Writ Petition No. 7487 of 2022 · Bombaybench High Court
Case Details
2025:BHC-AUG:18159 17487.2022WP.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADWRIT PETITION NO. 7487 OF 2022Saraswatibai Gangagoud Anantwar(Since Deceased) Through her L.Rs.1.Shivaji Gangagoud Anantwar,Age : 64 years, Occ : Business,R/o Bhishi, Tq. Kinwat, Dist. Nanded.2.Bhimrao Gangagoud AnantwarDeceased through L.Rs.2-a.Jaymala Bhimrao AnantwarAge : 54 years, Occ : Household,R/o Gokunda, Tq. Kinwat,Dist. Nanded.2-b.Kunal Bhimrao AnantwarAge : 34 years, Occ : Business,R/o Gokunda, Tq. Kinwat,Dist. Nanded. 2-c.Rohan Bhimrao AnantwarAge : 32 years, Occ : Business,R/o Gokunda, Tq. Kinwat,Dist. Nanded.3.Balaji Gangagoud AnantwarAge : 53 years, Occ : Business,R/o Bhishi, Tq. Kinwat,Dist. Nanded.4.Anuradha Gopal AalewarAge : 48 years, Occ : Household,R/o Vidal, Tq. Umarkhed,Dist. Yavatmal..PETITIONERVERSUS1.The State of MaharashtraThrough : The Principal Secretary,
Legal Reasoning
27487.2022WP.odtState Excise Department, M.S.,Mantralaya, Mumbai.2.The Commissioner of State Excise,Old Custom House, 2nd Floor,Fort, Mumbai.3.The Collector,Nanded.4.The Superintendent of State Excise,Nanded.5.Balaji Gopalrao SundergirwarAge : 51 years, Occ : Business,R/o Bhokar, Tq. Bhokar, Dist. Nanded.6.Nagnath Ramanna KondalwarAge : 68 years, Occ : Business,R/o Bhokar, Tq. Bhokar,Dist. Nanded.7.Padvinibai Nagnath KondalwarAge : 56 years, Occ : Household,R/o Bhokar, Tq. Bhokar,Dist. Nanded...RESPONDENTS…Mr.Rajendra Deshmukh, Senior Advocate a/w Advocate Ashwini Deshmukh i/b Mr.A.H. Tiwari for petitionerMr. V.S. Badhakh, AGP for respondent/StateMr.U.A. Bhadgaonkar, Advocate for respondent No.5.Mr. V.S. Undre, Advocate for respondent No.6.…CORAM:ROHIT W. JOSHI, J.RESERVED ON :25th JUNE, 2025PRONOUNCED ON:14th JULY, 2025JUDGMENT :The present petition is filed challenging the orderdated 04.07.2022 passed by the Principal Secretary, 37487.2022WP.odtMaharashtra State Excise Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai inRevision Application No.2/2022.2.The controversy in the matter pertains to CL-IIIlicence which was initially issued in favour of late GangagoudAnantwar, deceased husband of original petitioner. After filingof the petition, the petitioner has expired and her two sons, adaughter and widow and sons of pre-deceased son arebrought on record as legal representatives.3.A licence for sale of country liquor in the form ofCL-III was issued in the year 1973 in favour of one GangagoudBhimagoud Anantwar. This Gangagoud entered into apartnership for the purpose of country liquor business withrespondent nos.5 and 6 on 16.07.1994. Deceased Gangagoudhad 34% share and respondent nos.5 and 6 had 33% shareeach in the said firm. Respondent No.3 - Collector grantedapproval to the said firm and names of respondent nos.5 and6 were also entered in CL-III licence along with deceasedGangagoud. Thereafter, deceased Gangagoud and respondentnos.5 and 6 executed a supplementary deed of partnership 47487.2022WP.odtdated 20.07.1998. The supplementary deed of partnershipdated 20.07.1998 enumerates the same terms and conditionsas enumerated in deed of partnership dated 16.07.1994.Supplementary deed of partnership was executed since theearlier partnership deed dated 16.07.1994 was scribed on astamp paper of inadequate denomination.4.It appears that certain disputes had arisenbetween respondent nos.5 and 6 on one hand and deceasedGangagoud on the other, as a consequence of which RegularCivil Suit No.262/2003 was filed by respondent nos.5 and 6against deceased Gangagoud and his son Shivaji. The said suitis filed in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division,Nanded. Respondent Nos.5 and 6 (plaintiffs) prayed fordecree of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants(deceased Gangagoud and his son) from interfering with thebusiness of country liquor shop. The matter appears to beamicably settled between the parties and accordingly, the suitcame to be disposed of vide compromise decree dated26.06.2003. After the compromise decree was passed,deceased Gangagoud expired on 23.03.2004. The deceasedpetitioner has filed the suit, being Regular Civil Suit 57487.2022WP.odtNo.137/2014 seeking declaration that compromise decreedated 26.06.2003 passed in the said Civil Suit is null and voidand not binding on her. She also sought decree for perpetualinjunction restraining respondent nos.5 and 6 (defendants)from causing interference with the business of country liquorshop. The said suit is pending for adjudication before the CivilCourt. 5.After the demise of Gangagoud, on 23.03.2004,the petitioner initially filed an application dated 02.04.2004and thereafter another application dated 28.05.2005 beforerespondent no.3 requesting for including her name in thelicence and for deletion of the names of respondent nos.5 and6 on the ground that partnership had come to an end.Respondent No.3 passed order dated 20.07.2008 recordingthat in view of demise of original licensee Gangagoud, CL-IIIlicence in his name be transferred in the name of his widowi.e. the petitioner herein. 