Writ Petition No. 3587 of 2026 · Bombay High Court · 2026

10. Shri Prakash S/o Anandrao Mankar, Aged adult, Occupation: Agriculturist, R/o At Khatara, Post Munjal, Tahsil Kelapur, District : Yeovatmal.

11. Shri Ashish S/o Sureshbabu Lonkar, Aged adult, Occupation: Agriculturist, R/o At & Post Shiroli, Tahsil Ghatanji, District Yeovatmal.

12. Shri Rajiv reddy S/o Malla reddy Yeltiwar, Aged adult, Occupation: Agriculturist, R/o At Digras, Post Patan, Tahsil Zari Zamani, District Yeovatmal.

13. Shri Tikaram S/o Mahadeorao Kongare, Aged adult, Occupation Agriculturist, R/o At & Post Palsoni, Tahsil Wani, District Yeovatmal.

14. Shri Shankarrao S/o Gopaji Rathod, Aged adult, Occupation: Agriculturist, R/o At & Post Darvha, Tahsil Wani, District Yeovatmal.

15. Shri Snehal S/o Sukhdeorao Bhakre, Aged adult, Occupation: Agriculturist, R/o At Renukapur, Post Parthad, Tahsil Ner, District Yeovatmal. …. PETITIONERS. Judgment 3 WP3587-2026.odt // VERSUS //

1. The State Government through its Secretary of Ministry of Co-operation Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai-32.

2. The Divisional Joint Registrar Co-operative Societies, Amaravati, Tahsil & District Amaravati.

3. Shri Nanasaheb Chauhan, Aged adult, Administrator cum District Deputy Registrar Co-operative Societies, Yeovatmal. . …. RESPONDENTS ______________________________________________________________ Shri C.S.Kaptan, Sr.Advocate a/b Shri A.M.Ghare, Adv. for Petitioners. Shri Milind Sathe, Advocate General a/b. Shri N.S.Autkar, A.G.P. for Respondent Nos.1 to 3. ______________________________________________________________ CORAM : ANIL S. KILOR AND RAJ D. WAKODE, JJ. DATED : JUNE 22, 2026. ORAL JUDGMENT : (Per : Anil S. Kilor, J)

2. Heard. RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

3. In this petition a challenge is raised to the amendment made to the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 73AAA of the Judgment 4 WP3587-2026.odt Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1960”) by Section 2(2) of the Maharashtra Act No.XX of 2026 and consequential order of appointment of an Administrator on the Yavatmal District Central Cooperative Bank. Brief facts of the case are as under :

4. The petitioners are duly elected executive committee members of the Yavatmal District Central Cooperative Bank.

5. They got elected in the general elections held on 21/12/2020. Their term came to an end on 20/12/2025. Even after expiry of the term, the petitioners continued as members of the executive committee in view of second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 73AAA of the Act of 1960, which states that if the elections to the committee of the society could not be held for any reason not attributable to the members of the committee of such society the existing members of the committee shall be deemed to have continued till new committee is duly constituted.

6. On 15/04/2026 the amendment to the second proviso to sub- section (3) of Section 73AAA of the Act of 1960 was made and the applicability of it came to be withdrawn for ‘Type-A’ societies prescribed Judgment 5 WP3587-2026.odt in Rule 4 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies (Election to the Committee) Rules, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 2014”).

7. In view of the said amendment and as the Yavatmal District Central Cooperative Bank falls in ‘Type-A’ societies, vide order dated 27/04/2026 issued by the respondent No.2, an Administrator came to be appointed on the aforesaid Bank. Hence, this petition challenging the amendment to the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 73AAA of the Act of 1960 and the appointment of Administrator.

9. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties. Shri Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that the amendment to second proviso to sub- section (3) of Section 73AAA of the Act of 1960 withdrawing the applicability of the said proviso for Type-A society, is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that under Rule 4 of the Rules of 2014 the societies are categorized in Type-A to Type-E. However, none of the societies discriminated on the basis of such categorization under the Act of 1960 or Rules framed thereunder. However, a discrimination has been made by not extending the Judgment 6 WP3587-2026.odt applicability of the second proviso to ‘Type-A’ societies after amendment. It is submitted that the reasonable classification must be founded on intelligible differentia and it must be a nexus to the object to be achieved.

10. Shri Kaptan, learned Senior Advocate further argues that it is mandatory as per second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 77A of the Act of 1960 to issue notice calling objections and suggestions before appointing an Administrator. It is submitted that no such notice was issued or hearing was granted to the petitioners before appointment of the Administrator. It is therefore, submitted that the appointment of the Administrator is illegal and in violation of the principles of natural justice.

11. Shri Milind Sathe, learned Advocate General argues that under the Rules of 2014 the societies are classified and they are divided in various types namely ‘Type-A’ to ‘Type-E’. The amendment in question is in respect of Type-A societies which is a class in itself. It is submitted that since such classification of the societies has been made by the legislature itself, no argument is available to the petitioners to say that there is no intelligible differentia or there is no nexus with the object to be achieved. It is submitted that there is no violation of Article 14 of the Judgment 7 WP3587-2026.odt Constitution of India and hence, such amendment cannot be termed as “unconstitutional”.

