Writ Petition No. 3796 of 2020 · Bombaybench High Court
Case Details
2025:BHC-AUG:4141 -1- W.P.No.3796.2020.IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADWRIT PETITION NO. 3796 OF 2020Gurunanak Goshala TrustA Public Trust, Registered with the Charity Commissioner Office, NashikBearing Trust Registration No. E-232/JalgaonThrough its ChairmanShri. Amrutlal Parshuram HansResident of Kanwar NagarTaluka Jalgaon, District Jalgoan …. PetitionerVersus1Shri. Rameshwar Shreekrishna SomaniAge : Adult, Occu : Agriculture,2Jagdish Ramkrishna SomaniAge : Adult, Occu : Agriculture,3Narayan Ramkrishna SomaniAge : Adult, Occu : Agriculture,4Om Prakash Shrikrishna SomaniAge : Adult, Occu : Agriculture,All above R/o : Hotel Jayshree, National Highway No. 6, At Post Paldhi (Bu.), Dharan Gaon,District Jalgaon5The Additional DirectorTown Planning Jalgaon, District Jalgaon6.The State of MaharashtraThrough Revenue and Forest Department,Government of Maharashtra, Mantralaya, Mumbai …. Respondents***Advocate for Petitioners : Mr. A. S. BajajAdvocate for Respondents No. 1 to 4 : Ms. A. N. AnsariAGP for Respondents No. 5 and 6-State : Ms. A. S. Mantri -2- W.P.No.3796.2020.***CORAM:MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J. RESERVED ON:28 JANUARY, 2025PRONOUNCED ON:13 FEBRUARY, 2025 ***JUDGMENT : 1.Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally withthe consent of parties. 2.The petitioner is invoking the powers of this Court underArticles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking interferencein the order dated 15.07.2019 passed by the Minister for State(Revenue), Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai, in RevisionApplication No. tehu&3218@iz-dz-190@t&6v. The petitioner ischallenging the order which is filed in the revision application by therespondents No. 1 to 4 thereby quashing and setting aside the orderpassed by the Additional Commissioner, Nashik Division, Nashik inRTS/Revision/347/2018 dated 28.08.2018.3.The present petitioner is the original appellant who hadfiled Appeal No. 33/150/104/2015 before the Sub-Divisional Officer,Jalgaon Division, Jalgaon. The petitioner Trust owns Gat No. 73/1,73/2, 73/3, 73/4 and 73/5 at village Paldhi (Bu.) The respondents
Legal Reasoning
-3- W.P.No.3796.2020.No. 1 to 4 owns the land Gat No. 66/1/C and 66/1/, which is in frontof the land of the petitioner and the Jalgaon – Dhule Road is abuttingthe land of respondents. The respondents had applied for Non-Agricultural (hereinafter “NA” for short) permission of their land andthe same was granted to them. While granting the permission for NA,certain conditions were imposed out of which one condition imposedon the respondents No. 1 to 4 was that, they were directed to leave /keep a road of 15 meters wide and 13.5 meter to be used by theadjacent land holders. It is the contention of the petitioner that theland of the petitioner is just behind the land of respondents and theroad of 15 meter and 13.5 meter respectively have direct access to theNational Highway No. 6. The land bearing gat No. 73 which is ownedby the petitioner does not have any access to the National HighwayNo. 6. In order to approach National Highway No. 6, the internalroads in the lay out are the only ways of approach available to thepetitioner. 4.It is the contention of the petitioner that inspite of clearstipulation in the NA permission, the respondents No. 1 to 4obstructed the road. Therefore, the petitioner made complaint /application before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jalgaon seeking actionagainst the respondents for violation of condition of NA permission on -4- W.P.No.3796.2020.29.06.2012. In the complaint filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer, itwas also grievance of the petitioner that the respondents hadencroached upon his land and had destroyed the boundary marksplaced by the Deputy Director of Land Record along with obstructionof 15 meter road and 13.5 meter road adjacent to the land of thepetitioner. 5.The respondents had appeared before the Sub-DivisionalOfficer and filed their reply to the complaint. However, during thependency of the appeal, the parties decided to settle the disputeamicably and accordingly, consent terms were drawn and executedbetween the parties on 05.04.2016. The terms of settlement wereplaced before the Sub-Divisional Officer and he was requested to passorder in accordance with the consent terms. The Sub-DivisionalOfficer has accordingly passed an order on 19.05.2016 in appeal No.33/150/104/2015. After taking on record consent terms, since theorder was passed in terms of the compromise, it was recorded in theorder that -1.The petitioner and the respondents should maintaintheir boundaries according to the compromise enteredinto between the parties. 