THE ZILLA PARISHAD BEED THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS
Case Details
*1* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD 948 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1182 OF 2022 IN RAST/18286/2021 WITH CA/1183/2022 IN RAST/18286/2021 THE ZILLA PARISHAD BEED THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ... AND 949 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1185 OF 2022 IN RAST/18330/2021 WITH CA/1186/2022 IN RAST/18330/2021 THE ZILLA PARISHAD BEED THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ... AND 950 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1205 OF 2022 IN RAST/18339/2021 WITH CA/1206/2022 IN RAST/18339/2021 THE ZILLA PARISHAD BEED THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ... AND 951 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1213 OF 2022 IN RAST/17499/2021 WITH CA/1214/2022 IN RAST/17499/2021 THE ZILLA PARISHAD BEED THR ITS AUTHORISED *2* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group OFFICER CHANDRASHEKHAR PRALHADRAO KSHIRSAGAR VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ... AND 952 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1252 OF 2022 IN RAST/6684/2021 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND OTHERS VERSUS KARBHARI LAHANU BADHE AND OTHERS ... AND 953 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1256 OF 2022 IN RAST/6417/2021 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND OTHERS VERSUS JAYSHREE RANGNATH GHOLAP ... AND 954 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2598 OF 2022 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND ANOTHER VERSUS SAYYED SHABBIR BAHADUR AND OTHERS ... AND 962 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2744 OF 2022 IN RAST/25630/2021 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND ANOTHER VERSUS YASHWANT MUKINDA SURYAWANSHI AND OTHERS ... *3* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group AND 963 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2748 OF 2022 IN RAST/25617/2021 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND ANOTHER VERSUS YOJANA ANANDAO AHANKARI AND OTHERS ... AND 964 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2749 OF 2022 IN RAST/25635/2021 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND ANOTHER VERSUS SAUDAGAR ZAMEER RASUL AND OTHERS ... AND 965 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.2954 OF 2022 IN RAST/12475/2021 THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND ANOTHER VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ... AND 966 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1204 OF 2022 IN RAST/18312/2021 WITH CA/1203/2022 IN RAST/18312/2021 THE ZILLA PARISHAD BEED THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ... AND 967 CIVIL APPLICATION NO.1215 OF 2022 IN RAST/34814/2021 WITH CA/1216/2022 IN *4* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group RAST/34814/2021 THE ZILLA PARISHAD, BEED THROUGH ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS ...
Legal Reasoning
Advocate for the Applicants : Shri Suryawanshi Prashant D., Shri A.D. Aghav and Shri P.R. Tandale, in the respective applications. AGP for the Respondents / State : Shri P.S. Patil, Shri S.R. Yadav, Mrs.R.P. Gaur, Shri S.G. Sangle and Mrs.M.A. Deshpande, in the respective applications. Advocate for the original petitioners/ Respondents : Shri D.A.Madake, Shri D.R. Irale Patil, Shri V.G. Salgare, Shri S.K. Mathpati and Shri L.H. Kawale, in the respective matters. ... CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE & SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE, JJ. DATE :- 10th June, 2022 Per Court :- 1. In all these matters, the Zilla Parishad seeks condonation of delay in between 59 to 1119 days in filing the review applications. 2. The contention of the Zilla Parishad is that the order of this Court, which is sought to be reviewed, does not reflect the intricate issues raised by the Zilla Parishad, inasmuch as, there is no adjudication on such contentions. Since the State Government *5* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group also suffers financial implications on account of the said order, the Zilla Parishad was advised by the Government, after taking legal advise, to file the review petitions. By the orders sought to
Decision
be reviewed, the petitioners in the writ petitions have got dual benefits viz. benefits of hike in pay scale owing to the sixth pay scale recommendations and on account of the advance increments/ increments for excellent work by virtue of certain government resolutions. No employee can be held entitled for dual monetary benefits, is the argument and therefore, it is contended that these submissions have not been considered while delivering the orders, which are now sought to be reviewed. 3. The learned advocates representing the original petitioners have strenuously opposed these applications, led by the arguments of Shri Irale Patil, contending that the delay should not be condoned on sympathetic ground. The condonation of delay is not a routine exercise. Unless there are convincing reasons, delay should not be condoned. Large delay is caused and considering the view taken in Vedanta Ltd. (Formerly known as M/s Sesa Sterlite Ltd.) vs. Goa Foundation and others, 2021 (7) SCC 206, the delay ought not to be condoned. 4. The learned advocate for the applicant/ Zilla *6* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group Parishad submits, in rebuttal, that the Zilla Parishad has not waited for the Judges who have delivered the orders, to retire and therefore, have purportedly delayed their review petitions. One of the Senior Member of the Bench is still a Judge of this Court. It is only that the said learned Judge has moved to the Principal Seat. Since the Zilla Parishad and the State Government were to take a decision and the Zilla Parishad’s decision was based on the advise of the Government, that, time has been lost and as soon as the Zilla Parishad was advised to prefer a review, the Zilla Parishad has filed the review petitions. 5. The law on condonation of delay was first settled by the Honourable Supreme Court in the Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) wherein, it was concluded in paragraph 3 as under :- “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal *7* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day’s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala-fides. A litigant does not stand to *8* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach *9* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.” 6. In Esha Bhattacharjee v/s Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Honourable Supreme Court has considered the entire law on condonation of delay by referring to catena of judgments and has observed as under :- “8. Before we delve into the factual scenario and the defensibility of the order condoning delay, it is seemly to state the obligation of the court while dealing with an application for condonation of delay and the approach to be adopted while considering the grounds for condonation of such colossal delay. 9. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others [(1987) 2 SCC 107], a two-Judge Bench observed that: “3. The legislature has conferred power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing *10* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group of matters on merits. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice – that being the life- purpose for the existence of the institution of courts.” The learned Judges emphasized on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusal to condone delay can result in an meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the court to remove injustice. In the said case the Division Bench observed that the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant- non-grata status and the courts are required to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of interpretation of the expression 10. 11. *11* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group 12. “sufficient cause”. In G. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore [(1998) 2 SCC 142], Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, has opined thus:- “14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.[AIR 1962 SC 361] ; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575] ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365] ; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770] ; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.” 13. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh *12* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group (dead) and others [(1984) 4 SCC 66], the court was dealing with a fact- situation where the interim order passed by the court of first instance was an interpolated order and it was not ascertainable as to when the order was made. The said order was under appeal before the District Judge who declined to condone the delay and the said view was concurred with by the High Court. The Court, taking stock of the facts, came to hold that if such an interpolated order is allowed to stand, there would be failure of justice and, accordingly, set aside the orders impugned therein observing that the appeal before the District Judge deserved to be heard on merits. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others [(2005) 3 SCC 752], the Court, after referring to New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840], N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [AIR 1998 SC 3222], State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma [(1996) 10 SCC 634], came to hold that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another [(2010) 5 SCC 459], where a two-Judge Bench of this Court has observed that:- “14. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature 14. 15. *13* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.” Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate. In Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others [(2010) 6 SCC 786], it has been held that:- “16. While considering an application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.” It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves. 16. 17. A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others [(2010) 8 SCC 685] would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union *14* 948t954a962t967ca1182o22 group