The State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Narayan Ramdas Chavan

Judgment

1. This   appeal   by   the   State   is   against   the   judgment   of acquittal   vide   the   judgment   and   order   dated   5th  March   1991 passed by the learned Special Judge, Kolhapur in Special Case No.4   of   1988   acquitting   the   respondent   of   the   offences punishable under Section 161 Indian Penal Code and Sections * 2 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.   During the period 17th  May 1985 to 16th June 1986, the respondent was working as a Civil Surgeon at CPR Hospital, Kolhapur. According  to  the  prosecution, during that period, he had, by abusing his position as a public servant and   the   head   of   Health   Department   in   the   district,   obtained illegal   gratification   other   than   legal   remuneration   by   corrupt means.

2. The details of the prosecution case are as follows : One   Maruti   (PW­8),   a   labourer,   while   serving   as   the   Head Moulder in Bharat Cement Pipes Company, Shiroli met with an accident, in which he lost his right hand thumb and index finger resulting into permanent disability.   The factory owner, Deelip Lagade (PW­9) had got Maruti admitted to the hospital of Dr. Shahapurkar (PW­7) on the same day.   In the hospital, Maruti was treated by Dr. S.D. Khot, an expert (PW­5).  Dr. Khot had issued   certificate   (Exhibit   27)   dated   6th  May   1986   to   Maruti certifying that Maruti had suffered permanent disability to the extent of 30%.     One Sudama (PW­2, the complainant) cousin brother   of   Maruti,   who   was   at   the   relevant   time   serving   in * 3 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 Central Police Force had been to village Ninche to see Maruti. Both   Maruti   and   Sudama   felt   that   the   correct   extent   of permanent disability of Maruti was of 40%.     Therefore, on 6th June 1986, both met the respondent at his bungalow and showed him the certificate issued by Dr. Khot.   The first response of the respondent   to   the   certificate   was   that   it   showed   inflated disability of 30% and that the actual disability was of  only 5%. The   respondent,   however,   assured   to   issue   certificate   of   40% disability for payment of sum of Rs.600/­.  He asked Sudama to come   with   the   money   on   13th  June,   1986.     But,   Maruti   was unable to collect that amount by 13th June, 1986.  He could get the amount by borrowing from one Jagannath (P.W.6) on 18th June,   1986.   On   very   day   Sudama   and   Maruti   went   to   CPR Hospital.   Sudama asked Maruti to wait near the hospital and he   himself   reached   the   office   of   Anti­Corruption   Bureau   and lodged   the   complaint   at   Exhibit­6   with   P.I.   Mandlik   (P.W.17). He produced the Medical Certificate at Exhibit­27 issued by Dr. Khot to Maruti.

3. After   recording   the   complaint,   P.W.17   made   all   the arrangements for laying a trap.  He collected 2 panch witnesses, * 4 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 Sharad Tipugade (P.W.3) and one Satish  Karekar and narrated the incident to them.  He identified Sudama and prepared a plan to trap the  respondent.   The  currency  notes  of Rs.600/­ were marked by sprinkling   with   anthracene powder.   The pre­trap panchanama (Exhibit­30) was prepared.  After completing all the formalities   and   after   giving   suitable   instructions   to   all   the panchas and the complainant, the raiding party  reached CPR Hospital.   Sudama   &   P.W.3­panch,   Tipugade   also   reached   the hospital   separately.   They   alongwith   Maruti   entered   the residential premises of the respondent. Maruti and the  raiding party remained outside.  Sudama and panch, Tipugade entered the bungalow into a waiting room where 4 to 5 patients were waiting.  The respondent was busy with examination of  patients in   his   examination   room.       After   all   the   patients   left   when Sudama   and   panch   Tipugade   were   alone,   they   entered     the patients examination room, where the respondent was sitting at his table. After the initial pleasantries, when Sudama handed over   the   disability   certificate,   the   respondent   demanded   an amount of Rs.600/­ from him.  Sudama took out the amount with his right hand and kept the six marked currency notes of Rs. * 5 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 100/­ denomination on the table just in front of the respondent. Thereafter, the respondent wrote a fresh certificate  (Exhibit­28) certifying   40%   disability   of   Maruti   and   also   modified   the certificate   issued   by   Dr.   Khot   (Exhibit­27)   by   altering   the disability   from   30%   to   40%.     He   handed   over   both   the certificates   to   Sudama   who   took   them   and   left   the   room. Sudama handed over both the certificates to Maruti and gave the predetermined signal to the waiting raiding party.

4. In the meantime, panch­Tipugade who was posing as P.B. Kamble   feigned   stomach   ache.     The   respondent   therefore examined him.  When he was writing the case papers for panch Tipugade, the raiding party came inside.  P.I. Mandlik (P.W.17) disclosed his identity to the respondent and seized from the table of the respondent, marked currency notes (Exhibit­31) and the stamp   pad.     He   also   seized   a   currency   note   of   Rs.   50/­ denomination from one of the case­papers on the table.   Then post­trap panchanama (Exhibit­32) was prepared in the presence of   panchas.     Thereafter   on   completing   all   the   necessary formalities   P.W.17   lodged   a   detailed   report   with   Lakshmipuri

Police  Station  vide  Exhibit­77 and  FIR came  to  be  registered * 6 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 vide Crime no.82 of 1986.

5. During the investigation, it was found that the respondent habitually   accepts   illegal   gratification   for   issuing   various certificates. Therefore, the statements of P.W.  10 Sou. Anusaya Shankar  Patil,    P.W.  11  Shri.  Ganpat  Bhau Dange,    P.W.  12 Shri.   Ananda   Ramchandra   Sutar,   P.W.   13   Shri.   Nanasaheb Laxman Suryavanshi, P.W. 14 Shri. Shirish Rupchand Gandhi, and   P.W.   15   Shivaji   Parasu   Jogi   were   recorded.   There   were further reports lodged by these persons against the respondent. After completion of the investigation, the papers were forwarded to D.C.P. Anti Corruption Bureau, Pune for obtaining necessary sanction from the Government of Maharashtra to prosecute the respondent. The sanction was  received vide Exh. 35.

6. The   prosecution   examined   in   all   17   witnesses   to   bring home   the   guilt   of   the   respondent.   P.W.1     Shri.   Gulab   Husen Chandsaheb is the surveyor from the City Survey Office who had drawn the map of scene of offence. The map is at Exh. 23. P.W.2 is the complainant Shri. Sudam Narayan Kambale who had filed the   complaint   at   Exh.   26.     P.W.   3     Shri.   Sharad   Laxman Tipugade  is   a pancha of pre­trap panchanama at Exh. 30 and * 7 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 trap   panchanama   at   Exh.   32.   He   is   also   a   panch   for   sealed articles at Exh. 33. P.W.4 and P.W. 5 are the government officers who   were   concerned   with   the   sanction   granted   by   the Government   to   prosecute   the   respondent.   P.W.5   is   Dr. Shivprasad   Dattatraya   Khot   who   had   examined   and   operated upon Maruti Kambale, Shri. Jagannath Yallappa Kamble PW 6 is cousin brother of Sudama who had advanced loan of Rs.600/­ to   Sudama.   P.W.7  Shri.   Prakash   Shripad   Shahapurkar   is   the doctor in whose hospital Maruti was admitted and treated.  P.W. 8   is   Maruti   himself.   P.W.   9   is   Dilip   Shrikant   Ladage,   the employer of Maruti. P.W. 10 to P.W.15 are the other persons who had   identical   grievance   against   the   respondent.   P.W.17   is   the Investigating   Officer.   Dr.   Mule,   Deputy   Director   of   Health department for Kolhapur at the relevant time, was examined as the Court witness.