2.The respondents should get regularise the constructionmade on their lands in accordance with the NApermission dated 29.06.2012 and the sanction lay outdated 18.09.2010. -5- W.P.No.3796.2020.3.The 15 meter and 13.5 meter wide road as per thesanction lay out dated 18.09.2010 shall be madeavailable to the land owners without raising anyobjection in terms of compromise.6.Being aggrieved by the said order, the respondents hereinfiled appeal before the Additional Collector, Jalgaon. It waschallenged on the ground that order passed by the Sub-DivisionalOfficer (“SDO” hereinafter) is not in accordance with the terms ofcompromise entered into between the parties. The SDO has passedthe order which is beyond the terms of compromise and thereby hehas exceeded the jurisdiction. The Additional Collector, Jalgaon hasrejected the appeal filed by the respondents herein vide his orderdated 31.03.2018 upholding the order passed by the SDO. 7.Thereafter, being aggrieved by the order passed by theAdditional Collector, Jalgaon, the respondents herein filed RTSRevision Application No. 347 of 2018 before the AdditionalCommissioner, Nashik Division, Nashik. The AdditionalCommissioner, Nashik, by his order dated 28.08.2018, also rejectedthe revision of the respondents herein maintaining the order passedby the Additional Collector dated 31.03.2018. 8.The respondents, therefore, approached before theMinister of State (Revenue), Government of Maharashtra, by filing -6- W.P.No.3796.2020.Second Revision Application No. tehu&3218@iz-dz-190@t&6vunder Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. Theapplication was heard by the Minister for State (Revenue),Maharashtra State, Mumbai. 9.The Minister while recording his finding observed thatthough there was a compromise entered between the parties, the SDOhas unnecessarily referred to the conditions while sanctioning NA aswell as the lay out and based thereupon, he has passed the order. TheSDO has passed an order on the issues which were never raised in theappeal before the SDO and the order passed was beyond the prayersmade in the application, was not maintainable. The order passed bythe SDO is beyond the scope of compromise. The grounds which werenever raised by the applicant in the application have been suo-motoconsidered by the SDO which is not permissible and it is totallyperverse. Therefore, the order passed by the SDO is not maintainable.In compromise placed before the SDO, it has been recorded thatwhatever encroachment has been made by the respondent should beremoved and in future, if either of the parties propose to makepermanent construction, they will not create any obstruction to eachother. 10.The Minister further observed that due to unnecessary -7- W.P.No.3796.2020.medlling and referring to the issues which were not a matter ofdispute between the parties, the SDO has created complications in thematter. Since there was already compromise pursis which was placedbefore him, the matter should have been decided limiting it to theextent of terms of compromise and nothing more that that. Since theSDO has passed an order which is not as per the terms ofcompromise, even the other orders passed by the AppellateAuthorities are required to be quashed and set aside. With theseobservations, the Revision filed before the Minister was allowed andthe matter was sent back to the Tahsildar, Dharangaon, Dist. Jalgaonfor recording of compromise as per the terms settled into between theparties. 11.Learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that as aresult of order passed by the Minister, the concurrent findingsrecorded by all the three Authorities below in the hierarchy have beenset aside. The first contention of the petitioner is that whenever anyNA permission as well lay out is sanctioned, it is always a subject tocertain terms and conditions and the conditions are binding on theparties in whose favour the orders are sanctioned. 12.Learned Advocate for the petitioner has drawn myattention to condition No. 5, 6, 7-A as well as 21 of the NA permission -8- W.P.No.3796.2020.dated 29.06.2012 which was granted in favour of the respondentsherein. Amongst the core conditions which the learned Advocate forthe petitioner places reliance on, condition No. 21 stipulates that theroads in the sanction lay out should coordinate with the roads withthe adjoining lay out. It is the duty of the person seeking permissionto coordinate roads in the lay out with the existing roads and if theroads do not coordinate with the roads of the adjoining lay out, theapplicant has to take steps and get a fresh permission by makingnecessary changes to coordinate with the roads in the adjacent layout. Therefore, once having accepted the conditions of NA, therespondents were bound to keep the road of 15 meter as well as 13.5meter wide road at the beginning of his gat number available for theusage and passage of the petitioner. Since the road has beenobstructed, he was constrained to file the proceedings. 