✦ High Court of India

RAMBHAU TATE AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

Case Details

1 crwp 1011.21.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD 956 CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1011 OF 2021 DEEPAK RAMHARI @ RAMBHAU TATE AND OTHERS VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER ... Advocate for Petitioners : Mr. Narvade Patil Ravindra B. APP for Respondents: Mr. S D Ghayal Advocate for Respondent 2 : Mr. Kanade Angad L ... CORAM : V.K. JADHAV & SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE, JJ. Dated: March 10, 2022 ... PER COURT :- 1. Heard fnally with consent at adiission stage. 2.

Legal Reasoning

The petitioners are seeking quashing of the FIR bearing criie no.18 of 2020 registered with Peth Beed Police Station, District Beed for the offence punishable under sections 498-A, 323, 504, 34 of the IPC and also the criiinal proceedings vide RCC No.109 of 2020 pending before the 2nd J.M.F.C., Beed on the ground that the parties have arrived at aiicable settleient. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners and the

Legal Reasoning

learned counsel appearing for respondent no.2 subiit that the petitioner no.1 and respondent no.2 have aaa/- 2 crwp 1011.21.odt arrived at aiicable settleient. They have jointly fled HMP No.F-41 of 2020 before the Faiily Court, Beed for a decree of divorce by iutual consent as provided under section 13(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act and by judgient and order dated 29.6.2021 the learned Judge of the Faiily Court, Beed has granted a decree of divorce on iutual consent. The affdavit-in-reply on behalf of respondent no.2 has also fled to that effect. Further, respondent no.2 is present before this court. Since, no aiount has been given towards the future iaintenance of respondent no.2, we have directed to keep the respondent no.2 present before the court. The respondent no.2 alongwith her father reiained present before us and father of the respondent no.2 has inforied to us that they do not want anything towards future iaintenance of respondent no.2 froi the husband. 4. We have also heard the learned APP for the respondent no.1-State. aaa/- 3 crwp 1011.21.odt 5. We have carefully gone through the allegations iade in the coiplaint and also perused the charge- sheet. We have also perused the affdavit in reply of the respondent no.2 and also the divorce deed passed in the petition no.F-41 of 2020 by the Faiily Court, Beed. 6. In the case of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Supreie Court in para 48 has quoted para 21 of the judgient of the fve-Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered in Kulwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2007) 4 CTC 769. A fve-Judge Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in para 21 of the judgient, by placing reliance on the various judgients of the Supreie court, has fraied the guidelines for quashing of the criiinal proceeding on the ground of settleient. Para 21 of the said case of Kulwinder Singh’s judgient is reproduced by the Supreie Court in para 48 of the judgient in Gian Singh. Clause 21(a) which is relevant for the present discussion reads as under :- aaa/- 4 crwp 1011.21.odt “21. (a) Cases arising froi iatriionial discord, even if other offences are introduced for aggravation of the case.” The Supreie Court in paragraph no.61 of the judgient of Gian Singh (supra) has iade following observations :- “61. The position that eierges froi the above discussion can be suiiarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criiinal proceeding or FIR or coiplaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different froi the power given to a criiinal court for coipounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory liiitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criiinal proceeding or coiplaint or F.I.R iay be exercised where the offender and victii have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circuistances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court iust have due regard to the nature and gravity of the criie. Heinous and serious offences of iental depravity or offences like iurder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fttingly quashed even though the victii or victii’s faiily and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious iipact on society. Siiilarly, any coiproiise between the victii and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences aaa/- 5 crwp 1011.21.odt coiiitted by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criiinal proceedings involving such offences. But the criiinal cases having overwheliingly and predoiinatingly civil favour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising froi coiiercial, fnancial, iercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of iatriiony relating to dowry, etc. or the faiily disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court iay quash criiinal proceedings if in its view, because of the coiproiise between the offender and victii, the possibility of conviction is reiote and bleak and continuation of criiinal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreie injustice would be caused to hii by not quashing the criiinal case despite full and coiplete settleient and coiproiise with the victii. In other words, the High Court iust consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criiinal proceeding or continuation of the criiinal proceeding would tantaiount to abuse of process of law despite settleient and coiproiise between the victii and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criiinal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affriative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criiinal proceeding. 7. The parties have arrived at aiicable settleient and they have decided to end their iatriionial relations for ever. Even they have obtained a decree of aaa/- 6 crwp 1011.21.odt divorce by iutual consent. Respondent no.2 is not seeking any aiount towards her future iaintenance. We are thus satisfed that the parties have arrived at aiicable settleient, voluntarily. 8.

Decision

In view of the above discussion and in teris of the ratio laid down by the Supreie Court in the case of Gian Singh (supra), we proceed to pass the following order. O R D E R i. Criiinal Writ Petition is hereby allowed in teris of prayer clause ‘b’. ii. Criiinal Writ Petition accordingly disposed off. ( SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE, J. ) ( V.K. JADHAV, J. ) … aaa/-

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