Writ Petition No. 1844 of 2014 · Bombaybench High Court
Case Details
2025:BHC-AUG:20705 WP-1844-2014.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADWRIT PETITION NO. 1844 OF 2014 WITHCA/14319/20231.Kashinath Motiram Patil,Died through LRs, Tulshiram Kashinath Patil,Age: 74 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,2.Narayan Manku Gawali,Died through LRs,2A-Ramesh Narayan Gawali (Beedkar), Age: 50 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,3.Mahadu Manku Gawali,Died through LRs,3-A)Tukaram Mahadu Gawali (Beedkar), Age: 47 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,3-B)Yamunabai Mahadu Gawali (Beedkar), Age: 65 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,4.Subhash Shankar Patil,Age: 60 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,5.Suresh Shankar Patil,Age: 55 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,6.Manjulabai Gulab Patil,Died through Lrs,6-A) Anusayabai Pandurang Patil, Age: 76 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,6-B) Wanubai Vedu PatilAge: 70 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,7.Yashwant Kautik Patil,Age: 65 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,8.Prakash Atmaram Patil,UmeshPAGE 1 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtAge: 59 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,Petitioner No. 1 to 8 All R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule9.Yasin Shaikh Bagwan,Died through LRs,Manubi Shaikh Yasin Died Through L.Rs,9-A) Rabiyabi Shaikh Yusuf Age 50 years Occu: Household R/o: Dhule, Tq. & Dist. Dhule9-B) Nasimbi IsakAge 45 years, Occu: Household R/o: Dhule, Tq. & Dist. Dhule10.Gajmal Mahadu Patil,Died through LRs,10AHimmatrao Gajmal Patil,Age: 60 yrs, Occ: AgricultureR/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule11.Rambhau Sambhu Bhoi,Died through LRs,11-A)Sitabai Rambhau More,Age: 75 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,11-B)Vasant Rambhau MoreAge: 55 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,11-C)Mohan Rambhau MoreAge: 60 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,11-D)Shailabai Subhash ShindeAge: 62 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,11-E)Suresh Rambhau MoreAge: 50 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,11-F)Ramesh Rambhau MoreAge: 52 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,UmeshPAGE 2 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odt11-G)Ganesh Rambhau MoreAge: 45 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,11-H)Sanjay Rambhau MoreAge: 46 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,All R/o: Dhule Tq. & Dist. Dhule11-1)Mangala Anil WadekarAge: 40 yrs, Occ: Household,R/o: Nashik, Tq. & Dist. Nashik11-J)Vandana Yuvraj WadekarAge: 45 yrs, Occ: Household,R/o: Nashik, Tq. & Dist. Nashik12.Sadashiv Baburao Patil,Age: 77 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule13.Govind Arjun Patil,Age: 73 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule14.Dhrupadabai Arjun Patil(Through G.P.A.)14-A Govind Arjun Patil,Age: 73 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,R/o: Mahindale, Tq. & Dist. Dhule15.Dayaram Bhaga Patil,Died through LRs,15-A)Girjabai Dayaram Patil, (died thro LRs]Age:-yrs, Occ: Agriculture,15-B)Kasturabai Vishwas PatilAge: 70 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,15-C)Sumanbai Punwant PatilAge: 65 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,15-D)Venubai Vitthal PatilAge: 60 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,UmeshPAGE 3 OF 25
Legal Reasoning
WP-1844-2014.odt15-E)Vatsalabai Bhagwan PatilAge: 55 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,15-F)Dhanubai Bhikanrao PatilAge: 52 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,15-G)Nawal Dayaram PatilAge: 58 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,15-H)Kailas Dayaram PatilAge: 55 yrs, Occ: Agriculture,All R/o: Dhule Tq. & Dist. Dhule...PetitionersVERSUS1.The Collector,Dhule District, Dhule.2. The Deputy Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer, (General) Patbandhare Project, Dhule.3.The Commander Special Reserve Force (S.R.P.)Group No.6, in front of S.P.Office, Dhule...Respondents***• Mr. A. B. Kale, Advocate for the Petitioners• Mr. S. K. Shirse, AGP for the Respondents/State• Mr. S. S. Wagh h/f Mr. S. T. Shelke, Advocate forApplicant in CA/14319/2023***CORAM:R. M. JOSHI, JRESERVED ON:JULY 30, 2025PRONOUNCED ON:AUGUST 05, 2025JUDGMENT : 1.Petitioners take exception to the order dated29.07.2008 passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division,UmeshPAGE 4 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtDhule dismissing the references filed by thePetitioners under Section 18 of the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894 (for short ‘the Act’) and order dated07.09.2012 passed by the Special Land AcquisitionOfficer/Deputy Collector (for short ‘SLAO’) rejectingApplications of the Petitioners under Section 28-A ofthe Act on the ground that there is no award passed bythe Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act inorder to allow the