6.On 22.05.2012, respondent no.5 filed anapplication before respondent no.3 seeking review of the 67487.2022WP.odtorder dated 20.07.2008 whereby the licence was ordered tobe issued in the name of petitioner. The petitioner opposed thesaid application by filing reply. The said application wasallowed by respondent no.3 vide order dated 14.11.2013.Respondent No.3 directed that the names of the petitioner andother two partners i.e. respondent nos.5 and 6 be recorded inthe licence. 7.Being aggrieved by the said order dated14.11.2013, the petitioner filed appeal under Section 137 ofthe Maharashtra Prohibition Act before respondent no.2,being appeal no.319/2013. The said appeal came to beallowed by respondent no.2 on the ground that RespondentNo.3-Collector while exercising authority under theMaharashtra Prohibition Act did not have jurisdiction toreview his own decision. Respondent Nos.5 and 6 thereafterpreferred Revision under Section 138 of the MaharashtraProhibition Act before respondent no.1, being RevisionApplication No.2/2022, which came to be allowed vide orderdated 4th July, 2022. The present petition is filed assailing thesaid order. 77487.2022WP.odt8.Heard Mr. Rajendra Deshmukh, learned SeniorAdvocate for the petitioners. He contends that there is noprovision under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act conferringjurisdiction or authority upon the Collector to review hisdecisions. He contends that review is a creature of statute andorders once passed cannot be reviewed by any authorityunless power of review is expressly conferred. He contendsthat order dated 14.11.2013 passed by respondent no.3 bywhich earlier order dated 20.07.2008 came to be reviewed isabsolutely without jurisdiction and was accordingly rightly setaside by respondent no.2. He contends that respondent no.1has committed serious jurisdictional error in ignoring wellsettled legal principle in allowing the revision applicationpreferred by respondent nos.5 and 6. As regards thecompromise decree in Regular Civil Suit No.262/2003, Mr.Deshmukh, learned Senior Advocate contends that the licencewas being operated from Dharmabad, Tq. Dharmabad anddeceased was resident of Bhishi, Tq. Kinwat and despite thissuit was filed at Nanded, which creates serious suspicion asregards veracity of the compromise decree. 9.Per contra, Mr. U.A. Bhadgaonkar, learned 87487.2022WP.odtadvocate for respondent no.5 and Mr.V.S. Undre, learnedadvocate for respondent no.6 justify the order. They contendthat after filing of the application dated 02.04.2004 by thepetitioner for deletion of the names of respondent nos.5 and6, on 21.05.2004 a fresh partnership deed was executedbetween the petitioner and respondent nos.5 and 6. Theycontend that the matter was fully and finally resolved onexecution of partnership deed dated 21.05.2004. 10.It is contended that during the course of inquirypursuant to the application dated 02.04.2004 filed by thepetitioner, an inquiry was conducted by the office ofrespondent no.4 and during the course of this inquiry, thedeceased petitioner as also her three sons namely Shivaji,Bhimrao and Balaji had made statement before the authoritiesthat they did not intend to pursue the application dated02.04.2004 and that they are willing to continue the businessin the partnership with respondent nos.5 and 6. The saidstatements are filed by respondent no.6 along with affidavit inreply dated 30th August, 2022. Their statements assert that thepartnership deed dated 21.05.2004 was also simultaneouslyexecuted on the same day on which the statements were 97487.2022WP.odtrecorded and as such the matter was fully and finally settledbetween the parties. 11.The respondent nos.5 and 6 contend that afterthe application dated 02.04.2004 by the petitioner forrecording her name as licensee in place of deceased husband,the matter was amicably settled between the parties as isapparent from the statements recorded on 21.05.2004 as alsoexecution of partnership deed on the same date i.e. on21.05.2004. 