Civil Application No. 4448 of 2022 · Bombaybench High Court
Case Details
2023:BHC-AUG:24975 (1) sa-274-2002.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADSECOND APPEAL NO.274 OF 2002WITHCIVIL APPLICATION NO.4448 OF 2022ANDCIVIL APPLICATION NO.7230 OF 20231.Nana S/o Laxman Tapkire,Age: 45 years, Occ.: Service,R/o Village Burhanagar, Tq. Nagar,Dist. Ahmednagar.2.Ramnath S/o Rakhamaji Jadhav,Age: 35 years, Occ.: Agri,R/o Village Burhanagar, Tq. Nagar,Dist. Ahmednagar...Appellants(Orig. Defendant Nos.3 and 4)Versus1.Vijay S/o Arjun Bhagat,Age: 40 years, Occu.: Agri,R/o Village Burhanagar, Tq. Nagar,Dist. Ahmednagar.2.Raju S/o Arjun Bhagat,Age: 36 years, Occu.: Agri,R/o Village Burhanagar, Tq. Nagar,Dist. Ahmednagar.3.Kiran S/o Arjun Bhagat,Age: 31 years, Occu.: Agri,R/o Village Burhanagar, Tq. Nagar,Dist. Ahmednagar.4.Balaji @ Subhas S/o Arjun Bhagat,Age: 28 years, Occu.: Agri,R/o Village Burhanagar, Tq. Nagar,Dist. Ahmednagar.(Orig. Plaintiffs)5.Arjun S/o Kisan BhagatSince dead through legal heirsother legal heirs already on record as Respondent Nos.1 and 4.5a.Ambika Balasaheb Salunke,Age: 60 years, Occu.: Household,R/o. Belapur, Tq. Shrirampur,Dist. Ahmednagar.
Facts
(2) sa-274-2002.odt5b.Manisha Vasant Kedari,Age: 54 years, Occ.: Household,R/o Shukrawar Peth, Pune.(Orig. Defendant No.2)6.The Charity Commissioner,Bombay, 31, Dr. Annie Beasant Road,Worli, Mumbai-18.(Orig. Defendant No.1) …Mr. R. N. Dhorde, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. P. S. Dighe, Advocatefor the Appellants.Mr. V. D. Sapkal, Senior Advocate i/by Mr. N. C. Garud, Advocatefor Respondent Nos.1 to 4, 5a and 5b. … CORAM : S. G. CHAPALGAONKAR, J.RESERVED ON : 11th JULY, 2023.PRONOUNCED ON : 28th NOVEMBER, 2023.JUDGMENT:- 1.The present second appeal is placed for fresh hearingbefore this court after remand by Supreme Court. InitiallyRegular Civil Suit No.600/1982, instituted by respondent Nos 1 to4 seeking declaration of ownership and perpetual injunction inrelation to suit properties was dismissed by trial court, however,in Regular Civil Appeal. No.21/2000, first appellate court(District court) decreed the suit. In second appeal filed by originaldefendants 3 and 4, decree passed by first appellate had been setaside by this court and judgment and decree of Trial Court wasrestored, eventually decision of this court was subjected tochallenge before supreme court in appeal in earlier round. The factual matrix giving rise to the present second appealcan be summarized as under:2. The respondent nos.1 to 4 (hereinafter refereed asoriginal plaintiffs) have instituted a suit for declaration andinjunction in respect of properties as described in paragraph 1 ofthe plaint. The property referred in paragraph no.1(A)admeasures 53 feet (East-West) and 100 feet (North-South), which (3) sa-274-2002.odtconsist of a temple of Goddess Jagdamba, Tuljapur, situated atGaothan, Burhanagar of mouje Kapurwadi, Tq. and Dist.Ahmednagar. The properties described in Paragraph No.1(B)(C)(D) of plaint are adjacent to the property described in paragraphno.1(A). The plaintiffs have claimed that the property describedin paragraph no.1(A) is their ancestral property and unconcernedwith the Public Trust. As such they seeks permanent injunctionagainst defendants i.e. Joint Charity Commissioner and Trusteesappointed as per Scheme framed under Bombay Public Trust Act.So far as the properties described in paragraph no.1(B)(C)(D) areconcerned, the plaintiffs are seeking relief of declaration thatthose are their ancestral and private properties.3.It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the suitproperties continuously owned and possessed by them since theirforefathers. In the year 1913 some part of the property wasmortgaged for raising funds to purchase idols of Tuljapurchi Devi,Lord Ganpati and Gaynuka. The Deities were installed in a partof the house possessed by the forefathers of the plaintiffs. Theconstruction over the property was made from funds generatedout of family business i.e. Oil extraction. The surroundingproperties are owned and possessed by the plaintiffs anddefendant no.2, which are specifically described in paragraphno.1(B)(C)(D) of the plaint. In support of the aforesaidcontentions the plaintiffs rely upon the decree in Regular CivilSuit No.246/1935 instituted by one Chandrabhan Savaleram Teliagainst great grandfather of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claims, inthat suit, declaration was made that property belongs to theBhagat family. On 04.09.1942 there was partition and templeproperty was given in exclusive possession of the Kisan LahanuBhagat i.e. grandfather of the plaintiffs, who looked after theproperties as owner. The maintenance of the property was (4) sa-274-2002.odtundertaken out of his own funds. The Pooja-Archa of the Deitiesinstalled in the house property of the plaintiffs was exclusivelydone by the forefathers of the plaintiffs. The property was neverdedicated to public or to the Deity by way of Sankalp, Samarpanaor Utsav. It is only at the pleasure of the plaintiffs’ family,occasionally, the access to the public was permitted for Darshanor Pooja. The private interest and use of the property was neverdedicated or divested to the public.4.It is the contention of the plaintiffs that in the year1952 on enactment of the Bombay Public Trust Act, thegrandfather of the plaintiffs under erroneous belief that everyDeity needs compulsory registration, submitted an applicationwith Charity Commissioner, Pune seeking registration of theDeity as Public Trust. The application specifically describes theproperty (as referred in paragraph no.1(A) of the plaint) to beprivate property. The plaintiffs contend that even otherwise thegrandfather of the plaintiffs neither intended nor had exclusiveright to part that property. However, the Charity Commissionerunder mistake of facts or misrepresentation, registered suitproperty as Public Trust. The plaintiffs contends that defendantno.2 is their father, who discharged his obligation as Pujari sincehis childhood, so also managed the property as full owner.However, he has been appointed as Trustee alongwith defendantnos.3 and 4. As such, he is acting against the interest of theplaintiffs and joint family property therefore he is added asdefendant in this suit. The plaintiff no.1 recently attainedmajority and received information that suit property [described inparagraph no.1(A)] is being treated as Trust property anddefendant nos.2 to 4 have been appointed as Trustees. Although,Trustees have not taken charge of the Trust or suit property, inNovember-1981 Court Commissioner appointed by Charity (5) sa-274-2002.odtCommissioner, collected money and other articles offered in theboxes kept before the Deities. The aforesaid activity had beeninitiated in pursuance of the illegal orders passed by CharityCommissioner registering Public Trust with suit property. Hence,cause of action arose for filing of the suit.5.The defendant no.1/Charity Commissioner refutedcontentions of the plaintiffs stating that Shri. JagdambaTaljapurachi Devi Temple is registered under Bombay PublicTrust Act vide PTR No.A-327 along with temple propertyadmeasures 53 feet X 100 feet, Sapta Sringi Devi Mandiradmeasures 6 feet X 6 feet and Ota (Platform) admeasures 10 feetX 10 feet. The Scheme is framed by the order of the Joint CharityCommissioner. The defendant no.2-Arjun Bhagat has beenbrought on record as Trustee after Kisan Lahanu Bhagat. 