RAVINDRA v. GHUGE & Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, JJ.DATE
Case Details
2024:BHC-AUG:18172-DB 905&906CP577&587-24 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABADCONT. PETITION NO. 577 OF 2024SWARAJSINGH SHIVPALSINGH PARIHARVERSUSDILIP DATTATRAY WALSE PATIL (MINISTER OF CO-OP. DEPTMANTRALAYA MUMBAI) THROUGH ITS SECRETARYWITH905 CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7574 OF 2024 IN CP/577/2024DILIP DATTATRAY WALSE PATIL (MINISTER OF CO-OP. DEPTMANTRALAYA MUMBAI)VERSUSSWARAJSINGH SHIVPALSINGH PARIHAR AND OTHERSANDCONT. PETITION NO. 587 OF 2024 IN WP/1651/2024SWARAJSINGH SHIVPALSINGH PARIHARVERSUSTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THROUGH ITS ADDITIONALPRINCIPAL SECERTARY ANOOP KUMARWITH906 CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 7575 OF 2024 IN CP/587/2024DILIP DATTATRAYA WALSE PATIL MINISTER OF COOPERATIVEDEPARTMENTVERSUSSWARAJSINGH SHIVPALSINGH PARIHAR AND OTHERS…Mr. Vishal Bagal h/for Mr. K. T. Taur, Advocate for the Contempt Petitioner.Mr. A. B. Girase, Government Pleader for the Applicant/RespondentsCORAM: RAVINDRA V. GHUGE & Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, JJ.DATE : 6th August, 2024Page 1 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24ORDER (Per : Ravindra V Ghuge, J) 1.The Petitioner in both these two Petitions, has put forthparagraph Nos. 1 to 14 (wrongly mentioned as 12) in Contempt PetitionNo. 577/2024, as under:1. The petitioner is the original complainant before Resp.No. 2. The petitioner has filed complaint / application dated24..05.2028 against Resp. No.5 for seeking disqualification forthe post of Director of Resp. No.4 Bank on the ground that,Resp. No.5 is the representative and Director of defaultersociety i.e. the Member society of Resp. No.4 Bank, therefore,the Resp. No.5 is covered under the disqualificationprescribed U/Section 73 (c) (a)(f) (2) of M.C.S, Act, 1960.2. That, the Resp. No.5 is the M.L.A. of ruling party, therefore,the above mentioned complaint has not been decided by theResp. No.2. considering this aspect, the petitioner has filed W.P. No. 10061/2023 before this Hon'ble Court for seekingdirection against the Resp. No.2. to decide the complaint filedby the petitioner. This Hon'ble Court by its order dated19.08.2023 directed to Resp. No.2 to decide the complaint/application filed by the Petitioner within a 12 weeks from thedate of order.3. That, the Resp. No.3 has submitted detail inquiry reportdated 05/09/2023 alongwith all the evidential documentsbefore Resp. No.2. The said inquiry report clearly revels that,the Resp. No.5 is the representative and director of thedefaulter society - the Member society of Resp. No.4 Bank.Page 2 of 28
Legal Reasoning
905&906CP577&587-244. That, the Resp. No.2 has granted satisfactoryopportunity of hearing to the Resp. No.5 thereby consideringeach and every documents alongwith the inquiry report whichis self explanatory and enough documents to clarify the Resp.No.5 is the representative and director of defaulter society,therefore, the Resp. No.2 have rightly passed order dated08.12.2023, thereby the Resp. No.5 has been disqualifiedfrom the post of Director of Resp. No.4 Bank. 5. That, the petitioner has filed caveat before Resp. No.1.Accordingly, the Resp. No.5 has filed revision applicationNo.672/2023, thereby the disqualification order dated08.12.2023 passed by Respondent No.2 has been challengedby the Respondent No.5.6. That, the petitioner has filed application on 13.12.2023on the date of hearing thereby requesting to supply the copiesof revision and stay petition and to grant time for filing replyto the same. Thereafter, the Resp. No.1 has granted stay to theorder of disqualification by its order dated 15.12.2023. In thestay order, the next date of hearing has been mentioned on10.01.2024. But, there is no hearing has been taken by the Resp.No.1. Therefore, the petitioner has filed requestingapplication before Resp. No.1, thereby the petitioner hasrequested to fix the date of hearing in the revision petitionfiled by Resp. No.5.Page 3 of 28 905&906CP577&587-247. That, the Resp. No.1 have not granted or fix the date ofhearing in the revision petition filed by Resp. No.5 therein thepetitioner is the original complainant. Therefore, thepetitioner has filed Writ petition No.1599/2024 before thisHon'ble Court for seeking direction against Resp. No.1 todecide the revision petition No.671/2023 within a stipulatedperiod. A copy of memo of Writ petition No.1599/2024 dated22.01.2024 is annexed herewith and marked EXHIBIT-"A-1".8. That, the AGP submits that, revision petition is pendingbefore the Hon'ble Minister and the hearing has been fixed on21.02.2024 at 3.00 p.m. The petitioner is undertaking, that,he would be remain present for hearing. Therefore,considering the above mentioned facts and circumstances ofthe instant case, this Hon'ble Court by its order dated09.02.2024 directed to Resp. No.1 to decide the RevisionPetition No.67 /2023 be decide as expeditiously as possiblenot more than two months from today. A copy of order dated09.02.2024 passed by this Hon'ble Court in W. P. No. 1599/2024 is annexed herewith and marked as EXHIBIT ''A-2".9. That, as per the above mentioned order of this Hon'bleCourt, the petitioner is appeared before Resp. No.1 on21.02.2024 and submit affidavit in reply alongwith thisHon'ble Court. But, there is no hearing has been taken byResp. No.1 as well as there is no any next date has beeninformed by the Resp. No. 1. A copy of affidavit in reply filedby petitioner before Resp. No.1 dated 21.02.2024 is annexedherewith and marked as EXHIBIT- "A-3".Page 4 of 28 905&906CP577&587-2410. That, as per the order of this Hon'ble Court, the timeperiod granted by this Hon'ble Court by its order dated09.02.2024 has been expired on 08.04.2024, therefore, thepetitioner has requested to Resp. No. 1 to decide the revisionpetition filed by Resp. No.5. Thereafter, the Resp. No.1 has fixed the hearing on22.04.2024 in the revision petition filed by Resp. No.5.Accordingly, on the said date 22.04.2024, the revision petitionfiled by Resp. No.5 has been reserve/close for order.11. That, the petitioner various requested to the Resp. No.1to pass the order or to decide the revision petition filed byResp. No.5 thereby to comply the order of this Hon'ble Court.But, till today there is no any positive step has been taken bythe Resp. No.1 for passing order or deciding the revisionpetition filed by Resp. No.5.12. That, the Resp. No. 5 is the MLA of ruling party,therefore, the Resp. no.1 is not deciding revision petition,though the directions has been issued by this Hon'ble Court.On the contrary, the Respondent No.5 is holding the post ofDirector of Resp. No.4 due to the stay granted by the Resp.No.1.13. That, the provision itself mandate to decide revisionpetition within a three months, therefore, it is crystal clearthat, the intention of Resp. No. 1 is willful and malafidedisobedience of the Order of the Hon'ble Court, the presentPage 5 of 28
Legal Reasoning
905&906CP577&587-24Resp. No.1 needs to be punished as per the provisions ofContempt of Court Act.12. That, thus the Respondent No.1 has committed breach oforder of this Hon'ble Court, which amounts to contempt ofCourt's Order and therefore, he is liable to be punished underthe provisions of the said Act. Hence, this Contempt Petition."2.The Writ Court (Coram: Vibha Kankanwadi and S. G.Chapalgaonkar, JJ.), vide order dated 9th February, 2024 in WritPetition Nos. 1599 of 2024 and 1651 of 2024, specifically directedRespondent No. 1, Shri Dilip Dattatraya Walse-Patil, Cabinet Minister,Cooperation (Government of Maharashtra), to decide the RevisionApplication Nos. 172 of 2023 and 671 of 2023, within two months fromthe date of the order. 3.Both these Contempt Petitions were filed before this Court on20th June, 2024, alleging disobedience of the order of this Court dated9th February, 2024. When we heard these matters on 3rd July, 2024, thetwo months' time granted by this Court had expired on 9th April, 2024and no order was passed by the concerned Minister. Hence, we issuednotice under the Contempt of Courts Act in the form prescribed,returnable on 29th July, 2024. The matters were then listed yesterday.4.We have heard the learned Advocate for the Petitioner andthe learned Government Pleader. The learned Advocate for thePage 6 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24Petitioner has received the affidavit in reply filed by the concernedMinister, dated 24th July, 2024. 5.The Government Pleader has presented both these CivilApplications, which are filed personally by the said Minister, seekingexemption from appearance in the proceedings before the Court. Anunconditional apology has been tendered. Both these Civil Applicationsare filed seeking recalling of our order dated 3rd July, 2024. Thesematters were listed yesterday, before the Co-ordinate Bench of thisCourt. It was opined that the matters would lie to this Bench. This is thesubmission of the learned Government Pleader and which is confirmedby the learned Advocate for the original Petitioner. Hence, these matterswere mentioned at 2.30 p.m. yesterday and were called out at 6.00p.m., for hearing. We have, therefore, heard the learned advocates inboth these Petitions along with the Civil Applications, yesterday andtoday.6.There is no dispute that the timeline granted by the WritCourt has been crossed by Respondent No.1. It is equally undisputedthat the matters were heard by Shri Anup Kumar and were closed fororders on 22nd April, 2024. They were decided by the PrincipalSecretary (Additional Chief Secretary) Shri Anup Kumar, on 5th July,2024. Page 7 of 28 905&906CP577&587-247.Before we deal with the facts of this case, it will be appositeto refer to Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and Rules 9and 20 below Chapter XXXIV of the Bombay High Court Appellate SideRules, 1960. Section 12 and Rules 9 and 20 read as under:"12. Punishment for contempt of court.—(1) Save as otherwiseexpressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt ofcourt may be punished with simple imprisonment for a termwhich may extend to six months, or with fine which mayextend to two thousand rupees, or with both: Provided that the accused may be discharged or thepunishment awarded may be remitted on apology being madeto the satisfaction of the Court.Explanation.