7. Respondent   pleaded   to   be   innocent   to   the   charges.   He claimed to  have been falsely implicated in the case. According to him, the entire case was   planned against him because of his rivalry with the then District Superintendent of Police and the doctors   of CPR hospital. He alleged that the doctors of CPR * 8 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 Hospital   had   made   grievance   in   writing   against   him   to   the Chief Minister on 11th June, 1986.     The enquiry report held that  the respondent  used  to   behave in   rude    and insulting manner   with   his   doctor   colleagues.   According   to   respondent sanction   was,   therefore,   accorded   by   the   authority   with prejudiced mind.

8. In the impugned judgment, the trial court framed seven points   of   determination.   The   first   two   points   are   about   the respondent   being   a   public   servant   and   the   validity   of   the sanction granted to prosecute him. For the reasons stated in the impugned   order,   the   first   two   points   were   answered   in   the affirmative. In the absence of a challenge to these findings, the same must be accepted as proved. The last two points framed are formal in nature. The points for determination on merits of the case at  serial no. 3, 4 and 5 read as follows : "3. Do the prosecution prove that the accused habitually accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain   for   himself   any   gratification   other   than   legal remuneration   as   a   motive,   or   reward   from   different persons?

4.   Do the prosecution prove that the accused by corrupt or illegal means abusing his position  as a public servant obtained   for   himself   a   pecuniary   advantage   of   Rs.600/­ from complainant, Rs.100/­ from Nanasaheb Suryawanshi * 9 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 and Rs.1600/­ from Shivaji Jogi?

5.     Do the prosecution prove that the accused being a public servant obtained from complainant Sudam Rs.600/­ Nanasaheb   Suryawanshi   Rs.100/­   and     Shivaji   Jogi   Rs. 1600/­   for   himself   as   a   gratification   other   than   legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing an official act in exercise of his official functions?" All the three points came to be answered in the negative in the impugned judgment. With these findings, the trial court acquitted the respondent of the offences punishable under Section 161 Indian Penal Code and under Section 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(d) read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

9. The   State   challenges   the   impugned   judgment   and   order contending inter­alia that the same is perverse in as much as the finding of fact is contrary to the evidence on record. It also contends that the entire judgment is based on mere conjectures and surmises.

10. Before   entering   into   the   arena   of   dispute,   it   will   be convenient   to   take   note   of   the   undisputed   facts   of   the   case. Paragraph­12 of the impugned Judgment, records some of the facts as undisputed facts. The same  read as under : "12.........   It   is   not   disputed   that,   PW   8   Maruti Kamble Exh. 45, is a brother of complainant Sudama PW   2.   It   is   also   not   challenged   that,   said   Maruti * 10 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 Kamble was working as a Head Moulder in Bharat Cement Pipe Company owned by PW 9 Dilip Lagade and unfortunately met with an accident to   13­3­86 while   discharging   his   duty.   it   is   also   no   where disputed that, said Maruti lost his right hand thumb and the index finger was also damaged and turned disable, because of  the fatal accident. It is admitted by both the sides that, immediately after the incident said Maruti Kamble was admitted to the hospital of P.W. 7 Dr. Shahapurkar and was treated by PW 5 Dr. Khot.   It   is   an   admitted   fact   that,   Dr.   Khot   gave treatment to said Maruti vide case papers Exh. 37 to 40 and issued a certificate to Exh. 27 alleging  30% disability. The carbon copy of Exh. 27 is at Exh. 41 filed by Dr. Khot. There is no dispute that, in the hospital   for   Dr.   Shahapurkar   said     Maruti   took treatment  and the case paper Exh. 44 is pertaining to the treatment given to said Maruti Kamble." The above facts remain undisputed event today.

11. Perusal of the record however shows that there are further facts which are not controverted by the  respondent. They relate to the fact of   the trap laid by Anti Corruption Bureau   and recovery of marked currency notes of Rs.600/­ from the table of the respondent during the trap. Response of the respondent to questions   no.   44,51,   52,   54,   55,   58   to   61,   67   and   74   in   his statement   under   section   313   of   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure supports  these facts.  The record shows that the respondent has in fact tried to explain the marked currency notes found on his * 11 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 table by saying that the same were kept there by P.W.2 behind his   back.   Therefore,   these   facts   can   also   be   safely   taken   as admitted facts.

12. The   dispute   then   remains     about   the   demand   of   bribe made to P.W.2 earlier as well as on the date of the trap and actual acceptance of the money in fulfillment of the demand. The dispute is also about the statements in evidence by the other persons i.e. P.W.10 to P.W.15 in respect of the complaints lodged by them of similar incidents that had taken place earlier. In the circumstances, the only evidence that needs to be scrutinised in depth   in   the   appeal   is   the   evidence   of   Sudama   (P.W.2)   the complainant, P.W. 3  panch Tipugade and P.W.10 to P.W.15.

13. As   regards   the   demands   made   earlier,   the   prosecution evidence consists of deposition of P.W.2 and P.W.8. The relevant portion of evidence of P.W.2 reads as under : "......... On 6.6.86 at noon, I went to a cabin where accused   Dr.   Chavan   used   to   sit   in   a     Government hospital. I was told there that the accused is at his bungalow and I can meet him there. I went to the bungalow   and   met   with   accused   Dr.   Chavan.   I showed the certificate issued by  Dr. Khot to accused doctor   Chavan.   After   seeing   the   certificate   of   Dr. Khot the accused said that it is a case of 5%. The accused said that how Dr. Khot issued a certificate of 30%. I asked the accused that a thumb  of my brother * 12 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 is already cut and other finger is dead and therefore, how he should work.  The accused Doctor said to me that I should give him Rs.600/­ and he would issue a certificate of 40%. I said to Dr. Chavan that I am going to collect  the amount. The accused asked me to come   on   13th.   Thereafter   Dr.   Chavan   asked   me where I am serving. I told him that I am serving in C.R.P." The only question on this evidence  in the cross examination of the witness was whether the witness has stated in his complaint as well in his statement that on 6th June, 1986  he had first gone to   Government   Hospital   and   thereafter   to   the   bungalow   of   the respondent. It was not even suggested to the witness that on 6th June, 1986 he and P.W.8 had not met the respondent and no talk as alleged   had   taken   place.     The   above   evidence   of     P.W.2   is   fully corroborated by P.W.8.  The cross­examination of P.W.8 was limited to giving suggestions that the respondent did not demand Rs.600/­ from P.W.2 and he did not call them on 13th. Both the suggestions were   stoutly   denied.   Thus   the   evidence   of   PW   2   and   PW   8 establishes   beyond   reasonable   doubt   the   demand   made   by   the respondent  on 6th June, 1986. This aspect is seen to be completely ignored by the trial court.

