Criminal Appeal No. 496 of 2003 · Bombaybench High Court
Case Details
2024:BHC-AUG:11293 {1} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 496 OF 20031.Mahadeo s/o Ramchandra GaikwadAge: 23 yrs., Occu.: Agri. 2.Gangabai s/o Ramchandra GaikwadAge: 40 yrs., Occu.: Household,Both r/o. Vidoli, Tq.Mantha,Dist.Jalna.….Appellants Versus.The State of Maharashtra ….Respondent …..Advocate for Appellants : Mr. Satej S. JadhavAPP for Respondent : Mr.N.D.Batule ….. CORAM : ABHAY S. WAGHWASE, J. RESERVED ON : 12 JUNE, 2024 PRONOUNCED ON : 21 JUNE, 2024 JUDGMENT :- 1.Aggrieved by the judgment of order passed by the II Ad-hocAdditional Sessions Judge, Jalna, in Sessions Case No.8 of 2003,dated 30-06-2003, convicting appellants for offence under Sections306 read with 34 and 498-A read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code(IPC) and sentencing them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for fiveyears and two years respectively and to pay fine, appellants preferredinstant appeal.
Legal Reasoning
{2} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003 BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 2. Seetabai @ Parvatibai was married to accused no.1 Mahadeoon 30-05-2002. After marriage, she went to reside with her husbandand mother-in-law at village Vidoli, Tq.Mantha, Dist.Jalna. As percustoms, after 3-4 days, she was brought by father to his house, shestayed for two days and again went back when accused husbandcame to take her. After 15 days, brother of Seetabai visited her toascertain her well being and he brought her back to the maternalhouse. She again stayed for four days and during her such stay, sheinformed that husband and mother-in-law are demandingRs.20,000/- for purchasing agricultural land. She also told that if shefails to bring the amount, she would not be allowed to stay in thehouse. She also informed that they used to beat her and keep herstarved. However, she was again sent back. After 15 days, son of brother-in-law of informant went to bringher. On the way back, Seetabai weeped and informed about abovedemand. When she went back, eight days thereafter, a message wasreceived that she was serious. When informant and others went,they learnt that Seetabai had hanged herself. After last rituals, PW1Abasaheb, father of deceased, lodged report, which was made basisof registration of crime. {3} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003On investigation and gathering sufficient evidence, bothaccused were chargesheeted and tried before learned II Ad-hocAdditional Sessions Judge, who by judgment and order dated30-06-2003 recorded guilt of both accused husband and mother-in-law for offence under Sections 498-A and 306 read with 34 of theIPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay fine. Aggrieved by above conviction, appellants have preferredinstant appeal questioning legality, maintainability and sustainabilityof the impugned judgment. SUBMISSIONSOn behalf of appellants :3. Sum and substance of the argument of learned counsel forappellants is that there is false implication by father of deceased onaccount of annoyance of losing daughter. He pointed out thatdeceased was used to town and city life. She was brought up at Selu,whereas after marriage, she was required to live at Vidoli, which is asmall village. He pointed out that her conduct of repeatedly going toparents’ house itself shows that she was not happy and ready to stayin the village. He took this court to the cross-examination faced byparents of deceased and would submit that it is evident from the {4} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003answers given by them that victim was herself unhappy andunwilling to lead village life. 4.He further pointed out that there was no demand as alleged.That there are no details as to where the land was supposed to bepurchased. That infact there was no dowry demand and even motherof deceased has candidly admitted to that extent. Hence, accordingto learned Counsel allegation of demand of money are false andafterthought. He pointed out that apparently there are omnibusallegations of demand and beating. He pointed out that there areallegations of keeping her starved, but condition of body reflected inpost mortem, indicates something else and contrary. 5.He submitted that learned trial Court has not appreciated theevidence in the line of requirement of existence of essentialingredients of both Sections 498-A as well as 306 of the IPC. Hepointed out that evidence of prosecution was lacking on the aspect ofcruelty as contemplated under law. He further pointed out that eventhe elements of abetment, inducement, which are sine qua non forattracting offence under Section 306 of the IPC are explicitly missingfrom the prosecution evidence, but still according to him, learned {5} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003trial Court, returned the guilt probably because death has taken placein short span and surprisingly applied and invoked Section 113A ofthe Indian Evidence Act even when it was unwarranted and calledfor. 