—An apology shall not be rejected merely on theground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes itbona fide.(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the timebeing in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess ofthat specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either inrespect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, wherea person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if itconsiders that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that asentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead ofsentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he bedetained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding sixmonths as it may think fit.Page 8 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court inrespect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, everyperson who, at the time the contempt was committed, was incharge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conductof business of the company, as well as the company, shall bedeemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment maybe enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention incivil prison of each such person:Provided that nothing contained in this sub-sectionshall render any such person liable to such punishment if heproves that the contempt was committed without hisknowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent itscommission.(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4),where the contempt of court referred to therein has beencommitted by a company and it is proved that the contempt hasbeen committed with the consent or connivance of, or isattributable to any neglect on the part of, any director,manager, secretary or other officer of the company, suchdirector, manager, secretary or other officer shall also bedeemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment maybe enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention incivil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.Explanation.—For the purpose of sub-sections (4) and (5),— (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firmor other association of individuals; and(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in thefirm."Page 9 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24Rule 9. (1) Notice to the person charged shall be in form I. Theperson charged shall, unless otherwise order, appear in personbefore the Court as directed on the date fixed for hearing of theproceedings, and shall continue to remain present duringhearing till the proceeding is finally disposed off by Order ofthe Court.(2) When action is initiated on a Petition or a Reference,a copy of the Petition or the Reference along with theannexures and Affidavits shall be served upon the personcharged.Rule 20: Whenever the High Court or Designated Court issuesa notice, it may dispense with the personal attendance of theperson charged with the contempt and permit him to appearthrough an Advocate and in its discretion, at any stage of theproceeding, direct the personal attendance of such person, and,if necessary, enforce such attendance in the matter hereinabove provided."8.The first proviso, below Sub Section 1 of Section 12 providesthat an accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may beremitted, on an apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.The explanation there below indicates that an apology shall not berejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional, if theaccused makes it bona fide. Sub Section 3 provides that if a person isfound guilty of a civil contempt, the Court, if opines that a fine will notmeet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment isnecessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment,Page 10 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceedingsix months, as it may think fit. The proviso below Sub Section 4,purports that nothing contained in sub-section 4 would render anyperson liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt wascommitted without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligenceto prevent it's commission.9.As we turn to the facts of this case, it is undisputed that theorder of this Court dated 9th February, 2024 was conveyed to theRespondent Minister, by the Office of the Government Pleader via E-mail, on 20th February, 2024. Thereafter, the Model Code of Conduct,in view of the general elections to the Parliament, was declared on 16thMarch, 2024. 