RAVINDRA v. GHUGE AND R. M. JOSHI, JJ.RESERVED ON
Legal Reasoning
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADWRIT PETITION NO. 3236 OF 2024Chetansing Kalyansing RajputAge : 43 years, Occu.: Service,R/o. Village Varangaon, Tq. BhusawalDist. Jalgaon … PETITIONER (Ori. Applicant)Versus1.The State of MaharashtraThrough It’s Additional Chief SecretaryDepartment of Finance,Mantralaya, Mumbai-32.2.The Commissioner of State Tax,GST Bhawan, Mazgaon,Mumbai – 10.3.Pravin Ashok BhadakState Tax Officer,GST Bhavan, Kalayan, Dist. Thane.… RESPONDENTS(Ori. Respondents)Ms. S. A. Kale, Advocate h/f Mr. A. B. Kale, Advocate for the Petitioner Mr. A. B. Girase, Government Pleader for Respondent Nos.1 and 2/StateMr. S. N. Suryawanshi, Advocate for Respondent No.3.CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE AND R. M. JOSHI, JJ.RESERVED ON:26th MARCH, 2024PRONOUNCED ON :03rd APRIL, 2024ORDER (PER – R. M. JOSHI, J.) :-1.Issue involved in this Petition is as to whether the Petitioneris “aggrieved person” in order to invoke provisions of the AdministrativeTribunals Act, 1985 (for short ‘the Act’).wp3236.24.odt1 of 7 2.Though there is a challenge to the order dated 11th March,2024 passed in Original Application No. 730 of 2023 by MaharashtraAdministrative Tribunal Mumbai, Bench at Aurangabad, the challenge isrestricted to the extent of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that thePetitioner is not an aggrieved person as contemplated by Section 19 ofthe Act to challenge the order of transfer of Respondent No.3. We,therefore, do not wish to go in to the other factual details considered bythe learned Tribunal.3.The learned Advocate for the Petitioner submits that thePetitioner has raised issues regarding corruption and had lodgedcomplaint with Anti Corruption Bureau against Respondent No.3 foroffering him bribe. According to her, the Petitioner becomes an aggrievedperson by transfer of Respondent No.3 to Dhule, as said transfer wouldresult into the causing of interference in the criminal proceeding as wellas the departmental enquiry being conducted against him. The learnedAdvocate for Respondent No.3 supported the impugned order passed bythe Tribunal to the extent of dismissal of OA No. 730 of 2023.4.In order to appreciate the rival contentions it would benecessary to take into consideration the relevant provisions of the Act.Section 19 of the Act reads thus:“19. Applications to Tribunals-(1) Subject to the otherprovisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any orderpertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of aTribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for thewp3236.24.odt2 of 7 redressal of his grievance.Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section,"order" means an order made-(a)by the Government or a local or otherauthority within the territory of India or under thecontrol of the Government of India or by anycorporation [or society] owned or controlled by theGovernment; or(b)by an officer, committee or other body oragency of the Government or a local or other authorityor corporation [or society] referred to in clause (a).(2)Every application under sub-section (1) shall be insuch form and be accompanied by such documents orother evidence and by such fee (if any, not exceedingone hundred rupees) [in respect of the filing of suchapplication and by such other fees for the service orexecution of processes, as may be prescribed by theCentral Government.](3)On receipt of an application under sub-section (1),the Tribunal shall, if satisfied after such inquiry as itmay deem necessary, that the application is a fit casefor adjudication or trial by it, admit such application;but where the Tribunal is not so satisfied, it maysummarily reject the application after recording itsreasons.](4)Where an application has been admitted by aTribunal under sub-section (3), every proceeding underthe relevant service rules as to redressal of grievancesin relation to the subject-matter of such applicationpending immediately before such admission shall abateand save as otherwise directed by the Tribunal, noappeal or representation in relation to such matter shallthereafter be entertained under such rules.”5.A bare perusal of aforestated provision clearly shows that aperson aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within thejurisdiction of the Tribunal is permitted to make an application forwp3236.24.odt3 of 7 redressal of his grievance.6.Section 3 of the Act provides for the matters in which theTribunal would have jurisdiction. Section 3(q) defines “service matters”as under:“(q) "service matters", in relation to a person, means allmatters relating to the conditions of his service inconnection with the affairs of the Union or of any Stateor of any local or other authority within the territory ofIndia or under the control of the Government of India,or, as the case may be, of any corporation (or society)owned or controlled