12.The learned advocates for respondent nos.5 and 6contend that thereafter the petitioner clandestinely got hername recorded in the licence to the exclusion of respondentnos.5 and 6, vide order dated 20.07.2008. It is contended thatafter the statements were recorded during the course ofinquiry on 21.01.2004 and partnership deed was executed,they did not receive any notice from the office of Collectorbefore passing of the order dated 20.07.2008.13.Mr. Rajendra Deshmukh, learned Senior Advocate 107487.2022WP.odthas placed reliance on following judgments to contend thatthe respondent no.3/Collector did not have any power ofreview, and therefore, assuming all that the respondent nos.5and 6 stated to be correct, the order dated 14.11.2013 passedby the respondent no.3/Collector, reviewing the earlier orderdated 20.07.2008 is unsustainable :- (i)Patel Narshi Thakershi Vs. PradyumansinghjiArjunsinghji {1970 AIR (SC) 1273} (ii)Judgment in the matter of Balabai Vasantrao Patil Vs.The Collector of Kolhapur and others in Writ PetitionNo.4994/2004 dated 15.06.2004. (iii)Judgment in the matter of Mrs. KamaladeviSatyanaran Gupta Vs. State of Maharashtra and 3 orsin Writ Petition No.8776/2007 dated 16.04.2008. (iv)Judgment in the matter of Shri Abhijit RamraoBachewar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others inWrit Petition No.3315/2015 dated 29.10.2015. (v)Judgment in the matter of Rajesh MatadinlaljiJaiswal Vs. State of Maharashtra and others in WritPetition No.5460/2015 dated 01.03.2016. (vi)Judgment in the matter of Somnath Pandurang KateVs. The State of Maharashtra and others in WritPetition No.12204/2019 dated 18.01.2021. (vii)Judgment in the matter of Shri Suresh ShantaramTodankar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others inWrit Petition No.1088/2021 dated 20.06.2022. 117487.2022WP.odt14.All the judgments, except Balabai (supra),reiterate the settled legal principle that no judicial or quasi-judicial authority can revisit its own order, in the absence ofexpress enabling provision. It is held in all these cases thatright to review emanates from statute and therefore, unlessthe statute provides for authority to review its orders, ajudicial or quasi-judicial authority cannot exercise powers ofreview.15.There cannot be any quarrel with the legalproposition laid down in the aforesaid cases, however, theaforesaid principle applies only to judicial and quasi-judicialorders. The said principle does not apply to administrativeorders. The law with respect to review of administrativeorders is otherwise. In this regard, reference can be made tojudgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of R.R.Verma and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in(1980)3 SCC 402, wherein it is held as under :- "5.The last point raised by Shri Garg was thatthe Central Government had no power to reviewits earlier orders as the rules do not vest thegovernment with any such power. Shri Garg 127487.2022WP.odtrelied on certain decisions of this Court insupport of his submission : Patel NarshiThakershi v. Pradvamunsinghji Arjunsinghji; D.N.Roy Vs. State of Bihar and State of Assam Vs.J.N. Roy Biswas. All the cases cited by Shri Gargare cases where the government was exercisingquasi-judicial power vested in them by statute.We do not think that the principle that the powerto review must be conferred by statute eitherspecifically or by necessary implication isapplicable to decisions purely of anadministrative nature. To extend the principle topure administrative decisions would indeed leadto untoward and startling results. Surely, anygovernment must be free to alter its policy or itsdecision in administrative matters. If they are tocarry on their daily administration they cannotbe hidebound by the rules and restrictions ofjudicial procedure though of course they arebound to obey all statutory requirements andalso observe the principles of natural justicewhere rights of parties may be affected."16.It is, therefore, necessary to decide as to whetherthe order permitting names of the respondent nos.5 and 6 tobe included in the licence is an administrative order or quasi-judicial order. 137487.2022WP.odt17.It is, therefore, also necessary to consideressential distinction between an administrative function andquasi-judicial or judicial function. The distinction is succinctlyexplained in the case of Indian National Congress (I) Vs.Institute of Social Welfare and others reported in (2002) 5SCC 685. The issue which fell for consideration in the matterwas as to whether recognition granted to a political party bythe Election Commission of India (ECI)could be withdrawnsubsequently in the absence of any enabling provision. In thiscontext, nature of order granting recognition to a politicalparty fell for consideration before the Court. The question wasconsidered in the backdrop that, if the power is held to bequasi-judicial, decision cannot be reviewed in the absence ofenabling provision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thatthe order granting recognition to a political party is a quasi-judicial order, and therefore, the same cannot be withdrawn inthe absence of any enabling provision, since it will amount toa review. While explaining the distinction between"administrative” and “quasi-judicial function", the Hon'bleSupreme Court has held as under :- "24. The legal principles laying down when an act of a 147487.2022WP.odtstatutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act, whichemerge from the aforestated decisions are these:Where (a) a statutory authority empoweredunder a statute to do any act (b) which