10.It is stated by Respondent No.1 that he deemed it proper notto take up the matters because of the introduction of the Code ofConduct and, therefore, a meeting was scheduled on 2nd April, 2024with the Principal Secretary of the said Department. With dueconsultation, the file was transferred to the Principal Secretary on 10thApril, 2024. It is undisputed amongst the parties that such delegationof authority is permissible for enabling the Principal Secretary to decidethe proceedings, if the Minister, for any reason whatsoever, is unable totake up the matter or deal with the same. The record also reveals, andwhich is undisputed that, the Principal Secretary heard the parties andPage 11 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24closed the matter for orders on 22nd April, 2024. It is also undisputedthat the Nation went to the Polls and insofar as the State ofMaharashtra is concerned, the polling was held in five phases asunder:ActivitiesPhasesIII IIIIVVNotification20.03.202428.03.202412.04.202418.04.202426.04.2024Nomination27.03.202404.04.202419.04.202425.04.202403.05.2024Scrutiny28.03.202405.04.202420.04.202426.04.202404.05.2024Last date forwithdrawal30.03.202408.04.202422.04.202429.04.202406.05.2024Poll Date19.04.202426.04.202407.05.202413.05.202420.05.2024Results declared on 04.06.202411.The Principal Secretary, who was dealing with the said filewas also the Additional Chief Secretary for the State of Maharashtraand the learned Government Pleader submits that the entireGovernment machinery was fully engrossed and occupied in the generalelection. The order in these two matters, was passed on 5th July, 2024.12.The learned Advocate for the Original Petitioner had statedyesterday that, he will file his affidavit in Reply to the Civil Applicationsfiled by the first Respondent seeking exemption. However, today, he hasdecided to proceed to address the Court, orally, without a reply, on thebasis of his pleadings in the Contempt Petitions.Page 12 of 28 905&906CP577&587-2413.The learned Advocate for the Original Petitioner submits thatRespondent No.5 in both the Petitions, is an MLA from the rulingparty to which the Respondent No. 1 Minister belongs. The Revisionwas filed by Respondent No.5, on 13th December, 2023. The Petitionerhad filed a caveat. Hearing was conducted on the interim applicationon 15th December, 2023 and an interim order was passed on the sameday. Thereafter, the matters were posted on 12th January, 2024 alongwith various other matters. Only these two matters were adjourned byRespondent No.1 Minister, by continuing the interim order. Thecontention is that this happened only because Respondent No.5 is anMLA. Thereafter, the Petitioner visited the office of the Hon'bleMinister on two to three occasions. However, there was no hearingconducted. Hence, the Petitioner approached this Court by filing twoWrit Petitions in which the order dated 9th February, 2024 was passedand Respondent No. 1 Minister was granted 60 days time to decide thepending proceedings.14.The learned Advocate further submits that on 21st February,2024, the matter was not on Board. The Petitioner tendered a reply inthe office. No hearing was conducted. Thereafter, a hearing wasarranged on 22nd April, 2024 and the Principal Secretary closed theproceedings for orders. An order was passed on 5th July, 2024, afterthis Court passed an order issuing contempt notice, on 3rd July, 2024. Page 13 of 28 905&906CP577&587-2415.We are informed that the proceedings before the Minister,were allowed in favour of the present Petitioner and an adverse orderwas passed against Respondent No.5, MLA. It is further informed thatthe said Respondent No.5 has approached the learned Single Judge ofthis Court, in Writ Petition No. 7751 of 2024. By a speaking orderdated 25th July, 2024, the order of Respondent No.1 Minister has beenstayed by the learned Single Judge of this Court.16.Yesterday, when these matters were heard at length, thelearned Government Pleader informed us that, as the Model Code ofConduct was declared on 16th March, 2024, the concerned Ministerdeemed it appropriate not to hear the matter. The allegation that theappellant before the Minister is an MLA of the ruling party, alsoweighed on his mind. Due to the enforcement of the Model Code ofConduct, the Department of Co-operation issued a communicationdated 26th March, 2024 to the Election Commission of India, to seek aclarification, as to whether Respondent No.1 Minister could hear anddecide the proceedings. The file to obtain guidelines, was submitted tothe Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary of theGovernment of Maharashtra, which was constituted by GR dated 28thFebruary, 2024. Thereafter, the meeting of the committee was held on2nd April, 2024 and it was decided by the Chief Secretary that thePrincipal Secretary (Cooperation and Marketing), would be thePage 14 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24authority to decide the said proceedings. The parties to the saidproceedings appeared before the Principal Secretary on 22nd April,2024 and addressed him on all the grounds raised by each of them.17.In the light of the facts recorded above and on perusal ofRules 9 and 20 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960,the discretion is with the Court. Taking into account the above factorswhich indicate that Respondent No.1 Minister showed due diligenceand even the Chief Secretary of the State, being the Chief ElectionCommissioner of the State of Maharashtra, constituted a Committee totake a decision. The matter was referred to the Principal Secretary.This consumed time. Their bona-fides are evident. 18.Insofar as the issue as to whether Respondent No.1 deservesto be punished for contempt, we have revisited the facts as recordedherein above. It is apparent that after this Court passed the orderdated 9th February, 2024, the Government Pleader communicated theorder to the Respondent No.1 vide E-mail dated 20th February, 2024.The Code of Conduct was enforced on 16th March, 2024. TheDepartment of Cooperation immediately moved a communication to theState Election Commissioner dated 26th March, 2024 for seekingguidelines. Considering that the order of the High court was at issue,the Chief Secretary constituted a Committee in terms of the GR datedPage 15 of 28
