High Court
Legal Reasoning
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABADCIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 106 OF 2025Shivshankar s/o Khandu UdtewarAge 16 Years, Minor U/G of his father,Khandu s/o Madhavrao Udtewar, Age : 50 years, Occupation : Labour,R/o Shirur (T), Tal. Ahmedpur,District Latur.…Applicant Versus 1Sanjay s/o Baburao Waghmare(Deleted)2Managing Director, D.C.C. Bank,Tilak Nagar, Latur,Tal, & District Latur.3Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd.MurarijiPeth, CTS No.8516/11,Subhash Chowk, Murarji Chowk,Murarji Peti Solapur,Tal & Dist. Solapur 413001.4The Deputy Registrar/Taxing OfficerThe High Court of JudicatureOf Bombay Bench at Aurangabad.…RespondentsShri Manoj D. Shinde, Advocate a/w Shri P. C. Mayure,Advocate h/f Shri Shrikant B. Madde, Advocate for theApplicant.Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 4.WITHCIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 128 OF 2025Page 1 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt1Vilas Bayaji Thorve,Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,District Beed. …ApplicantVersus1The State of MaharashtraThrough Government Pleader,High Court of Bombay,Bench at Aurangabad.2Taxing OfficerThe High Court of JudicatureOf Bombay Bench at Aurangabad.…RespondentsShri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.WITHCIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 127 OF 20251.Vilas Bayaji Thorve,Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,District Beed. ..ApplicantVersus1.The State of MaharashtraThrough Government Pleader,High Court of Bombay,Bench at Aurangabad.2.Taxing OfficerThe High Court of JudicatureOf Bombay Bench at Aurangabad...RespondentsShri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.Page 2 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtWITHCIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 95 OF 20251.Vilas Bayaji Thorve,Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,District Beed. ..ApplicantVersus1.The State of MaharashtraThrough Government Pleader,High Court of Bombay,Bench at Aurangabad.2.Taxing OfficerThe High Court of JudicatureOf Bombay Bench at Aurangabad...RespondentsShri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.WITHCIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 137 OF 20251.Vilas Bayaji Thorve,Age 69 Years, Occupation : Agri,R/o. Nageshwadi, Tq. Patoda,District Beed. ..ApplicantVersus1.The State of MaharashtraThrough Government Pleader,High Court of Bombay,Bench at Aurangabad.2.Taxing OfficerThe High Court of JudicatureOf Bombay Bench at Aurangabad...RespondentsPage 3 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtShri Akshay S. Jagtap, Advocate for the Applicant.Shri B. A. Shinde, A.G.P. for the Respondent No. 1.Shri C. K. Shinde, Advocate for the Respondent No. 2.Shri S. V. Natu, Shri P. F. Patni, Shri Avinash Khande,Shri Mohit R. Deshmukh, Shri P. C. Mayure and ShriMahesh Swami, Advocates addressed the issue onbehalf of petitioners.CORAM:SHAILESH P. BRAHME J.Date on which matters closed forjudgment:25th JULY 2025Date on which judgment Ispronounced :07th August 2025J U D G M E N T : 1.Heard both sides finally. 2.The issue involved in these revisions is as to whetherappellants, who are neither insurer, nor owner in appeal forenhancement preferred against judgment and award of theclaims tribunal passed U/Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act(hereafter referred as to the ‘M. V. Act’ for the sake of brevityand convenience) can restrict the value or claim for paymentof lessor court fees at the time of filing of appeal.3.Revisional Petitioners suffered adjudication by ClaimsTribunal and they have approached High Court, challenging theaward. The appeals preferred by them are registered, butPage 4 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtoffice raised objection of deficit Court fees. The demand isquestioned by them and the matter is referred to learnedTaxing Officer. The Taxing Officer rendered decision upholdingthe office objection of deficit court fees by passing separateorders which are under challenge, under Section 115 of theCode of Civil Procedure. 4.It is informed by petitioners that the claim of the office fordeficit court fee is debatable and the litigants are required toface such objection frequently. In order to settle thecontroversy by my previous order, I called upon the membersof the Bar to address the issue. Accordingly with theassistance of learned Counsels who eagerly responded, Ipropose to decide these matters of general importance. 5. In Civil Revision Application No.106/2025, Appellant isthe original Claimant who had met with accident and sustainedinjuries affecting his earning capacity. He had claimed Rs.40,00,000/- as compensation before the Tribunal and paidCourt fees which was maximum before the Tribunal. His claimwas partially allowed awarding compensation of Rs. 5,50,000/-with interest. Being aggrieved by the award and forenhancement of compensation, appeal is preferred valuing theclaim at Rs. 1,00,000/- for purpose of Court fees. An amount ofRs.3205/- is paid towards Court fees. The office raisedobjection that Appellant is liable to pay Court fees fordifference of amount. The claim restricted to Rs. 1,00,000/- isnot accepted by the office and he is called upon to pay Rs.Page 5 of 22