6.He lastly pointed out that very approach taken by learned trialCourt in applying presumption is also against law, as according tohim, unless foundational facts had been proved beyond reasonabledoubt by prosecution, and unless essential ingredients for each of theoffences were cogently proved, it was not open for learned trialJudge to invoke provisions of Section 113A of the Indian EvidenceAct. Consequently, he criticized the judgment both for improperappreciation of evidence and failure to apply correct law and thus, heprayed to interfere by setting aside impugned judgment.On behalf of State :7. Supporting the impugned judgment, learned APP would pointout that barely after couple of weeks of marriage, accused husbandand mother-in-law put up demand of Rs.20,000/-. That in the verysecond visit to the maternal house, victim promptly reported theabove demand to her family members. That she was also beaten and {6} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003kept starved to coerce her to seek money from her parents. Thatbrother and cousin brother of deceased, who went to fetch her, arealso examined. That deceased had informed them too regardingdemand and ill-treatment. That independent neighbour is alsoexamined. According to learned APP, all witnesses are consistent andtheir testimonies have remained unshaken throughout. He submitsthat only because of ill-treatment and harassment, Seetabai hangedherself and there was no other reason. According to learned APP,unnatural death has taken place in the house of accused. Therefore,they being solely responsible and answerable, learned APP submitsthat learned trial Court rightly held them guilty and convicted themand hence, he prays to dismiss the appeal for want of merits.SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE8.In support of its case, prosecution has examined in all sixwitnesses in trial Court. Sum and substance of their evidence is asunder : PW1 Abasaheb s/o Gangadhar Kale is father of deceased andinformant. His evidence is at exh.31. He deposed about date ofmarriage, his daughter going to reside at Vidoli to stay with husbandand mother-in-law. He stated that for initial two days, everything {7} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003was smooth, but when his daughter came subsequently to maternalhouse, she reported about demand of Rs.20,000/- for purchase ofland put up by husband and mother-in-law. That she reportedbeating and starvation. That his son and son of his brother-in-law,who went to fetch her, were also informed by his daughter aboutdemand and ill-treatment. He deposed that finally on 29-07-2002,news of her serious condition was received and when they went toVidoli, they learnt that Seetabai had hanged herself. According tohim, accused husband and mother-in-law are responsible and so helodged report. PW2 Chandabai w/o Abasaheb Kale is mother of deceased. Herevidence is at exh.33. She stated that after marriage, Seetabai cameand stayed for two days at maternal house and went back with herhusband, who had come to take her. That after 15 days, when shewas again brought, at that time, she informed while crying regardingdemand of Rs.20,000/- for purchase of agricultural land, aboutharassment, she being kept starved and beaten. At that time, shestayed for three days. Thereafter, her son took her to matrimonialhouse. That after 15 days, they sent Vishnu Gunjkar to house ofaccused for seeing condition of my daughter. Vishnu brought {8} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003Seetabai to maternal house. Vishnu and her daughter told thataccused persons were harassing her on account of demand ofRs.20,000/- for purchasing agricultural land. At that time, Seetabaistayed there for four days. That when she went back, after 8-10days, they got the news. She deposed that she suspected thataccused persons killed her daughter. PW3 Narayan s/o Rambhau Dhavale is neighbour of PW1Abasaheb and PW2 Chandabai. He is an independent witness. Hisevidence is at exh.34. He stated that when deceased came for tea athis house, she reported about accused asking her to bringRs.20,000/- from her parents for purchase of agricultural land. Shealso stated about both accused harassing her. According to him, hewas told by her to inform about this to her parents. She also toldthat she was not given food. He claims that he reported this to PW1.After 8-10 days, they got message that Seetabai was serious.PW4 Vishnu s/o Narayan Gunjkar is cousin brother ofdeceased. His evidence is at exh.35. He deposed that he was sentto Vidoli to make enquriy about Seetabai. According to him, when hereached there, Seetabai expressed her desire to accompany him toback to Selu. In return journey, she told about accused asking to {9} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003bring Rs.20,000/- for purchase of agricultural land. At such time, shewas weeping and she told that both accused harassed her by beatingand keeping her under starvation. After 15 days, the incidentoccurred. He deposed that on account of demand of Rs.20,000/-Seetabai died.PW5 Prabhabai w/o Balaprasad Somani is Pancha to inquestpanchanama exh.39. She is an independent witness. Her evidence isat exh.38. She deposed about panchanama to be drawn. She alsodeposed about hearing of demand and ill-treatment. She alsodeposed that deceased told her during first visit that she was livinghappily, during second visit, she told that she was living ordinarymarried life and during third visit, she told that accused beat her,kept her starved and asked her to bring