6.The defendant no.4, who is one of the Trusteeappointed under order of the Charity Commissioner filed hiswritten statement contending that the temple is constructed outof public contribution and donation on the Gaothan land. Theidols are installed out of public funds. The grandfather of theplaintiffs Kisan Lahanu Bhagat was managing the temple. Onpromulgation of the Bombay Public Trust Act, he registered Trustalongwith property in the year 1952, as mandated under theprovisions of the Bombay Public Trust Act. Initially, themanagement of the Trust was governed by hereditary succession.The grandfather of the plaintiffs Kisan Lahanu Bhagat managedthe Trust during his lifetime he introduced defendant no.2 i.e.father of the plaintiffs as trustee accordingly he was managingthe affairs of the Trust. The change report to that effect wassubmitted and approved. The defendant no.2 submitted theaccounts of income and expenditures of trust. However, because (6) sa-274-2002.odtof his mismanagement in affairs of the Trust, a proceeding forframing of the Scheme was instituted before charity commissionervide M.A. No.302/1980. It has been allowed on 14.07.1981 andScheme is framed. The defendant no.2 i.e. father of the plaintiffsis appointed as Chairman of the Trust. The defendant nos.3 and4 are appointed as Trustees and all of them were to appoint twoadditional Trustees.7.It is the contention of defendant no.4 that thegrandfather of the plaintiffs i.e. Kisan Lahanu Bhagat registeredPublic Trust during his lifetime, including the suit property in theSchedule of Trust. The plaintiffs were not even borne at thattime. The defendant no.2 never objected culmination of theproperty, as Trust property. The plaintiffs have no cause of actionto file present suit. The suit is collusive between the plaintiffsand defendant no.2. It is further contentions of the defendantsthat the suit is barred in view of the provisions of Sections 79 and80 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. The suit is not tenable forwant of requisite consent under Section 51 of the Bombay PublicTrust Act. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertainthe suit. The suit is barred by limitation. 8.The Trial Court had framed as many as 13 issuesbelow Exhibit-27, which includes the issues as regards to thejurisdiction of Civil Court, so also limitation. The Trial Courtconcluded that since the claim of individual title to the property israised by plaintiffs, the civil suit is maintainable. Even, issue oflimitation is decided in favour of the plaintiffs. However, trialcourt dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs failed toestablish claim regarding ancestral ownership over suitproperties. The plaintiffs approached the Appellate Court i.e.District Judge, Ahmednagar in Regular Civil Appeal No.21/2000impugning the dismissal of the suit. The Appellate Court (7) sa-274-2002.odtaccepted claim of plaintiffs observing that the suit properties areancestral properties of the plaintiffs and exclusively in possessionand enjoyment since their forefathers. Consequently, firstappellate court decreed suit of the plaintiffs as claimed.Aggrieved defendant nos.3 and 4 filed present second appealimpugning the judgment and decree passed by the AppellateCourt. 9.This Court on 30.11.2002 admitted the second appeal onfollowing substantial questions of law:“(A)Whether the first appellate court has misread thedocument of partition deed (Exh.81) and therefore the findingin this behalf suffers from perversity.(B) Whether the first appellate court has failed to considerthe appropriate provisions of Order VII Rule 2 of the C.P.C.(C)Whether the first appellate court has erroneously reliedupon Xerox copies of the mortgage deed which is notregistered.(D)Whether the first appellate court has erroneously heldthat the suit properties are the private properties of originalplaintiffs.(E)Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide thenature of the property which issue required to be dealt with bythe Charity Commissioner.(F)Whether the suit is barred by limitation.”10.After hearing second appeal at earlier round, thisCourt, had reformulated substantial questions of law whiledelivering judgment as under:“(i)Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide thequestion whether a particular property is that of a PublicTrust or that it is not a property of the Public Trust andbelongs to individual claimant?(ii)Whether the suit for declaration that the propertieswere not of the Public Trust was barred by limitation and, (8) sa-274-2002.odttherefore, the impugned judgment of the first appellate Courtdeserves interference?”11.Accordingly recorded negative finding as regards tothe jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the nature of theproperty and affirmative findings holding that the suit is barredby the limitation. Accordingly, judgment of the First AppellateCourt in R.C.A. No.21/2000 was set aside. Consequently, suit wasdismissed restoring Trial Courts judgment and decree in R.C.S.No.600/1982. 12.The aggrieved plaintiffs had preferred Civil AppealNo.6272/2010 before the Supreme Court of India. The SupremeCourt by order dated 11.05.2018 pleased to set aside the judgmentand decree passed by this Court, finding procedural error inframing two additional substantial questions of law in thejudgment itself and consequential prejudice caused to the rights ofthe parties, particularly appellants who suffered adverse orderwithout knowledge about framing of two additional questionsinasmuch as they were deprived of opportunity to address theCourt on the two additional questions laying foundation for theimpugned judgment. Accordingly, the matter is remanded to thisCourt to decide the appeal afresh on merits in accordance withlaw.13.The learned Advocates appearing for the respectiveparties unanimously submitted that this Court has alreadyframed six substantial questions of law while admitting appealvide order dated 30.11.2002. The controversy in this appeal iscovered in the questions of law already formulated andaccordingly advanced respective submissions before this Court. 