High Court
Facts
Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.70 OF 2020Harinath s/o. Rayappa Suryawanshi,(C/8957), Age 72 years, Occ. Labour,r/o. Kelgaon, Tq. Nilanga, Dist. LaturPresently serving his life sentence at Central Jail, Harsool, Aurangabad..AppellantVs.The State of Maharashtra,Through Police Inspector,Nilanga Police Station, Nilanga, Dist. Latur ..Respondent----Mr.Mukul Kulkarni, Advocate for appellantMr.B.B.Bhise, APP for respondent---- CORAM : R.G.AVACHAT AND NEERAJ P. DHOTE, JJ. DATE : MARCH 22, 2024 JUDGMENT (PER R.G.AVACHAT, J.) :- The appellant, vide judgment and order dated 02.07.2019,passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nilanga, in Sessions CaseNo.12 of 2017, has been convicted under Section 302 of Indian PenalCode for committing murder of his wife and son and therefore,sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.1,000/-with default stipulation. He has also been convicted for the offencepunishable under Section 201 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to 2Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020suffer imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- withdefault stipulation. Both the sentences were directed to runconcurrently. The appellant is, therefore, before us in appeal.2.The facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are asfollows:-The appellant was 70 years of age at the relevant time.He was residing along with his wife Bhagirathibai (deceased) and sonVikas, at village Kelgaon, Tq. Nilanga, Dist. Latur. Deceased Vikaswas married. His wife was not home on the given day. On theintervening night of 27.03.2017 and 28.03.2017, the appellant,allegedly, committed murder of Bhagirathibai and Vikas by smashingtheir heads with stones, while both of them were asleep in the court-yard of their residence. The appellant, thereafter, fled to Nilanga. Itwas PW 2 – Mahadeo, who noticed the dead bodies in the court-yardof the appellant’s residence. He immediately informed the same tothe Bit-Amaldar (police official). PW 3 – Pandhari Rathod, Police HeadConstable, in turn, informed the same to API – Masal (PW 7).Accordingly, both of them came to the village. They saw bothBhagirathibai and Vikas to have suffered head injuries and passedaway. Blood stained stones were by their side. Since nobody cameforward to lodge FIR, it was PW 3 who lodged the same (FIR 35). 3Cri. Appeal No.70 of 20203.A scene of offence panchnama (Exh.18) was drawn in thepresence of panchas. Inquest on the dead bodies was conductedunder panchanamas (Exh.19 and 20) then and there in the presenceof the very panch (PW 1). The dead bodies were subjected to post-mortem examination. It was PW 5 – Saeed Patel, who had seen theappellant leaving the village in the early morning for Nilanga. Thepolice officers, therefore, immediately went to Nilanga. Theyarrested the appellant at a place nearby S.T. bus stand, Nilanga. Onthe following day, the appellant made disclosure statement (Exh.23),pursuant to which blood-stained shirt on his person, was recoveredfrom a place adjacent to the public urinals at bus-stand, Nilanga. Theclothes on the person of the deceased and that of the appellant wereseized and sent for chemical analysis. Statements of the personsacquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case wererecorded.4.On completion of the investigation, the appellant wasproceeded against by filing charge sheet before learned JudicialMagistrate, First Class, Nilanga. The case, in turn, was committed tothe Court of Addl. Sessions Judge, Nilanga (Trial Court) for trial inaccordance with law. The trial court framed Charge (Exh.13). Theappellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To bring home 4Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020charge, the prosecution examined seven witnesses and produced inevidence certain documents. The trial court, on appreciation of theevidence in the case, convicted the appellant and consequentially,sentenced, as stated above.5.Heard learned counsel for the parties.6.Mr.Mukul Kulkarni, learned counsel appointed torepresent the appellant, would submit that the case is based oncircumstantial evidence. Murder took place in the court-yard of thehouse of the appellant and not inside. The photographs indicate thatthe deceased were slept in the court-yard, since no bedding is seen.According to him, there is no consistency between the evidence ofPW 2 and PW 5, who claimed to have met the appellant on the givenday. He would further submit that, when pursuant to the so calleddisclosure statement of the appellant, the blood stained shirt wasseized, how come PW 5 – Saeed Patel did not notice the blood stainson the shirt of the appellant, while he had seen him boarding the busfor Nilanga. According to