✦ High Court of India

High Court

Facts

FA2414&3852-19.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADFIRST APPEAL NO. 2414 OF 2019Somnath s/o Suresh Mogal,Age 31 years, Occu: Service & Agri.R/o Deogaon Rangari,Tq. Kannad, Dist. Aurangabad...Appellant(Orig. Claimant)VERSUS1.Maharashtra State Regional Transport Corporation, Through Divisional Controller,M.S.R.T.C., Aurangabad Division,Aurangabad... 2.S. A. Dhaneshwar,Age- Major Occu: DriverR/o Vaijapur Depot,Through M.S.R.T.C., Aurangabad...Respondents(Orig. RespondentNos.1 and 2)WITHFIRST APPEAL NO. 3852 OF 2019Maharashtra State Regional Transport Corporation, Through Divisional Controller,M.S.R.T.C., Aurangabad Division,Aurangabad... Appellant(Orig. RespondentNo.1)VERSUS1.Somnath s/o Suresh Mogal,Age 31 years, Occu: Service & Agri.R/o Deogaon Rangari,Tq. Kannad, Dist. Aurangabad2.S. A. Dhaneshwar,Age- Major Occu: DriverR/o Vaijapur Depot,Through M.S.R.T.C., Aurangabad...Respondents(R-1 Orig. Claimant andR-2 Orig. Respondent No.2)Page 1 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtMr. Shrikant Y. Patil & V. D. Sonawane Advocate for Appellant/ClaimantMr. Manoj Shinde h/for Mr. Mr. M. K. Goyanka, Advocate for the Respondents/M.S.R.T.C.CORAM : Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J.RESERVED ON : 2nd May, 2024PRONOUNCED ON :9th May, 2024JUDGMENT:1.Both these Appeals are arising out of Judgment and Award dated1st of December, 2018 passed by learned Member, Motor Accident ClaimsTribunal, Aurangabad in M.A.C.P. No. 336 of 2017. First Appeal No. 2414of 2019 is preferred by the original Claimant seeking enhancement ofcompensation. Whereas another First Appeal No. 3852 of 2019 ispreferred by the original Respondent/M.S.R.T.C., challenging the quantumof compensation on the ground of contributory negligence on part ofRespondent No.1/original Claimant as well as on part of Respondent No.2/Driver. Therefore, both these appeals are being decided together. (Forthe sake of brevity parties to both the present Appeals are referred in theiroriginal capacity.)2.After hearing both the sides in First Appeal No. 3852 of 2019,following questions arise as under: A.Does the Appellant/original Respondent M.S.R.T.C., proves collision of S.T. Bus and Motorcycle on head to head?Page 2 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odt B.Whether contributory negligence 50-50% can be attributed to the Claimant and Bus driver of S.T. Bus?3. In First Appeal No. 2414 of 2019 question arises that,Whether the learned Tribunal has granted compensation indisproportionate?4. In nutshell the facts giving rise to the claim petition are that,on 18.04.2017, the Complainant was proceeding on motorcycle bearingregistration No. MH-20-EB-7422 and at about 20.30 hours he reachednear Divashi-Pimpalgaon, Tq. Gangapur District Aurangabad at that time,the Respondent No. 2 Bus Driver was plying the S.T. Bus bearingregistration No. MH-20-BL-2326 in high speed in rash and negligentmanner and gave dash to his motorcycle, due to which he sustainedgrievous injuries on several parts of his body. The Respondent No.1/M.S.R.T.C., is owner of the said Bus. After the accident, he was shifted toGovernment Medical College and Hospital, Aurangabad, where he wasindoor patient w.e.f. 18.04.2017 to 22.04.2017. Thereafter Shri ManjinathAbarao Jadhav reported accident to Police Station Sillegaon, on basis ofwhich Crime No. 114 of 2017 registered against Respondent No. 2/Driverfor the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IndianPenal Code. Page 3 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odt5. Since, the Claimant has not satisfied with the medicaltreatment given in Government Hospital and Medical College, Aurangabadtherefore, he was shifted to Sahyadri Multi Specialty Hospital,Mukundwadi, Aurangabad, where he was medically treated being indoorpatient from 22.04.2017 to 26.04.2017. During the course of medicaltreatment, necessary surgery was performed and steel rod was inserted inhis right leg. He incurred expenditure to the tune of Rs. One Lakh towardshis medical treatment.6. According to the Claimant, at the time of accident he was 28years old. He was working being daily wager with M.S.E.B.. He wasdrawing amount of Rs. 700/- per day. Beside this, he having agriculturalland and earning Rs. Two Lakhs per year. He suffered 16% permanentdisability to his right leg, due to which, he is unable to work with M.S.E.B.and perform agricultural operation, hence, prayed for compensation tothe tune of Rs. 50 Lakhs.7. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed their written statement atExh. 13 and denied the claim of the Claimant. According, Respondents,the Claimant was riding his motorcycle at high speed in middle of theroad in rash and negligent manner, due to which the complaint lostcontrol over his motorcycle and in consequence given dash on front side ofthe bus from driver side. Therefore, the claimant is negligent to the extentPage 4 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtof 50% for occurrence of said accident.8. On the basis of rival pleadings, the learned Tribunal framedIssues at Exh.14. The Claimant examined himself as CW-1 at Exh.15,Navnath Karde as CW-2 at Exh.18 and Dr. Sachin Surendra Bedmutha asCW-3 at Ex. 28. Beside oral testimony, the Claimant proved documentaryevidence viz., FIR at Exh. 23, Spot Panchanama at Exh.24, Form-AA atExh.25, Bill issued by Sahyadri Multi Specialty Hospital at Exh.29,Disability Certificate at Exh.30 and Charge sheet at Exh.36.9. On 01.12.2018, the learned Tribunal partly allowed the claimpetition holding that the claimant is entitled for compensation of Rs.3,39,328/- and directed the Respondents to pay jointly and severally saidamount with interest @ 8% per annum from the date of filing of the claimpetition till its realization.10. The learned counsel appearing for the Claimant vehementlysubmits that, at the time of accident, the Claimant was 28 years old andhe suffered 16% permanent disability in accident occurred on 18.04.2017near Divashi-Pimpalgaon, Tq. Gangapur District Aurangabad because ofdash given by the Respondent no. 2.11. The claimant sustained 16% disability at his right leg andsteel rod inserted, which is duly proved in evidence of CW-3, Dr. SachinPage 5 of 17