Legal Reasoning
924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt24,410/- towards deficit Court fees. 6.In Civil Revision Application Nos.128/2025; 137/2025;95/2025 and 127/2025, Appellant before Court was neitherowner, nor insurer. The vehicle involved in the accident waspurchased by him, but it was not registered with thecompetent authority. The Tribunal saddled the liability by theimpugned award treating him to be the owner of the vehicle.Hence he preferred appeals. In the foot note of thememorandum of the appeal, it is stated that he is paying halfof the ad valorem fees as he is neither insurer, nor owner. Hisclaim for Court fees is objected by the office. Ultimately thelearned Taxing Officer upheld the objection and called uponAppellant to pay full ad valorem fees. 7.Learned Counsels Mr. Manoj Shinde, Mr. Mohit Deshmukh,Mr. S. V. Natu, Mr. Avinash Khande, Mr. P. C. Mayure canvassedtheir submissions objecting the decision of the Taxing Officer infollowing manner :(i)The Appellant – Original Claimant when prefers appealagainst judgment and award passed by the Tribunal eitherwholly or partially dismissing the claim would be liable to payCourt fees as per Section 7(2)(ii) of the Maharashtra Court FeesAct (Hereinafter referred to ‘Act’). It is permissible for suchAppellant to restrict the claim for payment of one half of advalorem fees.Page 6 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt(ii)Section 7(2) of the Act permits the Appellant to restrictthe claim to a particular amount and if he succeeds in appealthen he/she has to make good the deficit court fees.(iii)Once the value in the memorandum of appeal isrestricted to a particular figure, Office or Registry cannot insistto pay Court fees either on the whole claim, if it is whollyrejected by the Tribunal or on difference of the claim, if claim ispartially rejected. There is no prohibition in the Act to restrictthe claim. (iv)M. V. Act is a benevolent legislation and Section 7(2) ofthe Act cannot be interpreted in the manner to defeat objectsought to be achieved.(v)The apprehension that Appellant is likely to extract theservices of the Court by valuing appeal at a meager amountand by dodging to pay Court fees is misplaced. (vi)So far as payment of Court fees is concerned, there is nodifference between the appeal preferred against rejection ofentire claim by the Tribunal and appeal preferred againstpartial rejection.(vii)The hardship, precarious condition and distress sufferedby the Appellant in most of the cases are overlooked and theapproach of the Taxing Officer is against the spirit ofPage 7 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtenactment. (viii)There is no ceiling on the Court fees so far as appealsfiled in High Court are concerned, which secures the interest ofthe State. 8.Learned advocate Mr. C. K. Shinde for the Taxing Officerand learned A.G.P. Mr. B. A. Shinde oppose the above referredsubmissions while supporting orders passed by the TaxingOfficer. They would submit that it is not permissible in law forthe Appellant to restrict the claim to a particular value whenthe appeal is against difference of amount of compensation. Itis submitted that appeal is continuation of the proceedings andwhatever Court fees is paid in the Tribunal has to be paid againin appeal. The Court fees are designed keeping in viewexpenditure on administration of justice. The human efforts,time and energy are equally exerted for deciding restricted orunrestricted or deprived claim. It is further submitted thatAppellate Court has to undertake the exercise in its entirety tofind out entitlement and liability. Hence entire Court fees ispayable. The demand of Court fees is justifiable. It is furthersubmitted that no concession can be granted in payment ofCourt fees, though Motor Vehicle Act, is a beneficial legislation.9.Having heard both sides, the issue needs to be addressedis as to whether it is permissible for the Appellant to restrictthe relief at a particular value of the claim in the appeal forPage 8 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtpayment of Court fees or the Appellant is obliged to pay Courtfees on the difference of amount?10.The objection raised by the office and the decisionrendered by learned Taxing Officer is in respect of Section 7(2)of the Act. Section 7(1) of the Act pertains to fee payable onmemorandum of appeal in case of award of compensationunder various acts for acquisition of land for public purpose.The controversy involved in the present Revision is not inrespect of matters involving acquisition of land, but mattersinvolving accident under Motor Vehicle Act. For the purpose ofcomputation and determination of Court fees on thememorandum of appeal against award of the Claims Tribunal isregulated by sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the MaharashtraCourt Fees Act, which is as follows : The Maharashtra Court Fees Act,1…2…7.(1)……..