High Court · 2024
Legal Reasoning
60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADWRIT PETITION NO. 10255 OF 2024Vistacore Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd, A Company incorporated underThe Indian Companies Act, 2013,Through Its Authorised Representative Hemchandra Arun Patil Having office address at Flat No.1,Highgate, Plot No.21,Nilanjali, Housing Society,Kalyani Nagar, Pune 411006.Petitioner...Versus1.Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar Municipal Corporation Through Its Deputy CommissionerSolid Waste Management Department,Having address at Chhatrapati SambhajinagarMunicipal Corporation – 431 001.2.The State of MaharashtraThrough its Secretary,Department of Urban Development3.M/s. Royal Westn Projects LLP JV,having its office at Vedant Residency,Opp Serum Institute of India,Gate No.5, Haweli (Maha),Pune – 411 028.4.Latur City, Municipal Corporation, LaturThrough its Municipal Commissioner, Having its address at Latur MG Road,Main Road, Latur, Maharashtra – 413512.[1]
Legal Reasoning
60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odt5.Malegaon Municipal CorporationThrough its Municipal Commissioner,Having address at GGWJ+G7J, GulshanabadMalegaon, Maharashtra – 423203.6.GNI Infra-CD Transport (JV)Through its authorized representative Ravindersingh Bindra having its office atGut No.107, GN House, Next toRenukamata Mandir Kaman,Beed Bypass Road, Chh, Sambhajinagar-431 007.Email- [email protected]…****** Mr. P.R. Katneshwarkar, Senior Advocate alongwith Mr. Anuj Fulfagar i/by Mr.Amit Yadkikar alongwith Mr.Akshay Kulkarni, Mr. Shritej Surve, Mr. AkshayKamble, Advocates for the Petitioner.* Mr. R.S. Wani, AGP for Respondent No.2/State.* Mr. S.S. Tope, Advocate for Respondent No.1.* Mr. Devdatta Palodkar alongwith Mr. Shubham Khoche, Advocates forRespondent No.6.*****WITHWRIT PETITION NO. 10915 OF 2024Royal Westin Projects LLPA Company incorporated underThe Indian Companies Act, 2013,Through Its registered office atSurvey No.169, Satyapuram Society,Lane No.10, C-163,Saswad Road, Phursungi, Pune – 412308. Petitioner...[2] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtVersus1.The State of MaharashtraThrough Ministry of Urban Development,Having its address at2.Chatrapati Sambhaji Nagar Municipal Corporation Through Its Commissioner, Having office atMunicipal Corporation Building,Main Building, Town Hall,Behind Post Office,Chatrapati Sambhaji Nagar – 431 001.3.GNI Infrastructures Limitedhaving office at Gut No.107, G.N. House,Next to Renukamata Mandir Kaman,Beed Bypass Road, Chatrapati Sambhaji Nagar - 431 007.4.Surat Municipal CorporationThrough its Chief Officer,Having office at Mahanagar Seva SadanMuglisara, Surat – 395 003.Respondents…****** Mr. Onkar Warange, Advocate for the Petitioner.* Mr. R.S. Wani, AGP for Respondent No.1/State.* Mr. S.S. Tope, Advocate for Respondent No.2.* Mr. Devdatta Palodkar, Advocate for Respondent No.3.***** CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL & SHAILESH P. BRAHME, JJ.. RESERVED ON : 21 OCTOBER 2024 PRONOUNCED ON : 14 NOVEMBER 2024 *****[3] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtJ U D G M E N T (Per Shailesh P. Brahme, J.) : .Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. With the consent ofthe parties, heard these petitions together finally. 2.In both the petitions, technical evaluation of the bids on10.09.2024, selection of the respondent no.6 and letter of intentissued in its favour on 14.09.2024, are under challenge. For thesake of convenience, we propose to refer to the papers of WritPetition No.10255/2024.3.These petitions pertain to the third attempt of tenderprocess namely Disposal of Legacy Waste by Bio-remediation andby Bio-mining undertaken by the respondent no.1/MunicipalCorporation. In all, seven bidders participated in the processincluding respondent no.3 and respondent no.6. Respondent no.3and 6 qualified the technical bid, whereas the petitioner failed init. Respondent no.6 is declared to be lowest one (L-1) bidder andrespondent no.3 is lowest two (L-2) in the financial bids. Theletter of intent was issued to the respondent no.6. Later on workorder was issued to it on 14.06.2024.4.The technical evaluation of the bids was conducted on10.09.2024. The petitioner’s technical bid was rejected. Itimmediately approached High Court by filing Writ PetitionNo.10255/2024, claiming quashment of technical evaluation andancillary prayers. Due to supervening events, petition wasamended with addition of prayers for putting up challenge to[4] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtletter of acceptance dated 14.09.2024 issued to respondent no.6with further ancillary prayers. In another petition, technicalevaluation and the work order are challenged. 