14. Coming to the evidence of the prosecution for the incident of trap on 16th June, 1986, the material witnesses are PW 2 and * 13 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 PW 3. As already seen above, all the facts relating to laying of the trap are undisputed and the dispute  is limited to what had transpired when PW 2 and PW 3 were with the respondent at the relevant time. Since the impugned judgment at some places observes   that   there   is   variance   in   the   evidence   of   the   two witnesses, it will be worthwhile to quote the relevant evidence. P.W. 2  Examination­in­chief : "I   and   Tipugade   entered   in   the   bungalow.   We   both entered in a  room which is meant as a waiting room for the   patients.   There   were   4­5   patients   in   that   room. There   is   one   room   touching   to   this   room   for   the examination of the patients. The accused Doctor was in patients   examination   room.   After   examination   of   the patients I and Tipugade entered in the room of patients. In that room the accused doctor was on a chair. We said Namaskar to the accused Doctor immediately entering in the room. The accused doctor demanded the certificate issued by Dr. Khot to me. The accused made enquiries from me about  Tipugade. I said to the accused that he is  in my relation.  The accused asked me why I failed to see him on 13th. I said to the accused  that today I came there. The accused enquired from me whether I brought the amount. The accused asked me about the quantum of amount  brought   by me. The  accused  doctor  demanded the   amount   from   me.   The   accused   gone   through   the contents   of   the   certificate   issued   by   Dr.   Khot.   The accused asked me how much percent I required. I said to the accused that I want 40%. accused doctor demanded Rs.600/­ from me. The accused said to me that I should pay Rs.600/­ and he would issue a certificate of 40%. I took out Rs.600/­ from my pocket with my right hand and kept them on the table of the accused. Thereafter the   accused   wrote   one   certificate     stamped   it   and * 14 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 thereafter   signed   it.   Thereafter   the   accused   wrote something   on   the   certificate   issued   by   Dr.   Khot.   The accused   put   his   stamp   and   signed   on   the   certificate issued by Dr. Khot. Exh. 28 is a certificate issued and signed   by   the   accused.   The   accused   put   his   seal   and signature   on   the   back   side   of   Exh.   27.   The   accused handed   over   Exh.   27   and   Exh.   28   certificates   to   me. While coming out along with two certificates the accused advised me to take zerox copies of both the certificates. Panch Tipugade remained   in the room of the accused and I alone came outside."

15. In the cross examination after suggesting to the witness that there was no demand made by the respondent it was put to him that he had kept the amount on the table by  entering in the room when the respondent was examining PW 3 and that it   was   kept   there   behind   the   back   of   the   respondent.   The suggestions were denied. Then an explanation was sought him   for   not   placing   the   money   in   the   hands   of   the respondent. P.W.2 explained that   the certificates of disability handed over by him  were in the hands of the respondent and therefore, he kept the amount on table. P.W.­3 examination­in­chief : "........... I and the complainant went in the bungalow to the room assigned for examination of the patient. There was   separate   room   of     the   accused   to   examine   the patients.   There   was   separate   waiting   room   for   the patients.   There   were   4­5   patients   in   that   room.   No patient   came   there,  after   us.   After   examination   of   the * 15 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 patients I and the complainant entered in the  room for examination of the patients. We both gave our regards to the accused. The accused was on the chair. We both stood in front of the table of the   accused. The accused after seeing   me   asked     the   complainant   who   am   I.   The complainant   said   that   I   am   his   relative.   The   accused demanded the certificate from the complainant to see it. The complainant took out a certificate from the right side pocket of his pant and handed over it to the accused. The accused  asked the complainant why he failed to visit him on  13th. The complainant said that he came today. The accused   enquired   from   the   complainant   whether   he brought the amount and how much he has brought. The complainant said that he has Rs.600/­. The accused said to the complainant to give.  The complainant took out the currency notes of Rs.600/­ with powder from his left side pocket with his right hand and kept the money on the table of the accused. The accused asked the complainant whether   he   had   been   with   the   patient   on   day   before yesterday.   The   complainant   replied   in   the   affirmative. The accused asked the complainant how much percentage he required. The complainant said that he needs 40 per cent.   The   accused   recorded   his   certificate   on   his   own letter   pad,   stamped   it   and   then   signed   on   it.   That certificate  is   at   Exh.  28.  Thereafter  the   accused   wrote something   on   the   certificate   Exh.   27   and   signed   on   it after  putting his stamp. The back side of Exh. 27 bears the signature of the accused. The accused returned those two certificates to the complainant, who took  them in his left hand. When the complainant was   coming out from the   room   of   examination   of   patients,   the   accused, instructed   him   to   have   a   zerox   copies   of     those certificates. The complainant went out of  that room." P.W. 3 further deposed that then he told the respondent that he had stomach ache. The respondent therefore examined him. Thereafter when   the  respondent  was  at  his  table  and PW3 was standing * 16 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 near   the   table,   the   raiding   party   and   the   other   panch   entered   the room.   The   cross   examination   of   this   witness   is   limited   to   giving suggestions   that   what   he   had   stated   was   not   correct.   All   such suggestions were denied by him.

16. The   evidence   of   P.W.2   and   P.W.3   quoted   above   exhibits consistency in almost every aspect. Both P.W.2 and P.W.3, on perusal of   their   evidence   are   seen   to   be   trustworthy   witnesses.   There   is nothing   in   their   entire   evidence   to   suggest   that   they   are   speaking falsehood.   Both   the   witnesses   have   stated   that   they   entered   the examination   room   of   the   respondent   together.   At   that   time,   the respondent was sitting at the table. He first demanded the certificate for disability from PW 2. Then he enquired about the  quantity of the amount   brought   by   PW   2.   PW   2   told   him   that       it   was   Rs.600/­. Respondent then demanded the money. The money was kept on the table   by   PW   2.   Thereafter,   the   respondent   modified   the   disability certificate   issued   by   Dr.   Khot   and   also   issued   a   fresh   disability certificate certifying permanent disability of P.W.8 as of 40%. The two certificates then were handed over by the respondent to P.W.2 after which PW 2 left the room.

17.  Evaluation of the above record and evidence of the witnesses by * 17 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 the learned trial Judge has resulted into his holding that the evidence of P.W.2 is not corroborated by P.W.3.  According to him, the evidence of these two witnesses exhibits "material irregularities, improbabilities as well as unnatural behaviour".  He found the prosecution case to be absurd   and   unbelievable   and   accepted   the   argument   of   the   defence that the money was "planted" by P.W.2.   The learned Judge is also seen to have drawn upon his general knowledge on how an educated person holding a high government post would behave.