learned counsel, no sooner the appellantwas arrested, the statement given by him has been video graphed.Same has not been placed on record. An adverse inference,therefore, need to be drawn. Learned counsel has relied on thejudgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jafarudheen and ors. 5Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 2022 SC 3627. Learned counsel,ultimately, urged for allowing the appeal.7.Learned APP would, on the other hand, submit thatexcept the appellant, none was residing with the deceased persons.The appellant was seen leaving the village early in the morning, i.e.,within a few hours of the deceased met with homicidal death. Theshirt on the person of the appellant was found stained with blood.The appellant did not offer any explanation. Learned APP read outthe reasons given by the trial court in support of the judgment andorder.8.Considered the submissions advanced. Perused theevidence on record. Also perused the judgment impugned herein. 9.Let us advert to the evidence on record and appreciatethe same. PW 4 – Dr. Pralhad conducted autopsy on the mortalremains of the deceased - Bhagirathibai and Vikas. He noticedfollowing injuries on the person of both of them :-Injuries on the dead body of Bhagirathibai :-(1)CLW at left ear pinna with cut left ear pinna.(2)CLW at left temporal bone behind left ear with irregular margin and directions.(3)One contusion on left side forehead.(4)Swelling on whole right side fact.(5)Fracture of right maxillary and mandibular bone. 6Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020(6)Fracture of left temporal bone behind left ear pinna.The injuries were antemortem.Injuries on the dead body of Vikas :-(1)Tear of upper lip and nose.(2)Contusion and swelling at left eyebrow and left side of forehead.(3)Fracture of Nasal bone.(4)Tooth fall upper- Two central incises, one left incise on upper side, lower two central and left lateral incises.(5)Fracture of maxillary Bone on left side.(6)Fracture left fracture of frontal bone.He issued the post-mortem reports of both of them vide Exhs.40 and41, respectively. In his opinion, the cause of death of both of themwas due to “intracranial hemorrhage due to number of skull bonedue to head injury.” 10.The fact that both Bhagirathibai and Vikas met withhomicidal death is not disputed. The question is, whether theappellant is author of the crime in question. The appellant washusband of late Bhagirathibai. The deceased Vikas was their son.Although he was married, his wife was not there at home on thegiven night. 7Cri. Appeal No.70 of 202011.PW 6 – Sangita @ Chanchla was daughter of theappellant and deceased Bhagirathibai. It is in her evidence that herparents and brother Vikas would reside together at the village. Theywere living happily. She denied that there used to be quarrelsbetween the appellant on one hand and the deceased, on the other.Learned APP declared this witness to have not been supporting theprosecution. She did not give in to the suggestions put to her incross-examination by learned APP. From the evidence of PW 6 –Sangita, it has been established that the appellant and deceased –Bhagirathibai and Vikas were residing together in the house of theappellant at village Kelgaon, Tq. Nilanga, Dist. Latur.12.To reinforce the fact of the appellant and the deceased tohave been residing together, we have evidence of PW 5 – SaeedPatel. It is in his evidence that there used to be quarrels betweenthe appellant on one hand the deceased, on the other. His evidencewould further suggest that Bhagirathibai was second wife of theappellant. The appellant used to consume alcohol. It is further in hisevidence that early in the morning on 28.03.2017, he was returningafter Namaz. It was about 06.30 a.m., he saw the appellant talkingover cellphone at the bus stand. His evidence further indicates theappellant to have boarded the bus for Nilanga. It is further in his
Legal Reasoning
10Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020appellant was at his residence and his wife and son were sleepingjust outside the same (court-yard). The conduct of the appellant inleaving the village, while his wife and son met homicidal death intheir court-yard, is inconsistent with his innocence. PW 2 – Mahadeowas specific to testify that there used to be quarrels between theappellant on one hand and the deceased, on the other. In our view,therefore, it is the appellant and none else who has killed his wifeand son with dropping heavy stones on their heads.15.The prosecution has, however, not come with anygenesis of the case. It is a settled legal proposition that theappellant can make out his defence or case within any of theexceptions of the Indian Penal Code, either leading positive evidenceor bringing it on record through the prosecution case itself. 