5.Respondent nos.1, 3 and 6 contested the petitions by filingaffidavits-in-reply. The litigating sides submitted on recordwritten submissions as well as number of judgments to supporttheir contentions. 6.Learned Senior Counsel Mr. P.R. Katneshwarkar appearingfor the petitioner made following submissions :(i)The technical evaluation and the selection of respondentno.6 is arbitrary and against the procedure prescribed in Requestfor Proposal (RFP).(ii)There is violation of procedural norms laid down in ClauseNo.11.3 and 31. Technical and financial bids were opened on thesame day. (iii)The petitioner was having requisite qualification especiallyexperience in bio-mining and bio-remediation, but still its bid wasrejected highhandedly. (iv)Respondent no.6 was not having essential qualification andit misled the tendering authority by suppressing material factswhile disclosing its bid capacity. (v)The tendering authority was biased and favouredrespondent no.6. The rate quoted by respondent no.6 wasRs.67.10 Crores including GST and other taxes but whileawarding work, value was shown to be Rs.79.05 Crores. (vi) The entire tender process stands vitiated and causes lossto the public exchequer. [5] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odt(vii)Petitioner relies on the following judgments :(a)Banshidhar Constructions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bharat Coking CoalLimited and Others, Special Leave Petition (Civil)No.17383/2024. (b)Union of India and Others Vs. Dinesh EngineeringCorporation and Another, (2001) 8 SCC 491.7.Learned Counsel Mr. Sambhaji Tope appearing forrespondent/Municipal Corporation vehemently opposed thesubmission of the petitioner by referring to affidavit-in-reply. Itwas submitted that the terms and conditions were approved bythe Central Government which were strictly followed by theCorporation. He would submit that there is no room for anyfavoritism or bias. Due procedure was followed by theCorporation in selecting respondent no.6. It is further submittedthat there is automatic calculation of unit rates and quantities asper Clause 33.1 of RFP. Attention is invited to Clause 36 also. Itis strongly refuted that respondent no.6 was not having essentialqualification. A reference is made to Clause 3 of RFP and itsClause 2.6. Learned Counsel would submit that the shortfallswere communicated on 11.06.2024 and there was response frompetitioner on 18.06.2024. Petitioner failed to submit thedocuments as contemplated by 11.3 of RFP.8.Learned Counsel for the Corporation further submits thathearing was not contemplated. Already work order has beenissued to respondent no.6 on 23.09.2024 and it started the workwhich cannot be halted. The tender process has been undertaken[6] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtin a transparent manner and no interference is called for. Thefollowing judgments are relied upon by the Corporation :i.Balaji Ventures Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Maharashtra State Power Generation Company Ltd. & Anr., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 295.ii.Bakshi Security and Personenel Services Private Limited Vs.Devkishan Computed Private Limited and Others.iii.Montecarlo Limited Vs. National Thermal Power CorporationLimited, 2016 AIR(SC) 4946.iv.Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2012 AIR(SC) 2915.v.Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, 1996 AIR(SC) 11.vi.JSW Infrastructure Limited and Another Vs. Kakinada Seaports Limited and Others, 2017 AIR(SC) 1175.vii.Meerut Development Authority & Anr. Vs. Association of Management Studies & Anr., 2009 AIR(SC) 2894.viii.Gautam Mangilal Katariya Vs. the State of Maharashtra and Another, Writ Petition No.12450/2017.ix.Amjad s/o. Mastan Pathan and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2024(1) AIR Bom R 62.x.Watergrace Products Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, Writ Petition No.7446/2024.xi.Tata Motors Limited Vs. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (BEST) and Others, 2023 AIR(SC) 2717.xii.N.G. Projects Limited Vs. Vinod Kumar Jain and Others, 2022 AIR(SCW) 1531.9.Respondent no.3 which qualified technical bid has filed Writ[7] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtPetition No.10915/2024 as well as contested Writ PetitionNo.10255/2024. Its case is that petitioner in the first petition didnot have essential qualification. It was rightly disqualified. It issubmitted that the decision making process of the tenderingauthority was arbitrary and discriminatory. Respondent no.6 alsodid not qualify the technical bid. No proper procedure wasfollowed in selecting respondent no.6. The work order issued infavour of respondent no.6 is illegal and liable to be quashed.10.The petition filed by respondent no.3 is contested byrespondent no.1/Corporation. The Corporation reiterated itsdefense. Additionally it is submitted that respondent no.6 wasfound to be lowest bidder and was selected. In the affidavit-in-reply, various judgments are quoted in support of its defense. 