Legal Reasoning

FA2414&3852-19.odtregistration No. MH-20-BL-2326 was standing on left side of the roadand the claimant was lying on right side of the road. Thereafter, someone called Ambulance and the claimant was taken to Hospital. 25. The Spot panchanama at Exh. 24 proves that, the claimantwas riding the motorcycle in middle of the road and gave dash on headof the Bus on driver side. Therefore, it prima facie appears that theMotorcycle and Bus collided on head to head. As per Exh. 24 SpotPanchnama, the accident occurred in middle of the road. Since, thecomplaint was riding Motorcycle, therefore, he could have easily noticethe Bus while coming opposite direction but evidence of the claimant issilent to this fact and gave dash to Bus on front of right side of the bus.Therefore, the driver of the offending vehicle cannot be held 100%liable for causing the accident. At the same time, the claimant couldhave been vigilant and cautious while riding the motorcycle.26. In case of Raj Kumar Vs/ Ajay Kumar & Anr., cited supra,the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Para Nos. 5 to 12 as under:“5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (`Act' for short) makes it clearthat the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extentpossible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to theaccident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as aresult of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitablemanner. The court or Tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively andexclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture withreference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person isnot only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which hePage 11 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtsuffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for hisinability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which hewould have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as heused to earn or could have earned. (See C. K. Subramonia Iyer vs. T. KunhikuttanNair - AIR 1970 SC 376, R. D. Hattangadi vs. Pest Control (India) Ltd. - 1995 (1)SCC 551 and Baker vs. Willoughby - 1970 AC 467).6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases arethe following :Pecuniary damages (Special Damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation,nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had henot been injured, comprising :(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses.Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads(i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specificmedical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensationwill be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss offuture earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, lossof amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.7. Assessment of pecuniary damages under item (i) and under item (ii)(a) donot pose much difficulty as they involve reimbursement of actuals and are easilyascertainable from the evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses- item (iii) -- depends upon specific medical evidence regarding need for furthertreatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary damages - items (iv), (v)and (vi) -- involves determination of lump sum amounts with reference tocircumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/ disability suffered by theclaimant and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. Decision of thisCourt and High Courts contain necessary guidelines for award under these heads,if necessary. What usually poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss offuture earnings on account of permanent disability - item (ii)(a). We are concernedwith that assessment in this case.Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability 8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in themanner considered normal for a human-being. Permanent disability refers to theresiduary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at theend of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximumbodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life ofthe injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some partPage 12 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtof the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of theperiod of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial ortotal. Partial permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform all theduties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he isable to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity.Total permanent disability refers to a person's inability to perform any avocation oremployment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanentdisabilities that may arise from motor accidents injuries, are of a much wider rangewhen compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Personswith Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)Act, 1995 (`Disabilities Act' for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated insection 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motoraccident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claimingcompensation.9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the Doctors