same compensation to the Petitionerunder Section 28-A of the Act.2.The facts, which led to the filing of thisPetition, can be narrated in brief as under:Petitioners are agriculturist and their landcame to be acquired for special reserved police camps.The acquisition proceedings were initiated by issuingnotification under Section 4 of the Act on 11.09.1979.An award came to be passed on 09.09.1986 by the SLAO.The Petitioners challenged the land acquisitionproceedings before Civil Court by filing RCS No.359/1989. This suit was dismissed in default on16.09.1995. Petitioners thereafter filed referenceunder Section 18 of the Act on 28.04.1992. AnUmeshPAGE 5 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtapplication came to be filed along with referencecontending that the claims are filed within limitation.The Registry of the Reference Court objected to theregistration of the references on the ground oflimitation. The 2nd CJSD, Dhule passed order dated30.08.2000 on applications for condonation of delaydirected the Registry to register the references. Therecord indicates that references came to be registeredin the year 2000. The statement of claim was resistedby the Respondent on merit as well as taking exceptionto the maintainability of the reference on the point oflimitation. The reference Court framed issues includingissue of maintainability of the reference on the pointof limitation. There was no objection raised by theparties to the issues framed. The parties led evidence.Reference Court by judgment dated 29.07.2008 dismissedreferences on the ground of bar of limitation. 3.Petitioners applied for the certified copy ofthe said order passed by the Reference Court on01.10.2008 and received copy on 26.04.2009. Thereafter,not only the order of Reference Court was notchallenged but an application was moved before the SLAOUmeshPAGE 6 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtunder Section 28-A of the Act claiming the compensationas determined by the Reference Court in the reference,which was dismissed on the ground of bar of limitation.The SLAO by impugned order dated 07.09.2012 rejectedthe application by holding that said application wouldbe maintainable only in case where there is order inreference under Section 18 of the Act and otheragriculturists/land owners in the common acquisitioncan make application for the same compensation.Petitioner are now challenging the said order of SLAOof refusing to exercise powers under Section 28-A andto grant relief and also the order dated 29.07.2008passed by the CJSD dismissing the reference underSection 18 of the Act.4.Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitthat the Petitioners have lost their agricultural landsand that they are entitled for reasonable compensation.It is his submission that the Reference Court thoughhas rejected references, however, has determined themarket value of the lands which is more than awardpassed by SLAO. It is his submission that such enhancedcompensation having been determined by the ReferenceUmeshPAGE 7 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtCourt, there was no justification for SLAO to rejectthe applications under Section 28-A of the Act. It ishis submission that the interpretation of Section 28-Aneeds to be done in such manner keeping in mindlegislative intent to benefit the agriculturist whohave lost their land in compulsory acquisition.5.Without prejudice to the said submissions, itis argued that the order passed by the Reference Courtrejecting the reference on the point of bar oflimitation is not tenable for the reason that it wasnot open for the Reference Court to review the orderpassed by the same Court in miscellaneous applicationscondoning the delay. According to him, since such orderof condonation of delay was not challenged by theRespondent, there occurred no occasion for theReference Court to enter upon the issue of limitationand hence, the order of reference Court rejecting thereferences deserve interference and that references beallowed. In support of his submissions, he placedreliance on following judgments: Shrimant Vithoba Koli(Since Deceased) vs. State of Maharashtra and Others,2018 SCC OnLine Bom 7244 & Union of India vs. HansoliUmeshPAGE 8 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtDevi and Others, Appeal (Civil) No. 9477/1994.6.Learned AGP appearing for Respondents opposedthe said submissions by referring to provisions ofSection 28-A of the Act, which according to him wouldapply only in case where there is already an awardpassed by the Competent Court in favour of any of thelandholders in the same acquisition and it is only thena person interested in all other lands covered by thesame notification and are aggrieved by the award of theSLAO are entitled to seek the same amount ofcompensation. It is his submission that since there isno award passed in the references made by thePetitioners, question of application of Section 28-Adoes not arise. He placed reliance on the judgment ofHon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India andAnother vs. Association of Unified Telecom ServiceProviders