(2)The amount of fee payable under this Act on a memorandum of appeal against an award of a Claims Tribunal preferred under section 110-D VI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, shall be computed as follows:-( i ) If such appeal is preferred by the insurer or owner of the motor vehicle- the full ad- valorem fee leviable on the amount at which the relief is valued in the memorandum of appeal Page 9 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtaccording to the scale prescribed under Article 1of Schedule I;(ii)If such appeal is preferred by any other person one half of ad-valorem fee leviable on theamount at which the relief is valued in the memorandum of appeal according to the said scale.Provided that, if such person succeeds in theappeal, he shall be liable to make good the deficit, ifany, between the full ad-valorem fee payable on therelief awarded in the appeal according to the said scaleand the fee already paid by him; and the amount ofsuch deficit shall, without prejudice to any other modeof recovery, be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue.11.Though the title of Section 7 is common for both sub-sections, there is material difference in the manner of paymentof the Court fees. The legislative intent for the difference canbe traced to object and the purpose for which Motor VehicleAct is enacted. I propose to deliberate this aspect in furtherpart of my judgment while dealing with the object and purportof the Act. 12.There are two categories of Appellant stipulated in ClauseNos. (i) and (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act.Depending upon the category, the Court fees is payable eitheras full ad valorem and one half of ad valorem. Injured personsor dependents of deceased who are aggrieved by inadequateor no compensation are covered by Sub-section (2)(ii) becausethey are other persons than insurer or owner. Sub-section 2(ii)Page 10 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtand the proviso thereafter would indicate a concession given tothose persons/Appellants. They are permitted to pay one halfof the ad valorem fees on the amount on which the relief isvalued in the memorandum of the appeal. 13.The persons/appellants falling in category of sub-Sec. 2(ii)are the victims of the accident. They are sufferers of physical,mental and financial trauma due to the bodily injuries resultinginto partial or full disablement. In case of death, the sufferingsand trauma would be of such magnitude which cannot bequantified. Many a times when the bread-earner in the familydies, the members and the dependents of the family wouldrequire to face emotional and social trauma as well. Bodilyinjury due to accident would leave deep impact on earningcapacity or wellness. The hardship and trauma get aggravateddue to the decision rendered by the Tribunal. These distressedpersons come to the Court with bleeding heart. Thelegislature has shown them a compassion to facilitate them toprosecute the remedy effectively. A special care is being takenby the Legislature by stipulating concession of payment of onehalf of the ad valorem Court fees.14.In both Clauses of sub-section (2), the wordings are, feeleviable on the amount at which the relief is valued. Thesewords permit the Appellant to quote a value for restricting therelief. Otherwise the wordings would have been mandatoryappellant to pay court fees on difference between the amountawarded and the amount claimed. But this is not the text ofPage 11 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtClause (i) and (ii). Unlike that of sub-section (1) of Section 7, incase of appeal arising out of acquisition of land, choice isavailable to restrict claim at a particular value. In case ofappeals arising out of the accident, wordings are used withspecific purport. Once this difference between sub-section (1)and sub-section (2) is understood, there is no difficulty tocomprehend that Appellants who are preferring appeal inMotor Vehicle Act have the choice to restrict their relief to aparticular claim quoted in the memorandum of the appeal. Inthe teeth of express provision, it is not possible to accept anyother interpretation.15.When words are clear and unambiguous, it is notpermissible to derive any other interpretation which woulddefeat the purpose of the enactment. Clause Nos. (i) and (ii) ofsub-section (2) of Section 7 give choice to the Appellant torestrict relief to particular amount. Therefore the interpretationof learned Taxing Officer to call upon the Appellant to paydeficit Court fees according to difference between the amountawarded and the amount claimed cannot be countenanced.This approach is against the legislative intent and the expressprovision of the Statute. 