Writ Petition No. 10553 of 2022 · The High Court
Case Details
2025:BHC-AUG:27978-DB W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 1 ::IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADWRIT PETITION NO.10553 OF 2022 WITHCIVIL APPLICATION NO.9419 OF 20251)Sardar Paramjot Singh s/o ArjunSingh Chahel, Age 67 years, Occu. Legal Practitioner (Retired Judge & Former Ex-Member/ Secretary of The Nanded Gurudwara Board),R/o ‘Vasundhara’, CHS, Sector-8, Flat No.101, Kharghar, Navi Mumbai – 410 2102)S. Bhupindar Singh Ji ManhasEx-President, Gurudwara SachkhandBoard Takhat Sachkhand Sri HuzurAbchalnagar Sahib Nanded,Age 73 years, Occu. Business,R/o 10-A, Vinay Hawaya Complex,159/A C.S.T. Road, Kalin, Sabtakruz (E), Mumbai – 8 (Petitioner No.2 deleted as per Court’s order dated 14/3/2024)3)S. Gurinder Singh Ji Bawa,Ex-Vice President – Gurudwara Sachkhand Board TakhatSachkhand Sri Hazur Abchalnagar Sahib, Nanded, Age 75 years, Occu. Business, R/o Guru Angad Niwas,Bungalow No.22Rd. B-1, Housing SocietyVittal Nagar Co-operative J.N.P.D. Scheme, Mumbai – 98 W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 2 ::4)S. Ravinder Singh Ji Aasa Singh JiBungai, Ex-Secretary- Gurudwara Sachkhand Board Takhat Sachkhand Sri Hazur Abchalnagar Sahib, NandedAge 52 years, Occu. Business,R/o Aasha-Jeet Niwas, Opp. Kalidhar English School, Shahidpura, Nanded ( M.S. )5)S. Manpreet Singhji Gobind Singh JiKunjniwale, Ex-Member – Gurudwara Sachkhand Board Takhat Sachkhand Sri Hazur Abchalnagar Sahib, NandedAge 35 years, Occ. Business,R/o Gurudwara Gate No.2, Near GurudwaraMahakal Saheb , Nanded 4316016)S. Gurmeet Singh Mahajan,Ex-Member- Gurudwara Sachkhand Board Takhat Sachkhand Sri HazurAbchalnagar Sahib Nanded, Age 38 years, Occ. Business,R/o Hari Niwas, H.No.3-6-180,Badpura, Nanded 4316017)S. Gobind S. Singhji Longowal,Ex-Member- Gurudwara Sachkhand Board Takhat Sachkhand Sri HazurAbchalnagar Sahib, Nanded Age 72 years, Occu. Business,R/o Teja SinghSamundri Hall, SGPC Opffice, Amritsar 143 0068)S. Raghujit Singh Ji VirkEx- Member, Gurudwara Sachkhand BoardTakhat Sachkhand Sri Hazur AbchalnagarSahib, Nanded, Age 58 years, Occu. Business. R/o Virk House, Meera Ghati GT Road, Karnal- 132001
Legal Reasoning
W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 20 ::and objections, if any, the Board has offered.15.The phraseology of Section 53(1) suggests that,the notice should be given to the Board. Under the Act, theterm ‘Board’ has been defined to mean a Board constituted interms of Section 6 of the Act. In our view, the notice providedunder the proviso should be given to each and every memberof the Board. A look at Section 7 of the Act indicates that, anindividual member of the Board could be disqualified to holdthe office as a member of the Board in certain circumstances.It has been stated time and again by the Apex Court that, whencertain things to be done in a certain manner prescribed by theStatute, the same has to be done in that manner alone or notat all. Let us, therefore, advert to the record as to whether theState Government had in fact issued the notice to the Board(each and every member thereof). The show-cause-notice isdated 30/5/2022. It has been addressed to the President,Gurudwara Board, Nanded. It has been averred in the noticethat, some complaints have been received and the StateGovernment was prima facie of the view that the Boardmembers have defaulted in their duty and abused their W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 21 ::powers. It, therefore, called upon the President of the Board toshow cause within a period of seven days as to why the Boardshall not be superseded.16.In our view, the notice is bad for more than onereason. First, it has been addressed to the President of theBoard alone and not to the individual members of the Board.One could have understood if the notice is addressed to theGurudwara Board and was served on it by delivering it to eitherthe Superintendent or President of the Board. Furthermore,the notice has been issued on the strength of the allegationswhich were not enquired into while the notice was issued.Meaning thereby, when the notice was issued, the StateGovernment did not have any material before it about thesubstance in the allegations or the complaints to have beenproved on enquiry. It is, therefore, just difficult to imagine as tohow the State Government, without there being any findingsabout the allegations made in the complaint, could issue noticeunder Section 53(1) of the Act, and call upon the President ofthe Board to show cause. Along with the show-cause-notice,copies of the complaints were said to have been served on the
Arguments
W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 3 ::9)S. Harpal Singh BhatiaEx-Member- Gurudwara Sachkhand BoardTakhat Sachkhand Sri Hazur AbchalnagarSahib Nanded, Age 29 years, Occu. Business, R/o 9/A, Prem Nagar, Indore, (M.P.)… PETITIONERSVERSUS1)The State of Maharashtrathrough the Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue & Forests, M.S., Mantralaya, Mumbai2)The Hon’ble Chief MinisterGovernment of MaharashtraM.S., Mantralaya, Mumbai3)The Hon’ble Deputy Chief Minister,Government of Maharashtra, M.S., Mantralaya, Mumbai 4)The Hon’ble MinisterDepartment of Revenue & Forest, M.S., Mantralaya, Mumbai 5)The Collector, Nanded6)The Superintendent,The Takht Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Board, Nanded, Taluka and District Nanded7)Dr. Parvinder Singh Paschricha,I.P.S. (Retired), Age 55 years, Occ. Pensioner, R/o as above. (Notices to the Respondents No.1 to 5 to be served through the Government W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 4 ::Pleader, High Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad)… RESPONDENTS.......Mr. R.S. Deshmukh, Senior Counsel with Mr. Kunal Kale & Ms Ashwini Deshmukh, i/b Mr. Devang Deshmukh, Advocate for petitionersDr. Mr. Biren Saraf, Advocate General with Mr. A.B. Girase, Government Pleader for R.No.1, 4 & 5 Mr. G.A. Gadhe, Advocate for R.No.6 Mr. P.R. Katneshwarkar, Senior Counsel i/b Mr. Anuj Fulpagar, Advocate for R.No.7Mr. S.A. Nagarsoge, Advocate for applicant/ intervener inCivil Application No.9419/2025....