13.According to learned Advocate for the petitioner, it is notonly the question of his personal rights but is also a question of allothers who would be entitled for usage of passage from the said road.Apart from him, there are other users who will be deprived of theirrights. Admittedly, there was a compromise entered between theparties on two issues. The first issue was regarding the encroachmentand second was regarding the obstruction. So far as the compromise -9- W.P.No.3796.2020.to the extent of encroachment is concerned, the compromise to thatextent has been accepted and both the parties had acted thereupon.As far as the compromise to the extent of closing the road by usingwire fencing and allowing petitioner to use a small gate with theconsent of either of the parties is concerned, it has a furtherstipulation that the respective parties should not create anyobstruction to each other. The condition that the wire fencing whichhas blocked the road in the lay out, the petitioner shall have no righton the said road, making the condition further binding even on thesuccessors of the parties. This according to petitioner does not restrictto him and the respondents. 14.Though there was a compromise, however, the SDOhimself had already conducted inspection of the spot. During the saidinspection, he found that the construction made by the respondentsherein is in contravention of the permission granted to them. Theroad which is shown in the lay out has been blocked by therespondents. In view of his inspection, he suo-moto has directed theDeputy Superintendent of Land Record vide letter dated 31.08.2015and 14.09.2015 to conduct the measurement of the lands of thepetitioner and respondents and submit the report alongwith the map. 15.Accordingly, after conducting the measurement, report -10- W.P.No.3796.2020.came to be submitted which indicates that the 15 meter wide road aswell as 13.5 meter wide road which was sanctioned in the lay out wasblocked by constructing wire compound which also resulted inblocking the access of the petitioner for approaching his gat number.Though compromise deed was placed before him, subsequent to thereports received by him, he has accepted the terms of compromiseonly to the extent of encroachment made by the respondents. So faras the violation of conditions of building permission, as well as lay outis concerned, he has proceeded to pass an order declaring it to beillegal. While passing the order, he has directed the respondent hereinto get the construction regularised as per the norms. So far as theobstruction to 15 meter and 13.5 meter road is concerned, it has beendirected that if at all in future, the land holders requests for makingavailable the road, the same shall be made available to them withoutany complaint.16.According to the learned Advocate for the petitioner,after observing the irregularity and illegality in the reports submittedby the Deputy Superintendent of Land Record as well as inobservations during the inspection of the site, both the appellateauthorities below have refused to interfere with the order passed bythe SDO since the order passed by the SDO was based on the report -11- W.P.No.3796.2020.of the Deputy Superintendent of Land Record. According to him, therespondents were granted development permission subject to certainconditions. In the present case, though there is a compromise, there isa violation of condition which is brought to the notice of the SDO. Inthe circumstances, the SDO, cannot ignore the said fact merelybecause of compromise has been entered between the parties. If thereis a contravention of terms of development permission, the SDO isbound to pass appropriate order. The terms of compromise cannotbind the Government Authority. 17.Learned Advocate for the petitioner my attention towardsSection 52 of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, whichreads thus :“52. Penalty for unauthorised development or for useotherwise than in conformity with Development Plan.