16.Learned Taxing Officer referred to judgment of thecoordinate bench in the matter of Govind Vs. State ofMaharashtra. In that case appeal was under Land AcquisitionAct for which Section 7(1) of Court Fees Act would apply.Present matters are within purview of Sec. 7(2) of the Act andPage 12 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odttherefore reliance on the said judgment is totally misplaced.The purport and the scheme of payment of Court fees underSection 7(2) of the Act is altogether different. The relianceplaced by the Taxing Officer on paragraph no.10 of thejudgment, is thoroughly misconceived. The explanationappended to sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Section 7(2) is totally losssight of. 17.In appropriate case, this Court will delve upon the scopeof Sec. 7(1) of the Act and examine as to whether it ispermissible in appeal arising out of land acquisition to restrictthe claim to a particular value for the payment of Court fees. 18.While interpreting the provision of enactment, theobjection sought to be achieved needs to be looked into. MotorVehicle Act is a benevolent legislation for the persons whomeet with accident. There are provisions in the Statutedesigned to assist the victims, sufferers and the stake holdersof the accident. It is not out of the context to refer to thejudgment of the Supreme Court by which the Claimants areheld entitled to receive more compensation than claimed inthe petition. The very genesis of payment of compensation is itwould be just and reasonable to mitigate sufferings anddistress’. The rules of procedure are designed to achieve thesaid object. The humanistic approach of the Supreme Court isevident from the following judgments : ANagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and others reported in (2003) 2 SCC 274.Page 13 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtB.Syed Basheer Ahameed and others Vs. Mohammad Jameel and another reported in (2009) 2 SCC 225.19.The purposive interpretation besides literal interpretationneeds to be adopted. The paramount consideration is theobject or the purport of the Act which is sought to be achieved.I lend support for literal and purposive interpretation ofprovision of Sec. 7(2) of the Act from the following judgments :a.Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. and another Vs. CherianVarkey Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others (2010) 8SCC 24 for the purpose of statutory interpretation, principlesare laid down in para Nos. 20 to 21.6 by the Supreme Court,which are as follows :20. The principles of statutory interpretation are wellsettled. Where the words of the statute are clear andunambiguous, the provision should be given its plain and normalmeaning, without adding or rejecting any words. Departure fromthe literal rule, by making structural changes or substitutingwords in a clear statutory provision, under the guise ofinterpretation will pose a great risk as the changes may not bewhat the Legislature intended or desired. Legislative wisdomcannot be replaced by the Judge’s views. As observed by thisCourt in somewhat different context : “When a procedure is prescribed by the Legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to its notion of justice. When the Legislature has spoken, the Judges cannot afford to be wiser.” (See : Shri Mandir Sita Ramji vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi – (1975) 4 SCC 298). 21.There is however an exception to this general rule. Wherethe words used in the statutory provision are vague andambiguous or where the plain and normal meaning of its words orgrammatical construction thereof would lead to confusion,absurdity, repugnancy with other provisions, the courts may,instead of adopting the plain and grammatical construction, usePage 14 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtthe interpretative tools to set right the situation, by addingor omitting or substituting the words in the Statute. Whenfaced with an apparently defective provision in a statute,courts prefer to assume that the draftsman had committed amistake rather than concluding that the Legislature hasdeliberately introduced an absurd or irrational statutoryprovision. Departure from the literal rule of plain andstraight reading can however be only in exceptional cases,where the anomalies make the literal compliance of a provisionimpossible, or absurd or so impractical as to defeat the veryobject of the provision. We may also mention purposiveinterpretation to avoid absurdity and irrationality is morereadily and easily employed in relation to proceduralprovisions than with reference to substantive provisions. b.Shailesh Dhariyawan Vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla reportedin (2016) 3 SCC 619 : principles of purposive interpretation arelaid down in following paragraphs :31.The aforesaid two reasons given by me, in addition to thereasons already indicated in the judgment of my learned Brother,would clearly demonstrate that provisions of Section 15(2) of theAct require purposive interpretation so that the aforesaid objective/purpose of such a provision is achieved thereby. The principle of'purposive interpretation' or 'purposive construction' is based onthe understanding that the Court is supposed to attach thatmeaning to the provisions which serve the 'purpose' behind such aprovision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed toaccomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process theCourt is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designedto realise. As Aharan Barak puts it: “Purposive interpretation is based on three components: language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or private) language.”3 Page 15 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt32. Of the aforesaid three components, namely, language, purposeand discretion 'of the Court', insofar as purposive component isconcerned, this is the ratio juris, the purpose at the core of the text.This purpose is the values, goals, interests, policies and aims thatthe text is designed to actualize. It is the function that the text isdesigned to fulfil. 