…WITHWRIT PETITION NO.4665 OF 2024 WITHCIVIL APPLICATION NO.6292 OF 20241)Sardar Manjeet Singh Jagan SinghAged about: 60 years, Occ. BusinessAddress : House No.3-6-219, Badpura, Nanded – 431 601 2)Jagjeevan Singh Trilok Singh Ramgadiya,Aged about: 45 years, Occ. Business,Address : House No.3-6-489, Satnam Niwas, Gurudwara Chourasta,Nanded – 431 601 3)Tahel Singh Gurmukh Singh NirmaleAged about: 75 years, Occ. Business,Address: House No.4-2-3, Shaheed Bhagat Singh Road, Near Govindbagh, Nanded – 431 601 4)Sardar Bishan Singh Beeran Singh, W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 5 ::Aged about : 56 years, Occ. Business, Address: House No.2-3-263, New Sikhwadi,Karimnagar (Telangana) 5050015)Sardar Triloksingh Kartar Singh,Aged about : 50 years, Occ. Business,Address: House No.2-6-59/1, Sikhwadi,Karimnagar (Telangana) 5050016)Gulab Singh Chanda Singh KhandarwaleAged about: 75 years, Occ. Business,Address: Block No.1, Khalsa Colony, Gawalipura, Station Road, Nanded – 431 6017)Darshansingh Charansingh Motorwale,Aged about: 85 years, Occ. Business,Address: House No.3-6-190, Gurudwara Gate No.3, Badpura, Nanded – 431 6018)Sardar Parvinder Singh Amar Singh,Aged about: 57 years, Occ. Business,Address: House No.2-5-22, Sikhwadi,Karimnagar (Telangana) 5050019)Narendra Singh Gangan SinghAsarjanwale, Aged about : 48 years, Occ. Business, Address: House No.3-4-100, Near Tara Singh Market, Guru Gobindsingh Road,Nanded 431 601 10)Amarjeet Singh Khem Singh Shiledar,Aged about : 55 years, Occ. Business,Address : Paras Ghar No.3, Sector No.4,Govindbagh, Abchalnagar, Nanded – 43160111)Sardar Santok Singh s/o Johar Singh W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 6 ::Aged about: 50 years, Occ. R/o H. No.6-3-266,Fateh Garh Gurudwara, Sahib Subhash Nagar, Nizamabad (Telangana State)12)Sardar Surjit Singh s/o Jivan SinghGirnewale, Age: 72 years, Occ. Business,R/o Gate No.3, Gurudwara, NandedTq. & Dist. Nanded13)Avtar Singh s/o Ratan SinghAge: 65 years, Occ.R/o Vishnupuri, Nanded Tq. & Dist. Nanded 14)Sardar Ajit Singh s/o Khanna Singh,Age: 50 years, Occ. R/o H. No.4-2-267, Hanuman Tekadi, Bodhan, Block No.2, Ward 4, Dist. Nizamabad(Telangana State)15)Raja Singh s/o Gurubachan Singh,Age: 56 years, Occ. R/o Badapura, Nanded 16)Sardar Manindersingh s/o Inder Singh,Age: 38 years, Occ. Business,R/o H.No.12-10-125/19, Gajulpeth, Near Post Office, Nizamabad… PETITIONERSVERSUS1)The State of Maharashtrathrough its Secretary of the Revenue & Forest Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai – 32 (copy to be served for Resp. No.1on Govt. Pleader, in the office of W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 7 ::High Court of Judicature of Bombay,Bench at Aurangabad)2)Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Apchalnagar,Nanded, through its Superintendent,Nanded, Tq. & Dist. Nanded3)Dr. Vijay Satbir SinghAdministrator of Nanded Sikh Gurudwara, Apchalnagar, Nanded,through its Superintendent, Nanded,Tq. & Dist. Nanded… RESPONDENTS.......Mr. S.G. Karlekar, Advocate holding for Mr. J.V. Patil, Advocate for petitionersDr. Mr. Biren Saraf, Advocate General with Mr. A.B. Girase, Government Pleader for R.No.1Mr. P.P. Mandlik, Advocate for R.No.2 & 3....… CORAM : R.G. AVACHAT ANDABASAHEB D. SHINDE, JJ.Date of reserving judgment : 18th September, 2025 Date of pronouncing judgment : 6th October, 2025 JUDGMENT (PER : R.G. AVACHAT, J.) :Both these Writ Petitions are taken up togethersince common questions of facts and law arise therein. Forthe sake of convenience, papers in Writ PetitionNo.10553/2022 would be referred. W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 8 ::2.This Writ Petition has been filed for the followingmain relief :(C)Rule may kindly be made absolute by allowing the WritPetition, thereby quashing and setting aside the impugnedNotificationdated 29/06/2022 (Annexure ‘D’) issuedfrom the Department of Revenue and Forest, M.S.,Mantralaya, Mumbai, whereby the Nanded SikhGurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar SahibBoard, Nanded came to be dissolved or superseded andfurther the respondent No.7/ Dr. P.S. Pasricha- I.P.S.(Retired) came to be appointed for performing andexercising all the duties and powers on behalf of theNanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri HazurApchalnagar Sahib Board, Nanded.(C-1)Rule may kindly be made absolute by allowing the WritPetition, thereby reinstating forthwith the Nanded SikhGurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar SahibBoard, which came to be dissolved or superseded videimpugned notification, dated 29/06/2022 (Annexure “D”)till the formation of the new Nanded Sikh GurudwaraSachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Board, Nanded.FACTS:3.The petition was originally preferred by only one ofthe members of the Board. After the respondent State pointedout certain shortcomings in the Writ Petition, other members ofthe Board have joined in as petitioners with some amendmentin the pleadings. W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 9 ::4.The then Hyderabad State passed the Act, “TheNanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Apchalnagar SahibAct, 1956 (“the Act” for short). The Act was passed for theproper administration of the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara. Thepetitioners were the members of the Board, nominated by theState Government. Number of complaints were receivedregarding functioning of the Board. The State Governmentappointed a Committee to enquire into the complaintsreceived. The Committee submitted its report to the StateGovernment, which in turn, issued the notification dated29/6/2022, superseding the Board by nominating one of theretired I.P.S. officers to manage the affairs of the NandedGurudwara. The said notification is sought to be annulled/ setaside in these Writ Petitions with the consequential prayer forreinstatement of the Board.5.The challenge is mainly on the following grounds :(i)The then Government acted in undue haste totopple the Board. The decision was taken on thelast day of the Maha Vikas Aghadi’s rule. W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 10 ::(ii)Malafides are thus attributed to the thenGovernment in Power.(iii)No notice under Section 53 of the Act was servedupon all the members of the Board. The sameconstituted breach of principles of natural justice.