of India and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 543 inorder to submit that Section 5 of the Limitation Act,1963 has no application to the reference under Section18 of the Act. He argues that once admittedly there isdelay in filing the reference, the same ought to havebeen dismissed without deciding the merit thereof.UmeshPAGE 9 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtAccording to him, it is his submission that once thereference itself was not maintainable, question ofconsidering the determination of the compensation wouldnot arise.7.In order to appreciate the submissions soughtto be made by the rival parties, it would be relevantto take into consideration certain relevant facts maybe at the cost of repetition which read as follows:The Petitioners are landholders/agriculturistsof their respective lands situated at Mahindale. Bynotification dated 11.09.1979 under Section 4 of theAct the procedure of acquisition had commenced. Awardcame to be passed on 09.09.1986. Admittedly,Petitioners received the compensation in the year 1989,which was accepted under protest. Thereafter, RCS No.359/1989 came to be filed challenging the acquisitionitself and not the compensation paid against the saidacquisition to the Petitioners, nor it was not forenhancement of compensation. This suit was dismissedfor want of prosecution on 16.09.1995. It is thereafterreferences were sought to be made and miscellaneousapplications were filed in the year 1998 for seekingUmeshPAGE 10 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtcondonation of delay. The CJSD, Dhule by order dated30.08.2000 condoned the delay and directed referencesto be registered and put up for further orders anddisposal thereof in accordance with law. Referenceswere registered in the year 2000. The statement ofclaim of the Petitioners were resisted by theRespondents on merit as well as on the point oflimitation. 8.Reference Court framed issues vide Exh. 24.Amongst other issues on merit, issue of maintainabilityof the reference is also framed. The Petitioners didnot challenged the said issue and proceeded to leadevidence in the matter. After hearing both sidesconsidering the facts on record, though the ReferenceCourt has decided the market price of the acquiredland, however, consequently held that references itselfnot maintainable and rejected the same. No award cameto be passed holding entitlement of the Petitioners ofthe amount of compensation as determined.9.The above facts clearly indicates thatPetitioners never objected to the framing of the issueof limitation and subjected themselves to theUmeshPAGE 11 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtjurisdiction of the said Court for the purpose ofdecision on the issue. Thus, now Petitioners areestopped from claiming that the issue of limitation,which came to be decided against them, could not havebeen gone into by the Reference Court while decidingthe references in view of previous order dated30.08.2000.10.Apart from this, perusal of the order passedby the Reference Court indicates that Reference Courthad taken into consideration the settled position oflaw, which does not permit the entertainment ofcondonation of delay in preferring reference. At thisstage, it would be relevant to take note of provisionof Section 18 of the Act, which reads thus:Section 18 - Reference to Court (1) Any person interested who has notaccepted the award may, by writtenapplication to the Collector, require thatthe matter be referred by the Collector forthe determination of the Court, whether hisobjection be to the measurement of theland, the amount of the compensation, thepersons to whom it is payable, or theapportionment of the compensation among thepersons interested.(2) The application shall state the groundsUmeshPAGE 12 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odton which objection to the award is taken:Provided that every such application shallbe made--(a) if the person making it was present orrepresented before the Collector at thetime when he made his award, within sixweeks from the date of the Collector'saward;(b) in other cases, within six weeks of thereceipt of the notice from the Collectorunder section 12, sub-section (2) or withinsix months from the date of the Collector'saward, whichever period shall first expire.11.Section 18(2) provides that the applicationtaking objection to the award shall be filed within 6weeks from the date of Collector’s award when theperson making it was present or represented before theCollector at the time of award. As per clause (b), inother cases, within six weeks of the receipt of thenotice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section(2) or within six months from the date of Collector’saward, whichever period shall first expire. Section12(2) requires the Collector to give notice of hisaward to such person interested who are not personallypresent or represented when the award is made. Thus, asper the said provision, depending upon theUmeshPAGE 13 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtcontingencies as explained therein, the maximum