18.  The reason given by the trial Court for holding that the evidence of   P.W.2   is   not   corroborated   by   the   evidence   of   P.W.3   is   that   the sequences   of   a   couple   of   statements   made   by  the   witnesses   do   not match.  The trial court does not find any contradiction in terms or any glaring   omission   in   the   evidence   of   the   two   witnesses.     What   is disapproved is the lack of sequence in the statements.  The sequence missed is also not in respect of any facts in issue.  The first sequence missed   is   in   respect   of   the   enquiry   by   the   respondent   about   the identity of PW 3 and the demand of the certificates of disability issued by Dr. Khot.  As per the deposition of P.W.2, first the certificate was demanded and then enquiries about P.W.3 made, whereas, P.W.3 has stated   that   the   enquiry   about   him   was   made   first   and   then   the * 18 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 certificate demanded. The second difference in the sequence is about keeping of the marked currency notes demanded by the respondent on the table by PW.2 and the talk regarding percentage of disability.  As per the evidence of PW 2 the amount was kept on the table after the discussion on the percentage of disability took place between PW 2 and the respondent whereas the testimony of PW 3 is that the amount was kept on the table before the discussions.   It is thus seen that, the sequence missed is not in respect of any fact in issue. It is in respect of some peripheral facts and nothing can turn upon  the difference  in the sequence mentioned.  It is also to be noted that cross­examination of the witnesses does not touch upon the sequence of those details of the conversation   between   P.W.2   and   the   respondent.   Based   on   the difference in the sequence of statements, the learned Judge draws one more astonishing inference and that is of doubting the very presence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 at the time of the trap.  The trial court observes "If at all panch Tipugade and Sudama both were present  there,  then there should not have been contradiction in the testimony of both regarding the happenings in the patient's examination room since both  entered therein."  This observation is patently perverse.

19. The   only   sequence   that   would   be   material,   in   the   facts   and * 19 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 circumstances   of   the   case,   is   about     handing   over   of   the   disability certificate  by PW 2 and  placing of money on the table by him. This sequence   is   material   because   PW   2   in   his   cross   examination   has explained   that   he   did   not   place   the   marked   currency   notes   in   the hands of   the respondent, because at that time the respondent was holding the  disability certificates in his  hand.   On the sequence  of these happenings, both the witnesses are unanimous in statements.

20.  The trial court next finds fault with the act of P.W.2 in placing the marked currency notes on the table and not in the hands of the respondent.  It comments, that going by the human nature whenever a person demands money, he just extends his hand forward to receive the money.  Therefore, it at all a demand was made by the respondent, he would have extended his hand and the money would have been placed in his hand.  There was no need for P.W.2 to keep the money on table. According to the trial court, keeping the money on table amounts to "material   irregularity", “ improbability”,   as   well   as,   unnatural “ behaviour” of P.W.2, particularly, when such were not the instructions to him either from the respondent or P.W.17, the officer from the Anti­ Corruption Bureau.   As regards the explanation given by P.W.2 for keeping the money on table, the same has been rejected solely on the * 20 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 ground that it does not find mention in the statement recorded by the police on 17th  June, 1986.   The trial Court did not even venture to consider it's probability.

21. The trial Court disbelieved the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3, that the respondent had asked P.W.2 whether he had come with the patient on 13th June.  Also that the respondent had twice enquired  about the money   and   asked   as   to   how   much   was   the   amount   brought.     For disbelieving   this   evidence,   the   trial   Court   draws   upon   it’s   general knowledge.   At paragraphs  20 and  23 of  the judgment, it  observes thus: "20.....A well educated person like the accused, working in the high office of the Government, fully   knowing a fact that, the complainant did not turn to him on 13th would not definitely ask him, whether he had been with a   patient   on   13th.     Again   a   well   educated   man   like accused would never enquire twice whether he brought the amount, how much be brought it, and thereafter he would never say to say Rs.600/­ to him, and thereafter I will   issue   a   certificate   to   him.     The   successive   events came from the mouth of Sudam and his natural conduct, clearly   reveals   that   his   testimony   his   full   of improbabilities, and therefore it should not be relied." "23....If   at   all   the   accused   would   have   demanded   on 6.6.86, Rs.600/­ then the accused would not have asked him about the quantum, but he would have asked him whether he brought the amount of Rs.600/­.   Thus the very   version   of   panch,   Tipugade   and   Sudam   is   thus seems to be improbable and absurd.  The accused is not a layman but on the contrary he is a well educated and * 21 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 popular   medical   expert,   having   no   leisure   for   chit­ chatting with a common man.   When the patients are there   waiting   for   examination   and   treatment,   had   the accused would kill time in talking with the complainant like Sudam, on silly matters.  The very testimony of both is thus obviously improbable."

22. There   are   other   reasons   also   given   by   the   trial   Court   to disbelieve the prosecution.  It says when the first demand for money was made by the respondent on 6th  June, 1986 there was no need for him to give specific date of 13th June to P.W.2.  He could have asked   him   to   come   on   any   date   after   collecting   the   amount. Secondly,   it   says   that   there   was   no   question   of   the   respondent demanding illegal gratification to issue certificate showing 40% of physical disability since P.W.8 had actually sustained disability to that extent.   The illegal gratification could have been demanded only for issuing a false certificate.  The Court has next doubted the evidence of P.W. 6, Jagannath from whom P.W.2 had borrowed the amount of Rs.600/­ on the ground that the fact is not disclosed in his statement recorded by the police.  According to the trial Court, the evidence of P.W.6 is an attempt at improvement on the part of the prosecution.

23. In order to accept the defence of  planting” the trial Court at “ paragraph­19 says  Non­payment of the bribe amount in the hands “ * 22 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 of the accused on his immediate demand is a material circumstance which   resulted   the   prosecution  case   into   improbability,  absurdity and the theory of plantation is therefore very well developed by the accused in the defence.”   Later, at paragraph­24 of the judgment, the trial Court has apparently tried to reconstruct the prosecution case to accept the defence.   It comments that the officers of the Anti­Corruption   Bureau     are   known   to   be   swift   in   action   while conducting raid.   After receiving the pre­determined signal, they quickly reach the spot without wasting time.  Therefore, if the word of P.W.2 and P.W.3 is to be believed that P.W.2 went out of the room after receiving the certificates and signalled the waiting officers, they   would   have   found   him   examining   P.W.3   who   had   feigned stomach ache.  The officers instead found him at his table writing the case papers of P.W.3.  The trial Court then speculates that the respondent must have taken at least 3 to 5 minutes to examine P.W.3, thereafter washed his hands, come to his table and started writing the case papers.   Therefore, there was sufficient time for P.W.2 to sneak in as soon as P.W.3 was taken to the examination table, to keep the amount on the table and get out of the room to signal the raiding party.  With this flight of imagination, the trial * 23 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 Court   holds   that   The   amount   must   have   been   kept   without “ knowledge   of   the   accused   when   he   was   duly   engaged   and concentrating on examination of a patient.”  The imagination goes further into saying that since there was a tray for papers kept on the right side of the table of the respondent, the bribe must have been kept either under the tray or inside the papers in the tray, so as to not make it immediately visible to the respondent.  The third reason given by the trial Court for believing the defence of planting is the conduct of P.W.3 in remaining with the respondent after P.W. 2 left the room.   It says that since P.W.3 was not instructed to remain   behind   with   the   respondent,   he   acted   contrary   to   the instructions given by P.W.17 to him.  Therefore, he is not a reliable witness   and  his  this   conduct  proves  the  defence   of   plantation”. “ According to the trial Court, P.W.3 waited there pretending to have stomach ache with sole intention of giving an opportunity to P.W.2 to keep the bribe amount on the table.

24. The trial Court appears to be impressed by the conduct of the respondent which according to it establishes his innocence.  He was calm   and   unruffled.     The   respondent   on   being   asked   about   the money on the table stated that P.W.2 did not give him the amount * 24 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 but   somebody   kept   the   amount   on   the   table.   The   trial   Court observes that if at all the respondent had accepted the money, there would  have been some fear on his face or some difficulty in his expression.