withreference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particularlimb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanentdisability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45%permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of alimb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functionsof that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of thewhole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80%permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanentdisability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). Ifdifferent parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, thesum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference tothe whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%.10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, theassessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, woulddepend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earningcapacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanentdisability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most ofthe cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earningcapacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentageof permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, aparticular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in acorresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence producedshow 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of futureearning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss ofearning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result inaward of either too low or too high a compensation.11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanentlydisability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss ofearning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified inPage 13 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtterns of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standardmultiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however notethat in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal mayfind that percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanentdisability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability inwhich case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage fordetermination of compensation (see for example, the decisions of this court inArvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd. - 2010(10) SCALE 298 andYadava Kumar v. D.M., National Insurance Co. Ltd. - 2010 (8) SCALE 567).12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanentdisability and if so the extent of such permanent disability. This means that theTribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence:(i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary; (ii) if the disablement ispermanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partialdisablement,(iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb,then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entirebody, that is the permanent disability suffered by the person.If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is noquestion of proceeding further and determining the loss of future earning capacity.But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceedto ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanentdisability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determinewhether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity. "27. In the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombaycited supra, the Hon’ble Supreme, in Paragraph Nos. 6 and 7, has heldas under:6. A plea which was stressed strenuously related to alleged contributorynegligence. Though there is no statutory definition, in common parlance'negligence' is categorised as either composite or contributory. It is first necessary tofind out what is a negligent act. Negligence is omission of duty caused eitherby an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon thoseconsiderations who ordinarily by reason of conduct of human affairs would do orobligated to, or by doing something which a prudent or reasonable man would notdo. Negligence does not always mean absolute carelessness, but want of such adegree of care as is required in particular circumstances. Negligence is failure toobserve, for the protection of the interests of another person, the degree of care,precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby suchPage 14 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtother person suffers injury. The idea of negligence and duty are strictly correlative.Negligence means either subjectively a careless state of mind, or objectively carelessconduct. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one; it is rather acomparative term. No absolute standard can be fixed and no mathematically exactformula can be laid down by which negligence or lack of it can be infalliblymeasured in a given case. What constitutes negligence varies under differentconditions and in determining whether negligence exists in a particular case, orwhether a mere act or course of conduct amounts to negligence, all the attendingand surrounding facts and circumstances have to be taken into account. It isabsence of care according to circumstances. To determine whether an act would beor would not be negligent, it is relevant to determine if any reasonable man wouldforesee that the act would cause damage or not. The omission to do what the lawobligates or even the failure to do anything in a manner, mode or method envisagedby law would equally and per se constitute negligence on the part of such person. Ifthe answer is in the affirmative, it is a negligent act. Where an accident is due tonegligence of both parties, substantially there would be contributory negligence andboth would be blamed. In