periodof limitation for filing the application for objectingthe award has been provided and in any case, this sixmonths in maximum from the date of award passed byCollector. Here in this case, admittedly, in the year1989 itself the amount of compensation was received bythe Petitioners though under protest. The order passedby the CJSD dated 30.08.2000 indicates that admitteddelay of 2 years, 3 months and 13 days came to becondoned. In this regard a reference can be made to thejudgment of Supreme Court in case of State of Karnatakavs. Laxuman, 2006 (1) Land Acquisition Cases 13/(2005(8) SCC 709), which has been relied upon by ReferenceCourt in its order. Thus, it was not open for the saidCourt to condone the delay in view of provision ofSection 18(2) and settled position of law by theSupreme Court.12.Now question arises as to whether it would beopen for the Petitioners to take exception to the orderof Reference Court and answer thereto would be innegative for more than one reasons. As recordedearlier, the Petitioners have never raised objectionUmeshPAGE 14 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtfor framing of issue of limitation afresh and subjectedthemselves to the jurisdiction of the Court to thatextent. Thus, there was acquiescence on the part ofPetitioners and once no objection was raised then, itwould not be open for the Petitioners now to claim thatthe Court had no jurisdiction to decide the said issue,after it came to be decided against the Petitioners.Secondly, there was no jurisdiction vested into theCourt to condone delay by applying Section 5 ofLimitation Act. Moreover, the circumstances as theyappear from the record also indicate that thePetitioners have practically accepted the said judgmentof the Reference Court and therefore, filed anapplication under Section 28-A of the Act on the basisof determination of the market price of the acquiredland. The Petitioners, therefore, are estopped fromtaking exception to the order dated 29.07.2008 byfiling Petition in the year 2014 i.e., after over aperiod of six years. The principles applicable forcondonation of delay, by keeping in mind the nature oflegislation, cannot be applied to the stage of filingreference in view of period of limitation prescribedtherefor.UmeshPAGE 15 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odt13. Now coming to the issue raised by thePetitioners with regard to the applicability of Section28-A of the Act to the present case, it would berelevant to refer to said provision, which reads thus:28A. Re-determination of the amount ofcompensation on the basis of the award ofthe Court.-(1) Where in an award under this Part, theCourt allows to the applicant any amount ofcompensation in excess of the amountawarded by the Collector under section 11,the persons interested in all the otherland covered by the same notification undersection 4, sub-section (1) and who are alsoaggrieved by the award of the Collectormay, notwithstanding that they had not madean application to the Collector undersection 18, by written application to theCollector within three months from the dateof the award of the Court require that theamount of compensation payable to them maybe re-determined on the basis of the amountof compensation awarded by the Court:Provided that in computing the period ofthree months within which an application tothe Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award waspronounced and the time requisite forobtaining a copy of the award shall beexcluded.(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of anapplication under sub-section (1), conductan inquiry after giving notice to all thepersons interested and giving them aUmeshPAGE 16 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtreasonable opportunity of being heard, andmake an award determining the amount ofcompensation payable to the applicants.(3) Any person who has not accepted theaward under sub-section (2) may, by writtenapplication to the Collector, require thatthe matter be referred by the Collector forthe determination of the Court and theprovisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, sofar as may be, apply to such reference asthey apply to a reference under section 18.14.A plain reading of the said provisionindicates that it has been brought to the statute bookby way of amendment in the year 1984 by Act 68 of 1984in order to give benefit of the award passed by theReference Court on determination of any amount ofcompensation over and above award passed by theCollector under Section 11 to all other personsinterested in the said lands covered by the saidnotification were entitled to the same compensationwithout afresh determination, if application is filedwithin three months from the date of the award of theCourt. The Collector after receipt of said applicationis required to give notice to all person interested andgiving them opportunity of being heard to make an awarddetermining the amount of compensation payable to them.UmeshPAGE 17 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odt15.The intention of the statute, therefore, isthat once in an