14.Mr. R. N.Dhorde, learned senior counsel appearing forthe appellants would submit that the suit properties are owned by (9) sa-274-2002.odtPublic Trust. In the year 1952, the grandfather of the plaintiffsnamely Kisan Lahanu Bhagat had applied for registration of thePublic Trust under the provisions of Bombay Public Trust Act.The copy of application is placed on record of the Trial Court atExhibit-82. The application was tendered in terms of the Section18 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, which specifically depictsimmovable property admeasuring 53 feet X 100 feet to be theproperty of Temple/Public Trust. He would submit that thetemple was constructed out of public funds, so also Deities wereinstalled from the public contribution. The ancestors of theplaintiffs were Pujari. They had never acquired title over theproperty of the temple. He would further submit that the FirstAppellate Court relied upon the documents, which depicts thatthe dispute regarding distribution of respective shares in offeringsreceived at the temple have been settled among forefathers of theplaintiffs through Court’s decree. It has nothing to do with thepartition of the immovable property. He would submit that theplaintiffs have failed to produce on record any document of title insupport of the their claim of exclusive ownership. Mr. Dhordewould invite attention of this Court to the findings of this Court inthe judgment and order dated 19.04.2023 passed in Writ PetitionNo.305/2023 with other connected Writ Petitions to contend thatthe registration of the Public Trust is already held to be validalongwith property described in paragraph no.1(A) of the plaint.He would point out that the temple is in existence since the timeimmemorial. The grants were received from the Government formanagement of the Ustav at Temple. The large number ofdevotees visits the temple. Every year the Deity is taken fromBurhanagar by way of Palkhi (Palanquin) procession to theTuljapur with participation of large number of devotees. Hugeofferings are made to deity during such procession. He would (10) sa-274-2002.odtfurther submit that the evidence on record clearly depicts that thesuit property described in paragraph no.1(A) belongs to the PublicTrust. Mr. Dhorde would also submit that the grandfather of theplaintiffs during his lifetime declared status of the property asTrust property. The defendant no.2 i.e. father of the plaintiffs hasalso accepted the status of the property being Trust property. Thegrandfather of the plaintiffs never objected the status of theproperty being Trust property during his life time. Conversely hesubmitted the accounts of the income and expenditures of Trust tothe Charity Commissioner. He being trustee submitted thechange reports. The defendant no.2 i.e. father of the plaintiffsafter his appointment as Trustee furnished the income andexpenditure accounts with the Charity Commissioner. However,when the learned Charity Commissioner framed Scheme, thepresent suit is instituted by plaintiffs in collusion with defendantno.2, who is Trustee. He would, therefore, submit that thefindings recorded by the First Appellate Court are contrary to thematerial on record so also in ignorance of law governing the issuesinvolved in the present matter.15.Mr. Dhorde would further submit that once propertyis registered as Trust property, the Civil Court has no jurisdictionto declare it otherwise. The suit claiming such relief would bebarred by Section 79 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. He wouldfurther submit that the suit property is scheduled as Trustproperty since 1952. The suit instituted after 28 years seekingdeclaration contrary to its registration as Trust property ishopelessly barred by limitation. He would further submit that theplaintiffs have no locus standi to seek declaration of theownership in respect of the suit property, since their grandfatherhas already declared it as a Trust property at the time ofregistration of Trust. Mr. Dhorde would further submit that the (11) sa-274-2002.odtdescription of the property mentioned in plaint is vague. Thehouse numbers, village panchayat numbers are not depicted inthe description of the property, as mandated under Order VIIRule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He would, therefore,submit that the impugned order passed by the District Judge isliable to be quashed and set aside.16.Per contra, Mr. Sapkal, learned senior counselappearing for respondent nos.1 to 4 (original plaintiffs) supportsthe judgment and order passed by the First Appellate Court. Hewould submit that there is voluminous evidence indicating thatthe property is owned by the forefathers of the plaintiffs. Hewould submit that there is no dispute on the point that theplaintiffs alongwith defendant no.2 are in possession of the suitproperty. The ancestors of the plaintiffs and defendant no.2 areenjoying the ownership and possession of the property since timeimmemorial. He would point out that the document at Exhibit-78is certified copy of the order passed in Civil Suit No.1216/1893between Bhiku Dhondi Teli Vs. Savalyaram Dhondi Teli, whereinright to manage the Palkhi was exclusively claimed by thenplaintiffs. The said suit was dismissed. The Palkhi referable inthe aforesaid suit relates to the Deity in question. He wouldfurther point out that in the year 1935 the suit was instituted byChandrabhan Savaleram Teli against Kisan Lahanu Bhagatclaiming rights in earning. Thereafter, there was resettlement ofthe terms regarding rights vide Enquiry Application No.249/1942.Thereafter, Dhondi Bhiku and others have surrendered Palkhirights in favour of Kisan Lahanu Bhagat against receipt ofRs.900/-. There is partition dated 04.09.1942 (Exhibit-81),wherein the distribution of the income out of donation/offerings tothe Goddess and Palkhi was settled. Mr. Sapkal would furtherinvite attention of this Court to the decree pertaining to the (12) sa-274-2002.odtredemption of mortgage in the Suit No.501/1859 betweenBalkrushna Shivram Vs. Sakharam Bhagwant. Further there ismortgage deed at Exhibit-90 dated 25.12.1913 in favour of theShankar Damodar Kate. Mr. Sapkal would, therefore, submitthat there is consistent evidence right from 1859 onward depictingforefathers of the plaintiffs to be owners and possessors of suitpropertied from immemorial times. He would submit that there isnothing on record to show that the temple or the suit propertieswere purchased or raised out of public contributions. He would,therefore, support the findings recorded by the First AppellateCourt that the suit properties are ancestral properties of theplaintiffs and unconcerned with the Public Trust.17.Mr. Sapkal would further submit that, although thegrandfather of the plaintiffs submitted an application forregistration of Trust with Charity Commissioner, there is nothingto indicate that the enquiry regarding the nature of the propertieswas conducted in accordance with law. The order regardingregistration of the Trust is not available in the record. Except theentry regarding the Trust in the register, no record leading to theregistration of Trust from the stage of filing of the applicationcould be traced. He would, therefore, submit that there is noreason to believe that the properties were intended to be madepart of Public Trust. By referring to the contents of theapplication at Exhibit-82 submitted by the Kisan Lahanu Bhagatunder Section 18 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, he wouldsubmit that even in application seeking registration of Trust suitproperty described as a private property. The registration of theTrust was not for any other object than to carry on day to dayServices/Pooja-archa of the Deities. There is no reason