(iv)None of the grounds of complaint alleged to havebeen proved has a potential to dislodge the Boardor any of its members.6.The petition has been countered with filingaffidavits-in-reply. Learned Advocate General (A.G.)represented the State of Maharashtra and its instrumentalities.It was first submitted by the learned A.G. that the notice underSection 53 of the Act was served on the Board. An admissionto that effect pleaded in para 24 of the Writ Petition wasadverted to. According to the learned A.G., number ofcomplaints were received inviting the Government’s attentiontowards the mismanagement of the Gurudwara affairs. ACommittee was, therefore, constituted to enquire into thecomplaints. The Superintendent of the Gurudwara was very W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 11 ::much present during the enquiry. All the record including theBooks of Accounts were inspected by the Enquiry Committee.The Enquiry Committee was fair enough to conclude that only4 of number of allegations made in the complaints were foundto have been proved. He then adverted our attention to certainprovisions of the Act to submit that, holding of meeting of theBoard at least once in four months was mandatory. No suchmeetings were held during the relevant period. No auditreports were placed within the time-frame. Moreover, theestimate/ budget of each and every year had also not beenplaced for approval on or before 31st of March each year. Inspite of there being Government orders preventing movementsor assembly of persons so as to prevent spread of Coronapandemic, the petitioners, in violation of those orders, took outa procession. They confronted with the authorities deputed formaintenance of law and order. Those authorities weremanhandled. Crimes were, therefore, registered against thepetitioners and others. In one of the communications made byone of the petitioners, he admitted that most of the members ofthe Board/ petitioners were absconding during the relevant W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 12 ::time. The learned A.G. meant to say that, there was nocoordination among the members of the Board. Even if thePresident was not keeping well and unable to convene ameeting of the Board, our attention was adverted to Section 15of the Act, whereunder the members of the Board wereauthorized to convene a meeting. The same has not beendone. According to learned A.G., the petition is silent to denyor traverse the enquiry report. The same suggests thepetitioners to have impliedly admitted the report of the EnquiryCommittee. Giving a notice as a part of principles of naturaljustice, although not a formality, when the matter comes to theCourt of law, the person claiming violation of principles ofnatural justice need to make out a case of prejudice. For wantof pleadings in the petition, it could safely be observed that thepetitioners did not suffer any prejudice by non-receipt of ashow-cause-notice, if any. According to the learned A.G.,although after having pointed out certain shortcomings, othermembers of the Board joined in the petition as petitioners, nofresh pleadings have been introduced. As such, the report ofthe enquiry went unchallenged. According to him, the Enquiry W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 13 ::Committee completed the enquiry before the time-frame and,therefore, the report was submitted two days in advance. Nofault, therefore, could be found therewith. More so, when thepetitioners themselves referred to the enquiry report. Hewould further submit that, the tenure of the petitioners has longbeen over. This Court, in exercise of discretionary jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can refuse togrant the relief of reinstatement. According to him, the groundsfor toppling the Board, given in Section 53 of the Act, have allbeen made out. It was not necessary for supersession of theBoard that the Board Members should indulge in financialmismanagement. In support of his submissions, the learnedA.G. has relied on the following three authorities : (1)State of Assam & anr. Vs. Gauhati Municipal Board,Gauhati [ AIR 1967 SC 1398](2)Dharampal Satyapal Limited Vs. Deputy Commissionerof Central Excise, Gau & ors. [ (2015) 8 SCC 519](3)State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh & ors.(2021) 19 SCC 7067.We need not detain ourselves with the submissionsadvanced by the learned Advocates for the respective parties. W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 14 ::Those are very much on our mind. Let us, therefore, turn toappreciate the same in the light of the factual and legal matrix.8.As stated above, the Hyderabad State passed theAct for better management of Nanded Gurudwara affairs. Aglance at the relevant provisions of the Act is a must. We,therefore, reproduce certain provisions thereof. Section 2 of the Act defines certain terms. Sub-clause (8) defines the term ‘Board’ to mean the Boardconstituted under the provisions of Chapter II. Chapter II of the Act speaks of control of theGurudwara. By virtue of Section 5 of the Act, the Board shallbe recognized by name of “The Nanded Sikh GurudwaraSachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Board”. The Boardis a body corporate having a perpetual succession and acommon seal with power to acquire and hold property andtransfer the same subject to such conditions and restrictions asmay be prescribed. Section 6 speaks of constitution of theBoard. It is a 17 member Board, 12 of whom to be nominated W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 15 ::by the State Government. Section 7 speaks of adisqualification of an independent member to hold the office asa member or an office bearer in a capacity as a member. Section 8 reads thus : “8.The members of the Board shall hold office forthree years from the date of its constitution or untilconstitution of a new Board, whichever is later.” Section 9 (2) reads thus :“9. (2) If any person having been nominated orelected member of the Board absents himself withoutsufficient cause from three consecutive meetings of theBoard, his name may be removed from membership ofthe Board, provided that if he applies to the Boardwithin one month of the removal of his name to berestored to membership, the Board may at the meetingnext following the date of receipt of such applicationrestore him to office, provided further that no membersshall be restored more than three times.Section 13 reads thus : “Meeting of the Board, other than the first meeting,shall be held as often as necessary at Nanded or at suchother place as the President may determine, but at leastone meeting shall be held in every four months.”Section 15 reads thus : W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 