11.Respondent no.6 contested both the petitions by filingseparate reply. Additionally written submissions alongwithjudgments are submitted by learned Counsel, Mr. Palodkar. Hewould submit that respondent no.6 was not a party to the WritPetition No. 2921/2024. No allegations were made againstrespondent no.6 initially. It is contended that even the workorder issued in its favour has not been challenged. LearnedCounsel submits that respondent no.6 opted for qualification ofTQ-3 of Clause 2.3 of Section III of RFP. It was permissible for atenderer to follow only one criteria. Therefore the Corporation isjustified in selecting his client. It is submitted that the petitionerhas been rightly disqualified in the technical bid evaluation. Hewould further submit that the petitioner did not challenge[8] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odttechnical qualification of respondent no.6. It is submitted that bidcapacity certificate was not required to be signed or approved bya Chartered Accountant. It is further submitted that the rate hasbeen quoted by respondent no.6 excluding GST as per norms ofRFP.12.In answer to Writ Petition No.10915/2024, it is submittedby respondent no.6 that the Writ Petition was filed on26.09.2024, challenging technical qualification of respondentno.6 when by that time letter of acceptance and work order wereissued. The petitioner in that petition is estopped fromchallenging the qualification of respondent no.6 havingparticipated in the process without any objection. It is submittedthat respondent no.6 was qualified as per Condition No.TQ-3 andhaving all the requisite and qualifying documents. Lastly, it issubmitted that the work has commenced and no interference iscalled for in larger public interest. 13.Learned Counsel Mr. Palodkar for respondent no.6 relies onthe judgments of Supreme Court in the matters of RaunaqInternational Ltd. Vs. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. And Others, (1999)1 SCC 492 and Silppi Constructions Contractors Vs. Union ofIndia and Another, (2020) 16 SCC 489. 14.Having heard rival submissions of the parties, we find itnecessary to examine as to whether the petitioner was qualifyingthe technical bid as a first fact in issue. The technical bids wereopened on 19.04.2024. By letter dated 11.06.2024, respondent/[9] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtCorporation called upon the petitioner to remove the defects byapprising it the shortfalls. The communication dated 11.06.2024has not been disputed by the petitioner. The petitioner failed tosatisfy the tendering authority. In technical evaluation conductedon 10.09.2024, it was disqualified.15.The petitioner was a member of Joint Venture whileexecuting earlier work which was submitted as experience for thepresent tender process. The petitioner opted for TQ-1 as theminimum qualification requirement prescribed by Clause 2.3 ofSection III of RFP. It had submitted experience of its earlier workexecuted through its Joint Venture. It was bound to submit thenecessary documents of Joint Venture. There is no rebuttal to thecontention of respondent no.1/Corporation that the petitionerwas apprised of following shortfalls in its bid :01. Experience in service of a similar nature and size for each of the sevenyears.02. Consortium/JV registered agreement should be produced at ChattrapatiSambhajinagar.03. 11.Process of Bid Submission-11.3 (ii) original affidavit regarding correctness of information furnishedwith bid document.16.The petitioner was given opportunity vide letter dated11.06.2024 to submit above documents. No attempt was madeby it to furnish the documents and that is the cause for incurringthe disqualification. In the petition and during the course ofarguments, no endeavour has been made to overcome theshortfalls or to justify its qualification in technical bid. We are of[10] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtthe considered view that petitioner was non-responsive toessential technical conditions laid down by Clause 10.5, 11.3 and2.2 of Section III of RFP. We do not find any illegality orperversity in disqualifying it in the technical bid evaluation. 