Decision
905&906CP577&587-2428th February, 2024 and conducted a meeting on 2nd April, 2024. Adecision was taken to let the Principal Secretary decide the matter,instead of Respondent No.1 Minister. Hearing was also held on 22ndApril, 2024 and the order was delivered on 5th July, 2024.19.As such, the issue is as to whether, there has been anintentional, deliberate and willful disobedience of the order of the HighCourt, by Respondent No.1 or the Principal Secretary. We haveconsidered the law on this issue.20.In BALWANTBHAI SOMABHAI BHANDARI VS. HIRALALSOMABHAI CONTRACTOR, 2023 SCC online SC 1139, it is held that,An unconditional apology not enough to evade punishmentfor contempt of court if conduct damages dignity ofinstitution –(i) We hold that an assurance in the form of an undertakinggiven by a counsel / advocate on behalf of his client to thecourt; the willful breach or disobedience of the same wouldamount to “civil contempt” as defined under Section 2(b) ofthe Act 1971.(ii) There exists a distinction between an undertaking given toa party to the lis and the undertaking given to a court. Theundertaking given to a court attracts the provisions of the Act1971 whereas an undertaking given to a party to the lis byway of an agreement of settlement or otherwise would notPage 16 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24attract the provisions of the Act 1971. In the facts of thepresent case, we hold that the undertaking was given to theHigh Court and the breach or disobedience would definitelyattract the provisions of the Act 1971.(iii) Although the transfer of the suit property pendente litemay not be termed as void ab initio, yet, when the court islooking into such transfers in contempt proceedings the courtcan definitely declare such transactions to be void in order tomaintain the majesty of law. Apart from punishing thecontemnor, for his contumacious conduct, the majesty of lawmay demand that appropriate directions be issued by thecourt so that any advantage secured as a result of suchcontumacious conduct, is completely nullified. This mayinclude issue of directions either for reversal of thetransactions by declaring such transactions to be void orpassing appropriate directions to the concerned authorities toensure that the contumacious conduct on the part of thecontemnor does not continue to enure to the advantage of thecontemnor or any one claiming under him. (iv) The beneficiaries of any contumacious transaction haveno right or locus to be heard in the contempt proceedings onthe ground that they are bona fide purchasers of the propertyfor value without notice and therefore, are necessary parties.Contempt is between the court and the contemnor and nothird party can involve itself into the same. (v) The apology tendered should not be accepted as a matterof course and the court is not bound to accept the same. Theapology may be unconditional, unqualified and bona fide, stillif the conduct is serious, which has caused damage to thePage 17 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24dignity of the institution, the same should not be accepted.There ought not to be a tendency by courts, to showcompassion when disobedience of an undertaking or an orderis with impunity and with total consciousness.21.In COURT ON IT'S OWN MOTION VS. AMAR SINGH BHALLA,2023 SCC Online Del 5740, it was held that,Contemnor had willfully disobeyed his own undertaking and alsodisobeyed the directions passed by the court and accordinglysentenced him for six months simple imprisonment -50. This court has taken note of the fact that the mereimposition of the fine would neither serve the purpose ofmaintaining the dignity of this court nor would be appropriate inthe facts and circumstances of the present matter. Even in thesecontempt proceedings, this court had to issue NBW several timesto ensure the presence of the contemnor as he was evadingappearance. Therefore, this court is constrained to impose themaximum sentence as the contemnor has repeatedly breachedhis own undertakings.51. Considering the facts of the instant case and the rule of lawlaid down in the foregoing decisions, it is deemed appropriate topunish the contemnor with simple imprisonment for a term of sixmonths, commencing from 14.09.202322.In RAMA KISHAN VS. TARUN BAJAJ, (2014) 16 SCC 204,the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-"Willfully disobeyed his own undertaking and also the directionspassed by the court –Page 18 of 28 905&906CP577&587-2412. Thus, in order to punish a contemnor, it has to beestablished that disobedience of the order is “willful”. The word“willful” introduces a mental element and hence, requireslooking