to discardthe case of the plaintiffs that the Public endowment was never inexistence and private Deity has been wrongly registered as a (13) sa-274-2002.odtPublic Trust alongwith ancestral property of the plaintiffs. Theforefathers of the plaintiffs were uneducated persons and undermisconception of the legal provisions, the application has beenmade for registration of the Trust. Mr. Sapkal would submit thatthe Charity Commissioner cannot rule upon title of the property.The plaintiffs are claiming their individual right and title over theproperties, wrongly shown to be property of the Trust. Suchdispute is beyond scope of inquiry or jurisdiction of the CharityCommissioner under Section 79 of the Bombay Public Trust Act.18.Mr. Sapkal would submit that plaintiff no.1 afterattaining the majority got the knowledge of registration of theTrust, when Charity Commissioner attempted to take over chargeof the property. Therefore, suit is instituted seeking declarationthat the suit properties are ancestral properties of the plaintiffsand unconcerned with the Trust. He would submit that evenotherwise Kisan Lahanu Bhagat i.e. grandfather of the plaintiffswas not exclusive owner of the suit properties. He had no right todedicate suit property as Public Trust property. His erroneous actwould not bind rights of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the suit hasbeen instituted immediately after getting knowledge of erroneousregistration of the property with the Public Trust. He wouldsubmit that the First Appellate Court has rightly considered allthe aspects of the matter in its proper perspective. The findings offacts recorded by the First Appellate Court are based on evidenceon record, hence, do not call for any interference. He wouldsubmit that the questions of law framed in this appeal are dulydealt with by the First Appellate Court and answers to thosequestions are elaborately discussed. No substantial questionrequires further adjudication. Hence, he urges to dismissed theappeal. (14) sa-274-2002.odt19.Having considered submissions advanced, I deem itappropriate to first deal with the substantial questions of law (E)and (F) respectively as framed by this Court at the time ofadmission of the Second Appeal, since those relates to jurisdictionof the Civil Court to entertain suit and period of limitation forclaims setup in the suit. 20.As regards to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court OrCharity Commissioner to decide the nature of the suit properties,first of all it would be necessary to look into the relief that hasbeen claimed in the present suit. The plaintiffs are seekingdeclaration of the ownership and perpetual injunction, as regardsto the suit properties contending that those are ancestralproperties and unconcerned with the Trust registered underBombay Public Trust Act. The plaintiff no.1 stepped into thewitness box and reiterated the contentions that the suit propertiesare ancestral properties and continuously owned and possessed byhis forefathers. Apparently, the plaintiffs are attempting toassert individual title over the suit properties, converse to itsincorporation in schedule of Trust property. Therefore, questionthat emerged for consideration before this Court is whether inview of the provision of Sections 79 or 80 of the Bombay PublicTrust Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly orimpliedly barred to entertain the suit, particularly in respect ofthe property described in paragraph no.1(A) of the plaint, which isdepicted as Trust property as per schedule (I) maintained withthe Charity Commissioner. The Sections 79 and 80 of theBombay Public Trust Act reads as under:“79. Decision of property as public trust property:(1) Any question, whether or not a trust exists and suchtrust is a public trust or particular property is the property of (15) sa-274-2002.odtsuch trust, shall be decided by the Deputy or AssistantCharity Commissioner as provided by this Act.(2) An appeal shall lie against such decision of theAssistant or Deputy Charity Commissioner to the CharityCommissioner under Section 70.80. Bar of jurisdiction :Save as expressly provided in this Act, no Civil Courtshall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any questionwhich is by or under this Act to be decided or dealt with byany officer or authority under this Act, and in respect ofwhich the decision or order of such officer or authority hasbeen made final and conclusive.”21.Pertinently Full bench of this Court had occasion todeal with question of Civil Courts jurisdiction to entertainindividual claim of title in property acquired by the Trust in thematter of Keki Pestonji Jamadar Vs. Rodabai KhodadadMerwan Irani1. This court after considering the scheme ofBombay Public Trust Act particularly the scope of inquiry underSection 19 concluded in para no.27 as under:“Neither the Act nor the Rules contemplate that persons whoclaim adversely to the trust or who dispute the right or title ofthe author of the trust to the trust property must be heard inthe inquiry under Section 19. In fact, Section 19 and R. 7-A(1) only reckon applications under S. 18 which are to be madeby trustees and applications by "any person having interest ina public trust". Surely, persons in the position of Rodhabaiand Baimai are not persons "having interest in a publictrust". They are interested in the assertion of their own privatetitle to the property and disputing the right of Jamshedji toconvey that property to the trust.” Further in para no.29 it is observed that:“And speaking of remedies, what is truly important is that theAct provides no remedy to a person whose title is deemed tohave been concluded by the order of the Deputy or AssistantCharity Commissioner, without affording to him anopportunity of being heard. The argument is that the decisionthat a particular property belongs to the trust involves thedetermination that it belongs to no one else and therefore,11972 Mh.L.J. 427. (16) sa-274-2002.odtafter the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner records adecision in the inquiry, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction, inview of Section 80, to decide any question regarding title tothe particular property. It is legitimate to inquire: if Section80 bars the suit, does the Act provide a remedy to theaggrieved person, as a self-contained Code should provide?” While concluding in para no.31 it is observed thus:“If the Act and the Rules thus contemplate in terms that theinquiry must be limited to the contentions of personsinterested in the trust, there is no place in that inquiry for aperson who wants to set up a title which is hostile to the trust.Such a claim is not a "particular relating to" the public trust,nor can it be said that it "has remained to be inquired into”.22.In the matter of Ramnarayan s/o Manilal Sahuand Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others2, this Courtafter giving due consideration to the observations of the FullBench of this Court in the matter of Keki Pestonji Jamadar(supra) concluded that the question of title in respect of theproperty acquired by the Trust has to be decided by the CivilCourt in independent suit filed. Hence, Section 80 of the BombayPublic Trust Act is no bar to the Civil Court to decide suchquestion. 