acquisition to any landholder amounthas been granted by way of compensation over and abovecompensation granted by Collector, there accrues rightin favour of other land owners/holders from sameacquisition, to seek such compensation determined byinvoking Section 28-A of the Act. At this stage, itwould be relevant to take note of Full Bench judgmentof Supreme Court in case of Union of India and Anothervs. Hansoli Devi and Others, (2002) 7 SCC 273, whereinit is held that even in case of dismissal of anapplication seeking reference under Section 18 of theAct, on ground of delay, it amounts to not having madean application. Thus, in case an application isdismissed on ground of delay or other technical ground,such person would be entitled to maintain anapplication under Section 28-A of the Act. It would befruitful to reiterate paragraphs 9 to 11 of the saidjudgment, which reads thus:9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as towhat would be the correct interpretation ofSection 28-A, we think it appropriate tobear in mind certain basic principles ofinterpretation of statute. The rule statedby Tindal, CJ in Sussex Peerage case,UmeshPAGE 18 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odt(1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034, stillholds the field. The aforesaid rule is tothe effect: (ER p. 1057) "If the words of the statute are inthemselves precise and unambiguous, then nomore can be necessary than to expound thosewords in their natural and ordinary sense.The words themselves do alone in such casesbest declare the intent of the lawgiver."It is a cardinal principle of constructionof statute that when language of thestatute is plain and unambiguous, then thecourt must give effect to the words used inthe statute and it would not be open to thecourts to adopt a hypothetical constructionon the ground that such construction ismore consistent with the alleged object andpolicy of the Act. In Kirkness v. JohnHudson & Co. Ltd. 1955 (2) ALL ER 345, LordReid pointed out as to what is the meaningof "ambiguous" and held that: (All ER p.366C-D)"A provision is not ambiguous merelybecause it contains a word which indifferent context is capable of differentmeanings and it would be hard to findanywhere a sentence of any length whichdoes not contain such a word. A provisionis, in my judgment, ambiguous only if itcontains a word or phrase which in thatparticular context is capable of havingmore than one meaning." It is no doubt true mat if on going throughthe plain meaning of the language ofstatutes, it leads to anomalies, injusticesand absurdities, then the court may lookinto the purpose for which the statute hasUmeshPAGE 19 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtbeen brought and would try to give ameaning, which would adhere to the purposeof the statute. Patanjali Sastri, CJ in thecase of Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose. 1953 SCR 1, had held that it is not asound principle of construction to brushaside words in a statute as beinginapposite surplusage, if they can haveappropriate application in circumstancesconceivably within the contemplation of thestatute. In Quebec Railway, Light Heat &Power Co. v. Vandray AIR 1920 PC 181, ithad been observed that the Legislature isdeemed not to waste its words or to sayanything in vain and a construction whichattributes redundancy to the legislaturewill not be accepted except for compellingreasons. Similarly, it is not permissibleto add words to a statute which are notthere unless on a literal constructionbeing given a part of the statute becomesmeaningless. But before any words are readto repair an omission in the Act, it shouldbe possible to state with certainty thatthese words would have been inserted by thedraftsman and approved by the legislaturehad their attention been drawn to theomission before the Bill had passed into alaw. At times, the intention of thelegislature is found to be clear but theun-skillfulness of the draftsman inintroducing certain words in the statuteresults in apparent ineffectiveness of thelanguage and in such a situation, it may bepermissible for the court to reject thesurplus words, so as to make the statuteeffective. Bearing in mind the aforesaidprinciple, let us now examine theprovisions of Section 28-A of the Act, toUmeshPAGE 20 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtanswer the questions referred to us by theBench of two learned Judges. It is no doubttrue that the object of Section 28-A of theAct was to confer a right of making areference, (sic on one) who might have notmade a reference earlier under Section 18and, therefore, ordinarily when a personmakes a reference under Section 18 but thatwas dismissed on the ground of delay, hewould not get the right of Section 28-A ofthe Land Acquisition Act when some otherperson makes a reference and the referenceis answered. But the Parliament havingenacted Section 28-A, as a beneficialprovision, it would cause great injusticeif a literal interpretation is given to theexpression "had not made an application tothe Collector under Section 18" in