16.PW 2 – Mahadeo was in the company of police. We areconscious of the fact that any confession made to the police isinadmissible. However, any part thereof beneficial to the appellantmay be read in his favour. We are, therefore, reproducing theevidence in paragraph 2 of PW 2 – Mahadeo, as under:-2.Earlier to the incident Bhagiratibai hadbeen to her parental home at Kanegaon. She was 11Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020also tried to bring back to home but she refused.Again on earlier day of incident, the deceasedVikas had gone to village Kanegaon and broughther back. The accused further disclosed to thepolice that, in the night the deceased Vikas andBhagiratibai have assaulted to him without foodand he was empty stomach until 12.00 in themidnight. Therefore, in the night at about 12.00in the midnight, he first assaulted Bhagiratibaiwith the boulder and then to Vikas. He slept inthe house until 5.00 am and then left to Nilanga.The police have taken my statement. Accusedbefore the Court is the same. 17.PW 1 is witness to multiple panchnamas such as, sceneof offence panchnama (Exh.18), inquest panchnamas (Exhs.19 and20), seizure of clothes panchnamas (Exhs.21 and 22) and even thediscovery statement made by the appellant on the following day. Thediscovery statement, allegedly, made by the appellant is being reliedon by us for his benefit. It is at Exh.23. The appellant has statedtherein that both the deceased namely, Bhagirathibai and Vikas hadassaulted him on the given night. He was even not givendinner/meal. He was annoyed thereby. As such, the appellant killedhis wife and son, since both the deceased had assaulted him fewhours therebefore and even he was starved since he was notprovided food by both of them. In our view, therefore, the case of 12Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020the appellant would get covered by Exception 1 to Section 300 ofIndian Penal Code. Exception 1 to Section 300 of Indian Penal Codereads thus:-Exception 1.— When culpable homicide is notmurder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender,whilst deprived of the power of self-control by graveand sudden provocation, causes the death of theperson who gave the provocation or causes the deathof any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the followingprovisos:— First.— That the provocation is not sought orvoluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse forkilling or doing harm to any person. Secondly.— That the provocation is not given byanything done in obedience to the law, or by a publicservant in the lawful exercise of the powers of suchpublic servant. Thirdly.— That the provocation is not given byanything done in the lawful exercise of the right ofprivate defence. Explanation.— Whether the provocation was graveand sudden enough to prevent the offence fromamounting to murder is a question of fact.18.In case of Dauvaram Nirmalkar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh(2022 LiveLaw (SC) 650, the Apex Court observed :-“10. Interpreting Exception 1 to the Section 300 inK.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, (1962 Supp (1)SCR 567, this Court has held that the conditions which 13Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020have to be satisfied for the exception to be invoked are(a) the deceased must have given provocation to theaccused; (b) the provocation must be grave; (c) theprovocation must be sudden; (d) the offender, by thereason of the said provocation, should have beendeprived of his power of self-control; (e) the offendershould have killed the deceased during the continuanceof the deprivation of power of self-control; and (f) theoffender must have caused the death of the person whogave the provocation or the death of any other person bymistake or accident. For determining whether or not theprovocation had temporarily deprived the offender fromthe power of self-control, the test to be applied is that ofa reasonable man and not that of an unusually excitableand pugnacious individual. Further, it must beconsidered whether there was sufficient interval andtime to allow the passion to cool. K.M. Nanavati (supra)succinctly observes: “84. Is there any standard of a reasonable manfor the application of the doctrine of “grave andsudden” provocation? No abstract standard ofreasonableness can be laid down. What areasonable man will do in certain circumstancesdepends upon the customs, manners, way of life,traditional values etc.; in short, the cultural,social and emotional background of the society towhich an accused belongs. In our vast countrythere are social groups ranging from the lowest tothe highest state of civilization. It is neitherpossible nor desirable to lay down any standardwith