Writ Petition No. 8194 of 2022 · Bombay High Court
Case Details
{1} WP 8194 OF 2022 . 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD WRIT PETITION NO.8194 OF 2022 Vishal s/o. Laxman Shinde Age: 33 years, Occu.: Business, R/o. At. Shindewadi, Post Wagholi, Tq. & Dist.Osmanabad. ..Petitioner VERSUS The State of Maharashtra, Through the Secretary, Revenue Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai. The Collector, Osmanabad, Dist.Osmanabad. The Sub-Divisional Ofcer, Osmanabad, Tq. & Dist.Osmanabad. The Tahsildar, Osmanabad, Tq. & Dist.Osmanabad. The Circle Inspector, Padoli, Tq. & Dist.Osmanabad. The Talathi, Padoli, Tq. & Dist.Osmanabad. ..Respondents
Legal Reasoning
No.3581 of 2022]. In the said case, this Court has held that the Gitti is a fnished product and not a mineral. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the case of Sumit s/o Hargovind Lanje Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [Writ Petition No.1579 of 2022] in which after relying on the Judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pralhad s/o Vishnu Wayade and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others [Writ Petition No.4077 of 2009], it has been held thus:- “6. While the learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. T.H. Khan would advance serious and prolonged submissions on the lines of what is stated in the afdavit, it is difcult to agree with the submission that gitti or metal stone is not a fnished product and further, even if it is assumed that {3} WP 8194 OF 2022 gitti or metal stone is a fnished product, its transportation can be regulated. The argument that ‘gravel’ which is defned as a ‘mineral’ in the Act of 1957 must be widely and expansively interpreted to include gitti or metal stone, merits rejection. The term ‘gravel’ which is used in the company of several other products which are defned as ‘minerals’ clearly refers to gravel in the natural form found in the river-bed etc. Moreover, the Division Bench has already held that gitti or metal stone is a fnished product and it would neither be appropriate nor permissible for me to take a contrarian view. The other submission is that even a fnished product can be regulated under the Code considering that the efcacy of the regulatory regime depends on such control and regulation, which argument is negatived by the Division Bench in Pralhad s/o Vishnu Wayade and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others in Writ Petition 4077/2009. I am bound by the said decision of the Division Bench.” 5. Since Division Bench of this Court has held that Gitti or metal stone is a fnished product and no contrary view has been placed before this Court indicating that Gitti or metal stone is a mineral, it has to be held that Gitti is not mineral and therefore, it is out of scope of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act. 6. Learned AGP for the respondents-State placed reliance on the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Chhabil Dass {4} WP 8194 OF 2022 Agarwal [(2004) 1 Supreme Court Cases 603]. Learned AGP submits that the petitioner has alternate efcacious remedy of preferring an appeal before the Collector. Instead of exhausting this remedy, the petitioner has approached this Court. He submits that a statutory remedy is provided. Unless that remedy is exhausted, writ Courts should not exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax and Others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus :- “11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law that non-entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efcacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efcacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufcient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See: State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn. {5} WP 8194 OF 2022 Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107; State of H.P. vs. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 499). 12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Sons vs. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207; Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425; Union of India vs. T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882; State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 have held that though Article 226 confers a very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfed that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted. (See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436; S.T.Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75; Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72).” {6} WP 8194 OF 2022 7. In the case at hand, this Court is constrained to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as time and again this Court has held that Gitti is not a mineral product, still the authorities are passing the orders and seizing the vehicles in which Gitti is transported in fagrant violation of the Judgment and orders of Division Bench and the Single Judges. Therefore, this Court has to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of this, petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses-’B’ and ‘C’. 8. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. SPT ( M.G.SEWLIKAR ) JUDGE
Arguments
... Advocate for Petitioner : Shri Tukaram M. Venjane AGP for Respondents-State : Shri S.B.Pulkundwar ... CORAM : M.G.SEWLIKAR, J. DATE : 25th August, 2022 ORAL JUDGMENT :- 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the parties, petition is taken up for hearing for fnal disposal at the admission stage. {2} WP 8194 OF 2022 2. Case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was transporting Gitti i.e. metal stone in his Truck bearing No.MH-23 W-2799. According to the petitioner, Gitti is not a mineral and therefore, the provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, cannot be pressed into service. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the decision of this Court (Nagpur Bench) in the case of Ramchandra Dadaji Tangle vs. State of Maharashtra and another [Writ Petition