RAVINDRA v. GHUGE &Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, JJ.RESERVED ON
Facts
( 1 ) wp 723.24IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADWRIT PETITION NO. 723 OF 20241. Nagorao s/o. Sitaram KulkarniAge:- 88 years, Occ.:- Agriculture, R/o. Khasgaon, Tq. Jafrabad, Dist. Jalna.2. Pralhad s/o. Dattatray KulkarniAge:-76 years, Occ.:- Retired, R/o. Khasgaon, Tq. Jafrabad, Dist. Jalna.3. Sharad s/o. Dattatray KulkarniAge:- 73 years, Occ.:- Retired, R/o. 231, G-1 Sector, Triveni Nagar, N-7, CIDCO, Dist. Aurangabad.4. Aruna w/o. Pandurang BhaleraoAge:- 64 years, Occ.:- Housewife, R/o. Flat No.8, Udyogdeep Apartment, Khivansara Park, Dist. Aurangabad.5. Purushottam s/o. Dattatray KulkarniAge:- 59 years, Occ.:- Agriculture, R/o. Khasgaon, Tq. Jafrabad, Dist. Jalna.6. Narayan s/o. Digambar KulkarniAge:- 69 years, Occ.:- Agriculture, R/o. Khasgaon, Tq. Jafrabad, Dist. Jalna....PETITIONERSV/s.1. The State of MaharashtraThrough Collector, Jalna.2. Divisional Commissioner, ( 2 ) wp 723.24Office of Divisional Commissioner Aurangabad.3. The Collector,Office of Collector, Jalna.4. The Collector,Office of Collector, Aurangabad.5.Sub-Divisional Officer,Jalna, Dist. Jalna.6. The Tahasildar,Office of the Tahasil, Jafrabad Tq. Jafrabad, Dist. Jalna.7. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,Office of the S.D.O., Bhokardan, Dist. Jalna. ... RESPONDENTS...Mr. G. S. Shete, Advocate for the PetitionersMr. P. K. Lakhotiya, AGP for Respondent-State…CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE &Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, JJ.RESERVED ON :22nd January, 2024 PRONOUNCED ON :5th February, 2024JUDGMENT (Per: Y. G. Khobragade, J.) :-1.Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally with theconsent of the parties.2.By the present petition, the Petitioners put-forth prayer Clause-B asunder:
Legal Reasoning
( 5 ) wp 723.245.In support of these submissions, the learned advocate appearingfor the Petitioners placed reliance on the judgment dated 05.01.2024 passed bythe Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat (Coram: B.P. Colabawalla &Somasekhar Sundaresan, JJ.) in Writ Petition No.1430/2022, Rajiv KumarDamodarprasad Bhadani and Ors. V/s. The Executive Engineer, MaharashtraState Electricity Distribution Company Limited (MSEDCL) and Ors., wherein itwas observed in Para Nos. 63 to 65 as under:“63.Consequently, it is apparent that the prime argument onmerits ie. that electricity law has overtaken land acquisition lawsand there is no need to pay any compensation for land acquisitiontowards construction of sub-stations is misconceived. For thereasons set out above, it is also clear that there is no reasonabledispute about the identity of the Subject Land and about whetherpossession of the Subject Land had in fact come from MHADArather than Respondent No. 2. We have also already explained whyit is appropriate not to treat this Writ Petition as one beingunworthy of consideration on merits, on the ground of delays andlaches.64. Therefore, for the Subject Land having been taken over andconstructed upon without any compensation having been paid, andwithout even a notification for land acquisition and consequentialaward of compensation, either under the Land Acquisition Act orthe MRTP Act, we would need to consider what appropriateremedy would follow. In our considered opinion, the position thatemerges is that even a specific piece of legislation has not beenselected by the State for exercise of powers of land acquisition.The State's officers' discussions about whether the acquisitionought to be under the MRTP Act, or the Land Acquisition Act orboth, are part of the record. The record points to the fact that theState was indeed aware of the need to pay compensation incompliance with law, but has not done so. The material on recordalso clearly brings out that the possession of the land was directly ( 6 ) wp 723.24taken by the MSEB but the State was conscious that it ought to paycompensation. It is noteworthy that Respondent No. 3 has not filedany affidavit throughout the journey of these proceedings whileRespondent No. 1 has filed four affidavits with wide-rangingcontentions to resist the payment of compensation.65. For the reasons set out above, we find that the Petitionershave indeed made out a case for compensation for the land handedover to Respondent No. 1. At this distance of time, there can be noquestion of vacating the Subject Land and handing it over to thePetitioners as prayed in prayer clause (a) in Paragraph 35 of theWrit Petition, which we reject. Multiple stakeholders have aninterest in the use to which the Subject Land has been put, andthere can be no question of granting such relief.”6.Per contra, the learned AGP has canvassed that, the Petitionersallege that the State Government acquired their land in the year 1955, but