(1) Any person who, whether at his own instance or atthe instance of any other person commences, undertakes orcarries out development or institutes, or changes the use ofany land-(a) without permission required under this Act; or(b) which is not in accordance with any permission grantedor in contravention of any condition subject to which suchpermission has been granted;(c) after the permission for development has been dulyrevoked; or -12- W.P.No.3796.2020.(d) in contravention of any permission which has been dulymodifiedshall be on conviction, annexed with imprisonment for aterm shall not be less than one month but which may extendto three years and with fine which shall not be less than twothousand rupees but which may extend to five thousandrupees, and in the case of a continuing offence with afurther daily fine which may extend to two hundred rupeesfor every day during which the offence continues afterconviction for the first Commission of the offence.(2) Any person who continues to use or allows the use ofany land or building in contravention of the provisions of aDevelopment Plan without being allowed to do so undersection 45 or 47, or where the continuance of such use hasbeen allowed under that section continues such use after theperiod for which the use has been allowed or withoutcomplying with the terms and conditions under which thecontinuance of such use is allowed, shall, on conviction bepunished with fine which may extend to five thousandrupees which may extend to one thousand rupees; and inthe case of a continuing offence, with a further fine whichmay extend to one Hundred rupees for every day duringwhich such offence continues after conviction for the firstcommission of the offence.”18.Therefore, considering that the scope of Section 52 ofMRTP Act, it is very much within the powers of the SDO to passappropriate order, if it is found that there is contravention ofcondition. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that awaiver of right which affects the public interest will not bind the otherparties who are affected more so if it is contrary to public interest. -13- W.P.No.3796.2020.According to him, the compromise which he had entered, amountedto waiver of rights of other gat owners who were affected by theobstruction created by the respondents. Therefore, by waving hisright, he has waived the right of other gat holders who also had aright for use of that road. Even otherwise, since waiver of right iscontrary to the conditions of NA permission is also against the publicpolicy. Therefore, the SDO has passed appropriate order which needsno interference.19.In order to support his contention that the petitionercannot waive his right which is contrary to the public policy, thelearned Advocate Mr. Bajaj relies upon the judgment of Hon’bleSupreme Court in All India Power Engineer Federation and Others Vs.Sasan Power Limited and Others 2017(1) SCC 487. Learned Advocatefor the petitioner specifically invites my attention to the paragraphsNo. 19, 21 and 25, which reads thus : “19. At this juncture, it is important to understand whatexactly is meant by waiver In Jagad Bandhu Chatterjee v.Nilima Rani8, this Court held : (SCC pp. 446-47, para 5)“5. In India the general principles with regard towaiver of contractual obligation is to be found inSection 63 of the Contract Act. Under that section it isopen to a promisee to dispense with or remit, wholly orin part, the performance of the promise made to him hecan accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinksfit. Under the India law neither This Court has aleady -14- W.P.No.3796.2020.laid down in Waman Shriniwas Kini v. RatilalBhagwandas & Co.9, SCT p. 226 that: (AIR p. 694, para13)”“13. …. waiver is the abandonment of a rightwhich normally everybody is at liberty to waive. Awaiver is nothing unless it amounts to release. Itsignifies nothing more than an intention not to insistupon the right,”It is well known that in the law of pre-emption the generalprinciple which can be said to have been uniformly adoptedby the Indian courts is that acquiescence in the sale by anypositive act amouting to relinquishment of a pre-emptive isconcerned the principle of waiver is based mainly onMohammedan Jurisprudence,. The contention that thewaiver of the appellant’s right under Section 26-F of theBengal Tenancy Act must be founded on contract oragreement cannot be acceded to and must be rejected.” “ 21. Regard being had to the aforesaid decisions, it isclear that when waiver is spoken of in the realm of contract,Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act governs. But it isimportant to note that waiver is an intentionalrelinquishment of a known right, and that, therefore, unlessthere