Rs.20,000/-. PW6 Sandipan s/o Shankarrao Kamble is Investigating Officer.His evidence is at exh.48. ANALYSIS9.Learned trial Court has recorded guilt of both appellants foroffence under Sections 498-A and 306 read with 34 of the IPC. {10} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003FIRST CHARGE – SECTION 498-A :10.First let us deal with charge under Section 498-A of the IPC.Before appreciating the evidence in the case in hand, it wouldbe profitable to give a brief account of settled legal position and legalrequirements for attracting said charge. Law is fairly settled that, for attracting the charge underSection 498-A of IPC, prosecution is duty bound to prove followingessential ingredients :- “(1)A woman was married; (2)She was subjected to cruelty; (3)Such cruelty consisted in - (i)any lawful conduct as was likely to drive suchwoman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury ordanger to her life, limb or health whether mental orphysical; (ii)harm to such woman with a view to coercing herto meet unlawful demand for property or valuablesecurity or on account of failure of such woman or anyof her relations to meet the lawful demand ; (iii)the woman was subjected to such cruelty by herhusband or any relation of her husband.”JUDICIAL PRECEDENT :11.As to what actually constitutes cruelty has been lucidly andsuccinctly dealt in the landmark case of Giridhar Shankar Tawade v.State of Maharashtra (2002) 5 SCC 177, where the Court dwelling {11} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003upon the scope and purport of Section 498-A IPC has held as under: “The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid‘cruelty’ which stands defined by attributing a specificstatutory meaning attached thereto as noticed hereinbefore. Two specific instances have been taken note of inorder to ascribe a meaning to the word ‘cruelty’ as isexpressed by the legislatures : Whereas explanation (a)involves three specific situations viz., (i) to drive thewoman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or(iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental andphysical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity,in explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury butthe legislature thought it fit to include only coerciveharassment which obviously as the legislative intentexpressed in equally heinous to match the physical injury :whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equallyserious in terms of the provisions of the statute since thesame would also embrance the attributes of ‘cruelty’ interms of Section 498-A.” [emphasis added]Similar views are echoed in Gurnaib Singh v. State of Punjab(2013) 7 SCC 108, wherein it is held as under:“Clause (a) of the Explanation to the aforesaid provisiondefines “cruelty” to mean “any willful conduct which is ofsuch a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit {12} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003suicide”. Clause (b) of the Explanation pertains tounlawful demand. Clause (a) can take in its ambit mentalcruelty.”In State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhan Rao (2008) 15SCC 582, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that, “Harassmentsimplicitor is not cruelty. Only when such harassment is committedfor the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person to meet anunlawful demand or property etc. alone would amount to crueltypunishable under Section 498-A IPC”. In Bhaskar Lal Sharma v. Monica (2009) 10 SCC 604, theHon’ble Apex court reiterated the essential ingredients for the saidoffence and pleadings which are necessary in that regard. Very recently in the case of K. Subba Rao v. The State ofTelangana (2018) 14 SCC 452, following observations are made:“6.The Courts should be careful in proceeding against thedistant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputesand dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not beroped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specificinstances of their involvement in the crime are made out.” {13} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 200312.Evidence of PW1 Abasaheb, informant / father of deceased, hiswife PW2 Chandabai, mother of deceased and PW4 Vishnu, cousinbrother of deceased is of relevance. Prosecution has also adducedevidence of immediate neighbour PW3 Narayan.13.Sifted evidence of parents of deceased. Both PW1 Abasaheband PW2 Chandabai, parents of deceased, deposed that deceasedreturned to their house after cohabiting with husband for 3-4 days.They both speak that she stayed at their place for two days. PW1 informant deposed in examination-in-chief itself thatduring first visit after marriage, she told him that her marital life isgoing smoothly. That accused husband came to take her anddaughter was sent back with him. Both parents also further deposedthat after 15 days, they sent their elder son Digamber to Vidoli andhe brought his daughter to their house. According to informant, shestayed for four days and during her such stay, she told that bothaccused were asking her to bring Rs.20,000/- for purchasingagricultural land. According to him, she further told that accusedpersons said that if she fails to bring money, she would not beallowed to live in the house. That she also stated that