wouldprejudicially affect the subject (c) although thereis no lis or two contending parties and thecontest is between the authority and the subjectand (d) the statutory authority is required to actjudicially under the statute, the decision of thesaid authority is quasi-judicial.26. Coming to the second argument of learnedcounsel for the respondents, it is true that merepresence of one or two attributes of quasi-judicialauthority would not make an administrative act as aquasi-judicial act. In some case, an administrativeauthority may determine question of fact beforearriving at a decision which may affect the right of anappellant but such a decision would not be a quasi-judicial etc. It is a different thing that in some cases,fair play may demand affording of an opportunity tothe claimant whose right is going to be affected by theact of the administrative authority, still such anadministrative authority would not be a quasi-judicialauthority.27. What distinguishes an administrative act from aquasi-judicial act is, in the case of quasi-judicialfunctions under the relevant law the statutoryauthority is required to act judicially. In other words,where law requires that an authority before arrivingat a decision must make an enquiry, such arequirement of law makes the authority a quasi-judicial authority."18.It is thus apparent that the distinction between ajudicial/quasi-judicial and administrative power is that in caseof judicial or quasi-judicial power, the authority is statutorily 157487.2022WP.odtobligated to exercise the power in a judicial manner byfollowing principles of natural justice. Such is not anobligation is not imposed while exercising administrativepower, although having regard to need of transparency andfair play, even while exercising administrative power, theauthority may afford opportunity of hearing to rival parties.However, that by itself will not mean that the power is ajudicial or quasi-judicial power. An order can be termed to bea quasi-judicial only if duty to act judicially is imposed by thestatute under which the same is passed. 19.The licence which was granted initially in favourof husband of the petitioner was transferred in the name ofthe partnership firm comprising of husband of the petitionerand respondent nos.5 and 6. The names of all three partnerswere also entered into licence. Thus to privilege to trade inliquor vested with all three partners. After demise of herhusband, the petitioner filed application for transferring thelicence in her name alone contending that the firm had ceasedto exist in view of demise of her husband. There are twoprovisions which fall for consideration in this backdrop, one isRule 28 which provides for transfer of licence and other is 167487.2022WP.odtclause 17 in Form CL-III. The form of licence is a statutoryform and therefore, it also has force of statute. 20.As stated above, licence is a privilege granted bythe State to a licensee. Whether the power to permit transferof this privilege and to permit the legal heirs/legalrepresentative of a deceased licensee to enjoy this privilege isa administrative function or quasi-judicial function is aquestion which falls for consideration in the present matter. 21.Perusal of both these provisions will demonstratethat the Collector, who is the licensing authority has discretionin the matter of permitting transfer and permitting legalheirs/legal representatives of deceased licensee to enjoy theprivilege. There is no statutory obligation on the Collector toto hear and decide the matter judicially like a judge, althoughthe Collector may choose to afford hearing to the concernedparties before taking decision in the matter.22.The power exercised by the Collector under Rule28 and clause 17 of Form CL-III of the Country Liquor Rules isnot a quasi judicial power. It is essentially an administrative 177487.2022WP.odtfunction. While exercising this administrative function, havingregard to need of transparency and fair play, the Collector maychoose to hear the parties concerned before taking decision,however, that by itself will not alter the nature of power.Since, the power exercised by the Collector is administrativein nature, the said authority will have power to review itsdecisions even in the absence of any express enablingprovision in view of law laid down in the matter of R.R.Verma (supra). 23.Now let us deal with the judgments relied uponby the petitioner. None of the judgments lay down the ratiothat an administrative order cannot be reviewed in theabsence of any enabling provision.