is a clear intention to relinquish a right that is fullyknown to a party, a party cannot be said to waive it. But thematter does not end here. It is also clear that if any elementof public interest is involved and a waiver takes place by oneof the parties to an agreement, such waiver will not be giveneffect to if it is contrary to such public interest. This is clearfrom a reading of the following authorities.” “25. It is thus clear that if there is any element of publicinterest involved, the court steps in to thwart any waiverwhich may be contrary to such public interest.”20.Hence, in the above-mentioned paragraphs, the Hon’bleSupreme Court observed that if there is any element of public interestinvolved, the court steps in to thwart any waiver which may be -15- W.P.No.3796.2020.contrary to such public interest. In the present case, the road which isblocked by the respondent is a public road and the compromiseentered between the petitioner and respondent amounts to waivingthe right which is against the public policy and public interest. 21.When the query was made to the learned Advocate forthe petitioner that whether compromise can be acted in part andwaived in part as has been done in the present case. According to therespective parties, they admit that so far as encroachment isconcerned, they do not have any qualms about the terms ofcompromise in that regard. Only to the extent of obstruction road, thepetitioner is not agreeable to the terms of compromise and though hehas entered into compromise by waiving his right. He justifies theorder passed by SDO and has also challenged the order passed by theMinister. According to him, the compromise is severable compromisewhich is nothing but an agreement. Doctrine of severability isapplicable even in case of contracts. 22.If there is an objectionable part in a compromise, it iscertainly severable and therefore, according to him, so far as the partof objection regarding the obstruction of 15 meter and 13.5 meterroad is concerned i.e. it is severable, hence, the SDO has passed anorder which cannot be faulted with. In this regard, he has relied upon -16- W.P.No.3796.2020.the judgment of Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. Vs. Jain Studios Ltd.(2006)2 SCC 628. In the above case, the question that arise fordetermination before the Court was whether arbitration agreement islegal, valid and enforceable. In the arbitration clause, there was astipulation that the arbitrator’s determination shall be final andbinding between the parties and parties waive all rights of appeal orobjection in any jurisdiction referring to the clause of severability.Similarly, there was a severability clause, which reads thus :“20. Severability.- If any provision of this agreement isheld invalid, illegal or unenforceable for any reason,including by judgment of, or interpretation of relevantlaw, by any court of competent jurisdiction, thecontinuation in full force and effect of the remainder ofthem shall not be prejudiced.”23.Considering the clauses above, the Hon’ble SupremeCourt has observed that if a contract is in several parts, the one whichare legal and valid, are enforceable, lawful parts can be enforcedprovided that they are severable. The learned Advocate for thepetitioner hence, submits that considering the above settled positionof law, the part of compromise which he had entered into, wasagainst the public policy and it can be severed it has rightly not beentaken into consideration by the SDO, while passing the order.Therefore, he requests that the order passed by the Minister is passedwithout taking into consideration the well settled principle of element -17- W.P.No.3796.2020.of public policy and severability of terms of compromise. Hence, onthat count, the order passed by the Minister deserves to be quashedand set aside.24.Per contra, learned Advocate Smt. Ansari for respondentsNo. 1 to 4 has opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioner,having once entered into terms of compromise, cannot again turnback and challenge it. It is her contention that, she has fully compliedwith the terms of the compromise. In the terms of compromise, it hasbeen noted that there is a small gate kept in the wire fencing betweenthe gat numbers of petitioner and respondent and it is admitted thatrespective parties will not create any obstruction for usage thereof. Sofar as the order passed by the SDO is concerned, the SDO hasexceeded his jurisdiction by passing the order, beyond the terms ofcompromise.25.It is her contention that she has acted and implementedall the terms of compromise. She also raised