precision: it is for the court to decide in eachcase, having regard to the relevant circumstances.It is not necessary in this case to ascertainwhether a reasonable man placed in the positionof the accused would have lost his self-controlmomentarily or even temporarily when his wifeconfessed to him of her illicit intimacy withanother, for we are satisfied on the evidence thatthe accused regained his self-control and killedAhuja deliberately.85. The Indian law, relevant to the presentenquiry, may be stated thus: (1) The test of“grave and sudden” provocation is whether a 14Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020reasonable man, belonging to the same class ofsociety as the accused, placed in the situation inwhich the accused was placed would be soprovoked as to lose his self-control. (2) In India,words and gestures may also, under certaincircumstances, cause grave and suddenprovocation to an accused so as to bring his actwithin the First Exception to Section 300 of theIndian Penal Code. (3) The mental backgroundcreated by the previous act of the victim may betaken into consideration in ascertaining whetherthe subsequent act caused grave and suddenprovocation for committing the offence. (4) Thefatal blow should be clearly traced to theinfluence of passion arising from that provocationand not after the passion had cooled down bylapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scopefor premeditation and calculation.”11. K.M. Nanavati (supra), has held that the mentalbackground created by the previous act(s) of thedeceased may be taken into consideration in ascertainingwhether the subsequent act caused sudden and graveprovocation for committing the offence. There can besustained and continuous provocations over a period oftime, albeit in such cases Exception 1 to Section 300 ofthe IPC applies when preceding the offence, there was alast act, word or gesture in the series of incidentscomprising of that conduct, amounting to suddenprovocation sufficient for reactive loss of self-control.K.M. Nanavati (supra) quotes the definition of‘provocation’ given by Goddard, C.J.; in R. v. Duffy,(1949) 1 All E.R. 932, as:“...some act or series of acts, done by the deadman to the accused which would cause in anyreasonable person, and actually causes in theaccused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject topassion as to make him or her for the momentnot master of his own mind… Indeed,circumstances which induce a desire for revengeare inconsistent with provocation, since theconscious formulation of a desire for revengemeans that the person had the time to think, to 15Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020reflect, and that would negative a suddentemporary loss of self-control which is of theessence of provocation...”. 12. The question of loss of self-control by grave andsudden provocation is a question of fact. Act ofprovocation and loss of self-control, must be actual andreasonable. The law attaches great importance to twothings when defence of provocation is taken underException 1 to Section 300 of the IPC. First, whetherthere was an intervening period for the passion to cooland for the accused to regain dominance and controlover his mind. Secondly, the mode of resentment shouldbear some relationship to the sort of provocation that hasbeen given. The retaliation should be proportionate tothe provocation. (R V.Duffy). The first part lays emphasison whether the accused acting as a reasonable man hadtime to reflect and cool down. The offender is presumedto possess the general power of self-control of anordinary or reasonable man, belonging to the same classof society as the accused, placed in the same situation inwhich the accused is placed, to temporarily lose thepower of self-control. The second part emphasises thatthe offender’s reaction to the provocation is to be judgedon the basis of whether the provocation was sufficient tobring about a loss of self-control in the fact situation.Here again, the court would have to apply the test of areasonable person in the circumstances. While examiningthese questions, we should not be short-sighted, andmust take into account the whole of the events, includingthe events on the day of the fatality, as these are relevantfor deciding whether the accused was acting under thecumulative and continuing stress of provocation. Gravityof provocation turns upon the whole of the victim’sabusive behaviour towards the accused. Gravity does nothinge upon a single or last act of provocation deemedsufficient by itself to trigger the punitive action. Lastprovocation has to be considered in light of the previousprovocative acts or words, serious enough to cause theaccused to lose his self-control. The cumulative orsustained provocation test would be satisfied when theaccused’s retaliation was immediately preceded andprecipitated by some sort of provocative conduct, whichwould satisfy the requirement of sudden or immediateprovocation. 