12. It is further argued that as per second proviso to Section 77A(1), satisfaction of the Registrar is sufficient for not to publish notice calling objections and suggestions while appointing an Administrator. It is argued that in the present matter, the Registrar has recorded the reasons showing his satisfaction as regards not to publish notice and therefore, the appointment of an Administrator cannot be held bad for not issuing notice calling objections and suggestions.

13. Having considered the rival contentions and gone through the record, it is evident that prior to the amendment in question to second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 73AAA of the Act of 1960, the executive committees of all types of societies were permitted to continue to hold the office if the election could not be held for any reason not attributable to the members of the Committee of such society. By virtue of the amendment in question, the said provision continued to operate for all types of societies except ‘Type-A’ societies, in which the Yavatmal District Central Cooperative Bank falls. Judgment 8 WP3587-2026.odt

14. Rule 4 of the Rules of 2014 classified the societies in five types i.e. Type-A to Type-E. Such classification is made by the legislature for the purpose of elections. Rules 2014 show that there are separate provisions for Type-C, Type-D and Type E societies to conduct elections. It is thus, evident that with certain purpose and object such classification of societies has been made by the legislature.

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of D.S. Nakara ..vs.. Union of India, reported in (1983) 1 SCC 305, has held thus : “10. The scope, content and meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution has been the subject-matter of intensive examination by this Court in a catena of decisions. It would, therefore, be merely adding to the length of this judgment to recapitulate all those decisions and it is better to avoid that exercise save and except referring to the latest decision on the subject in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : (1978) 2 SCR 621] from which the following observation may be extracted: (SCC pp. 283-84, para 7) “What is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits.... Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or nonarbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence....” Judgment 9 WP3587-2026.odt

11. The decisions clearly lay down that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute in question (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar [AIR 1958 SC 538 : 1959 SCR 279, 296 : 1959 SCJ 147] ). The classification may be founded on differential basis according to objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that there ought to be a nexus i.e. causal connection between the basis of classification and object of the statute under consideration. It is equally well settled by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.”

16. If we look at the Rules framed under the Act of 1960, it will be revealed that the legislature has classified the societies under various Rules for a specific purpose.

17. For instance, for the purpose to charge registration fees at the time of making application for registration under Rule 4 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules of 1961”) the societies are categorized. Similarly, the societies are categorized for payment of contribution per year per society under Rule 53 of the Rules of 1961. The societies are further classified for audit purposes as Class “A”, “B” and “C” under Rule 69 (1)(f)(vii) of the Rules of 1961. Judgment 10 WP3587-2026.odt

18. Furthermore the societies are categorized for fixing rates of daily allowances and sitting fees while a member of the committee on tour, under Rule 107A(2) of the Rules of 1961. Similarly, for the purpose of handling or keeping cash at hand Rule 107C of the Rules of 1961 the categorization is made as Primary Societies, Societies at Taluka Level, District Level, Federal Societies and State Level Federal Societies.

19. Thus, it is amply clear that for various purposes and wherever in the Rules framed under the Act of 1960, it is required, the legislature has categorized and sub-categorized or classified or sub-classified the societies in different classes or types.

20. As per exposition of law in D.S. Nakara (supra) to pass the test of permissible classification it is held that two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the statute in question. Judgment 11 WP3587-2026.odt

21. As we have, herein above, held that under the Rules of 2014, more particularly under Rule 4, the legislature itself categorized the societies for the purpose of elections. Thus, it is evident that ‘Type-A’ society is a class in itself. Therefore, exclusion of ‘Type-A’ societies from the applicability of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 73AAA of the Act of 1960, and while continuing its applicability to other categories of societies, namely Type-B to Type-E societies, it cannot be said that it is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

22. Rule 4 of the Rules of 2014 makes it abundantly clear that every type of society forms a separate class and therefore, separate sets of Rules are provided for conducting the elections for Type-C, Type-D and Type-E societies.

23. In the circumstances, the contention of the petitioners that because the amendment to the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 73AAA of the Act of 1960 is only applicable to ‘Type-A’ society, it is unconstitutional as it is not made applicable to all societies, is hereby rejected. Judgment 12 WP3587-2026.odt