objection to the report ofthe Deputy Superintendent of Land Record which is relied upon bythe SDO while passing the order. According to her, the report wasnever served on her. She was not present during the inspectionconducted by the SDO on 29.07.2015. Therefore, passing of order onthe basis of the report conducted by Superintendent of Land Record -18- W.P.No.3796.2020.as well as the the inspection which is conducted by the SDO dated29.07.2015 without making available the copies of such panchanamaas well as report to the respondents amounts to violation of principlesof natural justice.26.It is the contention of the respondent that even thegrievance of the petitioner herein while making the application to theSDO was limited only to the extent of encroachment and theobstructions to his approach road between the gat number ofpetitioner and respondents. When there was already a compromiseregarding the encroachment as well as the obstructions made on theroad, the SDO without there being any complaint whatsoever, has nobusiness to make observations regarding the construction made by therespondents by recording that the respondent has constructed thegodown contrary to the sanctioned lay out. 27.As per sanctioned lay out, plots No. 1 to 5 and 8 to 11were independent. However, by making construction on plots No. 1 to5, a single godown was constructed and the same has been done withthe plots No. 8 to 11 which according to the SDO, is contrary to theconditions of NA as well as lay out. In the operative order, he hasdirected that the respondents herein should get the constructionregularised in accordance with the conditions of the NA as well as -19- W.P.No.3796.2020.sanction lay out.28.The respondent No. 5 also filed the reply affidavit. It isthe contention of the learned AGP that the proposal for commerciallay out plan for ‘Transfer Godown for Goods’ in the suit, land bearinggat No. 66/1 (c + d) of Mauje Paldhi Bk. Tq. Dharangaon, Dist.Jalgaon was received by the Office of Assistant Director of TownPlanning, Jalgaon. On scrutiny of the proposal, it has recommendedthe lay out in the suit land vide letter dated 22.07.2010. Later arevised proposal for same purpose was received by the Office ofRespondent No. 5 vide letter dated 08.09.2010 which was sanctionedon 18.09.2010. After receiving the sanction, SDO, Jalgaon has finallyapproved the lay out and accordingly granted the NA permission onthe suit land vide order dated 29.06.2012. It is stated that the road inthe lay out has to be kept open for public use as per condition No. 6of the NA order which includes 13.50 meter and 15 meter wide roadin the lay out. Hence, in view of the condition No. 6 in the NA order,the SDO, Jalgaon has passed the order.29.I have heard respective parties and after hearing andgoing through the documents placed on record, the question thatarises for consideration is whether the authority i.e. SDO could have -20- W.P.No.3796.2020.passed order beyond the terms of compromise. The undisputed factsas per the record are that ; (1) the petitioner is the owner of Gat No.73 which is adjoining Gat No. 696/1, 66/1/d and 66/1/c. (2) Therespondent has been granted NA permission on 29.06.2012 forcommercial use with certain terms and conditions and in the sanctionlay out which is also not disputed. There is a 15 meter wide road aswell as 13.5 meter wide road. Both the roads are adjoining to Gat No.73 which is owned by the petitioner. (3) As per the conditions of theNA, the roads are to be kept open for the passage of adjoining landholders. (4) The petitioner herein had filed a complaint about theencroachment on the land in Gat No. 73 made by the respondent aswell as the road which is existing in the land of the respondent hasbeen blocked. (5) There was a compromise between the parties.According to terms of compromise, it was decided that the respondentherein has already removed whatever encroachment and he hadhanded over the possession of the land. 30.So far as the wire fencing is concerned, it was a conditionin the compromise that in future, if there is a necessity of makingpermanent construction, the respective parties will not take anyobjection to the said construction. The small gate which is kept openfor the use of petitioner herein will not be obstructed by either of the -21- W.P.No.3796.2020.sides and the wire fencing which is made by the appellant, therespondents will not claim any right over the said fencing. Since thereis a compromise entered into between the parties, the appellant willnot raise any objection with regard to it and he has given up his rightto proceed with the pending matter.31.In