25. It will be necessary at this stage, before expressing opinion on reassessment of the evidence, as also, assessment of the impugned judgment, to notice the scope of this court’s powers under Sections 378   and   386   Criminal   Procedure   Code.   Mr.   Gupte,   the   learned Senior Counsel, submits that the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court must be given the greatest consideration and this Court must be very slow in upsetting  that judgment.   He relies upon   the   latest   decision   of   the   Apex   Court   in  State   of   Uttar Pradesh V/s. Ram Sajivan, reported in (2010) 1 SCC page 539 . In   the   decision   cited,   the   Apex   Court   has   restated   the   legal principles   to   be   followed   while   dealing   with   appeal   against   the judgment of acquittal.   Mr. Gupte, submits that, over a period of time, there has been a substantial change in the approach of the courts   in   this   area.     The   courts   have   moved   from   the   earlier approach of requirement of good and sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome   reasonable   doubts   to   a   much   stricter   approach   of   very * 25 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 substantial  and  compelling  reasons.  After   considering  its   various decisions from the time of Tulsiram Kanu V. State reported in AIR 1954 SC page 1  to the latest decision in  State of U.P. V/s. Bame   reported   in   (2009)   4   SCC   271,   the   Apex   Court   at paragraph­58 summarized the legal position   and enumerated the circumstances, which are illustrative and not exhaustive, that would justify interference in the judgment of acquittal of High Court.  As regards   the   judgment   of   acquittal   of   the   trial   Court,   the   legal position   is   summarized   at   paragraph­57   and   the   same   reads   as follows :­

57. “ In Ghurey Lal V/s. State of U.P. reported in (2008) 10 SCC page 450, one of us (Bhandari, J.) summarised the legal position as follows in paras 69 and 70 (SCC p.477) The   following  principles   emerge  from  the   cases “ 69. above :

1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re­appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law.

2.   The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.   The   accused   possessed   this   presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal   bolsters   the   presumption   that   he   is innocent. * 26 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011

3.       Due or proper weight and consideration must be   given   to   the   trial   court's   decision.   This   is especially   true   when   a   witness'   credibility   is   at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that trial court was wrong.

70.     In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate   courts   should   follow   the   well   settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal:

1.     The   appellate   court   may   only   overrule   or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i)  The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii)   The   trial   court's   decision   was   based   on   an erroneous view of law; iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv)     The   entire   approach   of   the   trial   court   in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v)   The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi)    The trial court has ignored the evidence * 27 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 or   misread   the   material   evidence   or   has ignored material   documents   like   dying declarations/report of the Ballistic expert, etc. vii)   This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

2.   The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court.

3.   If two reasonable views can be reached ­ one that leads   to   acquittal,   the   other   to   conviction   ­   the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.” The above are the principles against which the impugned judgment is required to be assessed.

26. It would also be necessary to refer at this stage, to the relevant provisions of Section 161 Indian Penal Code (at it stood prior to its repeal by Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988).  Section Section 5(1)(a) and   Section   5(1)(d)   of   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1947,   the penal provisions and Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 prescribing presumption. “ S.161.   Public   Servant   taking   gratification   other than  legal  remuneration    in  respect  of  an  official act.­  Whoever, being or expecting to be a public servant, accepts   or   obtains,   or   agrees   to   accept,   or   attempts   to obtain   from   any   person,   for   himself;   or   for   any   other person,   any   gratification   whatever,   other   than     legal remuneration,   as   a   motive   or   reward   for   doing   or forbearing   to   do   any   official   act,   or   for   showing   or * 28 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour   or   disfavour   to   any   person,   or   for   rendering   or attempting   to   render   any   service   or   disservice   to   any person,   with   the   Central   or   any   State   Government   or Parliament  or the  Legislature  of  any  State or with  any local   authority,   corporation   or   Government   Company referred to in Sec.21 or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. “ Explanation:­  Expecting   to   a   public   servant.   If   a person   not   expecting   to   be   in   office   obtains   a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty   of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. “ “ Gratification”.­   The   word   gratification”   is   not restricted   to   pecuniary   gratifications,   or   to gratifications estimable in money. “ “ Legal remuneration.” The words  legal remuneration” are   not   restricted   to   remuneration   which   a   public servant   can   lawfully   demand,   but   include   all remuneration   which   he   is   permitted   by   the Government, which he serves, to accept. “ “ A motive or reward for doing.”­ A person who receives a gratification as a motive for doing what he does not intend to do, or as a reward for doing what he has not done, comes within these words.” Sec. 5. Criminal misconduct in discharge of official “ duty­ (1). A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to * 29 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 accept   or   attempts   to   obtain   from   any   person   for himself   or   for   any   other   person,   any   gratification (other   than   legal   remuneration)   as   a   motive   or reward such as is mentioned in Sec.161 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or (b).... (c).... (d). if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing   his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, [or (e)..... “

4.   Presumption   where   public   servant   accepts gratification other than legal remuneration. [1)]   Where   in   any   trial   of   an   offence   punishable under   Sec.161   or   165   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code   (45   of 1860), [or of an offence referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub­section (1) of Sec.5 of this Act punishable under sub­section   (2)   thereof],   it   is   proved   that   an   accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable   thing   from   any   person,   it   shall   be   presumed, unless   the   contrary   is   proved,   that   he   accepted   or obtained, or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said Sec. 161, or as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knowns to be inadequate. [(2)]   Where is any trial of an offence punishable under Sec. 165­A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) [or under Cl.(ii) of sub­section (3) of Sec.5 of this Act], it is   proved   that   any   gratification   (other   than   legal remuneration)  or  any   valuable   thing  has  been  given  or offered to be given or attempted to be given by an accused person,   it   shall   be   presumed,   unless   the   contrary   is proved, that he gave or offered to give or attempted to give * 30 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Sec.161 of the Indian Penal Code, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. (3).  Notwithstanding   anything   contained   in   sub­ sections (1) and (2), the Court may decline to draw the presumption referred to in either of the said sub­sections, if the gratification or thing aforesaid is, in its opinion, so trival that no inference of corruption may fairly be drawn.]

27. I have carefully and minutely gone over the entire evidence and the impugned judgment.   As already observed in the earlier paragraphs,   a   substantial   part   of   the   prosecution   case   goes undisputed.  For whatever little part that can be brought into the realm of dispute, the evidence of the prosecution is consistent and convincing.   Perusal of the notes of evidence shows that there is virtually   no   cross­examination   of   the   witnesses.     The   cross­ examination is  seen to be limited to giving  suggestions that  the statements   made   by   the   witnesses   are   not   either   correct   or   are false.  The witnesses have denied the suggestions.  There is also no apparent reason for P.W.2 to falsely implicate the respondent into any offence.  Though, on behalf of the respondent it was sought to be contended that there were some differences between him and the then District Superintendent  of Police, it would be preposterous  to * 31 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 hold that P.W.2 who is not a part of the Maharashtra police force and   who   had   come   from   outstation   to   visit   his   suffering   cousin would take up a cudgel on behalf of the Superintendent of Police.

