-"27. The decisions of this Court, therefore, leaveno manner of doubt that a plaintiff in a suit forspecific performance of contract not only must raise aplea that he had all along been and even on the date offiling of suit was ready and willing to perform his partof contract, but also prove the same. Only in certainexceptional situation where although in letter andspirit, the exact words had not been used but readinessand willingness can be culled out from reading all theaverments made by the plaintiff as a whole coupled withthe materials brought on record at the trial of the suit,to the said effect, the statutory requirement of Section16(c) of the Specific Relief Act may be held to have beencomplied with." As per the aforesaid judgment, the pleading and proof as per Section16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act is essential and in certain https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ exceptional cases, it can be culled out from reading the wholeaverment in the plaint and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff forthe purpose of complying with the requirement of Section 16 (c) ofthe Specific Relief Act. Now, we have to see whether the plaintiffhad complied with Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act as perthe dictum of our Apex Court. The plaintiff was examined as P.W.1.She had spoken in her evidence that she had paid a sum ofRs.15,000/- as advance on the date of agreement of sale i.e., on25.06.1990 and the balance amount of Rs.24,500/- have been paid onthe date of registration of the sale deed and the first defendanthad agreed to vacate the tenant within a period of one year and onvacating the tenant, the balance amount should have been paid andthe sale deed should have been executed. She would also speak thatthe first defendant did not vacate the tenant and had also notagreed to execute the sale deed even without vacating the tenant.She also issued notice Ex.A2 after sending the fact that the firstdefendant had planned to sell the property to the second defendantand she was waiting at the Sub Registrar's Office with money and thefirst defendant did not execute the sale deed in her favour but soldthe property in favour of the second defendant on the same date.She was telling that she was having the balance amount from the dateof agreement. So far as the plaint averments are concerned, shewould aver in paragraph No.5 that she was ready with Rs.24,500/- andapproached the first defendant on several occasions but he did notexecute the sale deed in her favour but sold the property in favourof the second defendant. It is also admitted by the plaintiff thatthe first defendant had replied on 31.08.1991 which is marked asEx.A3. Ex.A3 would go to show that the plaintiff was not in aposition to pay the balance amount and get the sale deed registeredand she also expressed her inability to pay the balance and get thesale deed registered. When it has been contended by the firstdefendant that he was not able to pay the balance sum ofRs.24,900/-, the plaintiff ought to have evidenced her ability topay the said amount either by depositing the said amount in heraccount on the said date of sale viz., 02.09.1991 or by taking ademand draft in favour of the first defendant. It is also admittedby P.W.1 that she was present at Sub Registrar Office on Ambur on02.09.1991 but she had not purchased any stamp papers for thepurpose of preparing the sale deed. It is an admitted fact that theplaintiff should bear the cost, get the sale deed registered. Ex.A4is the mortgage deed in between the third parties in which theplaintiff attested on 02.09.1991. The said document is produced bythe plaintiff to show her presence at the Sub Registrar Office Amburon 02.09.1991. The plaintiff was also witnessing the execution ofthe sale deed by the first defendant in favour of the seconddefendant could at least file her objection before the Sub Registrarprotesting to register the sale deed in favour of the seconddefendant. She did not do so. It was also an admission made by theplaintiff in her evidence that she had not issued any notice to thefirst defendant within a period of one year that she was ready withbalance money to get the sale deed registered. She had alsoaccepted in her evidence that she had issued notice only afterknowing that the first defendant had proposed to sell the suitproperty in favour of the second defendant. She had also admitted https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ that the second defendant inspected the suit property beforepurchase. These evidence of the plaintiff and her demand madethereon would go to show that she was not ready with balance moneyof Rs.24,900/- during the period of one year fixed in between theparties for execution of the sale deed and even thereafter. Thepleading and the evidence of the plaintiff are varied in theseaspect. Apart from that, the plaintiff in order to show herreadiness and willingness should have made her objections byproducing the agreement before the Sub Registrar in order to showher presence instead of attesting other persons documents. As perevidence, the first defendant was said to have badly in need ofmoney. If really the plaintiff was ready to pay the balance amounton 02.09.1991, he would have executed the sale deed in favour of theplaintiff herself but he was not paid with the balance money ofRs.24,900/- by