into the mind of a person/contemnor by gauging hisactions, which is an indication of one's state of mind. “Willful”means knowingly intentional, conscious, calculated anddeliberate with full knowledge of consequences flowingtherefrom. It excludes casual, accidental, bona fide orunintentional acts or genuine inability. Willful act does notencompass involuntarily or negligent actions. The act has to bedone with a “bad purpose or without justifiable excuse orstubbornly, obstinately or perversely”. Willful act is to bedistinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,heedlessly or inadvertently. It does not include any act donenegligently or involuntarily. The deliberate conduct of a personmeans that he knows what he is doing and intends to do thesame. Therefore, there has to be a calculated action with evilmotive on his part. Even if there is a disobedience of an order,but, such disobedience is the result of some compellingcircumstances under which it was not possible for thecontemnor to comply with the order, the contemnor cannot bepunished. “Committal or sequestration will not be orderedunless contempt involves a degree of default or misconduct.”23.In RAMA NARANG V.S RAMESH NARANG, 2021 SCC OnlineSC 29, it was concluded that, Willful disobedience or willful breach – are these necessaryrequisites for bringing in action for civil contempt? – not like anexecution proceeding under CPC. Page 19 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24It is quasi – criminal in nature and standard of proof required isin the same manner as in the other criminal cases. 24.In INDIAN AIRPORTS EMPLOYEES UNION VS. RANJANCHATTERJEE AND OTHERS, 1999 (2 ) SCC 537, it was held that,It is well settled that disobedience of orders of Court, in order toamount to `Civil Contempt' under section 2(b) of the Contemptof Courts' Act, 1971 must be `willful' and proof of meredisobedience is not sufficient. [S.S.Roy vs. State of Orissa &Others AIR 1960 SC 190]. Where there is no deliberate floutingof the orders of the Court, but, a mere misinterpretation of theexecutive instructions, it would not be a case of Civil Contempt[Ashok Kumar Singh & Others vs. State of Bihar & Others AIR1992 SC 407]. In this contempt case, we do not propose todecide whether these six sweepers do fall within the scope of thenotification dated 9.12.1976 or the judgment of this Court dated11.4.1997. That is a question to be decided in appropriateproceedings. It is true that these six sweepers' names are shown in theannexure to the W.P. No.2362 of 1990, in the High Court. But, thequestion is whether there is willful disobedience to the orders ofthis Court. In the counter affidavit of the respondents, it is statedthat there is no specific direction in the judgment of this Court forabsorption of these sweepers, if any, working in the Car Parkarea, and that the directions given in the judgment were inrelation to the sweeper working at the `International Airport,National Airport Cargo Complex and Import Warehouse'. It isPage 20 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24stated that the cleaners employed by the licensee in charge ofMaintenance of the Car Park area do not, on a properinterpretation of the order, come within the sweep of thesedirections. It is contended that even assuming that they wereincluded in the category of sweepers working at the`International Airport', inasmuch as, they were not employed forthe purpose of cleaning, dusting and watching the buildings, asmentioned in the notification abolishing contract labour, theywere not covered by the judgment. It is also contended that thecase of such sweepers at the Car Park area was not even referredto the Advisory Board under section 10 of the Contract Labour(Prohibition) Act and it was highly doubtful if they were coveredby the notification.In our view, these rival contentions involve an interpretation ofthe order of this Court, the notification and other relevantdocuments. We are not deciding in this contempt case whetherthe interpretation put forward by the respondents or thepetitioners is correct. That question has to be decided inappropriate proceedings. For the purpose of this contempt case, itis sufficient to say that the non-absorption of these six sweeperswas bonafide and was based on an interpretation of the aboveorders and notification etc. and cannot be said to amount to`willful disobedience' of the orders of this Court".25.In SURESH SRIKRISHANA NAIK VS. DEPARTMENT OFSOCIAL WELFARE, 2002(3) Mh.L.J 889, this Court held as under:-10. The reference to Bhimsen Dixit's case by the learnedadvocate for the petitioner was to draw attention to paras 15Page 21 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24and 16 thereof. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Courttherein that "just as the disobedience to a specific order of theCourt undermines the authority and dignity of the Court in aparticular case, similarly the deliberate and malafide conduct ofnot following the law laid down in the previous decisionundermines the constitutional authority and respect of the HighCourt. "Attention is drawn to this observation by submittingthat in view of the fact that the High Court in its decision hadset aside the earlier decision of the respondents denying thebenefits to the staff members of the institutions under theSocial Department and having directed to consider the same tobe extended by phased manner, the case is squarely covered bythe said observation of the Apex Court. However, as alreadyobserved above, merely because the decision to grant thebenefit was set aside, that itself cannot be construed as adirection to grant such benefits to the staff members of suchinstitutions in view of the specific direction given by the Courtto the respondents "to consider" such extension being grantedto such staff members in a phased manner. Apparently, theCourt had taken into consideration the fact of financialconstraints by the Government and, therefore, it was left thematter and to see to it if such benefits can be granted in phasedmanner. Being so, the said observations of the Apex Court is ofno help to the petitioner for the action of contempt of Court inrelation to the said order dated 18th January, 2000. Thedecision of Bhimsen Dixit case, rather than assisting thepetitioner's contention in the matter, justifies refusal of anyaction against the respondents. The Apex Court therein hasclearly held that "Contempt of Court is disobedience to theCourt, by acting in opposition to the authority, justice andPage 22 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24dignity thereof. It signifies a willful disregard or disobedienceof the Court's order; it also signifies such conduct as tends tobring the authority of the Court and the administration of lawinto disrepute." Apparently before initiating action under theContempt of Courts Act against a party, it is necessary toascertain whether that the party has acted in willful disregardor disobedience of the Court's order. The act on the part of therespondents in disregarding or disobeying the order hasnecessarily to be willful. The facts disclosed in this caseapparently reveal that the decision not to extend the benefiteven by phased manner to the staff members of the institutionsunder the Social Welfare Department has been taken onaccount of the financial constraints by the respondents.Certainly the said decision has been taken 2002(3) Mh.L.J 889pursuant to the direction to consider such extension in phasedmanner. The very fact that while setting aside the earlierdecision of 8th July, 1998 denying such benefits the Court hadchosen not to give any direction beyond leaving it to thediscretion of the respondents to take appropriate decision ofthe matter, discloses that the respondents were not given anyspecific direction for extension of such benefits and in suchcircumstances if the respondents have denied or refused togrant such benefits to the staff members of the institutions inquestion, it cannot be said that there is any disobedience of theCourt's order, much less willful disobedience. 12. The Apex Court in Chhotu Ram's case has clearly observedthat the conduct in order to come within the purview of thestatutory provisions must be willful and deliberate. It has beenfurther observed that "the introduction of the Contempt ofPage 23 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24Courts Act, 1971 in the statute-book has been for the purposesof securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general andfor due and proper administration of justice in the country. It isa powerful weapon in the hands of the law Courts by reasonwherefore the exercise of jurisdiction must be with due careand caution and for larger interest. Similar is a decision of theApex Court in Kapildeo Prasad Sah, which has been relied uponby the petitioner, therein, it has been observed that "for holdingthe respondents to have committed contempt, Civil Contemptat that, it has to be shown that there has been willfuldisobedience of the judgment or order of the Court. Power topunish for contempt is to be resorted to when there is clearviolation of the Court's order. Since notice of contempt andpunishment for contempt is of far-reaching consequence, thesepowers should be invoked only when a clear case of willfuldisobedience of the Court's order has been made out. Whetherdisobedience is willful in a particular case depends on the factsand circumstances of that case." It has been further observedthat "initiation of contempt proceedings is not a substitute forexecution proceedings though at times that purpose may alsobe achieved." It has been further ruled that "willful wouldexclude the casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional actsor genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order."26.In Vishram Singh Raghubanshi Vs. State of UP, AIR 2011 SC2275, the Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that the contemptjurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and the dignity of the Court. Page 24 of 28 905&906CP577&587-2427.In Pushpaben & Anr Vs. Narandas V. Badiani AIR 1979 SC1536, it was held that the Court must apply its mind properly and givespecial reasons for imposing punishment and imprisonment in aparticular situation. Imprisonment is an exception and fine is a rule.28.In Balram Singh