17.The petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to removethe shortfalls. The technical evaluation is an administrative order.It is not imperative for the tendering authority to extend theopportunity of hearing or to assign reasons. The tenderingauthority is not a quasi judicial authority. Respondent no.6 rightlyrelied on law laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter ofSilppi Constructions Contractors (supra). Following is the relevantextract of the judgment : “25. That brings us to the most contentious issue as to whether the learnedsingle judge of the High Court was right in holding that the appellate orderswere bad since they were without reasons. We must remember that we aredealing with purely administrative decisions. These are in the realm ofcontract. While rejecting the tender the person or authority inviting thetenders is not required to give reasons even if it be a state within themeaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. These decisions are neither judicialnor quasi-judicial. If reasons are to be given at every stage, then thecommercial activities of the State would come to a grinding halt. The Statemust be given sufficient leeway in this regard. The Respondent nos. 1 and 2were entitled to give reasons in the counter to the writ petition which they havedone.” 18.Respondent no.6 had submitted the bid by opting theminimum qualification requirement as per TQ-3 of Clause 2.3 ofSection III of RFP. Though the contract pertains to Disposal ofLegacy Waste by Bio-remediation and by Bio-mining, still it waspermissible for a bidder to participate in the process if it washaving experience in mining, excavation and material handling ofcoal or road construction etc. This is specifically provided by TQ-[11] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odt3 of Clause 2.3. It was open for a bidder to choose either one outof TQ-1, TQ-2 and TQ-3. Respondent no.6 chose TQ-3 which isin-consonance with RFP. Therefore the grievance made by thepetitioner that respondent no.6 had no experience in theDisposal of Legacy Waste by Bio-remediation and by Bio-mining,is totally misplaced. The tendering authority has rightly qualifiedrespondent no.6 in the technical bid. The bid capacity certificatesubmitted by respondent no.6 is also in-consonance with Clause15.4.19.The petitioner has not qualified technical bid and it failed todemonstrate that its disqualification was either perverse orarbitrary or its decision making process was defective. In thisback drop, it is not permissible for it to question the qualificationof respondent no.3 or respondent no.6. We propose to rely onour judgment rendered in Writ Petition No.8525/2024 in thematter of M/s. Surendra Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Vs. State ofMaharashtra and Others. Relevant paragraph is as follows : 28.Before we proceed to examine the other relief being claimed by thepetitioner questioning eligibility and qualification of respondent no. 5, weneed to emphasize that once having found that there was no error orillegality in disqualifying the petitioner, it would be a matter wherein thesituation would be like a bidder, who has been disqualified is questioning thequalification of the other bidders, who could get through the technicalevaluation. It is in this context, following observations in paragraph no. 27of the decision in the matter of Raunaq International Ltd. vs. I.V.R.Construction Ltd. and others; (1999) 1 SCC 492, particularly the portionemphasized by the Supreme Court in the matter of Tata Motors (supra) isimportant. Para No. 27, with the emphasis supplied in Tata Motors (supra)reads as under:"27.In the present case, however, the relaxation waspermissible under the terms of the tender. The relaxation whichthe Board has granted to M/s. Raunaq International Ltd. is on valid[12] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtprinciples looking to the expertise of the tenderer and his pastexperience although it does not exactly tally with the prescribedcriteria. What is more relevant, M/s I.V.R. Construction Ltd. whohave challenged this award of tender themselves do not fulfil therequisite criteria. They do not possess the prescribed experiencequalification. Therefore, any judicial relief at the instance of aparty which does not fulfil the requisite criteria seems to bemisplaced. Even if the criteria can be relaxed both for M/s RaunaqInternational Ltd. and M/s I.V.R. Construction Ltd., it is clear thatthe offer of M/s Raunaq International Ltd. is lower and it is onthis ground that the Board has accepted the offer of M/s RaunaqInternational Ltd. We