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941&942appln3067-25 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABADCRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3067 OF 2025Gorakhnath Baburao ShindeAge 58 years, Occu: Cane ManagarR/o Sahakar Marharshi Shankarrao Kolhe Sahakari Sakhar Kharkhana Ltd.Sahajanand Nagar, KopargaonDist. Ahmednagar....Applicants(Orig. Accused)VERSUS1.The State of Maharashtra,Through Police Inspector,Kopargaon Police Station,(FIR No.356/2025) Tq. Kopargaon Dist. Ahmednagar.2.Prakash Pundlik Jadhav Banjara,Age 30 years, Occu: LabourR/o Shevari Tq. ChalisgaonDistrict Jalgaon... RespondentsANDCRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 3068 OF 2025 Gorakhnath Baburao ShindeAge 58 years, Occu: Cane ManagarR/o Sahakar Marharshi Shankarrao Kolhe Sahakari Sakhar Kharkhana Ltd.Sahajanand Nagar, KopargaonDist. Ahmednagar....Applicant(Orig. Accused)VERSUS1.The State of Maharashtra,Through Police Inspector,Kopargaon Police Station,(FIR No.355/2025) Tq. Kopargaon Dist. Ahmednagar.Page 1 of 10 941&942appln3067-252.Gorakh s/o Dada Chavan Banjara,Age 24 years, Occu: LabourR/o Shevari Tq. ChalisgaonDistrict Jalgaon... RespondentsMr. P. M. Barde h/for Mr. Shailesh S. Chapalgaonkar, Advocate for the applicant in both the applications Mr. V. M. Kagne, APP for the Respondent-StateMr. A. R. Sayed, Advocate for Respondent No.2/Informants in both the applications.CORAM: MANISH PITALE & Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, JJ.DATE: 18.09.2025ORDER (Per: Y. G. Khobragade, J.) 1. Both these applications have been filed under Section 582 of theBhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for quashment of FirstInformation Report vide Crime Nos.0356/2025 and 0355/2025 dated04.07.2025 registered with Kopargaon Police Station, Tq. Kopargaon Dist.Ahmednagar, for the offences punishable under Sections 3(5), 351(2) 352,308 of the Bhartiya Naya Sanhita, 2023 (in short BNS, 2023).2. Respondent No.2 Informant/s have individually filed privatecomplaints under section 175(3) of the BNS, 2023 bearing Misc. Cri.Application No. 72 of 2025 and 70 of 2025 before the learned JudicialMagistrate, First Class, Kopargaon a seeking registration of FIR against theapplicant and other accused person. The informants alleged that on20.03.2025, the applicant, who is working as Agricultural Officer with theSahakar Marshi Shankarrao Kolhe Sahakari Sakharkhana Tq. Kopargaon,Page 2 of 10 941&942appln3067-25alongwith other staff members forcibly took away their Tractors bearingNos. MH-52-BO-452 of Mahindra Make (FIR 355/2025) and MH-19- CV-3034 (FIR 356/2025). Co-accused No.2 took the applicants to the office ofthe present applicant to return their tractors. The applicant assured themabout settlement of their payments. However, the applicant in both theseapplications and other accused did not pay the labour charges to theinformants and threatened to kill them. The learned Judicial Magistrate,First Class, Kopargaon passed an order on 20.06.2025 in both applicationsi.e. Criminal Application Nos. 70 of 2025 and 72 of 2025 and directed theKopargaon Police Station for registration of Crime. Accordingly, aforesaidFirst Information Reports were registered against the applicant and otheraccused.3. Heard Mr. P. M. Barde learned counsel for the applicant/s, Mr V.M. Kagne, learned APP for the respondent State and Mr. A. R. Syed,learned counsel for Respondent No.2/informants. 4.The learned counsel for the respective parties have submittedthat during pendency of both these applications, the parties have amicablysettled their dispute and arrived at a compromise through the process ofprivate negotiations. The compromise Pursis in both the criminalapplications containing the terms of settlement have been produced onrecord. Terms of compromise have been got verified through RegistrarPage 3 of 10 941&942appln3067-25(Judicial) and learned Registrar (Judicial) has submitted his report dated10.09.2025.5.As per terms of settlement, the applicant has returned both theTractors to the informants and agreed that he will not claim any right, titleor interest over the said tractors and henceforth the ownership of both theTractors will be with the respective informants. As the tractors arereturned, the informants/respondent No.2 do not wish to prosecute thecomplaints against the applicant and seek permission to compound thesame.6. The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 2/informantshas not disputed about the fact of settlement of dispute between theapplicant/accused and Respondent No.2/informant. In view of thecompromise, the learned counsel for the applicant in both theseapplications prayed for quashment of FIR Nos. 355 of 2025 and 356 of2025. The learned counsel submits that compounding is permissible inview of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of GianSingh V/s State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 and NarinderSingh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466.7. In case of Gian Singh -vs- State of Punjab, cxited supra, the Hon’bleSupreme Court has also conceded about the quashing of the case in terms Page 4 of 10 941&942appln3067-25of the settlement arrived at between the parties and observed in para 6 as follows:-6. In Nikhil Merchant AIR 2009 SC 428, a company, M/s.Neemuch Emballage Ltd., Mumbai was granted financialassistance by Andhra Bank under