vs Bhikam Chand Jain And Ors., AIR 1985SC 1726, it was held that it would be a travesty of justice, if the Courtswere to allow gross contempt of Court to go unpunished, if there is nomitigating circumstance.29.In Abdul Jabbar Taj Vs. R.K. Karanjia, AIR 1970 BOM 48, thisCourt concluded that an unreserved, clean and immediate apologytendered at the earliest opportunity, must undoubtedly be given greaterweight than a belated apology. If an apology is tendered belatedly,after getting a feeling that a conviction is possible, it ceases to have theevidence of real contriteness and manly consciousness of the wrongdoer and instead, indicates ‘a cringing of a coward shivering at theprospect of the stern hand of justice about to descend upon his head’(quoted from the cited judgment). 30.In Prem Surana Vs. Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate& Anr. 2002 SC 2956, it was held that the judges should not be hyper-sensitive, but that does not mean and imply that they ought to maintainPage 25 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24angelic silence. A person occupying the chair is immaterial. It is theseat of justice whose majesty needs to be protected and nobody can bepermitted to tarnish the image of the temple of justice.31.The learned Government pleader has cited a judgmentdelivered by the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,dated 05.02.2024, in Civil Appeal Nos. 1644-1645 of 2024 /SLP(C)25880-25881/2025, Sri L. V. Subramanyam Vs. The RegistrarGeneral, High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, wherein the challengeto the conviction of the appellants with fine of Rs.500, was being lookedinto. The High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State ofTelangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, passed an order coming toa conclusion that though the order, of which contempt was alleged,was complied with, there was a delay in compliance of the same. TheHigh Court observed that there is no explanation for the delay. TheHon'ble Supreme Court concluded that a mere delay in complying withthe order, unless there is a deliberate or willful act on the part of thealleged contemners, would not attract the provisions of Contempt ofCourts Act. Proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are quasijudicial in nature and, therefore, as the Court comes to a conclusionthat the act was neither deliberate nor willful, it could not haveconvicted the appellants for contempt of the Court. The appeals wereallowed and the impugned orders were quashed and set aside.Page 26 of 28 905&906CP577&587-2432.Having recorded the dates and sequence of events as above,it is apparent that there is neither a deliberate delay caused by ShriDilip Dattatray Walse Patil, nor has the Principal Secretary Shri AnupKumar caused a delay in the matter, intentionally or willfully ordeliberately. The dates and sequence of events ‘speak louder thanwords’. It is obvious that Respondent No.1, in our view, pragmaticallyavoided to hear the matter, after the Code of Conduct was enforced on16th March, 2023 in the face of an allegation that the appellant beforethe concerned Minister was an MLA of the ruling party. The ChiefSecretary showed equal pragmatism in forming a committee andtransferring the matter by delegation of authority to the PrincipalSecretary, which is neither challenged nor contradicted. After the filewas transferred on 10th April, 2024, which is within eight days of themeeting and two days after the timeline of the High Court concluded,the Principal Secretary conducted the hearing, within 12 days. 33.Much ado has been made by the Petitioner that after thematter was closed for orders on 22nd April, 2024, Shri Anup Kumarshould have passed an order expeditiously. In a sense, the Petitionermay be justified in saying so. But it cannot be ignored that the State ofMaharashtra went to the polls, from 20th March, 2024 and it is aherculean task for the State Administration to conduct the polling invarious parts of the State, in a general election or even in a StatePage 27 of 28 905&906CP577&587-24assembly election, under the strict guidance and vigil of the NationalElection Commission.34.We do not find any deliberate or willful or intentional conducton the part of Shri Anup Kumar. The allegation of bias and prejudice isalso put to rest by the fact that the final order delivered by the PrincipalSecretary, upholds the claim of the Petitioner and was againstRespondent no. 5, MLA. It is a different issue that the said order hasbeen subsequently stayed by the learned Single Bench of this Court.35.In view of the above, we do not find that there is anyintentional, deliberate or willful disobedience of the order of this Courtdated 9th February, 2024, with the object of overbearing the majesty oflaw or for undermining the constitutional provision enshrined underArticle 226, which vests with this Court with the Writ jurisdiction.36.Both these Contempt Petitions are, therefore, dismissed. Boththe Civil Applications, also stand disposed off.( Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. ) ( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J. )JPChavan Page 28 of 28