they used tobeat her and keep her starved. But he still sent his daughter with his {14} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003elder son to accused. PW2 Chandabai deposed that their son Digamber brought herfrom Vidoli and after coming to house, her daughter started weepingsaying that accused were demanding Rs.20,000/- for purchase ofagricultural land, she was harassed on the account of such demand,she was kept starved and beaten. Thus, informant father has stated that she reported aboutdemand and further informed about accused asking her not to comewithout bringing money. Version to this extent is not stated by PW2wife of PW1. PW2 merely speaks of hearing about harassment. Thisis general and omnibus allegation. There are allegations of beatingbut there is no clarification and elaboration about said episode. Evenbrother Digamber, who allegedly was sent and who brought victimfrom her matrimonial house, is not examined. Infact, such brotherwas a material witness. 14.If testimonies of PW1 Abasaheb and PW2 Chandabai arefurther carefully analyzed and considered, then it is emerging thatapproximate stay of victim till she went back after reporting demandand ill-treatment is a period of only 51 days i.e. in the house ofaccused. She seems to have spent nine days at parents house. Out of {15} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003above 51 days, during her first visit, she has already reported herfather that she was living happy married life. Therefore, apparentlyallegations of demand of Rs.20,000/- are reported only duringsecond visit. 15.Informant alone speaks that his daughter told him that shewould not be allowed to come in house unless she brings amount.But she had been to the house of accused and also seems to havestayed for further 15 days i.e. till PW4 Vishnu went to verify her wellbeing. PW4 Vishnu has deposed in his examination-in-chief itself thathe went to house of accused to make enquiry about Seetabai andduring his such visit, deceased expressed her desire to return back toher parents’ house at Selu and she even came back with PW4 Vishnu.He claims that in the journey, she told about demand and ill-treatment. Even what was the nature of ill-treatment is not statedby him. Informant in his cross-examination has admitted that aftermarriage, his daughter came to the house thrice and eight days afterher departure to stay with accused, the incident occurred. It isnoticed that inspite of allegation of assault, there is no distinctcomplaint to that extent. Where she was beaten and whether or not
Legal Reasoning
{16} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003she suffered any injury is not clarified.16.Though there are allegation of keeping her starved, as pointedout by learned counsel for appellants, in post mortem report, AutopsyDoctor had noted condition of dead body as well nourished.Consequently, evidence of parents, about harassment in thebackdrop of demand, cannot be readily accepted. Apparently, thereis fragile and weak evidence on the point of ill-treatment as generalallegations are raised about keeping her starved and beating withoutproper elaboration. Which of the two accused played what role isnot categorically stated. 17.As pointed out, PW2 mother has already admitted in cross-examination that there is no dowry demand. Her such answer inflictssevere blow to the prosecution version.18.PW3 Narayan, neighbour stated that deceased during hersecond visit, reported that accused asked her to bring Rs.20,000/- forpurchase of agricultural land, according to him, she stated that bothaccused used to harass her. It is to be noted that he does not speakabout being assaulted or beaten or even kept starved as is stated by {17} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003parents. Surprisingly he deposed that victim told him that he shouldinform such facts to her parents. He further claims to have giveninformation to PW1. But PW1 Abasaheb and PW2 Chandabai, whoare already informed, do not speak about PW3 also reporting themabout disclosure allegedly made by victim to him. Therefore,apparently, this witness is a got up witness. Therefore, for above reasons, witnesses are not found to beconsistent. There is absolutely no evidence on the point of cruelty.Neither instances of ill-treatment or its nature are coming on recordexcept stating that there was demand and beating. With suchmaterial on record, it cannot be said that offence of cruelty is madeout. None of the witnesses are speaking about incessant demand orcontinuous harassment, physical or mental so as to attract rigors ofSection 498-A. SECOND CHARGE – SECTION 306 : 19.Guilt is also recorded by trial Judge for offence under Section306 of the IPC.Law is fairly settled that offence of 306 can be said to beproved only when prosecution demonstrates abetment to commitsuicide. As to what amounts to abetment is also fairly settled. {18} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003Section 107 of the IPC deals with abetment. It reads thus:“107. Abetment of a thing- A person abets thedoing of a thing, who - First. - Instigates any person to do that thing; orSecondly. - Engages with one or more otherperson or persons in any conspiracy for the doingof that thing, if an act or illegal omission lakesplace in pursuance of that conspiracy, and inorder to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.