various facilities. On account ofdefault in repayment of loans, the bank filed a suit for recovery ofthe amount payable by the borrower company. The bank also fileda complaint against the company, its Managing Director and theofficials of Andhra Bank for diverse offences, namely, Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Coderead with Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1947 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The suit forrecovery filed by the bank against the company and the ManagingDirector of the Company was compromised. The suit wascompromised upon the Defendants agreeing to pay the amountsdue as per the schedule mentioned in the consent terms. Clause11 of the consent terms read, "agreed that save as aforesaidneither party has any claim against the other and parties dohereby withdraw all the allegations and counter-allegations madeagainst each other". Based on Clause 11 of the consent terms, theManaging Director of the Company, the Appellant who wasaccused No. 3 in charge sheet filed by CBI, made application fordischarge from the criminal complaint. The said application wasrejected by the Special Judge (CBI), Greater Bombay, which cameto be challenged before the Bombay High Court. The contentionbefore the High Court was that since the subject matter of thedispute had been settled between the Appellant and the bank, itwould be unreasonable to continue with the criminalproceedings. The High Court rejected the application fordischarge from the criminal cases. It is from this order that thematter reached this Court by way of special leave. The Courthaving regard to the facts of the case and the earlier decision ofPage 5 of 10 941&942appln3067-25this Court in B.S. Joshi, AIR 2003 SC 1386: (2003) 4 SCC 675, setaside the order of the High Court and quashed the criminalproceedings by consideration of the matter thus: 28. The basic intention of the accused in this case appearsto have been to misrepresent the financial status of theCompany, M/s Neemuch Emballage Ltd., Mumbai, in orderto avail of the credit facilities to an extent to which theCompany was not entitled. In other words, the mainintention of the Company and its officers was to cheat theBank and induce it to part with additional amounts of creditto which the Company was not otherwise entitled. 29. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of anoffence of cheating punishable Under Section 420 IndianPenal Code, the same has been made compoundable underSub-section (2) of Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedurewith the leave of the court. of course, forgery has not beenincluded as one of the compoundable offences, but it is insuch cases that the principle enunciated in B.S. Joshi casebecomes relevant. 30. In the instant case, the disputes between theCompany and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis ofthe compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues ofthe Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear tohave any further claim against the Company. What,however, remains is the fact that certain documents werealleged to have been created by the Appellant herein inorder to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to whichthe Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein hasovertones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. Thequestion which is required to be answered in this case iswhether the power which independently lies with this Courtto quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to thecompromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinaboveand keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. JoshiPage 6 of 10

Legal Reasoning

941&942appln3067-25case and the compromise arrived at between the Companyand the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed inthe suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fitcase where technicality should not be allowed to stand inthe way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since,in our view, the continuance of the same after thecompromise arrived at between the parties would be a futileexercise." 8.In case of Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, citedsupra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-"27. In the case of Dimpey Gujral (supra), observations of this Courtto the effect that offences involved in that case were not offencesagainst the society. It included charge under Section 307 Indian PenalCode as well. However, apart from stating so, there is no detaineddiscussion on this aspect. Moreover, it is the other factors whichprevailed with the Court to accept the settlement and compound heoffence, as noted above while discussing this case. On the other hand,in Shambhu Kewat (supra), after referring to some other earlierjudgments, this Court opined that commission of offence underSection 307 Indian Penal Code would be crime against the society atlarge, and not a crime against an individual only. We find that in mostof the cases, this view is taken. Even on first principle, we find that anattempt to take the life of another person has to be treated as aheinous crime and against the society.28. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a seriousoffence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of anotherperson/victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hardrealities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between theparties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury byeither or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of anoffence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code as well.Therefore, only because FIR/Charge-sheet incorporates theprovision of Section 307 Indian Penal Code would not, by itself, be aground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code andrefuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore,Page 7 of 10 941&942appln3067-25of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise insuch cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by thenature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injurieswere inflicted (namely whether injuries are caused at thevital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used etc.On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of provingthe charge under Section 307 Indian Penal Code, once the evidence tothat effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not acceptsettlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis ofprima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the HighCourt forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 Indian PenalCode were unnecessary included in the charge sheet, the Court canaccept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlementbetween the parties.29. At this juncture, we would like also to add that the timing ofsettlement would also play a crucial role. If the settlement is arrivedat immediately after the alleged commission of offence when thematter is still under investigation, the High Court may be somewhatliberal in accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings/investigation. of course, it would be after looking into the attendantcircumstances as narrated in the previous para. Likewise, whenchallan is submitted but the charge has not been framed, the HighCourt may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. However, at thisstage, as mentioned above, since the report of the I.O. under Section173, Code of Criminal Procedure is also placed before the Court itwould become the bounding duty of the Court to go into the saidreport and the evidence collected, particularly the medical evidencerelating to injury etc. sustained by the victim. This aspect, however,would be examined along with another important consideration,namely, in view of settlement between the parties, whether it wouldbe unfair or contrary to interest of justice to continue with thecriminal proceedings and whether possibility of conviction is remoteand bleak. If the Court finds the answer to this question inaffirmative, then also such a case would be a fit case for the HighCourt to give its stamp of approval to the compromise arrived atbetween the parties, inasmuch as in such cases no useful purposewould be served in carrying out the criminal proceedings which in alllikelihood would end in acquittal, in any case."Page 8 of 10 941&942appln3067-259. From the terms of compromise, it appears that the presentApplicant Accused and Respondent No. 2/Informants have settled thedispute amicably and have decided to set at rest the present criminalproceedings. Therefore, considering the law laid down in the cases citedsupra as well societal interest between the parties, in order to secure theends of justice and to prevent an abuse of process of law, it will be just andproper to quash and set aside the F.I.Rs. in respect of the present applicant/accused.10.Needless to say that, Respondent No. 2/Complainants in boththese applications had initially approached before the learned Magistrateby filing applications under section 175(3) of BNS, 2023 and prayed forregistration of crimes and after the order is passed, the RespondentNo.2/complainants and applicant- Accused amicably settled their privatedisputes over the money transaction. Respondent No. 2/complainants andthe applicant-accused engaged the Police Machinery and after registrationof crime they settled private dispute. Therefore, considering the nature ofF.I.R. in both these applications, it will be just and proper to direct theapplicant accused to deposit cost of Rs. 25,000/- each in account of PoliceKalyan Fund maintained by the Police Department, Amhednagar (nowAhilyanagar).Page 9 of 10 941&942appln3067-2512.In view of above discussion, we proceed to pass the followingfollowing order:ORDERi)Criminal Applications Nos. 3067 of 2025 and 3068 of 2025 arehereby allowed. ii)First Information Reports bearing Crime Nos.355 of 2025 andCrime No. 356/2025, dated 04.07.2025, registered with KopargaonPolice Station, Tq. Kopargaon Dist. Ahmednagar, for the offencespunishable under Sections 3(5) 352, 351(2), 308 of Bhartiya NayaSanhita, 2023 are hereby quashed and set aside as against thepresent applicant/Accused- Gorakhnath Baburao Shinde.(iii)The present applicant/accused shall deposit cost of Rs. 25,000/-each in the Account No. 11117727262 standing in the name of thePolice Adhikshak Ahmednagar "Police Kalyan Nidhi" with the StateBank of India, Ahilyanagar within period of two week from the dateof this order and receipts shall be produced with the KopargaonPolice Station immediately.( Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. ) ( MANISH PITALE, J. )JPChavan Page 10 of 10

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