High Court
Legal Reasoning
CRI-APPLN-1987-2025.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADCRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1987 OF 2025Dr. Pravin Ashok Tribhuwan,Age: 39 years, Occu: Medical Practitioner,R/o: E-1, Plot no. 16, N-8,CIDCO,Near Kanya Prashala Housing School,Nyayalayeen Husing Soviety,Tq. Dist. Aurangabad … APPLICANT VERSUS1.State of Maharashtra,Through Officer in charge,Bidkin Police Station,Aurangabad Rural, District- Aurangabad2.Nikita Vaibhav Kathumbare,Age: 21 years, Occ: Housewife,R/o: Kharadkar Galli, BidkinTq. Bidkin, Dist. Chh. Sambhaji Nagar … RESPONDENTS.…Mr. Jitendra S. Jain, Advocate for the Applicant Mr. S. D. Ghayal, Addl. P. P. for Respondent No.1 – State Mr. Tushar C. Shinde, Advocate for Respondent No.2.…CORAM: MANISH PITALE ANDY. G. KHOBRAGADE, JJ.DATE:23.09.2025ORDER (Per:- Y. G. Khobragade, J.) :- 1.By this application under Section 482 of the Code ofCriminal Procedure, the applicant prays for quashment of F.I.R. 1 of 9 (( 2 ))CRI-APPLN-1987-2025No.0440 of 2024, registered with Bidkin Police Station, AurangabadRural (Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar) on 09.12.2023, for the offencespunishable under Sections 354, 354A and 354B of the Indian PenalCode and the consequential charge-sheet No.32 of 2024, filed on29.02.2024, which registered as R.C.C. No.185 of 2024, pending onthe file of the learned J.M.F.C., Paithan, District Aurangabad(Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar). 2.On the face of the record, it appears that the presentapplicant is a medical practitioner running his clinic at the addressgiven above. On 08.12.2023, non-applicant No. 2/informant visitedhis clinic with her husband, as she was suffering from vomiting andcoughing. Therefore, she was admitted to the applicant’s clinic.However, on 09.12.2023, non-applicant No. 2/informant lodged anF.I.R. with the Bidkin Police Station, alleging that the applicantoutraged her modesty by touching her private parts and breasts underthe pretext of a medical check-up. On the basis of said F.I.R., CrimeNo.0440 of 2024 registered against the present applicant / accusedfor the offences punishable under Sections 354, 354A and 354B of theIndian Penal Code. 2 of 9
Legal Reasoning
(( 3 ))CRI-APPLN-1987-20253.Heard Mr. Jain, the learned counsel for the applicant, Mr.Ghayal, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and Mr. Shinde,learned counsel for non-applicant No.2.4.The learned counsel appearing for the respective partieshave submitted that during pendency of trial of R.C.C. No.185 of2024, arising out of charge-sheet No.32 of 2024 filed on 29.02.2024,the applicant / accused and the non-applicant No.2 / informant,arrived at compromise and they have filed compromise petition. Soalso, non-applicant No.2 / victim, has filed affidavit and admitted thatduring pendency of the present application, she and the applicant /accused, have amicably settled the dispute. The copy of compromisedeed is placed on record at Exhibit-R-1.5.Needless to say that the offence registered under CrimeNo.0440 of 2024, is in persona and against the body of informant /non-applicant No.2 and as such, non-applicant No.2 / informantamicably entered into the compromise with the applicant / accusedfor settlement of the dispute, therefore prayed for quashment of F.I.R.No.0440 of 2024, registered with Bidkin Police Station, AurangabadRural (Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar) on 09.12.2023, for the offences 3 of 9 (( 4 ))CRI-APPLN-1987-2025punishable under Sections 354, 354A and 354B of the Indian PenalCode as per the law laid down in the cases of Gain Singh Vs. State ofPunjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh & Ors.Vs. State of Punjab, (2024) 6 SCC 466.6. In case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab, cited supra, theHon’ble Supreme Court has also conceded about the quashing of thecase in terms of the settlement arrived at between the parties andobserved in para 6 as follows:-6. In Nikhil Merchant AIR 2009 SC 428, a company, M/s.Neemuch Emballage Ltd., Mumbai was granted financialassistance by Andhra Bank under various facilities. On accountof default in repayment of loans, the bank filed a suit forrecovery of the amount payable by the borrower company. Thebank also filed a complaint against the company, its ManagingDirector and the officials of Andhra Bank for diverse offences,namely, Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 ofthe Indian Penal Code read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) ofthe Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13(2) readwith Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988. The suit for recovery filed by the bank against thecompany and the Managing Director of the Company wascompromised. The suit was compromised upon the Defendantsagreeing to pay the amounts due as per the schedulementioned in the consent terms. Clause 11 of the consent termsread, "agreed that save as aforesaid neither party has any claimagainst the other and parties do hereby withdraw all theallegations and counter-allegations made against each other". 4 of 9 (( 5 ))CRI-APPLN-1987-2025Based on Clause 11 of the consent terms, the ManagingDirector of the Company, the Appellant who was accused No. 3in charge sheet filed by CBI, made application for dischargefrom the criminal complaint. The said application was rejectedby the Special Judge (CBI), Greater Bombay, which came to bechallenged before the Bombay High Court. The contentionbefore the High Court was that since the subject matter of thedispute had been settled between the Appellant and the bank,it would be unreasonable to continue with the criminalproceedings. The High Court rejected the application fordischarge from the criminal cases. It is from this order that thematter reached this Court by way of special leave. The Courthaving regard to the facts of the case and the earlier decision ofthis Court in B.S. Joshi, AIR 2003 SC 1386: (2003) 4 SCC 675,set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the criminalproceedings by consideration of the matter thus: 28. The basic intention of the accused in this caseappears to have been to misrepresent the financial statusof the Company, M/s Neemuch Emballage Ltd., Mumbai,in order to avail of the credit facilities to an extent towhich the Company was not entitled. In other words, themain intention of the Company and its officers was tocheat the Bank and induce it to part with additionalamounts of credit to which the Company was nototherwise entitled. 29. Despite the ingredients and the factual content ofan offence of cheating punishable Under Section 420Indian Penal Code, the same has been madecompoundable under Sub-section (2) of Section 320 Codeof Criminal Procedure with the leave of the court. ofcourse, forgery has not been included as one of thecompoundable offences, but it is in such cases that theprinciple enunciated in B.S. Joshi case becomes relevant. 