nocompensation has been paid. However, the Petitioners have not explained thedelay to approach this court seeking compensation after lapse of more than 68years from the date of acquisition of the land. Merely, the Respondent No.6Tahsildar effected Mutation Entry No. M. E. No.369 in 7/12 extract on18.12.1989, which does not create any right in favour of the petitioners,because the mutation entries in revenue record are only for fiscal purpose andthey do not confirm the title over the property. Further, merely the petitionerssubmitted the Representation on 03.08.2006 with the Respondents authoritiesand issuance of communication dated 18.08.2006 by the Respondent No.2 -Divisional Commissioner, does not create any cause of action. Hence, claim ofthe petitioners is hopelessly barred by the law of limitation. Therefore, the ( 7 ) wp 723.24Petitioners are dis-entitled for claiming compensation in lieu of acquisition ofthe land. So also, on 26.10.2010, the State Government issued a GovernmentResolution that, if the State Government acquires the land and the land ownersseek compensation after lapse of huge period, it would be presumed that theland owners relinquish their right in favour of the State Government. Since,the petitioners approached this court after lapse of 68 years from theacquisition of the land, therefore, the petitioners claim for compensation ishopelessly barred by law of limitation. Hence, prayed for dismissal of thepetition. 7.Needless to say that, the Petitioners are allegedly owners of theirancestral land bearing old Survey No.181 presently Gut No.488 ad-measuring 3H 25R. The Petitioners claim that, in the year 1955 the Government acquiredtheir land for extension of Gavthan, but no compensation have been paid tothem till date. Further, though the State Government acquired their land in theyear 1955, but mutation entry No. 369 has been taken by the Respondent No.6-Tahsildar on 18.10.1989. It is settled principle of law that, the mutation entriesin revenue record do not create any title over the property, but those entriesare only for fiscal purpose as held in Shrikant R. Sankanwar and Ors. V/s.Krishna Balu Naukudkar; (2003) 2 Mh.L.J 276. ( 8 ) wp 723.248.In the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. V/s. MaharashtraIndustrial Development Corporation and Ors.; (2013) 1 SCC 353, the Hon’bleSupreme Court held that right to property is a fundamental right under Article300-A of the Constitution and observed in para no.9 as under:“9.The right to property is now considered to be not only aconstitutional or a statutory right but also a human right. Though,it is not a basic feature of the Constitution or a fundamental right.Human rights are considered to be in realm of individual rights,such as the right to health, the right to livelihood. the right toshelter and employment, ete. Now however, human rights aregaining an even greater multifaceted dimension. The right toproperty is considered very much to be a part of such newdimension. (Vide Lachluman Dass v. Jagat Ram, Amarjit Singh v.State of Punjab. State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolans, Stateof Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd.v. State of U.P.¹)”9.In the case of State of Maharashtra V/s. Digambar; (1995) 4 SCC683, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, on account of lapse of time or ofundue delay the Writ Petitioner, be he a citizen or otherwise, is not entitled torelief against anybody including the State and observed in Para Nos. 18 to 26as under:“18. Coming to the exercise of power conferred upon the HighCourt under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuing orders,directions or writs for "any purpose", such power is discretionary,being a matter well-settled, cannot be disputed.19. Power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 ofthe Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious andreasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person'sentitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the ( 9 ) wp 723.24Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if isfounded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has tonecessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the personseeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief tosuch person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it withunclean hands or blameworthy conduct.20. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a personin approaching a court of equity in England for obtainingdiscretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief wasexplained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, long ago, in LindsayPetroleum Co. v. Hurd thus:"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equityis not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where itwould be practically unjust to give a remedy, eitherbecause the party has, by his conduct, done that whichmight fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it,or where by his conduct and neglect he has, thoughperhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the otherparty in a situation, in which it would not be reasonableto place him if the remedy were afterwards to beasserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time anddelay are most material. But in every case, if anargument against relief, which otherwise would be just,is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course notamounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, thevalidity of that defence must be tried upon principlessubstantially equitable. Two circumstances, alwaysimportant in such cases, are, the length of the delay andthe nature of the acts done during the interval, whichmight affect either party and cause a balance of justiceor injustice in taking the one course or the other, so faras it relates to the remedy."21. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grantof relief to a party by equity court of England, could disentitle thegrant of relief to a person by the High Court in exercise of its powerunder Article 226 of our Constitution, when came up forconsideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in MoonMills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, it was regardedas a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High ( 10 ) wp 723.24Court in exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of theConstitution.22. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Maharashtra SRTC v.Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service reiterated the said principle oflaches or undue delay as that which applied in exercise of power bythe High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.23. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vestedunder Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writfor granting relief to a person including a citizen without consideringhis disentitlement for such relief due to his blameworthy conduct ofundue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order orwrit becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously andreasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as thatmade arbitrarily.24. Since we have held earlier that the person seeking grant ofrelief under Article 226 of the Constitution, even if it be against theState, is required to satisfy the High Court that he was not guilty oflatches or undue delay in approaching it for relief, need arises for usto consider whether the respondent in the present appeal (writpetitioner in the High Court) who had sought for relief ofcompensation on the alleged infringement of his legal right, hadsatisfied the High Court that he was not guilty of undue delay orlatches in approaching it for relief. The allegation of the petitioner inthe writ petition, as becomes clear from the judgment under appeal,was that although a certain extent of his land was taken away in theyear 1971-72 by the agency of the State for the scarcity relief roadworks undertaken by the State Government in the year 1971-72, tofind work for small agriculturists and agricultural labourers in thethen prevailing severe drought conditions, without his consent, hewas not compensated therefor, despite requests made to the StateGovernment and various agencies in that regard ever since till thedate of filing of the writ petition by him.25. In our view, the above allegation is in no way sufficient tohold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained properlyand satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had occurredbetween the alleged taking of possession of his land and the date offiling of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot overlook the fact ( 11 ) wp 723.24that it is easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody thattoo against the State. When such general allegation is made against aState in relation to an event said to have occurred 20 years earlier,and the State's non- compliance with petitioner's demands, the Statemay not at all be in a position to dispute such allegation, havingregard to the manner in which it is required to carry on itsgovernmental functions. Undue delay of 20 years on the part of thewrit petitioner, in invoking the High Court's extraordinaryjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for grant ofcompensation to his land alleged to have been taken by thegovernmental agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken atall, or if it had been taken it could not have been taken without hisconsent or if it was taken against his consent he had acquiesced insuch taking and waived his right to take compensation for it.26. Thus, when the writ petitioner (respondent here) was guilty