16 ::“15.Not less than one fourth of the whole number ofmembers may by application in writing made to thePresident demand that a meeting of the Board be heldand if notwithstanding such demand, notice of ameeting is not given within fifteen days of the date onwhich the application was received by the President,the applicants may themselves call a meeting to beheld at the Office of the Board by ten days noticeserved in the manner described in Section 14.”9.The Scheme of the Act indicates that, there shallbe a Superintendent to look after the day-to-day affairs of theGurudwara. A Committee is there to control the day-to-dayaffairs and the Apex body is in the nature of the Board.Section 53 reads thus : “53.1) If the Government is of opinion that theBoard is unable to perform, or has persistentlymade default in the duty imposed on it by or underthis Act or has exceeded or abused its powers, theGovernment may, by notification in the OfficialGazette, supersede the Board for such period asmay be specified in the notification.Provided that before issuing a notificationunder this sub-section the Government shall give areasonable time to the Board to show cause why itshould not be superseded and shall consider theexplanation and objections, if any, of the Board.2)Upon the publication of a notification undersub-section (1), superseding the Board - W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 17 ::a)all the members of the Board and theCommittee shall, as from the date ofsupersession, vacate their offices as suchmembers;b)all the powers and duties which may, by orunder the provisions of this Act, beexercised or performed by or on behalf ofthe Board or the Committee shall, during theperiod of supersession be exercised andperformed by such person or persons as theGovernment may direct, and;c)all property vested in the Board shall, duringthe period of supersession, vest in theGovernment.3)On the expiration of the period ofsupersession specified in the notificationissued under sub-section (1), Governmentmay -a)extend the period of supersession for suchperiod as it may consider necessary, or b)reconstitute the Board and the Committee inthe manner provided in Chapter II.”10.A look at the aforesaid provisions and the Schemeof the Act, one will have no difficulty to conclude that the Boardmeans and includes its members, both nominated by the StateGovernment and elected as per the Scheme under Section 6of the Act. As such, the members of the Board constitute the W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 18 ::Board itself. It is also true that, the Board has been recognizedas a separate entity, which can, on its own sue or be sued inits own name.11.Admittedly, the Board was reconstituted in 2019.The tenure of the Board was for three years. In themeanwhile, number of complaints were said to have beenreceived against the Members of the Board. A three memberCommittee was, therefore, constituted to look/ enquire into theallegations in the complaint. The record indicates that theCommittee enquired into the complaints and found substancein four of the complaints. The nature of those complaints saidto have been proved is :-(1)The Board did not convene/ hold requisite number ofmeetings. (2)No annual budget was placed for approval on or before31st March each year.(3)No accounts were audited within a time-frame.(4)The Board/ petitioners took out a procession in breach ofdirections issued with a view to contain or prevent W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 19 ::spread of Corona pandemic.12.True, the Superintendent of the Board was presentbefore the enquiry committee all along. It is also true that, theenquiry committee did not find substance in rest of thecomplaints including fiscal mismanagement ormisappropriation.13.As seen above, under Section 53(1) of the Act, theState Government has power to supersede the Board for suchperiod as may be specified in the notification. The grounds forsupersession are :(1)Inability of the Board to perform, (2)Persistent default in discharge of duty imposed on theBoard by or under the Act.(3)The Board has exceeded or abused its powers. 14.The proviso to sub-section (1) mandates the StateGovernment to give the Board a reasonable time to showcause why it should not be superseded. The StateGovernment is under obligation to consider the explanation
Decision
W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 22 ::President of the Board. It has been specifically averred in thepetition, after amendment, that, no notice was individuallyserved on the Board members. The report of enquiry hadnever been served to any of the Board members (petitioners).The petitioners, therefore, required to obtain the enquiry report,under the Right to Information Act.17.Admittedly, the Committee, appointed to makeenquiry into the allegations did its job in June 2022. In ourview, after the receipt of the enquiry report, the StateGovernment ought to have served the same along with theshow-cause-notice to each and every member of the Board.The same has admittedly not been done in this case. True, inpara 24 of the Writ Petition, it has been averred that theGurudwara Board was served with the show-cause-noticedated 30/5/2022. Those were the pleadings when the petitionwas filed by the then sole petitioner No.1. It is true that, afterjoining of the other members of the Board as co-petitioners,the pleadings have not been substantially amended. The saidadmission remained as it is. Law as regards admission iscrystal clear. Admissions are not conclusive proof. It may, W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 23 ::however, estop. Admission can be explained, proved to bewrong or successfully be withdrawn. The admission appearingin para 24 of the petition was that of the sole petitioner No.1.The same would not bind the co-petitioners. Moreover, therecord itself indicate the said admission was not factuallycorrect.18.Giving of a notice to show cause is in the nature ofprinciples of natural justice introduced by a statutory provision.19.In case of State Orissa Vs. Binapani Dei (AIR1967 SC 1269), it has been observed :-“Even administrative orders which involved civilconsequences have to be passed consistently with therules of principles of natural justice.”20.In the case in hand, we are not concerned with thegeneral principles of natural justice under the AdministrativeLaw. The proviso to