28. Perusal   of   the   impugned   judgment   shows   that   the   learned trial Court instead of assessing the entire evidence on the test of the   approach  of   a   prudent   man   has   assessed   it   on  his   personal notions.   He has also picked up every sentence in the deposition separately, twisted and turned it for the purpose of disbelieving it. In the process, he has apparently lost sight of the facts in issue and given unnecessary importance to the statements in evidence which form part of the peripheral details.   It has gone to the extent of doubting the presence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 at the time of the trap which is patently perverse. The Evidence Act, does not provide any method   or   standard   for   judging   the   situation.     It   also   does   not define as to the quantum of evidence that would be required to be adduced   so   as   to  amount   a  fact   to   be   proved.    It   is   left  to  the discretion   of   the   Court   to   judge   the   situation   on   the   facts   and circumstances   of   the   case,   when   after   considering   the   material before   it,   the   Court   either   believes   it   to   exist   or   considers   its existence probable. Under Section 3 of the Evidence Act for holding * 32 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 a fact to be proved or disproved,  the test is whether a prudent man after considering the matters before him, deems it proved or not. Thus   the   Act   adopts   the   requirement   of   the   prudent   man   as appropriate and concrete standard by which to measure the proof. Undoubtedly, the Judge will naturally take aid of his training as a Judge, human experience and judicial sense while arriving at the conclusion whether a fact is proved or disproved, but, while doing so he must act like a prudent or reasonable man.

29. The finding of the trial Court that the marked currency notes must   have   been  kept   at   the   table   without   the   knowledge   of   the respondent when the respondent was at the examination table, is not based on any material on record. The judgment suggests that after   P.W.2   left   the   room   on   receiving   certificates   from   the respondent, he had returned when the respondent was examining P.W.3.  The suggestion given in regard to P.W.2 and P.W.3 in their cross­examination have been denied by them.   The record in fact negates the theory,  The trial Court has noted that there were no instructions from P.W.17 to P.W.3 to remain with the respondent after P.W.2 left the room with the certificate.  P.W.3 had remained on   his   own   and   had   apparently   thought   of   giving   the   excuse   of * 33 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 having stomach ache in order to stay back.  P.W.2, therefore, could not have known that he would get an opportunity to come back into the room for any reason.  It was not even argued on behalf of the defence that there was any preplanning in this regard. It is obvious that this exercise was undertaken by the learned trial Judge for the purpose of anyhow acquitting the respondent.

30. The trial court has taken pains to hold that there was no motive for the respondent to accept any illegal gratification from PW­2.  While saying so, the trial Court has lost sight of Section 4 of the Prevention of   Corruption   Act   quoted   hereinabove.     Ordinarily,   the   prosecution would be liable to prove the motive or reward under Section 161 Indian Penal   Code.     Section   4,   however,   raises   a   presumption   that   the gratification was received by the accused as a motive or reward as mentioned in Section 161 Indian Penal Code.   Section 4(1) of the Act says  that if the prosecution proves that the accused persons are/have accepted or agreed to accept any gratification, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted or agreed to be accepted with   a   corrupt   motive.   This   raises   rebuttable   presumption   and contrary may be proved to  displace  the presumption contained in the section.   Perusal of the record shows that the prosecution had in its * 34 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 written   submissions   made   a   specific   reference   to   the   provision   of Section 4 and the presumption thereunder.  The argument advanced by the prosecution based on Section 4 has not been dealt with by the trial court.   In the circumstances, the entire discussion in the impugned judgment   and   order,   as   regards   non   existence   of   motive   must   be considered as a futile exercise.

31. Mr. Gupte, submits that the prosecution has failed to establish that there was actual acceptance of illegal gratification.   He argues that   placing   of   the   marked   currency   notes   on   the   table   of   the respondent,   cannot   amount   to   acceptance   of   the   same   by   the respondent.     The   currency   notes   ought   to   have   been   placed   in   the hands   of   respondent.     Mr.   Gupte,   relies   upon   decision   of   the   Apex Court in  M.K. Harshan vs. State of Kerala, reported in  (1996) 11 Supreme Court Cases, page 720 to support his submission.  In the facts of the decision cited, the currency notes were put in the drawer of the accused and it was the evidence of the complainant (PW­1) that the money had been put in the drawer at the directions of the accused. It was plea of the accused that he was not in the office prior to 4.00 pm. and he only entered in the office at about 4.00 pm. and when he was   in   his   seat,   the   trap   party   entered   his   office   suggesting   that * 35 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 tainted money must have been put in the drawer of his table without his   knowledge.     The   Apex   Court   found   that   there   were   conflicting versions and suspicious features on this crucial aspect.   PW­11 and PW­8, the vigilance officers, deposed that PW­1 had come out of the office of the accused and told them that the accused had accepted the money and that he had put it in the left drawer of the table.   This evidence suggested that PW­1 had told them that the accused himself had accepted the money and put it in the left drawer of the table. Both these officers further deposed that the accused was asked to dip his right hand in the liquid in the glass and when he did so, it became pink   in   colour.     This   evidence   was   in   complete   contrast   with   the positive case of the prosecution as narrated by PW­1 that the accused never touched the currency notes and it was he, who put them in the table drawer.  In the light of these conflicting versions and suspicious features, the Apex Court held that plea of the accused that the notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, did not appear to be improbable.   The Apex Court further observed  In all such type of “ cases of bribery, two aspects are important.   Firstly, there must be a demand and secondly there must be acceptance in the sense that the accused has obtained the illegal gratification.  Mere demand by itself * 36 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 is not sufficient to establish the offence.  Therefore, the other aspect, namely, acceptance is very important and when the accused has come forward with a plea that the currency notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, then there must be clinching evidence to show that it was with the tacit approval of the accused that the money had been put in the drawer as an illegal gratification.”   The Apex Court observed that since the evidence of PW­1 suffered from infirmities and there was no corroboration of that evidence that the bribe was put in the drawer as directed by the accused, it was difficult to hold that the accused tacitly accepted the illegal gratification or obtained the same within the meaning of Section 5(1))d) of the Act.  The decision in M.K. Harshan’s case has been quoted with approval in another decision of the Apex Court in Banarasi Dass vs. State of Haryana, reported in 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 1608 (S.C.)  relied upon by Mr. Gupte, wherein the   Apex   Court   had   accepted   the   similar   contention   and   held   that there   was   no   evidence   to   prove   voluntary   acceptance   of   the   bribe amount by the accused.   In that case, the prosecution had examined mainly   four   witnesses,   of   which   the   material   witnesses   PW­1   and PW­4   had   turned   hostile   and   were   cross­examined   the   prosecution. PW­2, the complainant had deposed that she had placed the tainted * 37 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 money on the table wherefrom the same was picked up by the Police. PW­4   stated   that   the   accused   had   not   accepted   or   demanded   any money from PW­2, in his presence, whereas PW­10 and PW­11 , the senior officers of the administration and the Police had deposed that the   search   of   person   of   accused   was   conducted   by   the   Police   and tainted money was recovered from the front left pocket of his shirt. The accused however had been convicted by the High Court relying on the statement of PW­10 and PW­11 with recovery of the currency notes from the shirt pocket of the accused.   The Apex Court held that the High Court had fallen in error in drawing inference of demand and receipt   of   illegal   gratification   from   the   fact   that   the   money   was recovered from the accused.