a case of contributory negligence, the crucial question onwhich liability depends would be whether either party could, by exercise ofreasonable care, have avoided the consequence of other's negligence. Whicheverparty could have avoided the consequence of other's negligence would be liable forthe accident. If a person's negligent act or omission was the proximate andimmediate cause of death, the fact that the person suffering injury was himselfnegligent and also contributed to the accident or other circumstances by which theinjury was caused would not afford a defence to the other. Contributory negligenceis applicable solely to the conduct of a plaintiff. It means that there has been an actor omission on the part of the plaintiff which has materially contributed to thedamage, the act or omission being of such a nature that it may properly bedescribed as negligence, although negligence is not given its usual meaning. (SeeCharlesworth on Negligence, 3rd Edn. Para 328). It is now well settled that in thecase of contributory negligence, courts have power to apportion the loss betweenthe parties as seems just and equitable. Apportionment in that context means thatdamage are reduced to such an extent as the court thinks just and equitable havingregard to the claim shared in the responsibility for the damage. But in a case wherethere has been no contributory negligence on the part of the victim, the question ofapportionment does not arise. Where a person is injured without any negligence onhis part but as a result of combined effect of the negligence of two other persons, itis not a case of contributory negligence in that sense. It is a case of what has beenstyled by Pollock as injury by composite negligence. (See Pollock on Torts, 15th Edn.P.361).7. At this juncture, it is necessary to refer to the 'doctrine of last opportunity'. Thesaid doctrine is said to have emanated from the principle enunciated in Devies v.Mann (1842 (10) M&W 546) which has often been explained as amounting to arule that when both parties are careless the party which has the last opportunity ofavoiding the results of the other's carelessness is alone liable. However, according toLord Denning it is not a principle of law, but test of causation. (See Davies v. SwanMotor Co. (Swansea) Ltd. (1949 (2) KB 291). Though in some decisions, thePage 15 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtdoctrine has been applied by courts, after the decisions of the House of Lords in TheVolute (1922 (1) AC 129) and Swadling v. Cooper (1931 AC 1), it is no longer to beapplied. The sample test is what was the cause or what were the causes of thedamage. The act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care or in defiance ofduty or obligation on the part of the complaining party which conjointly with theother party's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident renders it one tobe the result of contributory negligence.28. In the case in hand, it prima facie appears that as per spotpanchanama at Exh. 24, said accident occurred in the middle of the roadand the claimant gave dash by his motorcycle on front right side of theBus, which corroborates by CW-2, Navnath Karde. Therefore, RespondentNo. 2/Driver of the offending Bus cannot be attributed 100% negligence,but it has to be contributory 50-50% negligence on the part of claimant aswell as Respondent No. 2/Bus driver. However, the learned Tribunal failto consider contributory negligence 50-50% on part of Claimant andRespondent No.2/Bus Driver. In view of above discussion, I am of viewthat, impugned Judgment and Award requires modification holding that,the claimant and Respondent no. 2 both are contributory negligent to theextent of 50%-50% for occurrence of accident.29. Since, the Claimant held responsible for contributorynegligence of 50%, therefore, he would be entitled for 50% of thecompensation granted under the impugned judgment and award dated01.12.2028. Accordingly, the compensation granted by the learnedTribunal requires to be reduced by 50%.Page 16 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odt30. In view of the above discussion, First Appeal No. 3852 of2019 preferred by the M.S.R.T.C. deserves to be partly allowed and FirstAppeal No. 2414 of 2018 preferred by the Claimant deserves to bedismissed. Accordingly I proceed to pass the following order:::O R D E R::(I)First Appeal No. 3852 of 2019 is hereby partly allowed.(ii)The Impugned Judgment and Award dated 01.12.2018 passed by thelearned Tribunal in M.A.C.P. No. 336 of 2017 is hereby modified onlyto the extent quantum of compensation. (iii)The Claimant is entitled to total compensation of Rs.1,69,664/- (i.e.50% of Rs.3,39,328/-) including of No fault Liability with interest @8% per annum from the date of filing of Petition i.e. 16.06.2017 tillrealization of the entire amount.(iv)First Appeal No. 2414 of 2019 preferred by the Claimant is herebydismissed.(v)No Order as to cost. (vi) Award be drawn up accordingly. ( Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. )JPchavanPage 17 of 17

Arguments