oflatches or undue delay in approaching the High Court, the principleof latches or undue delay adverted to above, disentitled the writpetitioner (respondent here) for discretionary relief under Article 226of the Constitution from the High Court, particularly, when virtuallyno attempt had been made by the writ petitioner to explain hisblameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches. The High Court,therefore, was wholly wrong in granting relief in relation to inquiringinto the allegation and granting compensation for his land alleged tohave been used for scarcity relief road works in the year 1971-72. Asseen from the judgment of the High Court, the allegation adverted toabove, appears to be the common allegation in other 191 writpetitions where judgments are rendered by the High Court followingthe judgment under appeal and which are subject of SLPs in thisCourt that are yet to be registered. We have, therefore, no hesitationin holding that the High Court had gone wholly wrong in granting therelief which it has given in the judgment under appeal, and judgmentsrendered following the said judgment in other 191 writ petitions, saidto be the subject of SLPs or otherwise. All the said judgments of theHigh Court, having regard to the fact that they were made in writpetitions with common allegation and seeking common relief, areliable to be interfered with and set aside in the interests of justiceeven though only learned counsel appearing for a few writ petitionerswere heard by us.” ( 12 ) wp 723.2410.It is submitted that, on 26.10.2010 the State Government issued aG. R. in respect of seeking compensation by the agriculturist belatedly inrespect of acquisition of their lands. The State Government resolved in the GRwhich is in verbatim reproduced as under: " शासनानेसार्व(cid:7)जनिनकप्रयोजनांतर्ग(cid:7)तएखादीयोजनातातडीनेराबनिर्वण्यासाठी खाजर्गीजमीन, जमीनमालकांकडूनताब्यातघेण्याचीनिनतांतनिनकडअसते. अशार्वेळी खाजर्गीजमीनताब्यातघेतांनाकाहीअटीर्वरप्रस्तुतजमीनजमीनमालकाकडूनघेण्यातयेते. ज्याअटीर्वरजमीनमालकाकडूनजमीनघेण्यातआलीअसेलत्याअटीनुसारचजमीन मालकासनुकसानभरपाईदेयराहील. मात्र, जमीनमालकांकडूनजमीनताब्यातघेतांना कोणत्याहीअटीघालण्यांतआल्यानसतीलतरनिकंर्वाजमीननिर्वनामूल्यताब्यातघेतली असेलतरअशाजनिमनीबाबतजमीनमालकासनुकसानभरपाईदेयराहणारनाही. परतु एखादीजमीनभूसंपादनअनि.निनयम, १८९४नुसारसार्व(cid:7)जनिनकप्रयोजनासाठीसंपानिदतकेली असल्यासअशाजनिमनीसाठीनुकसानभरपाईदेयराहील. शासनानेसार्व(cid:7)जनिनकप्रयोजनासाठीशेतक- यांच्याखाजर्गीजनिमनी, जमीन मालकांच्यासंम्मतीने, राजीनामा, बक्षीसपत्रक, दानपत्रनिकंर्वातत्सम्प्रनिक्रयेद्वारेस्र्वखुशीने शासनाच्याताब्यातनिदल्यासअशाजनिमनीचीनुकसानभरपाईकाहीकालार्व.ीनंतरमार्गणी करण्याचाअनि.कारसंबंनि.तजमीनमालकासरहातनाहीर्वअशाप्रकारेताब्यातघेतलेल्या जनिमनीसाठीजमीनमालकांनीकालांतरानेनुकसानभरपाईचीमार्गणीकेल्यासत्यांनीनुकसान भरपाईनिमळण्याचाहक्कसोडूननिदलेलाआहेअसेर्गृहीत.रण्यासर्वार्वअसल्यामुळेपा. सर्वो(cid:7)च्चन्यायालयानेनिसव्हीलअपीलक्रमांक- ६०६६/१९९५, महाराष्ट्रशासननिर्वरुद्ध निदर्गंबरयान्यायालयीनप्रकरणामध्येनिदनांक१२/५/ १९९५रोजीनिदलेल्यायाचनिनण(cid:7)यामध्ये स्पष्टनिनष्कर्ष(cid:7)नोंदनिर्वलेलेआहेत. जरभनिर्वष्यातअशाचप्रकारचीकाहीप्रकरणंउद्भर्वल्यास अशाप्रकरणीमा. सर्वो(cid:7)च्चन्यायालयाच्यान्यायनिनण(cid:7)यानुसारनिर्वचारकरूननिनण(cid:7)यघेणे आर्वश्यकआहे. जमीनताब्यातघेतेर्वेळीमोबदलासंदभा(cid:7)तअटीलार्गूकेल्चानसल्यासनिकंर्वा रीतसरभूसंपादनप्रनिक्रयेच्यामाध्यमातूनसंपादनझालेनसल्यास, जमीनमालकाच्या संम्मतीनिशर्वायघेतलीनसार्वीर्वत्यानेनुकसानभरपाईनिमळण्याचाहक्कसोडूननिदलाआहे असेसमजूनकालांतरानेसंबंनि.तजमीनमालकांनीनुकसानभरपाईचीमार्गणीकेल्यासअशी नुकसानभरपाईसंबंनि.तांनादेण्यांतयेऊनयेर्वअशीप्रकरणेनाकारण्यांतयार्वीत.” ( 13 ) wp 723.2411.In the case of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU. Kakinada & OrsVs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care; (2020) 19 SCC 681, it isobserved that, what the Supreme Court cannot do in exercise of its plenarypowers under Article 142 of the Constitution, it is unfathomable as to how theHigh Court can take a different approach in the matter of reference to Article226 of the Constitution. The principle underlying the rejection of suchargument by the Supreme Court ‘would apply on all fours to the exercise ofpower by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India’. It isheld that neither jurisdiction under Article 142 nor the Writ jurisdiction underArticle 226 can be exercised to undermine or defeat the applicable statutoryregime.12.In the case in hand, the Petitioners claimed that, in the year 1955,the State Government acquired their land, but no compensation is paid tothem. However, the Petitioners fail to bring any circumstances or cause, whichprevented them to claim compensation till expiry of 68 years period. Therefore,it appears that, the petitioners have been sleeping over their rights for morethan 6 decades. The law of equity will not applicable to the litigants who areignorant of law and have slept over their rights for 68 years. ( 14 ) wp 723.2413.No doubt, in Vidya Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.;(2020) 2 SCC 569 and Tukaram Joshi cited (supra), the Hon’ble SupremeCourt laid down the law that, right to property is a Constitutional right underArticle 300-A of the Constitution of India and the State cannot dispossess thecitizen of his property except in accordance with procedure established by thelaw. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included inArticle 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. 14.In the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi cited (supra) the Hon’bleSupreme Court observed in Para Nos. 10 to 12 as under:“10. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by theRule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that isprovided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic andflexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion todecline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet.The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretionis dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and lachesis one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absoluteimpediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action,etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then theCourt should exercise the discretion more so, when no third partyinterest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrineof delay arid laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, thecause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocksjudicial conscience.11. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion andhas to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as thesame vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach offundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how thedelay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courtsto exercise their powers under Article 226. nor is it that there can never ( 15 ) wp 723.24be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passageof a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand forjustice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined tointerfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within thediscretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly andjustly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of theparty's defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.(Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271; Stateof MP. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 251; andTridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2009)1 SCC 768 (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 824);)12.No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the HighCourt should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party whomoves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches.Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the eventthat the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay shouldbe condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying theconduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained onthe sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technicalconsiderations are pitted against cach other, the cause of substantialjustice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to havea vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberatedelay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights haveinfact emerged, by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide: DurgaPrasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Ors., AIR 1970SC 769; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katijiand Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway CompanyLtd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 802:(1992) AIRSCW 3181); Dayal Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR2003 SC 1140: (2003 AIR SCW 685); and Shankara Co-op HousingSociety Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar and Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2161: (2011 AIRSCW 3033))”15.In the case of Digambar (supra), it has been held that, no person isentitled to obtain equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if hisconduct is blameworthy because of laches, undue delay and acquiescence or ( 16 ) wp 723.24waiver. The relief so granted becomes unsustainable. The relief sought underArticle 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare state is foundedon its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action. The need to explain lachesor undue delay on his part to obtain such relief would be more stringent thanin other cases. Therefore, the petitioners are required to be diligent in showingthat, their land has been acquired by Respondent No. 4, but