32.Both   the   above   decisions   are   not   applicable   to   the   facts   and circumstances of the present case.  It has already been seen that evidence of PW­2 and PW­3 as regards the demand of illegal gratification and placing of the currency notes on the table in satisfaction of that demand is consistent and convincing.   The trap party had recovered the tainted money from the table of the respondent.  The table was in the patient’s examination room in the residential bungalow of the respondent, which is a private * 38 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 bungalow   and   not   a   public   place.     The   respondent   was   in exclusive possession of the room and had complete dominion over the same.  Nobody could enter the room without his permission. In these circumstances, placing of the money on the table of the respondent as per his directions would amount to acceptance of money by him though he had not actually touched the money by hand.     There   was   also   no   attempt   made   whatsoever   by   the respondent to explain the existence of the marked currency notes on   the   table.     It   was   not   sufficient   for   him   to   contend   that somebody had kept the amount on the table.  A lot has been said about the existence of a curtain next to the table of examination of patients to contend that because of the curtain, the person at the examination table could not have seen anybody entering the room.  However, the evidence on record including the map of the room at Exhibit 23 makes it clear that the curtain did not cause an obstruction to the view of the sitting table. The evidence on record shows that there is a distance of only 5 feet between the examination table and the office table of the respondent.   The examination table was on Northern side of the room and the office table was on the Southern side and the curtain placed was * 39 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 not between the two tables.  This would shows that there was no obstruction whatsoever in the line of vision from the examination table to the office table.  Further the reaction, or rather absence of reaction of the respondent on his return to the table after examining PW­3 is significant.   It is nowhere the case of the respondent that he had not noticed the tainted money kept on his table.   A person completely innocent of the charges would have   naturally   shown   the   reaction   of   surprise   on   seeing   the amount on the table and would have said something about it to PW­3, who was present near the table.  The respondent had kept quiet about the money until the raiding party came in the room.

33.        The respondent has taken his specific defence that he has been falsely implicated in the case at the instance of the then District   Superintendent   of   Police,   Shri  Ulhas   Joshi  and   other doctors   working   in   CPR   Hospital,   Kolhapur.     This   specific defence   has   been   taken   by   him   in   his   written   statement   at Exhibit 85.  In the written statement, the respondent stated that in the year 1985­1986, when he took up charge as Civil Surgeon, Kolhapur,   the   administration   of   CPR   Hospital   was   not   good. When the respondent tried to bring in some changes, to make * 40 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 the administration stricter, it was not liked by the other doctors, who were carrying on private practice.   Therefore, the doctors had on 11th June 1986 made a complaint to the Chief Minister. As   regards,   Mr.   Ulhas   Joshi,   the   respondent   stated   that   the relations between him and Ulhas Joshi were strained on account of a speech given by the respondent, at the time of inauguration of Drug Consulting Centre at CPR Hospital on 27th  November

1985. In his speech, the respondent had stated that there were about 200 to 300 patients of drug abuse in Kolhapur district. According   to   the   written   statement,   from   that   date   onwards, Shri Ulhas Joshi was pestering the respondent with continuous correspondence   as   regards   the   veracity   of   the   statement. Therefore, the respondent was required to make a complaint to D.I.G.,   Shri   Narayan   Swamy.     The   respondent   produced   the entire correspondence between him and Shri Ulhas Joshi along with his written statement.   The respondent, however, has not produced any evidence to establish his deface.   Perusal of the correspondence between the two shows that the same relate only to the extent of drug abuse in Kolhapur district.     It appears that   Mr.   Ulhas   Joshi   had   taken   the   statement   made   by   the * 41 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 respondent seriously and wanted to take some action at his level in   that   regard.     Therefore,   he   had   been   asking   for   some particulars   from   the   respondent.     This   was   not   liked   by   the respondent.

34. It is thus seen that the conclusions of the trial Court with regard to the facts are palpably wrong.  The entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was peculiar and patently illegal.   The trial Court has at some places ignored the evidence on record, at other places,   misread   the   evidence   and   at   times   tried   to   given   some explanation   on   its   own.     Therefore,   the   trial   Court’s   judgment   is manifestly   unjust   and   unreasonable   and   has   resulted   into   grave miscarriage of justice as regards  the charge under Section 5(1)(d) of The Prevention of Corruption Act.

35. This brings me to the charge under Section 5(1)(a) of habitual acceptance of illegal gratification by the respondent.  The evidence of the prosecution in this connection is of P.W.10 to P.W.15.   There are allegations of five instances of acceptance of illegal gratification. The first instance, relates to a certificate to be issued to one Shankar Patil, who was serving as a driver in Kolhapur Municipal Transport. He was suffering from cancer for four years and a certificate was required to * 42 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 state that he was unable to serve any more on account of his health. The witnesses in connection with the first instance are, P.W.10­widow of Shankar Patil and P.W.11­his neighbour.   P.W.10 stated that she alongwith her husband and P.W.11 had been to the respondent for the medical certificate.   Shankar had taken treatment in the hospital of Kolhapur Municipal Corporation, which had issued certificate that he was unfit for duty.  That certificate was required to be endorsed by the respondent.   The  respondent,  however, demanded  Rs.3,000/­   for  the purpose.   P.W.10 therefore had to return without the certificate. This witness could not identify the respondent in the court for which the reason given by her was that, she had seen him only once and that too for   10   to   15   minutes   at   his   bungalow.     P.W.11,   however,   while supporting   the   evidence   of   P.W.10,   identified   the   respondent.     He stated   that   he   had   accompanied   P.W.10   and   her   husband   to   the bungalow of the respondent and narrated the entire incident.

36. The   second   instance,   involves   a   certificate   relating   to   one Ramchandra Sutar, father of P.W.12.   The evidence of P.W.12 is that his father who was serving in the Agricultural College at Kolhapur was suffering from cancer in the year 1986.   He was treated in CPR Hospital, Kolhapur.   As his father was unable to work, P.W.12 had * 43 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 approached the respondent for  unfit certificate” of his father. P.W.12 “ for that purpose had gone to the residence of the respondent.  He had carried all the documents and requested for the certificate.   But, the respondent   initially   demanded   1/4th  of   the   amount   that   would   be received   by   PW­12   on   the   basis   of   the   certificate.     When   P.W.12 expressed his  inability  to pay such a large amount, the respondent reduced   the   demand   initially   to   Rs.3,000/­   and   then   to   Rs.2,000/­. P.W.12   stated   that   thereafter   he   did   not   approach   the   respondent again.   In his cross­examination, it was suggested to P.W.12 that he was   deposing   falsely   against   the   respondent   at   the   instance   of   one Dinkar Kadam, the son­in­law of P.W.17.  P.W.12 denied the suggestion stating that he did not even know Dinkar Kadam.  He stated that he had lodged the complaint with Anti Corruption Bureau after reading the news published in the newspaper about the incident of trap.