24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ram Chandra Choudhary and others ..vs.. Roop Nagar Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Samiti Limited and others, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 583, has held thus : “18.1. It is well settled that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest an election is a fundamental right. In Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal23 and Javed v. State of Haryana, this Court authoritatively held that these rights are purely statutory in nature and exist only to the extent conferred by statute. While the right to vote enables a member to exercise franchise in accordance with the statutory scheme, the right to contest an election or to be elected is a distinct and additional right which may legitimately be made subject to qualifications, eligibility conditions, and disqualifications. This position was reiterated in K. Krishna Murthy v. Union of India (supra), where this Court emphasised that rights of political participation are not absolute and remain subject to statutory control, including eligibility criteria and disqualifications. The following paragraphs are pertinent: “35…In fact the petitioners have also urged us to reconsider some earlier decisions of this Court which have dealt with the status of the rights of political participation such as the right to vote, the right to nominate candidates and the right to contest elections. It may be recalled that the right to vote has been held to be a statutory right and not a fundamental right and the same position has been consistently upheld in subsequent decisions. (See decision in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, which has been followed in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, Mohan Lal Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly, Rama Kant Pandey v. Union of India and Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India) This implies that the rights of political participation are not absolute in nature and are subject to statutory controls such as those provided in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 among others. Undoubtedly, reservations in elected local bodies do place restrictions on the rights of political participation of persons who do not belong to the reserved categories. In this respect, the petitioners have contended that this Court should examine the reasonableness of such Judgment 13 WP3587-2026.odt restrictions with regard to the objective of ensuring “free and fair elections” [as observed in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, SCC at p. 94, para 213] as well as the expanded understanding of Article 21 of the Constitution.” “78. In this respect, it may be noticed that the Constitution empowers the Election Commission of India to prepare electoral rolls for the purpose of identifying the eligible voters in elections for the Lok Sabha and the Vidhan Sabhas. This suggests that the right to vote is not an inherent right and it cannot be claimed in an abstract sense. Furthermore, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 gives effect to the constitutional guidance on the eligibility of persons to contest elections. This includes grounds that render persons ineligible from contesting elections such as that of a person not being a citizen of India, a person being of unsound mind, insolvency and the holding of an “office of profit” under the executive among others. It will suffice to say that there is no inherent right to contest elections since there are explicit legislative controls over the same.”

25. Thus, it is evident that right to vote in election or to contest the election is not a fundamental right but purely statutory in nature and exists only to the extent conferred by the statute.

26. By applying the aforementioned well settled principles of law and having held that ‘Type-A’ society is a class in itself, the amendment in question cannot be held to be in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

27. Moving to the next question, whether the appointment of an Administrator, without issuing notice, calling objections and suggestions, Judgment 14 WP3587-2026.odt as stipulated under the first proviso to Section 77A(1)(b-1) of the Act of 1960 would vitiate the order of appointment of an Administrator ?

28. To answer it, it is apposite to refer the relevant provisions, which read thus : “77A. Appointment of member of committee, new committee or Administrator, where there is failure to elect member, to constitute committee or where committee does not enter upon office — (1) Where the Registrar is satisfied that,— (1a) ... (a) ... (b) the term or extended term, as the case may be, of the committee of any society or of any of its members has expired or for any other reason election is held and there is a failure to elect all or any of the members required to fill the vacancies; (b-1) ... (c) to (f) ... The Registrar may, either, suo-motu or on the application of any officer of the society, by order appoint- (i) any member or members of the society to be the member or members of the committee to fill the vacancies; (ii) a committee, consisting of not more than three members of the society, or one or more administrators, who need not be members of the society, to manage the affairs of the society till a new committee enters upon office : Provided that, before making such order, the Registrar shall publish a notice on the notice board at the head office of the society, inviting objections and suggestions with respect to the proposed order within a period specified in the notice and consider all objections and suggestions received by him within that period; Provided further that, it shall not be necessary to publish such notice in any case where Registrar is satisfied that immediate action is required to be taken or that it is not reasonably practical to publish such notice. Judgment 15 WP3587-2026.odt

29. No doubt, the aforementioned first proviso says that before making order of appointment of the Administrator the Registrar shall publish a notice on the Notice Board of the Head Office of the society inviting objections and suggestions with respect to the proposed order within a period specified in the notice and consider all the objections and suggestions received by him within that period.

30. However, second proviso states that it shall not be necessary to publish such notice in any case, where the Registrar is satisfied that immediate action is required to be taken or that is not reasonably practical to publish such notice.

31. The order appointing Administrator shows that the Registrar did not publish a notice calling objections and suggestions by taking recourse to the second proviso.

32. The second proviso permits exemption from publishing the notice as stipulated in the first proviso, subject to the satisfaction of the Registrar that immediate action is required to be taken or that it is not reasonably practical to publish such notice. Judgment 16 WP3587-2026.odt

33. On perusal of the impugned order appointing Administrator, such satisfaction is recorded and sufficient reasons are given to take recourse under the aforementioned second proviso.

34. Having found compliance of aforementioned second proviso, the appointment of the Administrator cannot be faulted with or it cannot be held bad for not issuing notice calling objections and suggestions as stipulated in the first proviso.

35. Hence, on both the counts, the petition fails and in absence of any merit in the petition, the same deserves to be dismissed. We accordingly pass the following order : The Writ Petition is dismissed. Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs. ( RAJ D. WAKODE, J ) (ANIL S. KILOR, J ) RRaut..