FA2414&3852-19.odtSurendra Bedmutha, who issued disability certificate at Exh. 30. It isfurther canvass that, due said disability the claimant is unable to moveand execute his normal activities. However, the learned Tribunal failed toconsider evidence of P. W. 3 and granted meagre amount of compensation.12. The learned counsel for the claimant further canvassed thatprior to accident, the Claimant was working with M.S.E.B., on daily wagesand was drawing income Rs. 700/- per day i.e. Rs.21,000/- per month.But due to permanent disability, the claimant is deprived from his incomeof Rs. 2,52,000/- per annum. Therefore, considering 16% disability andloss of earning, the claimant is entitled for benefit of 25% of his annualincome.13. Therefore, the Claimant is entitled for compensation to thetune of Rs. 10,71,000/- (Rs.63000 x 17=Rs. 10,71,000/-) and loss offuture prospects, however, the learned Tribunal granted meagercompensation of Rs.3,39,328/-, hence, prayed for enhancement.14.According the claimant he is entitled for reassessment of thecompensation as under:1Compensation for future earning andbenefitsRs.10,71,000/-2.Medical ExpensesRs.1,00,000/-3.Pain and suffering Rs.1,00,000/-Page 6 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odt4.Loss of amenities of lifeRs.2,00,000/-5.Loss of expectation of lifeRs.2,00,000/-6.Disfigurement of legRs.1,00,000/-7.Discomfort, inconvenience and Hardship in futureRs.1,00,000/-8.Compensation for continuing permanent disability in futureRs.2,00,000/-9.Loss of Salary during trial period of 2 months (Rs.21,000/- x 2) Rs. 42,000/-10.Misc. ExpensesRs.50,000/-TotalRs.21,63,000/-Thus the claimant has prayed for enhancement i.e. 21,63,000(-) 3,39,328= Rs. 18,23,672/-.15.Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for M.S.R.T.C.submits that as per Spot Panchanama at Exh. 24, the Claimant was ridinghis motorcycle in middle of the road and gave dash on front right side ofthe bus. The sketch map of the accident proves about occurrence ofaccident in middle of the road. However, the learned Tribunal failed toconsider the fact that claimant is contributory negligent to the extent of50% as the claimant/motorcyclist gave dash on front right side of the Bus.Therefore, the Respondent No. 1 as well as the Claimant are contributorynegligent 50-50%, hence, the learned Tribunal ought to have awarded50% compensation only.16. In support of these submissions, the learned counselappearing for the M.S.R.T.C. relied on the case of Municipal CorporationPage 7 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtof Greater Bombay Vs. Shri Laxman Iyer and another, AIR 2003 SupremeCourt 4181. 17. It is further canvassed on behalf of learned counsel forM.S.R.T.C., that, the evidence of CW-3 Dr. Sachin Surendra Bedmuthawho medically treated the claimant and issued Disability CertificateExh.30 proves that, the claimant suffered 16% permanent disability, butsaid disability does not appear in reference to the entire body, but it isonly in reference to the right leg of the claimant. Therefore, the learnedTribunal ought to have granted compensation to the extent of 16%disability on right limb/leg of the Claimant.18. To buttress this submissions, the learned counsel appearingfor the appellant M.S.R.T.C., placed reliance on the case of Raj KumarVs/ Ajay Kumar and another, (2011) Supreme Court Cases 343.19. Having regard to the submissions canvassed on behalf ofboth the sides, I have gone through the record.Though, the claimantprayed for enhancement of compensation to the tune of Rs. 18,23,672/-under different heads as described herein above. 20. The claimant examined himself at Exh. 15 and deposedthat, at the relevant time he was serving being a daily wager inPage 8 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtM.S.E.B., and was drawing wages @ Rs. 700/- per day. Beside this hewas earning income of Rs. 2,00,000/- from agricultural produce. Hesuffered 16% permanent disability as per Disability Certificate Exh. 30.In cross examination, the claimant admitted that he has not producewage certificate. The claimant has not examine any officer/competentperson of M.S.E.B., to prove wage/salary certificate to prove that hewas drawing Rs. 700/- per day wages. 21. Needless to say that, though the claimant claimed that hehaving agricultural land and drawing income of Rs. 2 lakhs per year,from the agricultural product, but the claimant has not produceddocumentary evidence to support his income. Therefore, in absence ofdocumentary evidence, the learned Tribunal considered complaint’snotional income of Rs. 5500/-which comes to Rs. 66000/- per annumonly. 22 Though the claimant claimed that, at the time of accidenthe was 28 years old but no documentary evidence produced before thelearned Tribunal to prove his age. The claimant produced disabilitycertificate at Exh. 30 which described age of claimant as 29 years.Therefore, as per case of Sarla Verma Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation,reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121, the learned Tribunal has appliedmultiplier of ‘17’ and ascertained the gross compensation to the tune ofPage 9 of 17 FA2414&3852-19.odtRs.11,22,000/- and considering 16% disability as per medical certificateExh.30) compensation comes to Rs.1,79,520/-. In addition, the learnedTribunal granted Rs. 71,808/- i.e. 40% of 1,79,520/- towards loss ofincome. Further, the learned Tribunal has granted Rs.38,000/- towardsmedical expenses incurred by the claimant and Rs.50,000/- towardspain and suffering and nutritious diet, the total of which comes toRs.3,39,328/-. 23. In the case in hand, the claimant has proved aboutsustaining 16% disability. However, as per evidence of RW-1, S. A.Dhaneshwar, driver of S.T. Bus bearing registration No. MH-20-BL-2326,at about 8.00 to 8.30 p. m, he reached near Devshi Pimpalgaon onNashik-Aurangabad Highway and he was driving his bus form the leftside of the road in moderate speed. There is Hotel and Petrol Pumpnear the spot of incident. He saw the police personnel and took the busbehind police van to stop the Bus but at the same time, the claimantcame from opposite direction in high speed, in rash and negligentmanner and gave dash to the ST Bus from front on driver side. 24. The CW-2, Navnath karde deposed at Exh. 18 that on18.04.2017, at about 8.30 p.m., he received a phone call informing thatthe claimant met with an accident at Devashi-Pimpalgaon, Tq.Gangapur Dist. Aurangabad. Thereafter, within 15-20 minutes, hereached at spot of accident and noticed that, the S.T. Bus bearingPage 10 of 17

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