(a)The judgment in the matter of Patel Narshi Thakershi(supra) pertains to a judicial function. The first paragraph ofthe judgment itself indicates the same. In this context, it isheld that power of review is not an inherent power and thatthe same cannot be exercised unless specifically conferred. (b)The judgment in the case of Balabai Vasantrao Patil(supra), the question which fell for consideration was as towhether the Collector had power of review under the 187487.2022WP.odtMaharashtra Prohibition Act. It is observed in the judgmentthat no express provision was brought to the notice of thisCourt enabling the Collector to exercise power of review. Thejudgment also records that the respondents had also acceptedthat the Collector is not vested with power to review his owndecisions. This judgment is based on concession. A Judgmentbased on concession cannot be followed as a precedent. Apartfrom this, the judgment does not take into considerationdifference in the legal position with respect to power to reviewadministrative decisions and judicial or quasi-judicialdecisions. The judgment does not lay down that the principlethat power of review is not inherent is also applicable toadministrative orders. (c) The judgment in the matter of Kamaladevi SatyanaranGupta (supra) pertains to revisional powers under Section 138of the Maharashtra Prohibition Act. The power under Section138 to adjudicate a revision is essentially a quasi-judicialpower. Judgment holds that in the absence of any enablingprovision to review orders passed by him, the Minister couldnot change or alter earlier orders passed under Section 138 ofthe Act. (d) The judgment in the case of Abhijit Ramrao Bachewar 197487.2022WP.odt(supra). the State Government had revisited its earlierdecision. The power to take subsequent decision was sought tobe justified placing reliance on Section 138 of the MaharashtraProhibition Act. Section 138 of the Maharashtra ProhibitionAct provides for power of revision against orders passed byProhibition Officers working under the MaharashtraProhibition Act. It is held that the State Government does notfall within the definition of "Prohibition Officer" as definedunder the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, and therefore, Section138 could not be invoked by the State Government to reviewdecisions taken by it earlier. The judgment in the matter ofSomnath Pandurang Kate (supra) lays down the sameproposition of law. (e) The judgment in the matter of Rajesh MatadinlaljiJaiswal does not deal with power of review. (f) In the matter of Suresh Shantaram Todankar (supra),the State Government had passed orders granting renewal ofdormant licences by charging renewal fees. Subsequently, theGovernment reviewed the decision and directed the licenseesto pay interest on the outstanding licence fees. It will bepertinent to mention that the order was passed in suomotureview proceeding. It is held that the said power of review 207487.2022WP.odtcannot be traced to Sections 137 and 138 of the MaharashtraProhibition Act. It is obvious that powers under Sections 137and 138 being appellate and revisional powers respectivelyare quasi-judicial powers, and therefore, the principle thatreview is a creature of statute and power of review cannot beexercised in the absence of any express enabling provision willapply to Sections 137 and 138 of the Maharashtra ProhibitionAct. As regards section 139, it is held that the said provisionalso could not be invoked to impose condition of payment ofinterest on outstanding licence fees. The judgment does notdeal with the issue as to whether power of review is inherentwith respect to administrative orders. The judgment also doesnot consider distinction between judicial and quasi-judicialorder on one side and administrative orders on the other. Theratio of the judgment is not that administrative orders cannotbe reviewed in the absence of express enabling provision andthat there has to be an express enabling provision for reviewof administrative orders.24.The matter can be viewed from another angle.Admittedly, respondent nos.5 and 6 were inducted as partnersand subsequently their names were included in the licence 217487.2022WP.odtalong with deceased husband of the petitioner. If thecontention of the petitioner that Collector cannot revieworders passed under the Prohibition Act is accepted, then it isobvious that the decision for inclusion of names of respondentnos.5 and 6 also cannot be reviewed by ordering deletion oftheir names from the licence, in the absence of any subsequentdevelopment entailing disqualification to hold the licence.Mere death of one of the partners cannot be a ground todelete the names of respondent nos.5 and 6 from the licence.The privilege granted to them could not be withdrawn only onaccount of death of one of the partners i.e. husband of thepetitioner. Deletion of names of respondent nos.5 and 6 fromthe licence also amounts to review of the decision takenearlier to permit inclusion of their names in the licence.25.The learned Commissioner has erred in holdingthat the order dated 20.07.2008 is bad in law on the groundthat the Collector does not have power to review his decisions.As is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R.R.Verma and others