23.The Supreme Court in the matter of Vinayaka Dev,Idagunji and Others Vs. Shivaram and Others3 observed thatthe main object of the Public Trust Act is to regulateadministration of the Public Trust. The right asserted by theplaintiffs in the plaint is claimed as their families'personal/private right. Whether they are entitled to continue asArchaks on hereditary basis is a private claim of the plaintiffs.Further, this Court in the matter of Abhishek RavishankarAgrawal Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner Bhandaraand Another4, observed that the question whether author of the22005 (2) Mh.L.J. 95.3(2005) 6 SCC 641.42009 (2) Mh.L.J. 178. (17) sa-274-2002.odtTrust had title and competence to deal with the properties allegedto be of Joint Hindu Family properties, is clearly beyond the scopeof scrutiny and inquiry under the provisions of Bombay PublicTrust Act. In yet another judgment, this Court in the matter ofShree Hanuman Mandir, Alibag, Public Trust through itsTrustees & ors. Vs. Satishchandra Bhalchandra Gurjar &ors.5 observed in paragraph no.31 that, the plaintiffs have notraised any dispute as regards administration or management ofthe Trust, deities and temple. In other words, since the questionsraised in the Suit are unconnected with the administration orpossession of the trust property, the Civil Court will have thejurisdiction to entertain and try the Suit. The Division Bench ofthis Court in the matter of Samastha Lad Vanjari Samaj &Another Vs. Waman Kisan Sanap & others6 observed that “Inour opinion, the conclusion is inescapable that what the fullBench has decided is that questions of title to the trust propertyare outside the scope of an inquiry under section 19 of the Act sothat disputed questions of title are not to be dealt with by theDeputy or the Assistant Charity Commissioner and this authorityhad to confine itself to determination of those questions and thosequestions only which it is required to decide under the provisionsof the statute.” It is further held that a person who sets up aclaim hostile to the Trust cannot by any stretch of imagination besaid to be a person having interest in the Trust. 24.In case of J.V. Gokal Charity Trust Vs. ContrexPvt. Ltd this court laid general principles as regardsjurisdictional bar of civil court in view of section 79 and 80 of theMPTA, relevant part reads as under(b) A substantive suit for an adjudication of title is not hitby the jurisdictional bar of Sections 79 and 80 of the52014 (2) Bom. C.R. 221.61976 Mh. L.J. 806. (18) sa-274-2002.odtMPTA. The determination of whether or not a property isthe property of a trust is for the purpose of an enquiry,findings and making an entry in the register. It is not anadjudication of title of the kind a Civil Court can do.(c) The correctness of any entry in the register is liable tochallenge, including under Section 72 in a suit; and,following Section 26, an order of a court on that mustresult in the necessary changes being effected in theregister.(e) Where the persons in question are not persons havinginterest in the trust, as for example rank outsidersclaiming a hostile title independently in themselves, then,too, no permission can ever be obtained from the CharityCommissioner under Sections 50(i) to (iii) of the MPTA.(f) The jurisdictional bar under Sections 79 and 80 onlyapplies to those acts that the Charity Commissioner andother authorities are required by the statute to do.It does not extend to matters beyond the purview or powersof those authorities.25.In another judgment recently delivered by DivisionBench of this Court in the matter of Dipesh Mehta and othersVs. Gerald Shirley and others7, this Court after taking surveyof the scheme under Bombay Public Trust Act and variouspronouncement observed in para no.56 :“Once we accept that what is being canvassed by theplaintiffs is an enforcement of their civil rights then there isno question of jurisdictional ouster.” 26.Mr. R. N. Dhorde, learned Senior Counsel forappellants while contending that jurisdiction of civil court isbarred in facts of present case placed his reliance on judgments ofthis court as well as Supreme Court in case of Mahibubi AbdulAziz Vs. Sayyed Abdul Majid and others8, Lakhanlal BrijlalPurohit and Others Vs. Marwadi Samshan Hanuman72023 (2) ALL MR 467.82001 (2) Mh.L.J 512 (19) sa-274-2002.odtMandit Akot9, The Church of North India Vs. LawajibhaiRatanjibhai and others10, Rajesh Chunnilal Meghani Vs.Andheri Recreation Club and others11, Ms. JankibaiPrahladraj Seksari Vs. Kashinath Kelkar and others12,Ganpat Surwase-Walke Vs. Government of Maharashtra13,to contend that civil courts jurisdiction to entertain claim inrespect of Trust property is barred as per scheme and provisionscontained u/s 79 and 80 of BPT Act, 27.In case of Church of North India (Supra) SupremeCourt in para 82 and 83 observed thus:The provisions of the Act and the Scheme thereof leave nomanner of doubt that the Act is a complete code in itself. Itprovides for a complete machinery for a person interested inthe trust to put forward his claim before the CharityCommissioner who is competent to go into the question andto prefer appeal if he feels aggrieved by any decision. Thebar of jurisdiction created under Section 80 of the Actclearly points out that a third party cannot maintain a suitso as to avoid the rigours of the provisions of the Act. Thematter, however, would be different if the property is not atrust property in the eye of law. The civil court'sjurisdiction may not be barred as it gives rise to ajurisdictional question. If a property did not validly vest ina trust or if a trust itself is not valid in law, the authoritiesunder the Act will have no jurisdiction to determine thesaid question.92006 (3) ALL MR 52410(2005) 10 SCC 730112017 (5) Mh. L.J 16712AIR 1972 SC 199132010 (5) ALL MR 72
Legal Reasoning
(20) sa-274-2002.odtWith a view to determine the question as regard exclusionof jurisdiction of civil court in terms of the provisions of theAct, the court has to consider what, in substance, and notmerely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suitand the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein.If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the court comes tothe conclusion that the question is required to bedetermined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, thejurisdiction of the civil court must be held to have beenousted. The questions which are required to be determinedare within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of theauthorities whether simple or complicated. Section 26 of theAct must be read in that context as it specifically refers tothose questions wherewith a court of competent jurisdictioncan deal with and if the same is not expressly or impliedlybarred. Once a decision is arrived at, having regard to thenature of the claim as also the reliefs sought for, that civilcourt has no jurisdiction, Section 26 per force will have noapplication whatsoever.28.In cases of Mahibubi and Lakhanlal (Supra) fullbench judgment of this court in case of Keki Pestonji Jamadar(supra) is not referred. However this court after referring to thescheme of the act, specially scope of inquiry u/s 19 of the actconcluded that question of title can be gone into by the authoritiesunder the act and ascertain that property is trust property or not.The civil court cannot be permitted to usurp jurisdiction ofcompetent authority in view of express bar u/s 80 of the Act. Incase of Keshav Bharti (Supra) challenge was made to the orderpassed by Assistant Charity Commissioner regarding registrationof Trust with suit property and declaration was sought that order (21) sa-274-2002.odtof charity commissioner is null and void, not binding to right ofplaintiffs and also suit property is not trust property, which isheld to be incompetent before civil court. 