5 of 9 (( 6 ))CRI-APPLN-1987-202530. In the instant case, the disputes between theCompany and the Bank have been set at rest on the basisof the compromise arrived at by them whereunder thedues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank doesnot appear to have any further claim against theCompany. What, however, remains is the fact that certaindocuments were alleged to have been created by theAppellant herein in order to avail of credit facilitiesbeyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. Thedispute involved herein has overtones of a civil disputewith certain criminal facets. The question which isrequired to be answered in this case is whether the powerwhich independently lies with this Court to quash thecriminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrivedat, should at all be exercised?31. On an overall view of the facts as indicatedhereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of thisCourt in B.S. Joshi case and the compromise arrived atbetween the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 ofthe consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, weare satisfied that this is a fit case where technicalityshould not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashingof the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, thecontinuance of the same after the compromise arrived atbetween the parties would be a futile exercise." 7.In case of Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, citedsupra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-"27. In the case of Dimpey Gujral (supra), observations of thisCourt to the effect that offences involved in that case were notoffences against the society. It included charge under Section 307Indian Penal Code as well. However, apart from stating so, there isno detained discussion on this aspect. Moreover, it is the otherfactors which prevailed with the Court to accept the settlement and 6 of 9 (( 7 ))CRI-APPLN-1987-2025compound he offence, as noted above while discussing this case.On the other hand, in Shambhu Kewat (supra), after referring tosome other earlier judgments, this Court opined that commission ofoffence under Section 307 Indian Penal Code would be crimeagainst the society at large, and not a crime against an individualonly. We find that in most of the cases, this view is taken. Even onfirst principle, we find that an attempt to take the life of anotherperson has to be treated as a heinous crime and against the society.28. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is aserious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the lifeof another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot beoblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is aquarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion andsustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is atendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IndianPenal Code as well.Therefore, only because FIR/Charge-sheet incorporates theprovision of Section 307 Indian Penal Code would not, by itself, bea ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code andrefuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are,therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whethercompromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Courtshould go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of thebodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely whether injuriesare caused at the vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature ofweapons used etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strongpossibility of proving the charge under Section 307 Indian PenalCode, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved,the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On theother hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaidcircumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisionsof Section 307 Indian Penal Code were unnecessary included in thecharge sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of theoffence based on settlement between the parties. 7 of 9 (( 8 ))CRI-APPLN-1987-202529. At this juncture, we would like also to add that the timing ofsettlement would also play a crucial role. If the settlement isarrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offencewhen the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may besomewhat liberal in accepting the settlement and quashing theproceedings/ investigation. of course, it would be after looking intothe attendant circumstances as narrated in the previous para.Likewise, when challan is submitted but the charge has not beenframed, the High Court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.However, at this stage, as mentioned above, since the report of theI.O. under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure is also placedbefore the Court it would become the bounding duty of the Courtto go into the said report and the evidence collected, particularlythe medical evidence relating to injury etc. sustained by the victim.This aspect, however, would be examined along with anotherimportant consideration, namely, in view of settlement between theparties, whether it would be unfair or contrary to interest of justiceto continue with the criminal proceedings and whether possibilityof conviction is remote and bleak. If the Court finds the answer tothis question in affirmative, then also such a case would be a fitcase for the High Court to give its stamp of approval to thecompromise arrived at between the parties, inasmuch as in suchcases no useful purpose would be served in carrying out thecriminal proceedings which in all likelihood would end in acquittal,in any case."8.After perusal of compromise deed placed on record, itappears that the present applicant / accused and non-applicantNo.2 / informant, have settled the dispute amicably and decided toset at rest the proceeding of R.C.C. No.185 of 2024. Therefore,considering the law laid down in the cases cited above as well as 8 of 9 (( 9 ))CRI-APPLN-1987-2025societal interest between the parties, in order to secure the ends ofjustice and to prevent abuse of process of law, it will be just andproper to quash and set aside the F.I.R. No.0440/2024 registered withBidkin Police Station, Aurangabad Rural, consequentially R.C.C.No.185 of 2024 registered after filing of charge-sheet No.32 of 2024and pending on the file of the learned J.M.F.C. Paithan, DistrictAurangabad. 9.In view of above discussion, we proceed to pass thefollowing order:-ORDERi)The Criminal Application is hereby allowed.ii)The proceeding bearing R.C.C. No.185 of 2024 pending on thefile of the learned J.M.F.C. Paithan, District Aurangabad, arising out ofthe charge-sheet filed in Crime No. 0440 of 2024 dated 09.12.2023,registered with Bidkin Police Station, Aurangabad Rural, for theoffences punishable under Sections 354, 354-A and 354-B of theIndian Penal Code, is hereby quashed and set aside against thepresent applicant / accused. [ Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. ] [ MANISH PITALE, J. ]SMS 9 of 9