Vs. Union of India, (1980)3 SCC 402, thelegal principle is that power of review is not available in theabsence of enabling provision applies to judicial or quasi- 227487.2022WP.odtjudicial functions and not to administrative functions. Thelearned Commissioner has lost sight of this vital aspect of thematter. Even if it is assumed that power is quasi-judicial, yetunless the respondent nos.5 and 6 incur any disqualificationthe earlier order permitting inclusion of their names in thelicence could not be reviewed by directing deletion of theirnames as has been done vide impugned order dated20.07.2008 on the ground that one of the partners hadexpired.26.The respondent no.1 has rightly interfered withthe order passed by the Commissioner. While allowing therevision, the respondent no.1 has had due regard to thecompromise decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No.262/2003and the fact of execution of partnership deed dated21.05.2004 between the petitioner and respondent nos.5 and6 after demise of the husband of petitioner. 27.In this regard it is necessary to refer to pleadingsin the petition with respect to the partnership deed dated21.05.2004. It is stated in paragraph 9 of the petition that 237487.2022WP.odtthere was no occasion for execution of the said partnershipdeed since the application was already filed for deletingnames of respondent nos.5 and 6. It is stated that thispartnership deed was never approved by the Collector.However, execution of this partnership deed is not specificallydenied. It is averred that the partnership deed appears to bean attempt of taking unfair advantage of close relationsbetween the petitioner and respondent nos.5 and 6. Theaverments pertaining to execution of partnership deed dated21.05.2004 are evasive.28.It appears from pleadings in paragraph 11 of thepetition that after execution of partnership deed dated21.05.2004, the petitioner again made an application on28.05.2005 for recording her name in the licence. It is statedthat after a detailed enquiry in the matter by the State ExciseDepartment, the Collector passed order dated 20.07.2008 totransfer the licence in the name of petitioner. It is stated thatintimation about the order dated 20.07.2008 is received bythe petitioner vide communication dated 24.07.2008 issued bythe Collector. It is not the case of the petitioner that therespondent nos.5 and 6 were noticed in the matter after she 247487.2022WP.odtmade fresh application dated 28.03.2005 for recording hername. There is no pleading participation of respondent nos.5and 6 in the enquiry pursuant to application dated28.03.2005. The order dated 20.07.2008 is passed behind theback of respondent nos.5 and 6. 29.Likewise, the statements in replies filed byrespondent nos.5 and 6 that the petitioner and her sons hadconfirmed the fact of settlement before the Officers of StateExcise Department vide statements recorded on 21.05.2004 isalso not denied by filing any counter affidavit. As statedabove, execution of the partnership deed dated 21.05.2004 isalso not specifically denied in the petition.30.It must also be stated that Regular Civil SuitNo.137/2013 filed by the petitioner in order to challengecompromise decree dated 26.06.2003 in Regular Civil SuitNo.262/2003 is not yet decided and is pending. Copy of plaintdated 11.03.2014 in the said suit is filed on record as Exhibit-E. 257487.2022WP.odt31.The petitioner has not made any avernment in theplaint in the said suit with respect subsequent partnershipdeed dated 21.05.2004. She has not challenged the saidpartnership deed.32.Having regard to the facts of the case, therespondent no.1 has rightly appreciated that the compromisedecree is still holding the field and fresh deed of partnership isexecuted on 21.05.2004 by petitioner and respondent nos.5and 6 after demise of husband of the petitioner and in suchcircumstances, the petitioner filed second application dated28.05.2005 and obtained the order for inclusion of herindividual name in the licence by excluding the names ofother two partners i.e. respondent nos.5 and 6. No fault canbe found with the reasons recorded by the respondent no.1 inreversing the order passed by the learned Commissioner andrestoring the order dated 14.11.2013 passed by the Collector.For the reasons aforesaid, no case is made out for interferencewith the order dated 04.07.2022 passed by the respondentno.1.33.The Writ Petition stands dismissed with no ordersas to cost.
Decision
267487.2022WP.odt34.Civil Applications, if any, stand disposed of.[ROHIT W. JOSHI, J.].At this stage, the learned Advocate for the petitionermakes a request to continue the interim order dated19.07.2022.2.Learned Advocate for the respondent nos.5 and 6strongly opposes the request.3.However, having regard to the fact that the interimorder is operating almost for a period of three years, the sameis extended upto 22.08.2025.[ROHIT W. JOSHI, J.]sga/2025