Section28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expressionwould mean that if the land-owner has madean application for reference under Section18 and that reference is entertained andanswered. In other words, it may not bepermissible for a land owner to make areference and get it answered and thensubsequently make another application whensome other person gets the referenceanswered and obtains a higher amount. Infact in Pradeep Kumari's case the threelearned Judges, while enumerating theconditions to be satisfied, whereafter anapplication under Section 28-A can bemoved, had categorically stated (SCC p.743,para 10) "the person moving the applicationdid not make an application to theCollector under Section 18". The expression"did not make an application", as observedby this Court, would mean, did not make aneffective application which had beenUmeshPAGE 21 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtentertained by making the reference and thereference was answered. When an applicationunder Section 18 is not entertained on theground of limitation, the same notfructifying into any reference, then thatwould not tantamount to an effectiveapplication and consequently the rights ofsuch applicant emanating from some otherreference being answered to move anapplication under Section 28-A cannot bedenied. We, accordingly answer question No.1(a) by holding that the dismissal of anapplication seeking reference under Section18 on the ground of delay would tantamountto not filing an application within themeaning of Section 28-A of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894.10. So far as question 1(b) is concerned,this is really the same question, as inquestion 1(a) and, therefore, we reiteratethat when an application of a land ownerunder Section 18 is dismissed on the groundof delay, then the said land owner isentitled to make an application underSection 28-A, if other conditionsprescribed therein are fulfilled.11. Coming to the second question forreference the receipt of compensation withor without protest pursuant to the award ofthe Land Acquisition Collector is of noconsequence for the purpose of making afresh application under Section 28-A. If aperson has not filed an application underSection 18 of the Act to make a reference,then irrespective of the fact whether hehas received the compensation awarded bythe Collector with or without protest, heUmeshPAGE 22 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtwould be a person aggrieved within themeaning of Section 28-A and would beentitled to make an application when someother land owner's application forreference is answered by the referenceCourt. It is apparent on the plain languageof the provisions of Section 28-A of theAct. Otherwise, it would amount to addingone more condition, not contemplated orstipulated by the Legislature itself todeny the benefit of substantial rightconferred upon the owner.16.It is thus clear that for the purpose ofapplication of Section 28-A i.e. for re-determinationof amount of compensation on the basis of award of theCourt, the pre-condition is that there is an award ofthe Court which allows compensation in cases of theamount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 of theAct. Thus, the determination of quantum of compensationis not contemplated but what is relevant is that theCourt allows to the Applicant any amount ofcompensation in cases of amount awarded by theCollector. This could be done in case where referenceis maintainable. In the event the reference is nottenable on the point of limitation, such determinationof market value is of no consequence. Suchdetermination is done only for the reason that in anUmeshPAGE 23 OF 25 WP-1844-2014.odtAppeal, if the reference is held within limitation,there is determination on merit. Thus, unless thereference is allowed and the Application is allowed thecompensation in cases of the amount as determined bythe Collector, the question of applying the same toother person does not arise. Moreover, the saidprovision more than sufficiently indicates that Section28-A would have application to the other person thanthe one an application in the reference. Thus,Petitioners would have been justified in makingapplication under this provision, provided there wassome other land owner’s application is answered by theReference Court. By no stretch of imagination, anapplication can be maintained by Petitioners whoseapplication on reference is rejected and there is noother order in respect of any other land owners. 17.In the light of above facts, the Petitionershave failed to make out the case to cause interferenceinto the order passed by the SLAO under Section 28-A ofthe Act so also the Petitioners having been estoppedfrom taking exception to the order passed by theReference Court and even otherwise, in view of nonUmeshPAGE 24 OF 25
Decision
WP-1844-2014.odtapplication of Section 5 of Limitation Act toReference, are not entitled for any relief.18.As a result of above discussion, Petitionstands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any,stands disposed of. (R. M. JOSHI, J.) UmeshPAGE 25 OF 25