no compensationhas been paid. 16.According to the Petitioners, the Respondent No.6-Tahsildareffected Mutation Entry No.369 on 18.10.1989. However the Petitioners havenot pleaded that, they were not having knowledge in respect of acquisition oftheir property by the State Authority, in the year 1955. So also, even from thedate of mutation entry, the Petitioners did not make any grievance for a longperiod of 34 years and after lapse of 68 years from the acquisition of theproperty, have approached this Court which certainly appears unjustifiable. Itis settled a principle of law that, the person who slept over his right for yearstogether and the claim which is barred by limitation, cannot be considered bythe Court. No doubt, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 thereis no absolute impediment. However, said exercising of powers arediscretionary. ( 17 ) wp 723.2417.Indeed, the Petitioners have put-forth a claim for compensationafter 68 years from the date of acquisition of their land. But they have not put-forth any such explanation to prove that, though they continuously pursuedtheir remedy before the Respondents since the date of acquisition of land, theirefforts have been rendered futile. As observed above, the Petitioners initiallyremained silent from 1955 to 1989, a period of 34 years. Again they remainedsilent for the period of 34 years from the date of effecting the mutation entry.Therefore, merely submitting representations on various dates i.e. 18.08.2006,24.08.2009, 12.11.2016, 16.08.2016, 24.05.2022 and 04.09.2023, would notindicate due diligence and justify lapse of limitation. Considering the factsclearly appearing in the present petition in the light of the law laid down incited cases, we do not find any merit in the present case.18. Thus, in the above circumstances, this Petition is dismissed. Rule isdischarged. No order as to cost. [Y.G. KHOBRAGADE, J.][RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.]mub
Arguments
( 3 ) wp 723.24“B. By issuing the writ of Mandamus or any other appropriatewrit, order or direction in the like nature be issued to theRespondents to pay Fair Compensation with interest along with allancillary benefits provided under the provisions of Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, for the land Adm. 03Hector 25 R of Gut no. 488 situated at village Khasgaon, Tq.Jafrabad, Dist. Jalna to the Petitioners.”3.Shri Shete, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners invehemence canvassed that, the Petitioners having ancestral land bearing oldSurvey No.181 (New Gat No. 488), ad-measuring 3 H 25 R. In the year 1959-60, mutation entries of said land were standing in the names of Shri DattatraySitarampant Kulkarni, Narayan Digambar Kulkarni (Petitioner No.6) andNagarao Sitaram Kulkarni (Petitioner No.1). Prior to 1959-60, the RespondentState Government initiated proceeding for acquisition of their land forextension of Gavthan. In the year 1955, the office of Land Records mistakenlyshown acquisition of the Petitioners’ land Survey No.97 for extension ofGavthan on the directions of Respondent No.3-Collector. According to thepetitioners, the Special Land Acquisition Officer-Respondent No.7, did notinitiate land acquisition proceeding and acquired their land ad-measuring 3 H25 R out of Gut No.488. It is further submitted that, though the land has beenacquired in the year 1955, the Respondent No.6 Tahsildar effected MutationEntry No. M.E. No.369 in 7/12 extract on 18.12.1989, but no compensation ( 4 ) wp 723.24have been paid. Therefore, on 03.08.2006, they submitted representation withthe Respondent Nos. 2 to 7. Accordingly, the Respondent No.2 - DivisionalCommissioner issued a communication dated 18.08.2006 and directedRespondent no. 3 to submit a status report in respect of grievance of thePetitioners, but effective steps were not taken. Ultimately, the Petitioners issueda legal notice dated 12.11.2016 under Section 80 of the Code of CivilProcedure to the Respondent/Authorities and called upon them to paycompensation for the acquired land as per the market rate under the Right toFair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation andResettlement Act, 2013. Thereafter, again on 16.08.2016, 24.05.2022 andlastly on 04.09.2023, the Petitioners submitted representation with theRespondent No.3-Collector and prayed for compensation, but till date nocompensation have been paid. 4.The learned advocate for the Petitioners canvased that, right toproperty is a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution ofIndia and as such the Petitioners’ ancestral land was acquired by theRespondents without payment of compensation, therefore, the petitioners aredeprived from enjoyment of fruits of their land, livelihood and fundamentalright of the Petitioners is violated and great miscarriage of justice caused to thePetitioners.