by the Government, as respects -i) remuneration (including allowances), pensionand other retirement benefits;ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority,promotion, reversion, premature retirement andsuperannuation;iii) leave of any kind;iv) disciplinary matters; orv) any other matter whatsoever; “7.This definition shows that the aspects such as remuneration,pension, retiral benefits, confirmation, seniority, promotion, leave,disciplinary matters or any other matter whatsoever included. This wouldmean, these matters related to the applicant, i.e. he is directly andsubstantially affected by the order under challenge. A question arises asto whether term “any other matter whatsoever” would be sufficient tocover the dispute between two employees which is not the servicematter. The term any other matter whatsoever necessarily would meanany matter connected with the service condition of the employee vis-a-vis employer, not specifically spelt out in clauses (i) to (iv).wp3236.24.odt4 of 7 8.At this stage, it would be relevant to take into considerationthe provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The said Act definesIndustrial dispute under Section 2 (k) as under; which could be subjectmatter of consideration/ jurisdiction before Industrial Tribunal. “(k) “industrial dispute” means any dispute ordifference between employers and employers, orbetween employers and workmen, or betweenworkmen and workmen, which is connected with theemployment or non-employment or the terms ofemployment or with the conditions of labour, of anyperson;”9.It is thus clear that as per the said provision, a dispute notonly between employer and employee but also inter se betweenemployees can become a industrial dispute and the Industrial Tribunalwould get jurisdiction to entertain such dispute and adjudicate upon thesame. In spite of such provisions already existing on the statute book,the legislature in its wisdom has thought it fit not to include the inter sedisputes between employees to become subject matter of adjudicationbefore the Administrative Tribunal. The conspicuous absence of suchprovision clearly demonstrates the intention of the legislature not toinclude a dispute or grievance, which has the semblance or trappings ofpersonal enmity/antipathy between two officers of a department, excepton account of a cause by which the service conditions of an individual areseriously impinged or are directly affected by any adverse decision of thedepartment. wp3236.24.odt5 of 7
Decision
10.In such circumstances it would not be possible to expand thedefination of the term aggrieved person. So also, doing so would defeatthe purpose of the legislature and it will open the pandora box which willenable any disgruntled person who has personal enmity with a co-employee, to challenge any action of the department to settle hispersonal scores. We, therefore, do not agree with the proposition soughtto be made by the learned Advocate for the Petitioner that since thePetitioner has lodged complaint under the Prevention of Corruption Actagainst Respondent No.3, he would be aggrieved person by the transferof the Petitioner, when in fact, his service conditions are not affected inany manner. The learned Tribunal while passing impugned order hasdealt with this issue at length and has also recorded the findings that aperson aggrieved would be a person who is wrongly deprived of hisentitlement which he is legally entitled to receive. 11.In view of the above factors, we do not find that theimpugned judgment of the learned Tribunal could be termed as beingperverse or unsustainable, considering the law laid down in Syed YakoobVs. K. S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 and Surya Dev Rai v/s RamChander Rai, AIR 2003 SC 3044.12.The Petitioner also seeks direction to the EnforcementDirectorate to initiate action against Respondent No.3. Apart from thefact that a Writ of Mandamus cannot be used for seeking such direction,wp3236.24.odt6 of 7 even perusal of the petition lacks essential material which evenotherwise would attract any action under The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, against Respondent No.3. There is absolutely nomaterial pleaded or placed on record in that regard. Hence, we do notfind any substance in the Petition.13. This Petition stands dismissed.( R. M. JOSHI, J. )( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J. )ssp Later on 1.This order is pronounced in the morning session. At 2.30p.m., learned Advocate Mr. Kale for the Petitioner has prayed forcontinuation of the interim relief granted by the Tribunal.2.Since this Court has concurred with the findings recoded bythe Tribunal about the Petitioner not having locus standi to file theapplication, we do not see any reason to continue interim relief further.3.Hence, the request stands rejected. ( R. M. JOSHI, J. )( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J. )sspwp3236.24.odt7 of 7