fail to see how the award of tender can bestayed at the instance of a party which does not fulfil the requisitecriteria itself and whose offer is higher than the offer which hasbeen accepted. It is also obvious that by stopping the performanceof the contract so awarded, there is a major detriment to thepublic because the construction of two thermal power units, eachof 210 MW, is held up on account of this dispute. Shortages ofpower have become notorious. They also seriously affect industrialdevelopment and the resulting job opportunities for a large numberof people. In the present case, there is no overwhelming publicinterest in stopping the project. There is no allegation whatsoeverof any mala fides or collateral reasons for granting the contract toM/s. Raunaq International Ltd. (Emphasis supplied)”These observations more particularly emphasized in Tata Motors Limited(supra), would demonstrate that since the petitioner’s disqualification is beingupheld by us, it would not be appropriate to undertake any scrutinyregarding challenge to the eligibility and qualification of respondent no. 5 atits instance. Therefore, even though the petition has been filed challengingpetitioner’s disqualification and simultaneously disputing qualification ofrespondent no. 5, the judicial enquiry into the latter would be contingentupon grant of relief to the petitioner in the former. Therefore, it would notbe necessary for us to undertake any scrutiny on merits in respect of thepart of the petition putting up a challenge to the disqualification ofrespondent no. 5. 20.Respondent no.3 filed Writ Petition No.10915/2024 on26.09.2024. The technical evaluation was disclosed on10.09.2024. The financial bids were open on the same day. Theletter of acceptance was issued on 14.09.2024. The work orderwas issued to respondent no.6 on 23.09.2024. Respondent no.2[13] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtdid not object the technical evaluation timely. It was takingchances. 21.In the financial bid, respondent no.6 was found to be thelowest bidder for having quoted amount of Rs.67.10 Crores,whereas respondent no.3 quoted amount of Rs. 87.50 Crores.The tender was based on quality and cost based selectionmethod. We do not find any arbitrariness or discrimination inselecting respondent no.6 in the financial bid. We have alreadyrecorded that respondent no.6 was having the technicalqualification. Therefore the challenge of respondent no. 3 in WritPetition No.10915/2024 also fails. 22.The financial bid of respondent no.6 is regulated byfollowing provision: C. FINANCIAL PART1. Evaluation (ITB 32.1(d))In addition to the criteria listed in ITB 32.1 (a) to (c) the following criteriashall apply :a) The Bidder shall quote the quoted price must include the price forremediating legacy waste on per ton basis (“Bid Price”) in the Letter of Bid-Financial Part but excluding GST, which shall be quoted separately in thePrice Bid format.b)Price Bids shall be evaluated taking into account the Price quotedfor all services including applicable GST (CGST & SGST/UTGST or IGST)..The format of the financial bid is prescribed by RFP. In thefoot note, it has been clarified that the rates were exclusive ofGST and any other applicable taxes. Accordingly, respondentno.6 quoted the rates which were accepted. We do not find anyinfirmity in the rate quoted and the amount shown in the workorder. [14] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odt23.Learned Counsel Mr. Sambhaji S. Tope has cited variousjudgments which were also reflected in the affidavit-in-reply ofthe Corporation. We do not propose to burden our judgment byreferring to all the judgments cited by the learned Counsel. Wehave gone through the ratio. Those are applicable. Similarly thejudgments cited by Mr. Palodkar in the matter of RaunaqInternational Ltd. (supra), lays down parameters while exercisingour powers in the tender matters. We have gone through thescope prescribed in paragraph nos.11, 14 and 15 of thejudgment which we propose to follow. 24.Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner referred tojudgment of Supreme Court in the matter of BanshidharConstructions Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Our attention is adverted to itsparagraph nos. 20, 21 and 29. The technical bid of the appellantbefore the Supreme Court was rejected on extraneous groundand technical bid of successful bidder (respondent no.8) wasaccepted in utter non-compliance of mandatory requirement ofClause No.10 and thereafter the successful bidder was permittedto furnish the shortfall of documents after opening technical bid.The facts are distinguishable. The legal proposition laid down inparagraph no.21 cannot be disputed. On facts, we are of theconsidered view that the judgment is not applicable. 