16Cri. Appeal No.70 of 202013.Thus, the gravity of the provocation can beassessed by taking into account the history of the abuseand need not be confined to the gravity of the finalprovocative act in the form of acts, words or gestures.The final wrongdoing, triggering off the accused’sreaction, should be identified to show that there wastemporary loss of self-control and the accused had actedwithout planning and premeditation. This has been aptlysummarised by Ashworth (1975 Criminal LR 558-559) inthe following words:“The significance of the deceased’s final actshould be considered by reference to the previousrelations between the parties, taking into accountany previous incidents which add colour to thefinal act. This is not to argue that the basicdistinction between sudden provoked killings andrevenge killings should be blurred, for the lapseof time between the deceased’s final act and theaccused’s retaliation should continue to tellagainst him. The point is that the significance ofthe deceased’s final act and its effect upon theaccused – and indeed the relation of theretaliation to that act – can be neither understoodnor evaluated without reference to previousdealings between the parties.” Exception 1 toSection 300 recognises that when a reasonableperson is tormented continuously, he may, at onepoint of time, erupt and reach a break pointwhereby losing self-control, going astray andcommitting the offence. However, sustainedprovocation principle does not do away with therequirement of immediate or the final provocativeact, words or gesture, which should be verifiable.Further, this defence would not be available ifthere is evidence of reflection or planning as theymirror exercise of calculation and premeditation.14. Following the view expressed in K.M. Nanavati(supra), this Court in Budhi Singh v. State of HimachalPradesh (2012) 13 SCC 663, observed that in the test forapplication of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC, theprimary obligation of the court is to examine thecircumstances from the point of view of a person of
Arguments
8Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020evidence that when the police came to village Kelgaon, heimmediately informed the same.13.Then, we have evidence of PW 2 – Mahadeo, anothervillager, and PW 3 – Pandhari, Police Head-Constable, besidesevidence of PW 7 – Mashal, Asst. Police Inspector (InvestigatingOfficer), to indicate that they immediately went to Nilanga. Theyspotted the appellant at the bus-stand. The appellant was arrested.It is true that as per the case of prosecution itself, the appellant gaveone statement. It was video-graphed. The same is not forthcoming.Learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, may be justified tocontend that an adverse inference, therefore, may be drawn.Learned counsel had also submitted that when PW 5 – Saeed hadseen the appellant at the bus-stand, how come he did not noticeblood stains on the shirt the appellant had clad in. Learned counselmay be correct to some extent. There is, however, nothing toindicate that PW 5 – Saeed and the appellant had any interaction atthe relevant time. PW 5 – Saeed might have seen the appellanteither from back side or from any other angle and the blood stainsmust have been missed to be seen. The fact remains that PW 5 –Saeed had seen the appellant leaving the village by 06.30 in themorning for Nilanga. The appellant was arrested at Nilanga within anhour. 9Cri. Appeal No.70 of 202014.The appellant and both the deceased were residingtogether. Those were summer days (27th-28th March). Althoughlearned counsel for the appellant would submit that only the deadbodies were seen in the court-yard, he meant to say that thedeceased were not sleeping in the court-yard. We have, therefore,seen the colour photographs (Articles `E-1’ to `E-6’) of the scene ofoffence, to find that both the deceased had their bedding below theirperson. Same suggests that both of them, because of heat ofsummer, must have been sleeping in the court-yard of theirresidence. In the opinion of Dr. Pralhad, the death might haveoccurred within 12 hours next before the post mortem examination.The post mortem report indicates that the autopsy was conductedbetween 03.30 p.m. and 04.30 p.m. on 28.03.2017. Same suggeststhe deceased to have been assaulted and breathed their last at thedead of night and to be specific, little past 03.00 a.m. on 28.03.2017.When the appellant was residing along with the deceased in the veryhouse, he did not offer any explanation, where was he at the fatefulnight. On the contrary, he was seen leaving the village three hoursafter his wife and son were murdered in the court-yard of hisresidence. Even if we ignore recovery of the blood-stained shirt,pursuant to his discovery statement, the fact remains that the