29.In view of legal position espoused from variouspronouncements of the Supreme Court of India as well as thisCourt it can be irresistibly concluded that the when claim of titleis raised by an individual / stranger relating suit property therebyasserting his independent right or title adverse and hostile to theTrust, it would be beyond the scope of inquiry under theprovisions of Bombay Public Trust Act. Thus, the jurisdiction ofthe Civil Court is not barred to entertain and decide such claim.30.Keeping in mind aforesaid principles of law letsexamine facts of present case, apparently the plaintiffs areclaiming their title in respect of the suit properties in exclusion ofthe Trust stating it to be their ancestral property. They arefurther coming with the case that their grandfather neitherintended nor had authority to transfer or dedicate the suitproperty upon the Trust excluding rights of others. Theregistration of property in schedule of trust is undermisconception of facts. If sum and substance of relief claimed byplaintiffs is extracted in true spirit, it can be gathered that theyare raising challenge to registration of Trust so also inclusion ofsuit property in schedule of Trust under section 21 of the Act inpursuance of order of competent authority passed in year 1952 oninquiry u/s 19 of the act. Pertinently the property is registered astrust property on the basis of application tendered by grandfatherof plaintiffs u/s 18 of the Act for registration of Trust. It can not bedisputed that in the year 1952 grandfather of plaintiffs wasexclusively in control of temple and suit property. He wascompetent to file such application so also he had every authority (22) sa-274-2002.odtto include property of Temple as Trust property. The plaintiffswere not even born at that time. The father of plaintiffs neverraised challenge to inclusion of property as Trust property till thedate of filing this suit. The plaintiffs who are claiming their rightthrough father or grandfather cannot have right, independent oftheir grandfather who on his volition included property as Trustproperty before their birth. Therefore plaintiffs cannot assertindependent title in suit property or raise challenge to itsregistration being trust property without assailing order ofcharity commissioner thereby entering it in schedule of Trust. Theplaintiffs cannot be treated as strangers to the trust when theyrest claim through their father or grandfather. If they wish tochallenge registration of property as trust property suchquestions would definitely fall within the scope of jurisdiction ofthe Charity Commissioner or his subordinate officer under thescheme of Bombay Public Trust Act. Pertinently at the time ofinstitution of suit the title of suit property had been absolutelyvested with trust. Even before their birth vesting of suit propertywith trust was completed as per law. At the time of institution ofsuit neither plaintiffs joint family property was existence nor hadindependent claim over trust property. Even assuming suitproperty was originally ancestral property held by grandfather ofplaintiff, it culminated in Trust on his voluntary dedication. Thematerial on record i.e. various Court proceedings clearly depictsthat grandfather of plaintiffs was a prudent man, conversant oflegal proceedings and its consequences. In that view of the matterit is difficult to accede with contentions of plaintiffs that undermisconception suit property was registered by him as trustproperty. (23) sa-274-2002.odt31.As held by Supreme court in case of Church of NorthIndia vs Lavajibhai (Supra). the courts are required to look in tonature of claim, underlying object in seeking relief in substanceand not in form while deciding issue as to exclusion of jurisdictionof civil court. Pertinently, the Trial Court as well as the AppellateCourt have failed to observe that in all probabilities, present suitis instituted to avoid rigours of provisions of the Act by father ofplaintiffs i.e. defendant No.2 in the name of plaintiffs. Both courtscommitted patent illegality while holding that the suit ismaintainable. I conclude that the Civil Court has no jurisdictionto try and entertain present suit in view of section 79 and 80 ofthe Act.32.The next substantial question of law is whether suitfiled by the plaintiffs is within the limitation? The plaintiffs seeksdeclaration that suit property 1-A in ancestral property andunconcerned with public Trust and perpetual injunction in respectof the suit properties. The cause of action for filing the suit isstated to be the action taken by the authorities under BombayPublic Trust Act, thereby collecting money and other articlesoffered in the boxes kept before the Deities in the month ofNovember 1981. According to the plaintiffs, they have recentlygot knowledge of the registration of the Trust including the suitproperties. The plaintiff no.1 was aged about 20 years at the timeof institution of the suit. As such, he asserts his right in theproperties claiming it to be ancestral properties. The Trial Courthad framed the issue as regards to the limitation and recordedaffirmative finding in favour of the plaintiffs. It is observed thatsuit has been instituted within a period of three years in terms ofArticle 113 of the Limitation Act. Since the plaintiffs have pleadedthat they got the knowledge regarding registration of the Trust (24) sa-274-2002.odtwith suit properties in the year 1980, the suit is well within thelimitation. The First Appellate Court also framed points forconsideration and affirmed findings of the Trial Court holdingthat the suit is within limitation. Taking into account provisionsof Article 58 and 113 of Limitation Act and date of cause of actionas pleaded in the plaint suit is instituted within prescribedlimitation period of three years. There is no reason to interfere inthe findings of the Courts below. Although, the appellants haveraised objections regarding limitation, the written statementnowhere specifies pleadings in support of such objections. Hence,I find that suit is filed well within limitation from date of cause ofaction. The substantial question of law framed is answeredaccordingly. 