25.Reliance is placed on judgment of Union of India and Others(supra). We have gone through paragraph nos. 12, 15 and 16 ofthe judgment. We do not notice any arbitrary use of discretion bythe respondent/Corporation in accepting offer of respondent[15] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtno.6. The petitioner failed to prove that its disqualification intechnical bid evaluation, was arbitrary or in flagrant abuse ofstatutory or constitutional provision. This judgment is also notapplicable.26.We are guided by the principles laid down by the SupremeCourt in the matter of Jagdish Mandal. The scope for the judicialreview has been laid down in paragraph no.22 of the judgment.We are also aware of the law laid down by the Supreme Court inthe matter of N.G. Projects Limited (supra), especially pertainingto the infrastructural project. We prefer to reiterate paragraphno.23.“23. In view of the above judgments of this Court, the Writ Court shouldrefrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer asto whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer. The Court does not havethe expertise to examine the terms and conditions of the present- dayeconomic activities of the State and this limitation should be kept in view.Courts should be even more reluctant in interfering with contracts involvingtechnical issues as there is a requirement of the necessary ex- pertise toadjudicate upon such issues. The approach of the Court should be not to findfault with magnifying glass in its hands, rather the Court should examine asto whether the decision-making process is after com- plying with theprocedure contemplated by the tender conditions. If the Court finds thatthere is total arbitrariness or that the tender has been granted in a malafidemanner, still the Court should refrain from interfering in the grant of tenderbut instead relegate the parties to seek damages for the wrongful exclusionrather than to injunct the execution of the contract. The injunction orinterference in the tender leads to additional costs on the State and is alsoagainst public interest. Therefore, the State and its citizens suffer twice,firstly by paying escalation costs and secondly, by being deprived of theinfrastructure for which the present-day Governments are expected to work.”27.Learned Counsel Mr. Sambhaji S. Tope has rightly referredto judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Tata MotorsLimited (supra). We propose to follow what is laid down in[16] 60 & 61.WP-10255 & 10915-2024.odtparagraph no.48 which is as under :“48. This Court being the guardian of fundamental rights is duty-bound tointerfere when there is arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides and bias.However, this Court has cautioned time and again that courts should exercisea lot of restraint while exercising their powers of judicial review incontractual or commercial matters. This Court is normally loathe to interferein contractual matters unless a clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides orbias or irrationality is made out. One must remember that today many publicsector undertakings compete with the private industry. The contracts enteredinto between private parties are not subject to scrutiny under writjurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies which are State within the meaning ofArticle 12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly and are amenable tothe writ jurisdiction of superior courts but this discretionary power must beexercised with a great deal of restraint and caution. The courts must realisetheir limitations and the havoc which needless interference in commercialmatters can cause. In contracts involving technical issues the courts should beeven more reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes do not have thenecessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our domain.The courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders andmake every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts mustgive “fair play in the joints” to the government and public sectorundertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere wheresuch interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. (See:Silppi Constructions Contractors V. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489).”28.The upshot of the above analysis, both the petitions aredevoid of substance. Both are dismissed. Rule is discharged. [ SHAILESH P. BRAHME ] [ MANGESH S. PATIL ] JUDGE JUDGEnajeeb..[17]