Section 53(1) introduced the statutorymandate of issuance of a show-cause-notice. A three JudgeBench of the Apex Court, in case of City Corner Vs. PersonalAsstt. To Collector and Addl. District Magistrate, Nellore (AIR W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 24 ::1976 SC 143), observed : 5. But the main ground of attack against the order ofcancellation is that in making it the District Magistratehad failed to observe the principles of natural justice.The order that the District Magistrate passed is a quasi-judicial order and therefore the appellant is right incontending that the principles of natural justice shouldhave been followed before that order was passed. It isnow well established by decisions of this Court that suchis the requirement of law even where the statute inquestion itself does not so provide. It is also wellestablished that the principles of natural justice do notnecessarily conform to a fixed formula, nor is it aprocrustean bed into which all proceedings must befitted. The principles of natural justice will alwaysdepend upon the facts of each case. The learned Judgesof the High Court examined the various documents thecopies of which had been asked for by the appellant andcame to the conclusion that the show cause notice issuedto him contained a summary of all those documentswhich was sufficient to enable the appellant to make hisrepresentation. We cannot say that this conclusion iswrong. It is not always necessary that the documentsasked for should itself be furnished provided thesubstance of those documents is furnished, alwaysprovided, however, that the summary is not misleading.Such is not the case here. But when the appellant askedfor original documents he could at least have been toldthat he had already been given a summary of thedocuments which was sufficient to enable him to makehis representation and he could make his fullerrepresentation as he had promised in his earlier so calledinterim reply. The District Magistrate's characterisationof the interim reply of the appellant as a routine one isnot correct. After all the opinion of the VillagePanchayat which is a representative body of all thevillagers is entitled to great if not greater weight than thatof the Mitramandali and the Town Yuvajanasangham, W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 25 ::the composition of which or the strength of which we donot know. The Village Panchayat was also competent ona consideration of all the facts to form its own opinion.The opinions of representative bodies should not belightly brushed aside unless of course there is reason tothink that they have acted out of considerations otherthan relevant. We are of opinion that the order passed bythe District Magistrate post-haste immediately hereceived the appellant's reply without either giving himthe copies asked for or at least telling him that thematerial already furnished was sufficient to enable himto make his representation and if he had any furtherrepresentation to make he could do so offends theprinciples of natural justice. We are aware that we aredealing with an appeal questioning the proceedingsinitiated under Article 226 of the Constitution where thepower of the Court is a limited one, that is to say, limitedto cases where there is any error of law apparent on theface of the record. But the observance of the principles ofnatural justice is fundamental to the discharge of anyquasi-judicial function. We therefore allow the appealand set aside the order of the District Magistrate.”21.In case of Southern Painters Vs. Fertilizers andChemicals Travancore Ltd. & anr. [1994 Supp (2) SCC 699],it has been observed : 10. Again, in Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar(1989) 1 SCC 229, this Court observed: (SCC p. 230,para 4) - 4) "Indisputably, no notice had been given to theappellant of the proposal of blacklisting the appellant. Itwas contended on behalf of the State Government thatthere was no requirement in the rule of giving any priornotice before blacklisting any person. Insofar as the W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 26 ::contention that there is no requirement specifically ofgiving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right.But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that anyorder having civil consequence should be passed onlyafter following the principles of natural justice. It has tobe realised that blacklisting any person in respect ofbusiness ventures has civil consequence for the futurebusiness of the person concerned in any event. Even ifthe rules do not express so, it is an elementary principleof natural justice that parties affected by any ordershould have right of being heard and makingrepresentations against the order." While in case of Krishna Lal Vs. State of Jammu& Kashmir (1994) 4 SCC 422, it has been held :“Whether the violation of the mandatory provisionunder Section 17(5) of the J & K Act regardingfurnishing of copy of proceedings of the enquiry to thedelinquent would render the order of dismissal a nullitywould depend upon whether the requirement underSection 17(5) is one which is for the benefit of theindividual concerned or serves a public purpose. If itbe former, the same can be waived; if it be latter, itcannot be. The requirement is for the benefit of theperson concerned which is to enable him to know as towhat had taken place during the course of theproceedings so that he is better situated to show hiscause as to why the proposed penalty should not beimposed. Such a requirement cannot be said to berelatable to public policy or one concerned with publicinterest, or to serve a public purpose. Thus therequirement mentioned in Section 17(5) of the Actdespite being mandatory is one which can be waived.If, however, the requirement has not been waived anyact or action in violation of the same would be a nullity.In the present case as the appellant had far fromwaiving the benefit, asked for the copy of the W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 27 ::proceeding despite which the same was not madeavailable, it has to be held that the order of dismissalwas invalid in law. This, however, is not suficient todemand setting aside of the dismisal order in thisproceeding itself because what has been stated in ECILcase in this context would nonetheless apply. This isfor the reason that violation of natural justice whichwas dealt with in that