33.Now turning to the first four questions of law i.e. (A),(B), (C) and (D). All of them require joint consideration. Thequestion no.(D) goes to the root of the litigation since it deals withthe nature of the properties, whether private or ancestralproperties. The plaintiffs in support of their claims that suitproperties are ancestral properties and unconcerned with theTrust, relied upon oral evidence of plaintiff no.1 himself anddocumentary evidence. The oldest document relied upon by theplaintiffs is placed at Exhibit-83, which is decree in SuitNo.501/1859 between Balkrushna Shivaram Vs. Dhondi Balaji &Ors. They have also relied upon subsequent orders passed invarious proceedings instituted by or against the family membersof the plaintiffs. For the purpose of better understanding of thedocumentary evidence tendered into service, it would beappropriate to refer to the undisputed genealogy/pedigree (Asrefereed in WP No. 305/2023), which is as under: (25) sa-274-2002.odtJankojiDhondi-(Grandson)Bhiku (died sometimes in the year 1912)Lahanu (died in the year 1935)Kisan (died in the year 1979)Arjun (defendant no.2)Vijay and three others (plaintiffs)34.On perusal of the certified copy of the decree in CivilSuit No.501/1859 placed at Exhibit-83, it can be gathered thatsuit was instituted by Balkrushna Shivaram and another againstDhondi for recovery of amount on the basis of mortgage. Dhondihad mortgaged his mansion consisting of 74 khan and it wassubsequently redeemed. Another document relied upon by theplaintiffs is at Exhibit-78, which pertains to the Civil SuitNo.1216/1893 between Bhiku and Savalyaram. The subjectmatter of the suit is right to manage Palkhi (palanquin)procession from Rahuri to Tuljapur. In that suit, the sons ofDhondi namely Bhiku and Savalyaram were declared to have ajoint right. However said suit nowhere deals with the partition ordistribution of the rights in the immovable properties of thetemple. The subsequent document pertains to the decree in CivilSuit No.246/1935 decided on 28.06.1938 between ChandrabhanSavaleram Teli Vs. Kisan Lahanu Devkar and further ApplicationNo.249/1942 seeking modification of the decree regarding rightsin earnings of the temple. Another document placed at Exhibit-90, is certified copy of mortgage deed dated 25.12.1913 by Lahanu (26) sa-274-2002.odtBhiku Bhagat in favour of the Rajeshree Shankar DamodharKate. It pertains to the mortgage of the house property executedby Lahanu Bhagat in favour of Rajeshree Shankar DamodharKate. However, on the basis of the aforesaid documents, it isdifficult to draw any inference that ancestors of the plaintiffs wereabsolute owners of the properties. The partition deed dated04.09.1942 at Exhibit-81 pertains to distribution of the offeringsreceived towards services like pooja and archa performed in thetemple of the Goddess amongst the heirs of the Kisan LahanuDevkar and others. Therefore, aforesaid documents are bereft tosupport the claim of the plaintiffs that the suit properties weretheir ancestral properties. The learned District Judge appears tohave drawn inference on the basis of the order passed in the CivilSuit No.501/1859 and 1216/1893 that the suit properties must beownership properties of the ancestors of the plaintiffs. 35.Although the plaintiffs have filed document Exhibit 83relating to suit for redemption of mortgage of the year 1859, thedescription of the property mentioned therein is not comparable tosuit property. There is nothing on record by which propertydescribed in that suit can be identified as present suit property.Further there is no material on record to indicate partition of theimmovable property amongst the ancestors or forefathers of theplaintiffs, which could be normal feature of ancestral property.What is being distributed in partition is the receipts or offeringsmade before the Deities. Apparently, plaintiffs’ forefathers wereperforming their duties as Pujari and living on offerings receivedfrom the devotees. The existence of temple as could be gatheredfrom pleadings in old suits and documents, appears sinceimmemorial time. It clearly denotes the public character of theDeities and temple, converse to the claim of the plaintiffs that theDeities were installed in the year 1912 by their forefathers at a (27) sa-274-2002.odtprivate place of worship. Pertinently grants were made availablefrom the Government for palanquin/Palkhi procession or themanagement of Yatra. The public character of the temple cannotbe superseded only because the plaintiffs’ forefathers wereenjoying the right to perform daily rituals of the Deities.Therefore, even considering the documents at Exhibit-81 i.e.partition deed dated 04.09.1942 as referred in first substantialquestion of law or the mortgage deed referred in third question oflaw, the claim of the plaintiffs regarding its character as ancestralproperties cannot be established.36.The document at Exhibit-82 is an applicationsubmitted by Kisan Lahanu Bhagat i.e. grandfather of theplaintiffs under Section 18 of the Bombay Public Trust Act,wherein at the time of registration of the Trust, the property asdescribed in paragraph no.1(A) is shown as Trust property.Thereafter, the purpose of Trust is mentioned as maintaining thetemple of the Deities and continue daily services of the pooja-archa and offerings. The grandfather of the plaintiffs was soleTrustee and the Trust had earning from the offerings made to theDeities and grant of Rs.21/- from the Government at the time ofthe registration of the Trust. Upon registration of the Trust, thepublic character of the temple was maintained by the grandfatherof the plaintiffs till his death. He had submitted accounts ofincome and expenditures to the Charity Commissioner.Thereafter, defendant no.2 i.e. father of the plaintiffs has beenadded as Trustee and he was in the control and management ofthe Trust. Pertinently, the grandfather of the plaintiffs, so alsofather of the plaintiffs at no point of time till the institution ofpresent suit challenged the registration of the Trust alongwithsuit property described in paragraph no.1(A) of the plaint. (28) sa-274-2002.odt37.Pertinently father of the plaintiffs i.e. defendant no.2while managing the affairs of the Trust, instituted Regular CivilSuit No.671/1980 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division atAhmednagar seeking relief of declaration and perpetualinjunction against Grampanchayat Burhanagar pertaining to theopen spaces surrounding Temple. He claimed himself to be soleTrustee of the temple of “Jagdamba Tuljapurchi Devi” havingrights of prayer with the family of the plaintiffs. It also refers tothe registration of the Trust and right to manage the property ofthe Trust including open spaces surrounding the temple. In theplaint specific reference is made that on 16.08.1952 in the enquiryconducted by the Tahasildar, it is held that the properties belongto the temple and the plaintiffs. The issue no.4 was specificallyframed in that suit, which reads thus:“Is the suit in the name of Pujari in respect of this trustproperty tenable?”. 