the plaintiff and therefore, the agreement enteredinto between the plaintiff and the first defendant was not honoured.The omission to have the stamp papers ready on hand for theexecution of sale deed and the failure to show that she waspossessed money in hand on that day i.e., on 02.09.1991 would golong way to show that she was not ready even on 02.09.1991 to whichdate she had called the first defendant to execute the sale deed inher favour. Therefore, this case cannot be considered as anexceptional case in which the readiness and willingness wereconstructively pleaded and proved. Therefore there is no otherwayexcept to find that the plaintiff had miserably failed to complywith the requirement as mentioned under Section 16 (c) of theSpecific Relief Act. Accordingly it cannot be considered as anexceptional case as referred in the Judgment of the Apex Court viz.,(2003) 10 SCC 390 (MANJUNATH ANANDAPPA V. TAMMANASA), to exempt frompleading and proving specifically under Section 16 (c) of theSpecific Relief Act. Therefore, the plaintiff is found failed toshow her readiness and willingness to perform her part of thecontract as per the agreement dated 25.06.1990. It is also foundthat the plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of Section16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act by failing to aver and prove thereadiness and willingness on her part as per its requirement.17. As regards the claim of the second defendant/appellant thathe was the bonafide purchaser for value is concerned, the evidencewould go to show that he knew about the earlier agreement and on theconsent of the plaintiff only, he had purchased the property fromthe first defendant. He had purchased the property on 02.09.1991from the first defendant knowing full well that the agreement forsale Ex.A1 was in existence in between the plaintiff and the firstdefendant. Except the oral evidence that the plaintiff was aconsenting party to the said sale deed in between D1 and D2 nodocument produced to show the consent of the plaintiff. Thedocuments produced by the plaintiff in Ex.A2 and Ex.A3 would go toshow that there was some dispute in execution of sale deed inbetween the plaintiff and the first defendant. We have alreadyfound that the plaintiff was not ready with money to get the saledeed registered in her favour on 02.09.1991 as mentioned in Ex.A2and Ex.A3. The plaintiff had lost her right to get the sale deedexecuted as she was not ready and willing to perform her part of https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ the contract, the sale deed executed by the first defendant infavour of the second defendant could be valid otherwise, but not asa bonafide purchaser.18. Admittedly, the plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.15,000/- tothe first defendant as advance on 25.06.1990. The said amount wasadmittedly with the first defendant from the date of agreement. Ithas been found that the plaintiff is not entitled for specificperformance of the contract. Therefore, it has become obligatory onthe part of the first defendant to return the said amount to theplaintiff. However, the lower court had decreed the suit forspecific performance and therefore, it had not passed any orderregarding the advance amount. Since the decree passed in favour ofthe plaintiff is found not sustainable and set aside by it hasbecome necessary for this Court to pass an order of refund of thesaid amount of Rs.15,000/- by the first defendant to the plaintiffwith subsequent interest. Since the said amount was payable on thedate of sale in favour of the second defendant executed by the firstdefendant, the said amount with accrued interest shall be paid bythe first defendant with a charge created over the suit property.Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to have the refund of advanceof Rs.15,000/- with interest at 9% p.a. on and from 02.09.1991 tillthe date of decree and thereafter, with subsequent interest. Thesuit property shall be held as charge for the due payment of thedecree amount. These points are decided accordingly.19. Point No.3:- For the foregoing discussions, the appeal isallowed and the decree for specific performance passed by the lowerCourt is set aside and consequently, the decree for payment for asum of Rs.15,000/- with interest at 9% p.a. from 02.09.1991 till thedate of decree and thereafter with subsequent interest onRs.15,000/- shall be paid by the first defendant to the plaintiffwith proportionate cost in the suit. In the circumstances, there isno order as to cost in the appeal.20. In fine, the appeal is allowed and the decree for specificperformance passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Tirupattur inO.S.No.254 of 1991 is set aside and consequently, the decree forpayment for a sum of Rs.15,000/- with interest at 9% p.a. from02.09.1991 till the date of decree and thereafter withsubsequent interest on Rs.15,000/- shall be paid by the firstdefendant to the plaintiff with proportionate cost in the suit. Inthe circumstances, there is no order as to cost in the appeal.VriSd/Asst.Registrar/true copy/Sub Asst.Registrar https://hcservices.ecourts.gov.in/hcservices/ ToThe Subordinate Judge,Tirupattur,North Arcot Ambedkar District.+ 1 cc to Mr. A. K. Kumarasamy, Advocate, SR No.1015+ 1 cc to Mr. A. Saravanavel, Advocate, SR No.316 JUDGMENTIN A.S.Nos.867 of 1993MBS(CO)SR/16.2.2009