case, also renders an order invaliddespite which the Constitution Bench did not concedethat the order of dismissal passed without furnishingcopy of the inquiry officer’s report would be enough toset aside the order. Instead, it directed the matter to beexamined as stated in paragraph 31.”22.The facts in the case of Gauhati Municipal Board(supra) indicate that the notice was served on the Board. Thetenure of all the members of the Board had come to an end byJuly 6, 1966. From reading of the said judgment, we could notgather the format of the notice besides title thereof. We havealready observed here that, the notice in question was issuedin the name of the President of the Board alone and not theBoard or the members thereof individually.23.There can be no two views over what has beenobserved in case of Dharampal and Sudhir (supra). Wepropose to reproduce the relevant observations from both theauthorities relied on by the learned A.G. In case of Dharampal, W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 28 ::the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed :“38.But that is not the end of the matter. While thelaw on the principle of audi alteram partem hasprogressed in the manner mentioned above, at thesame time, the Courts have also repeatedly remarkedthat the principles of natural justice are very flexibleprinciples. They cannot be applied in any straight-jacket formula. It all depends upon the kind offunctions performed and to the extent to which aperson is likely to be affected. For this reason, certainexceptions to the aforesaid principles have beeninvoked under certain circumstances. For example, theCourts have held that it would be sufficient to allow aperson to make a representation and oral hearing maynot be necessary in all cases, though in some matters,depending upon the nature of the case, not only full-fledged oral hearing but even cross-examination ofwitnesses is treated as necessary concomitant of theprinciples of natural justice. Likewise, in servicematters relating to major punishment by way ofdisciplinary action, the requirement is very strict andfull-fledged opportunity is envisaged under thestatutory rules as well. On the other hand, in thosecases where there is an admission of charge, evenwhen no such formal inquiry is held, the punishmentbased on such admission is upheld. It is for thisreason, in certain circumstances, even post-decisionalhearing is held to be permissible. Further, the Courtshave held that under certain circumstances principlesof natural justice may even be excluded by reason ofdiverse factors like time, place, the apprehendeddanger and so on.39.We are not concerned with these aspects in thepresent case as the issue relates to giving of noticebefore taking action. While emphasizing that theprinciples of natural justice cannot be applied instraight-jacket formula, the aforesaid instances aregiven. We have highlighted the jurisprudential basis of W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 29 ::adhering to the principles of natural justice which aregrounded on the doctrine of procedural fairness,accuracy of outcome leading to general social goals,etc. Nevertheless, there may be situations wherein forsome reason – perhaps because the evidence againstthe individual is thought to be utterly compelling – itis felt that a fair hearing 'would make no difference' –meaning that a hearing would not change the ultimateconclusion reached by the decision-maker – then nolegal duty to supply a hearing arises. Such an approachwas endorsed by Lord Wilberforce in Malloch v.Aberdeen Corporation [(1971) 2 All ER 1578], whosaid that :“… A 'breach of procedure...cannot give (rise to) aremedy in the courts, unless behind it there issomething of substance which has been lost by thefailure. The court dos not act in vain'. Relying on these comments, Brandon LJ opined inCinnamond v. British Airports Authority[(1980) 1WLR 582] that 'no one can complain of not beinggiven an opportunity to make representations if suchan opportunity would have availed him nothing'. Insuch situations, fair procedures appear to serve nopurpose since 'right' result can be secured withoutaccording such treatment to the individual.40.In this behalf, we need to notice one otherexception which has been carved out to the aforesaidprinciple by the Courts. Even if it is found by theCourt that there is a violation of principles of naturaljustice, the Courts have held that it may not benecessary to strike down the action and refer thematter back to the authorities to take fresh decisionafter complying with the procedural requirement inthose cases where non-grant of hearing has not causedany prejudice to the person against whom the action istaken. Therefore, every violation of a facet of naturaljustice may not lead to the conclusion that order W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 30 ::passed is always null and void. The validity of theorder has to be decided on the touchstone of'prejudice'. The ultimate test is always the same, viz.,the test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing.41.In ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727, themajority opinion, penned down by Sawant, J., whilesumming up the discussion and answering the variousquestions posed, had to say as under qua the prejudiceprinciple:“30. Hence the incidental questions raised above maybe answered as follows:xx xx xx(v) The next question to be answered is what is theeffect on the order of punishment when the report ofthe enquiry officer is not furnished to the employeeand what relief should be granted to him in such cases.The answer to this question has to be relative to thepunishment awarded. When the employee is dismissedor removed from service and the inquiry is set asidebecause the report is not furnished to him, in somecases the non-furnishing of the report may haveprejudiced him gravely while in other cases it mayhave made no difference to the ultimate punishmentawarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of theemployee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce therules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory ofreasonable opportunity and the principles of naturaljustice have been evolved to uphold the rule of lawand to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights.They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to beperformed on all and sundry occasions. Whether infact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or noton account of the denial to him of the report, has to beconsidered on the facts and circumstances of eachcase. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of thereport, no different consequence would have followed,it would be a perversion of justice to permit the W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 31 ::employee to resume duty and to get all theconsequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding thedishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching theconcept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits.It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of naturaljustice” which in itself is antithetical to justice.”42.So far so good. However, an importantquestion posed by Mr. Sorabjee is as to whether it isopen to the authority, which has to take a decision, todispense with the requirement of the principles ofnatural justice on the ground that affording such anopportunity will not make any difference? To put itotherwise, can the administrative authority dispensewith the requirement of issuing notice by itselfdeciding that no prejudice will be caused to the personagainst whom the action is contemplated? Answer hasto be in the negative. It is not permissible for theauthority to jump over the compliance of theprinciples of natural justice on the ground that even ifhearing had been provided it would have served nouseful purpose. The opportunity of hearing will servethe purpose or not has to be considered at a later stageand such things cannot be presumed by the authority.This was so held by the English Court way back in theyear 1943 in the case of General Medical Council v.Spackman[1943 AC 627]. This Court also spoke inthe same language in the case of The Board of HighSchool and Intermediate Education, U.P. & Ors. v.Kumari Chittra Srivastava & Ors.[(1970) 1 SCC 121],as is apparent from the following words:“7. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. C.B.Aggarwal, contends that the facts are not in disputeand it is further clear that no useful purpose wouldhave been served if the Board had served a show causenotice on the petitioner. He says that in view of thesecircumstances it was not necessary for the Board tohave issued a show cause notice. We are unable toaccept this contention. Whether a duty arises in a W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 32 ::particular case to issue a show cause notice beforeinflicting a penalty does not depend on the authority'ssatisfaction that the person to be penalised has nodefence but on the nature of the order proposed to bepassed.”43.In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, Mr.Sorabjee may also be right in his submission that itwas not open for the authority to dispense with therequirement of principles of natural justice on thepresumption that no prejudice is going to be caused tothe appellant since judgment in R.C. Tobacco P. Ltd.V. Union of India (2005) 7 SCC 725 had closed all thewindows for the appellant.44.At the same time, it cannot be denied that as faras Courts are concerned, they are empowered toconsider as to whether any purpose would be served inremanding the case keeping in mind whether anyprejudice is caused to the person against whom theaction is taken. This was so clarified in the case ofECIL v. B. Karunkar (1993) 4 SCC 727 itself in thefollowing words:31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer'sreport is not furnished to the delinquent employee inthe disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunalsshould cause the copy of the report to be furnished tothe aggrieved employee if he has not already secured itbefore coming to the Court/ Tribunal and given theemployee an opportunity to show how his or her casewas prejudiced because of the non-supply of thereport. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunalcomes to the conclusion that the non-supply of thereport would have made no difference to the ultimatefindings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunalshould not interfere with the order of punishment. TheCourt/ Tribunal should not mechanically set aside theorder of punishment on the ground that the report wasnot furnished as it regrettably being done at present. W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 33 ::The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Sinceit is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply theirjudicial mind to the question and give their reasons forsetting aside or not setting aside the order ofpunishment, (and not any internal appellate orrevisional authority), there would be neither a breachof the principles of natural justice nor a denial of thereasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunalfinds that the furnishing of the report would havemade a difference to the result in the case that itshould set aside the order of punishment.”45.Keeping in view the aforesaid principlesin mind, even when we find that there is an infractionof principles of natural justice, we have to address afurther question as to whether any purpose would beserved in remitting the case to the authority to makefresh demand of amount recoverable, only afterissuing notice to show cause to the appellant. In thefacts of the present case, we find that such an exercisewould be totally futile having regard to the law laiddown by this Court in R.C. Tobacco (supra).” In case of Sudhir, it has been observed : “42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thusreveals:(1)Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands ofthe judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedyinjustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rulecannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusionthat prejudice is thereby caused.(2)Where procedural and/or substantive provisionsof law embody the principles of natural justice, theirinfraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 34 ::orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused tothe litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provisionof law which is conceived not only in individualinterest, but also in public interest.