37.  The third instance involves PW­13, who in the year 1986 was attached to Shahupur Police Station as ASI.  He had taken treatment in the hospital of his family Doctor, Dr. Kore during the period 25th January 1986 to 26th  April 1986. At the time of discharge from the hospital, Dr. Kore had issued a fitness certificate to him which was required to be  endorsed by the respondent in his capacity as the Civil * 44 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 Surgeon.     Therefore,   on   28th  April   1984,   PW­13   had   been   to   CPR Hospital   to   obtain   counter   signature   of   the   respondent   on   the certificate.     He   met   Mr.   Sawant,   the   Clerk   working   with   the respondent.   The clerk demanded a sum of Rs.100/­ for getting the counter signature and asked him to come between 4.00 pm to 6.00 pm. PW­13   met   Mr.   Sawant   at   about   4.30   pm   and   was   taken   to   the respondent.     When   Mr.   Sawant   told   the   respondent   about   the requirement   of   his   endorsement   on   the   certificate   the   respondent asked him whether the amount had been received.  When Mr. Sawant gave a reply in the affirmative, he put his signature on the certificate. P.W.13 explained in his examination­in­chief that he had not lodged a complaint immediately against the respondent because he was to retire soon after joining the service.  Later, on going through the newspapers, he learnt about the action of the Anti­Corruption Bureau against the respondent and decided to lodge a complaint.

38. The   witness   for   the   fourth   instance   is   P.W.14,   one   Shirish Gandhi.    He   stated   that   in   the   year  1986,  he   was   selected   by  the Maharashtra Public Services Commission for the post of Police Sub­ Inspector.  For joining the new posting, he needed the medical fitness certificate   which  was   to  be  obtained   from  the   Civil   Surgeon  of   the * 45 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 District.   Therefore, on 9th  June, 1986 he went to the CPR Hospital, Kolhapur for the certificate.   He met Mr. Sawant, the clerk working with the respondent.  He was asked to come after two days, since the respondent was out of station.  As per the appointment order received by P.W.14 he was to join the police training college, Nashik on 15th June, 1986.  Therefore, on 13th June, 1986 he visited CPR Hospital at 10 am..   Mr. Sawant took him to the respondent.   On discussing his need,   the   respondent   made   enquiries   about   his   family   background. After knowing that the brother of the witness was carrying on business of   selling   television   sets,   the   respondent   demanded   a   sum   of   Rs. 10,000/­ from him. This witness then, on 16th  June, 1986, made an application   to   the   Superintendent   of   Police,   Kolhapur   seeking permission to submit medical certificate from another district. Since the respondent, the Civil Surgeon of Kolhapur was avoiding to issue him   certificate     On   permission   being   granted,   he   obtained   fitness certificate from the Civil Surgeon, Sangli.

39. As   regards   the   last   instance,   it   relates   to   the   certificate   in respect of one Parsu Jogi, father of P.W.15 who had suffered a paralytic attack.   He was unable to walk and also  speak.   P.W.15 had been temporarily appointed as a peon at Octroi Naka, Municipal Council, * 46 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 Ichalkaranji in the place of his father.   He needed  unfit certificate” “ from   the   Civil   Surgeon   for   the   purposes   of   pension   for   the   father. Sometime,   in   the   month   of   December,   1985   or   the   first   week   of January, 1986 he and his father visited the respondent, who called him   at   his   bungalow   in   the   evening.     There,   at   the   bungalow   the respondent demanded a sum of Rs.3,000/­ for the certificate.   When P.W.15 pleaded that his financial position was not such so as to pay that   much   amount,   the   respondent   had   turned   him   away.     P.W.15 visited him again on a couple of days.  Finally, on 4th February, 1984 the respondent issued the necessary certificate to him after taking an amount of Rs.1600/­.

40. The cross­examination of all the above witnesses was limited to giving suggestions to them, that they had not met the respondent for any certificate and the respondent had not demanded any money from them.  It was also suggested to them that the police had put them up against the respondent.  The suggestions were denied.  The trial judge has disbelieved the evidence of all these witnesses.   It has also held that they were got up witnesses who had filed complaints only at the instance of police.

41. Perusal of the above evidence shows that the acceptance of illegal * 47 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 gratification   alleged   by   these   witnesses   was   only   in   respect   of   the incidence deposed by PW­13 and PW­15.  There is nothing on record to indicate   that   these   witnesses   are   got   up   witnesses   or   are   deposing falsely against the respondent.  However, at the same time, there is no corroboration   of   the   evidence.     In   these   circumstances,   I   am   not inclined to disturb the inference drawn by the trial court in respect of the charge under Section 5(1)(a) and disturb the decision of acquittal.

42. In all the above circumstances, in my view, the impugned order of acquittal of the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 161 Indian Penal Code and 5(1)(d) of The Prevention of Corruption Act is founded on a perverse judicial approach and it cannot be said that the view of acquittal was a possible view.  Therefore, the same cannot be sustained.  At the same time, in my view the charges under Section 5(1)(a)   of   The   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act   are   not   proved   for   the reasons mentioned hereinabove.

43. This brings me to the question of the sentence to be imposed upon   the   respondent   for   the   offence   punishable   under   Section   161 Indian   Penal   Code   read   with   Section   5(1)(d)   of   The   Prevention   of Corruption Act, Mr. Gupte submitted that the incident in the case had taken   place   in   the   year   1986   i.e.   more   than   24   years   back   and * 48 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 requested that no jail sentence be awarded to the respondent and a sentence of fine alone would meet the ends of justice.  In support of his argument, Mr. Gupte relies upon the decision of our High Court in The   State   of   Maharashtra  vs.  Joseph   Mingel   Koli   &   Ors., reported in 1997 (2) Crimes 228.   He points out that in the case of Joseph Mingel, the incident had taken place more than 18 years ago, by taking this fact into consideration along with others, this court had imposed sentence only of fine upon the appellants before it.  Perusal of the decision cited shows that the fact of the incident being an ancient one was only one of seven circumstances, which had persuaded this court   to   impose   the   sentence   of   fine   only.     In   fact   the   other circumstances   were   more   persuasive.     In   that   case,   the   principal accused   and   the   architect   of   the   whole   incident   was   dead.     The appellants before the court were only his stooges.   They were acting under the influence of the principal accused.   There was no specific overt act assigned to them in the incident.  One of the appellants was also at the time of the judgment was 73 years old.  The incident in the instant case being more than 24 years old persuades me only to impose minimum   punishment   of   jail   sentence   upon   the   respondent.   In   my opinion, the sentence of imprisonment for a period of one year with * 49 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 fine of Rs.10,000/­ would be an appropriate punishment in the facts of the case.   This judgment is pronounced despite delay in view of the statement made by both the counsel that they have no objection and that they do not desire to advance any further arguments. Hence, I pass following order: O R D E R (a).  The appeal is partly allowed. (b).  The judgment and order dated dated 5th  March 1991 passed by the learned Special Judge, Kolhapur in Special Case No.4 of 1988, is partly set aside. (c).  The   respondent   is   convicted   of   the   offence   punishable   under Section   161   Indian   Penal   Code   read   with   Section   5(1)(d)   of   the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. (d) The acquittal of the respondent for the offence punishable under Section 5(1)(a) is confirmed. (e) The respondent is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs.10,000/­ (Rs.Ten Thousand only).  In the   event   of   default   in   payment   of   fine,   he   shall   suffer   simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months. * 50 * Cri.Appeal. 276.1991 8.2.2011 (f) The respondent is granted time of 10 weeks to surrender for the purpose of undergoing the sentence (Smt. R.P. SondurBaldota, J.)