view of the said compromise, according to therespondent, there should not have been any order passed by the SDO.It is apparent that during the pendency of the application / complaintof the petitioner, the SDO has visited the spot and has observedcertain irregularities and illegalities committed by the respondentherein. Therefore, he had made observations in his order dated29.06.2012. So far as the terms of the compromise is concerned, ithas been recorded by the SDO that the respective parties shouldadhere to their boundaries as mentioned in the compromise.Thereafter, either of the gat holders if at all find it necessary thatthere is need of opening the 15 meter as well as 13.5 meter road, therespective party shall make available the said road by removing theobstruction. So far as these two directions are concerned, there isnothing which is contrary to the compromise entered between theparties. The only objection regarding clause No. 2 in the orderdirecting the respondent herein to get the construction regularise is -22- W.P.No.3796.2020.concerned, there is nothing to be aggrieved by the said order.32.Hence, on going through the passed by the SDO, theoperative part was not contrary to the terms of compromise. So far asthe regularisation of construction part is concerned, it was very muchwithin the power of SDO to direct the respondents herein on the basisof inspection conducted by the SDO himself on the spot on29.06.2015. The SDO has not exceeded his jurisdiction by passingthe said order. Though it is the contention of the respondent hereinthat he has exceeded his jurisdiction by passing the order which isbeyond the terms of compromise, but as can be gathered from thejudicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All IndiaPower Engineering Federation (Supra) as well as Shin Satellite(supra), that when there is a compromise between the parties whichamounts to waiver which affects the public interest in such case,Section 63 of the Contract Act governs. If any public interest isinvolved and waiver is exercised by one of the party, an agreement ofsuch waiver will not be given effect to if it is contrary to such publicinterest. Whenever such public interest is involved, the Court stepsinto to thwart any waiver which may be contrary to such publicinterest. -23- W.P.No.3796.2020.33.Similar is the view taken by this Court in case of KisanShivram Marwadi Vs. Nama Rama Vir (1910)12 BOMLR 1024, whena similar question fall for the consideration of this Court. In para 9 ofthe Shivram (supra), it is held thus :“9. We are of opinion, moreover, that the mere fact, thatthe defendant though apprised of the terms of thecompromise agreed to it, does not invest the Court withjurisdiction to pass a decree to carry out such a compromise.It must be observed that the only knowledge which appearsto have been brought home to the defendant is a knowledgeof the terms of the compromise, not a knowledge of his legalposition under the specially favourable DekkhanAgriculturists'' Relief Act. That is important in connectionwith Section 12 of the Act which deals with admissions bythe debtor, and requires the Court to be satisfied, beforegiving effect to such admissions, that they were made withthe full knowledge of the debtor''s legal rights as against thecreditor. This section and Section 13 seem to us to indicatethat the object of the Act was to place the defendant-agriculturist''s interests rather in the hands of the Court forprotection than to trust them to the hands of the defendanthimself.”34.All the above judicial pronouncements succinctlyobserves that whenever there is compromise and it is opposed to thepublic policy or statute, it is not binding on the Court. Hence, in viewof the above observations though there was a compromise betweenthe petitioner and the respondents, the order passed by the SDOcannot be held to be passed by exceeding the jurisdiction. 35.In view of the settled position of law as stated here-in- -24- W.P.No.3796.2020.above, the order passed by the Minister which has taken a view thatthe order passed by the SDO is beyond his powers and jurisdictionand is not according to the compromise, needs to be quashed and setaside. Resultantly, writ petition deserves to be allowed. Hence,following order. ORDERI.Writ Petition is allowed in terms of prayer Clause (B).II.The order dated 15.07.2019 passed by the Minister forState (Revenue), Government of Maharashtra in SecondRevision Application No. tehu&3218@iz-dz-190@t&6vstands qushed and set aside. III.Rule made absolute in above terms. [MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J.] Omkar Joshi