(3)No prejudice is caused to the person complaining ofthe breach of natural justice where such person does notdispute the case against him or it. This can happen byreason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way ofnon-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, incases in which the Court finds on facts that no realprejudice can therefore be said to have been caused tothe person complaining of the breach of naturaljustice.”24.In case of Isolators and Isolators through itsProprietor Sandhya Mishra Vs. Madhya Pradesh MadhyaKshetra Vidyut Vitran Company Limited & anr. [2023 AIR (SC)2058], the Hon’ble Supreme Court, referred to the case ofUMC Technologies Private Limited Vs. Food Corporation ofIndia & anr. [2021 SCC (2) 551], paragraph No.13 of whichreads as under : “13.At the outset, it must be noted that it is the firstprinciple of civilised jurisprudence that a person againstwhom any action is sought to be taken or whose rightor interests are being affected should be given areasonable opportunity to defend himself. The basicprinciple of natural justice is that before adjudicationstarts, the authority concerned should give to theaffected party a notice of the case against him so that he W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 35 ::can defend himself. Such notice should be adequateand the grounds necessitating action and the penalty/action proposed should be mentioned specifically andunambiguously. An order travelling beyond the boundsof notice is impermissible and without jurisdiction tothat extent. This Court in Nasir Ahmed v. CustodianGeneral, Evacuee Property, (1980) 3 SCC 1 has heldthat it is essential for the notice to specify the particulargrounds on the basis of which an action is proposed tobe taken so as to enable the noticee to answer the caseagainst him. If these conditions are not satisfied, theperson cannot be said to have been granted anyreasonable opportunity of being heard.”25. It is true that, in the petition, the enquiry reporthas not been substantially traversed. That, however, does notmean the petitioners to have admitted the conclusions arrivedat by the enquiry committee. As seen above, the Scheme ofthe Act suggests that most of the members of the Board werenominated by the Government. An individual member of theBoard could be held to be disqualified if he was found to haveindulged in some unwanted activities. In terms of Section53(1) of the Act, the Board could be superseded only after theshow-cause-notice is issued to the Board (according to us,each and every member of the Board) and that too after findingthe explanation or objection offered by the members of theBoard to be not satisfactory. It is reiterated that, in the case in W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 36 ::hand, no show-cause-notice along with the enquiry report wasserved on the petitioners individually. The show-cause-noticewas served on the President alone, that too long before theenquiry committee was even constituted. In our view, that isthe non-compliance of the mandate of Section 53(1) of the Act,the breach whereof goes to the root of the matter. If we acceptthe submission of the learned A.G. that the petitioners havefailed to make out a case of what prejudice has been causedto them by non-service of notice to show cause, in our view,the petitioners were condemned unheard. They were beingunseated of the post of members of the Board. It hasnecessarily a civil consequence. Without affording thepetitioners opportunity of hearing, they are held to have beenguilty of the grounds in Section 53 of the Act, which authorizesthe State Government to supersede the Board for a certainduration.26.In our view, when the action of the StateGovernment in superseding the Board is held to be illegal, thelegal consequence thereof is to restore the status-quo ante. Itis true that, the term of the petitioners (Board members) has W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 37 ::already been over. Section 8 of the Act, however, specifiesthat the members of the Board shall continue officiating untilthe constitution of a new Board, even after the expiry of theirthree-year term by efflux of time. It is true that, in exercise ofjurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India, thisCourt may even refuse to grant the relief since it isdiscretionary in nature. Needless to mention, discretion is tobe exercised rationally/ judicially. The nature of complaints donot have potential to dictate our conscious not to grant thediscretionary relief of restoring the status-quo ante. 27.It is true that, the petitioners, vide prayer clause(C), only seek setting aside the notification with a furtherdirection to appoint a new Board. In our view, the said prayerclause remained in the petition as it is on account of thenegligence of the petitioners. This prayer clause was theresince beginning i.e. when the petition was filed by the solepetitioner. Thereafter the petition was amended, introducingthe prayer for restoration of the Board. As we have alreadyobserved that the ground on which the Board has been toppledno longer sustained, the consequential relief of status quo ante W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 38 ::deserves to be granted.28.In our view it was negligence on the part of thepetitioners to withdraw from such prayer when on amendmentof the petition, they came with a prayer for reinstatement of theBoard. It cannot be taken that, the petitioners still continuedwith the said prayers. Even it is assumed the said prayers tohave been still alive, the legal corollary of the decision insetting aside the impugned notification would be to restore thestatus-quo ante.29.For all the aforesaid reasons, we find the action ofthe State Government in issuing notification superseding theBoard of the Gurudwara to be illegal and therefore, required tobe set aside. The petition, therefore, succeeds in terms of thefollowing order :O R D E R(i)Writ Petition No.10553/2022 is allowed.(ii)The notification dated 29/06/2022 is hereby set aside.(iii)The respondent- State is hereby directed to restoreNanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur W.P. No.10553/2022 withW.P. No.4665/2024:: 39 ::Apchalnagar Sahib Board to its original state i.e. itsstatus immediately before issuance of notification dated29/06/2022, within two months from the date of this order.(iv)In view of the above order, Writ Petition No.4665/2024(second petition) stands disposed of.(v)Consequently, Civil Applications are disposed of. (ABASAHEB D. SHINDE, J.) (R.G. AVACHAT, J.) FMPathan/-