33. We may also emphasize that the statutory interpretation of aprovision is never static but is always dynamic. Though literal ruleof interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the 'goldenrule', it is now the doctrine of purposive interpretation which ispredominant, particularly in those cases where literalinterpretation may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity.If it brings about an end which is at variance with the purpose ofstatute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal processthinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as agrand strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place theyoffered purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by theCourts not only in this country but in many other legal systems aswell.c.The Full Bench in the matter of Kanhaiyyalal SonbajiGajbhiye Vs. Bhartiya Jgruti Shikshan Sanstha Sawari (JavaharNagar and others reported in 2020(6) MH.L.J. 595 highlightsthat interpretation process is amalgamation of literal andpurposive objects in following manner :14. The arguments so put-forward present different viewpoints and would require for their appreciation detailedexamination of relevant provisions of the The MaharashtraEmployees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service)Regulation Act, 1977 (for short “Act, 1977”) and the Rules,1981, in the light of well established principles ofinterpretation of statutes. After all, any interpretative processis governed by the set principles, precepts and doctrines. Inlaw, it begins with an effort to ascertain true intention of thePage 16 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtlegislature or the rule making authority through the wordsused in the statute or rule and if necessary, by making aresort to other aids, which may be internal or external to thestatute. When only plain meaning is considered, the approachis literal and when the meaning is found out with reference toobject and purpose of an enactment, the method is purposive.However, now it is well established that the intention of thelegislature assimilates two aspects: in one aspect it carries theconcept of “meaning” or what the words mean and in another,it takes along the idea of “purpose and object”. Anyinterpretative process thus is an amalgamation of literal andpurposive approaches. This formulation has received theapproval of the Supreme Court and is called “cardinalprinciple of construction” (see Union of India V/s. ElphinstoneSpinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. [AIR 2001 SC 724]). 15. It may be added here that even for knowing of themeaning the words convey, apart from litera legis, the contextof the letters assumes importance. In the case of ReserveBank of India V/s. Peerless Finance and Investment Co.,(1987) 1 SCC 424 it was held that the interpretation mustdepend on the text and the context, they being the bases ofinterpretation. It was observed that if the text was thetexture, context was what lent it colour. It was also held that,such interpretation as would make textual interpretationmatch the contextual, would be the best kind of interpretation.As regards the search for discovery of purpose of the statute, ithas been held, one need not be restricted to the internal aidfurnished by the statute itself, that is, the text and the contextof the provision under construction, and one may look beyondthem. Other provisions contained in the same enactment,statement of objects and reasons or the preamble to theenactment, existing state of the law, other statutes in parimateria, if any, and the mischief which the statute intends toremedy, would all be useful tools in the construction of astatute. These aids widen the concept of “context”, in whichthe text is to be read and understood. A useful reference inPage 17 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtthis regard may be made to the principles laid down in thecases of Premchand Jain V/s. R.K. Chhabra, (1984) 2 SCC 302,Bhagwan Baksh Singh (Raja) Vs. Secretary of State, AIR 1940PC,1982, Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State ofOrissa, (1987) 3 SCC 279 and District Mining Officer V/s. TataIron and Steel Company, AIR 2001 SC 3134. 20.I am of the considered view that purposive or literalinterpretation of sub-section (2) leaves no iota of doubt toconclude that it is permissible for the Appellant to restrict hisrelief to a particular value and to pay Court fees accordingly. Itherefore do not concur with the observations of learned SingleJudge in paragraph no. 5 of Vivek Badgire Vs. SaheblalMoinuddin. There is no provision either in the Motor VehicleAct or in the Maharashtra Court Fees Act to indicate that it isnot permissible to restrict the claim for the purpose of Courtfees. 