Decision
17Cri. Appeal No.70 of 2020reasonable prudence, if there was such grave and suddenprovocation, as to reasonably conclude that a personplaced in such circumstances can temporarily lose self-control and commit the offence in the proximity to thetime of provocation. A significant observation in BudhiSingh (supra) is that the provocation may be an act orseries of acts done by the deceased to the accusedresulting in inflicting of the injury. The idea behind thisexception is to exclude the acts of violence which arepremeditated, and not to deny consideration ofcircumstances such as prior animosity between thedeceased and the accused, arising as a result of incidentsin the past and subsequently resulting in sudden andgrave provocation. In support of the aforesaidproposition and to convert the conviction from Section302 to Section 304 Part I of the IPC in Budhi Singh(supra), the Court also relied upon Rampal Singh v. Stateof Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289.15. For clarity, it must be stated that the prosecutionmust prove the guilt of the accused, that is, it mustestablish all ingredients of the offence with which theaccused is charged, but this burden should not be mixedwith the burden on the accused of proving that the casefalls within an exception. However, to discharge thisburden the accused may rely upon the case of theprosecution and the evidence adduced by theprosecution in the court. It is in this context we wouldrefer to the case of the prosecution, which is that thedeceased was addicted to alcohol and used to constantlytorment, abuse and threaten the appellant. On the nightof the occurrence, the deceased had consumed alcoholand had told the appellant to leave the house and if not,he would kill the appellant. There was sudden loss ofself-control on account of a ‘slow burn’ reaction followedby the final and immediate provocation. There wastemporary loss of self-control as the appellant had triedto kill himself by holding live electrical wires. Therefore,we hold that the acts of provocation on the basis ofwhich the appellant caused the death of his brother,Dashrath Nirmalkar, were both sudden and grave andthat there was loss of self-control.” 18Cri. Appeal No.70 of 202019. The appellant, at the relevant time, was of 70 years ofage, a rustic and illiterate person. Grave and sudden provocation, isa question of fact and changes with person to person. In the casein hand, both the deceased had kept the appellant hungry. He wasnot provided food entire night. When both of them had assaulted himhaving been annoyed thereby, the appellant killed both of them in amanner stated above. 20.The Investigating Officer filed charge-sheet with thefollowing summary of the prosecution case:-……... यांनी सतत घरगुती कारणावरून भांडणतक्रार करूनमारहाण केल्याचा राग मनात धरून यातील दोन्ही मयत रात्रीघराचे बाहेर मोकळे अंगणात झोपले असता, आरोपीने दोन्हीमयताचे डोकीत दगड घालून दोन्ही मायातास जीवे ठार मारूनअंगावरील शर्ट+ला रक्त लागलेने शर्ट+ बसस्थानक निनलंगा येथीलमुतारीजवळ झुडपात लपवून पुरावा नष्ट केला, म्हणून यातीलआरोपी निवरुद्ध दोष सिसद्धी साठी भा द निव चे कलाम 302,२०१ प्रमाणे दोषारोप असे".21.We have already not believed the case of the prosecutionas regards recovery of blood-stained shirt, pursuant to the discoverystatement of the appellant from an open place nearby a public urinalat bus-stand Nilanga. We are, therefore, not at one with the findingsrecorded by the trial court convicting the appellant for the offenceunder Section 201 of Indian Penal Code. 19Cri. Appeal No.70 of 202022.The appellant, by now, is 77 years of age. In our view,the offence would be falling under Section 304 Part I of Indian PenalCode. Considering the appellant’s age, we propose to imposesentence of rigorous imprisonment of ten and half years with fine ofRs.1,000/-.23.For the reasons given herein above, the appeal partlysucceeds. Hence, the following order:-(i)The appeal is partly allowed.(ii)The order dated 02.07.2019, passed by learned Addl.Sessions Judge, Nilanga, in Sessions Case No.12 of 2017, convictingand sentencing the appellant for the offences punishable underSections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code, is set aside. Theappellant stands acquitted thereof.Instead, the appellant is convicted for the offencepunishable under Section 304 Part I of Indian Penal Code andtherefore, sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten and half yearsand directed to pay fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to suffer rigorousimprisonment for one month. [NEERAJ P. DHOTE, J.][R.G. AVACHAT, J.] KBP