-Intentionally aids, by any act or illegalomission, the doing of that thing.Section 306 of the IPC deals with abetment of suicide.Ingredients of this section are as under :(1) There was suicide of a person;(2) It was committed in consequence of abetment of the accused. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT :20. In order to attract the charge of Section 306 of IPC, it isincumbent upon prosecution to establish incitement, instigation,aiding or abetment to commit suicide. Law to this extent has beenfairly settled in series of cases. Scope of Sections 107 and 306 IPChas been time and again decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in thecases viz; State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73;Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhatisgarh reported in(2001) 9 SCC 618; {19} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of M.P. reported in(2002) 5SCC 371; Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (2009) 16 SCC 605;Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal (2010) 1 SCC 707;State of West Bengal v. Indrajit Kundu and others (2019) 10 SCC188; Rajesh v. State of Haryana (2020) 15 SCC 359; V.P.Singh etc. v.State of Punjab and others 2022 SCC Online SC 1999 and veryrecently in the case of Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka[Criminal Appeal No. 1427 of 2011 decided on 01.03.2024], In above series of cases, it has been held and reiterated thatCourt should be extremely careful in assessing the facts andcircumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in thetrial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to thevictim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide.Principle that is culled out is that accused persons should specificallyintend that deceased should end up her life. With that sole object inmind, they must have deliberately created circumstances, which areof such nature, that deceased is left with no other alternative but toend up her life. Only in such circumstances, charge of abetment tocommit suicide can be said to be successfully brought home. 21.Here in the case in hand, deceased allegedly hanged herself on {20} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 200329-07-2002. Precisely what happened on that day or in immediateproximity of alleged hanging is not coming on record. There is noevidence to show that husband and mother-in-law were in the houseat the time of incident. There is no evidence that in the backdrop ofdemand, there was cruelty, which was of such nature and gravity thatdeceased was forced to hang herself as it had become unbearable forher. Unless there is material to show that accused persons with mensrea abetted the suicide or induced deceased to commit suicide, lawdoes not permit holding accused responsible for offence underSection 306 of the IPC.22.It is pointed out by learned counsel for appellants that inspiteof no evidence either about cruelty or abetment, learned trial Courthas recorded guilt by invoking section 113A of the Indian EvidenceAct. 23.No doubt Sections 113A and B of the Indian Evidence Actpermits the Court to draw presumption regarding abetment tocommit suicide and if accused fails to rebut the presumption,conviction can be recorded. However, the rider and pre-requisite isthat required ingredients under Section 306 of the IPC are first to be {21} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003cogently and firmly established. Here learned trial Judge, as is evident from paragraph 32 ofjudgment, seems to have invoked presumption under Section 113A ofthe Indian Evidence Act and held that accused abetted the suicide. 24.Section 113A reads as under:“113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by amarried woman. - When the question is whether thecommission of suicide by a woman had been abetted byher husband or any relative of her husband and it is shownthat she had committed suicide within a period of sevenyears from the date of her marriage and that her husbandor such relative of her husband had subjected her tocruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all theother circumstances of the case, that such suicide had beenabetted by her husband or by such relative of herhusband.”Therefore, for invoking above provision, firstly it has to bedemonstrated by the prosecution that husband or his relativessubjected victim to cruelty and secondly, she committed suicidewithin seven years of her marriage only because of such cruelty. Here no doubt death has taken place within barely two monthsof marriage, but as discussed above, here on re-appreciation of {22} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003evidence, this Court does not find any cogent, convincing or legallyacceptable evidence on the point of ill-treatment or cruelty. Thewording used in Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act is that the“the Court may presume”. Therefore, it is open for the Court to applyand invoke above provision, but only when prosecution hasestablished beyond reasonable doubt that deceased was subjected tocruelty and harassment. 