21.The proviso to sub-section (2) indicates that the Appellantis under obligation to pay full ad-valorem fees on the reliefawarded in the appeal. The appellants falling in Clause No. (ii)is given concession of payment of one half of ad valorem Courtfees for time being and if they succeed in appeal, they wouldhave to make good the deficit Court fees. Therefore it is notthat the concession of payment of one half of ad valorem Courtfees is in its perpetuity. The specific intent for incorporatingthe concession of one half of ad valorem Court fees at thebeginning and that too for time being is in view of peculiarcircumstances in which appeal would be preferred. Page 18 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt22.It’s a common knowledge that even if some amount isawarded by the Tribunal, the amount would not get disbursedunless a recourse to execution is taken for realizing theamount awarded by the Tribunal. In case a total rejection of theclaim hardship is of greater magnitude. It cannot be lost sightof that the Claimant has to pay entire Court fees in theTribunal, notwithstanding decision of the claim. Consideringthese situations concession to restrict the relief to a particularvalue is provided. This aspect is totally ignored by the TaxingOfficer while compelling the Appellant to pay Court feesaccording to difference between the amount awarded and theamount claimed. 23.It needs to be mentioned that there can be no differencein the appeal preferred by Claimant against complete rejectionof his claim and partial rejection of his claim. In bothcircumstances, the Appellant is entitled to restrict the relief toa particular value for payment of Court fees. Therefore thedecision of learned Single Judge in the matter of VivekRavikumar Badgire (supra) on which the reliance is placed bylearned Taxing Officer cannot be made applicable. In that caseentire claim was rejected by the Tribunal and while preferringappeal, relief was restricted to a particular amount. The aboveaspect is not brought to the notice and it is recorded that sucha restriction is not permissible in the eyes of law. Page 19 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odt24.The apprehension is expressed during the course ofsubmission by learned Counsel Mr. C. K. Shinde that Court feesare designed to meet expenditure on the administration of thejustice and equal amount of energy, time and human effortsare exerted notwithstanding quantum of court fees. Thissubmission cannot be accepted for the reason that the humanefforts, energy and time would not go waste becauseultimately before receiving the payment Appellant is requiredto pay deficit Court fees. The Appellant who is receiving benefitof appellate jurisdiction cannot escape from the liability of thepayment of deficit Court fees. The defaulted court fees isrecoverable as land revenue as per rule. 25.It is relevant to notice that sub-section (2) of Section 173stipulates that no appeal should lie against award of a claimTribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal, is less thanRs.1,00,000/-. This provision suppresses mischief and prohibitspersons who are likely to take disadvantage of valuing therelief at extremely meager sum and availing adjudication.Therefore I do not find that there is any possibility of takingdisadvantage of the concession engrafted in the Section 7(2). 26.One cannot be oblivious of the fact that Court fees arenot in the nature of taxes or the commission. There is noprofiteering purpose in charging the Court fees. Court fees isfor the purpose of meeting the expenditure for administrationof justice. There is ceiling on the payment of Court fees even ifPage 20 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtthe money claim exceeds a particular limit. The Legislature hasstruck a balance of not imposing the ceiling on the payment ofCourt fees on memorandum of appeal preferred in the HighCourt. 27.My attention is adverted to the different decision of thelearned Single Judge referred in the impugned order. Withrespect, I am of the considered view that the above aspect ofthe matter has not been dealt with. Those cannot be madeapplicable to the cases. Impugned judgment and order in CivilRevision Application No.106/2025 is perverse and liable to bequashed. It is noticed that learned Taxing Officer is frequentlyrelying upon the decision referred in the impugned judgment indeciding Court fees claims. He is expected to undertakerectified approach. 28.Civil Revision Application No.106/2025 is allowed andimpugned order is quashed. 29.In the remaining matters, the Appellant claims to be thepurchaser of the vehicle which is yet to be registered with theDepartment. In that context, he is claiming himself to becovered by clause (ii) of Section 7(2). I have already recordedthat Appellant has to pay full ad valorem fees. Only question isas to when to pay the same. Even if Appellant is treated to bethe owner and held liable by the Tribunal, a concession ofpayment of one half of ad valorem fees, would not absolve himfrom payment of deficit Court fees in the future. In that view ofPage 21 of 22 924.CRA-106-2025 & Ors.odtthe matter, I find that there is no impediment in treating theAppellant to be any other person and permitting him to payone half of ad valorem fees. 30.Impugned order in that cases are quashed and set aside.Civil Revision Application Nos.128/2025; C. R. A. No. 137/2025;C. R. A. No. 95/2025 and C. R. A. No. 127/2025 are allowed,thereby quashing impugned judgment and orders. [ SHAILESH P. BRAHME ] JUDGEbsb/Aug. 25Page 22 of 22