38.It has been answered in affirmative and right ofthe plaintiff in suit properties was confirmed being the Pujariof the temple on behalf of the Trust. The said decree attainedfinality on confirmation by this court in Second AppealNo.16/2001 vide judgment and order dated 22.06.2004.Apparently, the father of the plaintiffs had also accepted thestatus of the suit properties to be the Trust propertiesaccordingly established his claim in the Regular Civil SuitNo.671/1980. The copy of the judgment dated 16.08.1996 isplaced at Exhibit-92 on the record of present suit. Theobservation and findings in that proceeding clearly demolishplaintiffs claim that suit properties described in para 1 (B) (C)and (D) are their ancestral or ownership properties. (29) sa-274-2002.odt39.One more significant facet of the matter is thatalthough plaintiffs are seeking declaration of suit properties beingancestral and unconcerned with the Trust, so far registration ofthe Trust is concerned, it was never challenged by theirgrandfather during his lifetime nor it has been assailed bydefendant no.2 i.e. (father of the plaintiffs) till institution of thepresent suit. It is only when the scheme had been framed andofferings received at temple were accounted for the public Trust,present suit has been instituted. Thereafter, defendant no.2appears to have initiated separate proceeding before ChatityCommissioner challenging the registration of the Trust as wellthe order framing of the scheme under Bombay Public Trust Act.However, the aforesaid challenge failed affirming its validity uptothis court in Writ Petition No.305/2023 with other connected WritPetitions. This Court has recorded elaborate reasons in support ofconclusions. 40.Pertinently plaintiffs who were not even born at thetime of registration of the Trust with suit property are seekingdeclaration that the suit properties are their ancestral propertiesand unconcerned with the Trust. Apparently, the grandfather ofthe plaintiffs on his own volition made an application forregistration of the Trust in the year 1952 including the propertydescribed in paragraph no.1(A) of the plaint to be the property ofthe Trust with an object to continue sanctity of the Deities andperformance of daily rituals. He continued to discharge his dutiesas Trustee. During his lifetime father of the plaintiffs (DefendantNo. 2) was introduced as trustee by way of change report and hecontinued as Trustee without challenging the public character ofthe Trust and its properties. At this stage reference can be madeto the observations of the privy counsel in case of Maharani (30) sa-274-2002.odtHemanta Kumari Debi Vs. Gauri Shankar Tewari14, whereinit is observed that: “from the stand point of Hindu law it is not essential to avalid dedication that legal title should pass from the ownernor is it inconsistent with an effectual dedication that theowner should continue to make any and all uses of theland which do not interfere with uses for which it isdedicated.” 41.In that view of the matter, even assuming thatinitially suit properties were ancestral ownership, however oncededicated would completely vest with the public trust, owing tovoluntary act on the part of the grandfather of the plaintiffs in theyear 1952 itself, when plaintiffs were even not born. Thegrandfather of the plaintiffs or at the most defendant no.2 i.e.father of the plaintiffs could have asserted their private right inrespect of the properties, if those were assumed to be ancestralproperties. However, the plaintiffs could have no locus to set upany claim in respect of the property, which had been completelyvested into the public Trust in the year 1952. Consequently,plaintiffs never had cause of action to set up claim in respect ofsuch properties. Pertinently, the plaintiffs are claiming theirrights through their father or grandfather. In absence of anyclaim by father or grandfather of the plaintiffs after registrationof public trust with properties, the plaintiffs cannot haveindependent right to set up claim of ownership. In that view ofthe matter, I have no hesitation to hold that First AppellateCourts conclusion that the suit properties are private ancestralproperties of the plaintiffs is patently illegal.1458 Mad 994. (31) sa-274-2002.odt42.Now turning to next substantial question of law (B)regarding Order VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. TheTrial Court had framed issue 1(A) on the basis of the objectionraised by defendant nos.3 and 4 in paragraph no.10 of the writtenstatement and held that in absence of survey numbers, gutnumbers or grampanchayat property numbers, the suit propertiescannot be identified and the description of the properties given inthe plaint sans requirement of Order VII Rule 3 of the Code ofCivil Procedure. Pertinently, it is not the case of the defendantsthat the properties were marked with gut numbers, surveynumbers or grampanchayat property numbers at the time of filingof the suit. The plaintiffs are coming with the case that theproperties are situated in gaothan area, therefore, they havedescribed properties by giving four boundaries withmeasurements. As such, there is no serious dispute as regards tothe identification of the properties. In that view of the matter, itwill have to be held that there is no error in findings recorded bythe Appellate Court that plaint is compliant with provisions ofOrder VII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No fault can befound in the view taken by First Appellate Court on this aspect.Hence I answer substantial question of law (B) accordingly.43.So far as first and third question of law (A & C) isconcern it relates to interpretation of document Exhibit 81 i.e.partition deed dated 26.08.1942. As observed in forgoingparagraphs, partition deed relates to distribution of incomereceived towards offering before deity. It has no significance indeciding ownership of suit property. Even first appellate court hasnot based its finding on this document although drawn somesupport from it. So far as mortgage deed Exhibit 91 is concerned,record show that Xerox copy of certified copy issued by this court (32) sa-274-2002.odtin F.A. 2578/1983 is filed on record. Trial court in paragraph 16 ofjudgment observed that Exhibit 91 is xerox copy of unregisteredmortgage deed. Original is not produced. Even it is not the case ofplaintiffs that original is lost. Hence document exhibit 91 cannotbe considered in evidence. Even first appellate court has notreferred or relied on said document. Accordingly Substantialquestion of law so framed does not survive 44.In result, second appeal succeeds. Hence followingorder:ORDERa.The Second Appeal is allowed.b.The judgment and decree dated 16.01.2002 passed by thelearned District Judge, Ahmednagar in Regular Civil AppealNo.21/2000 is hereby quashed and set aside and judgment anddecree dated 10.12.1999 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, JuniorDivision, Ahmednagar thereby dismissing Regular Civil SuitNo.600/1982 is restored.c.In view of disposal of the Second Appeal, pending CivilApplications are also disposed of. (S. G. CHAPALGAONKAR)JUDGEDevendra/November-2023