25.The Hon’ble Apex Court in its recent judgment in the case ofNaresh Kumar v. State of Haryana (2024) 3 SCC 573 has succinctlyand lucidly summarized law on Section 306 of the Indian Penal Codeas well as Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act and theobservations in the above judgment are as under :“Held, basic ingredients to constitute an offence under S.306 are suicidal death and abetment thereof. Abetmentinvolves a mental process of instigating a person orintentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Thus,without a positive act on the part of the accused toinstigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot besustained. Thus, in order to convict a person under S. 306there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence andmere harassment, cannot be sufficient to hold an accusedguilty of abetting the commission of suicide. Prosecution {23} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003has to prove an active act or direct act which led thedeceased to commit suicide. Ingredient of mens rea cannotbe assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visibleand conspicuous.” It is further held, “mere fact that the deceasedcommitted suicide within a period of seven years of hermarriage, the presumption under S. 113-A would notautomatically apply – Because as per the legislativemandate, presumption under S. 113-A may be raised onlywhen a woman commits suicide within seven years of hermarriage and it is shown that her husband or any relativeof her husband had subjected her to cruelty.It is further observed that “ the court may presumehaving regard to all other circumstances of the case thatsuch suicide had been abetted by her husband”, thepresumption, held discretionary, unlike the presumptionunder S. 113-B of the Evidence Act, which is mandatory -Therefore, before raising presumption under S. 113-A,prosecution, held, must show evidence of cruelty orincessant harassment in that regard.Further held, the court should be extremely carefulin assessing evidence under S. 113-A for finding out ifcruelty was meted out and, thus, if it transpires that avictim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinarypetulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite {24} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003common to the society to which the victim belonged andsuch petulance, discord and differences were not expectedto induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a givensociety to commit suicide, the conscience of the courtwould not be satisfied for holding that the accused chargedof abetting the offence of suicide was guilty.” It is thus summarized on re-appreciation and re-analysis ofevidence on record that here in the case in hand, on the first count,except general and omnibus allegations of beating and starvation,which are not supported by distinct evidence, there is no trustworthyand reliable evidence. Cruelty as contemplated under Section 498-Ais not finding place in the prosecution evidence. Secondly, what exactly prompted deceased to hang herself isalso not getting clear for want of evidence. Presence of accused atthat relevant point of time is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.Further as required by law, here there is nothing to show that therewas consistent, persistent or incessant demand and on failure to meetdemand, there was cruelty, which was further of such nature that lifeof deceased was made so miserably that she was left with no otheralternative but to end up her life. There is no live link betweendemand, cruelty and suicide. Evidence to connect death to cruelty isnot forthcoming. Resultantly, even charge of Section 306 of the IPC {25} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003cannot be said to be proved. 26.Resultantly, Prosecution evidence on re-appreciation is fallingshort of necessary ingredients to attract both the charges i.e. underSection 498-A and 306 of IPC. 27.Perused the judgment under challenge. On going through thejudgment, it is noticed that there is improper appreciation ofevidence on record. Answers given by parents and other witnesseswhile under cross-examination are not taken into consideration.Learned trial Court directly proceeded to apply and invoke provisionsunder Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act without gettingsatisfied as to whether cruelty and suicide is satisfactorily provedbeyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, interference at the hands ofthis Court is called for. Accordingly, I proceed to pass followingorder: ORDERI)Criminal Appeal No.496 of 2003 is allowed. {26} CR APPEAL NO. 496 OF 2003II)The conviction awarded to appellant no.1 – MahadeoRamchandra Gaikwad and appellant no.2 – GangabaiRamchandra Gaikwad in Sessions Case No.8 of 2003 bythe learned II Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Jalna on30-06-2003 for the offence punishable under Section 306 readwith 34 and under Section 498-A read with 34 of the IndianPenal Code, stands quashed and set aside. III)The appellants stands acquitted of the offence punishableunder Section 306 r/w 34 and under Section 498-A r/w 34 ofthe Indian Penal Code.IV)The bail bonds of appellants stand cancelled. V)The fine amount deposited, if any, be refunded to theappellants after the statutory period.VI)It is clarified that there is no change as regards the orderin respect of disposal of muddemal. ( ABHAY S. WAGHWASE ) JUDGE SPT