SANDEEP CHHAGAN MANDAGE v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
Case Details
1 cran 180.22.odt IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD 983 CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.180 OF 2022 SANDEEP CHHAGAN MANDAGE VERSUS THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER ... Advocate for Applicants : Mr. Karpe Rahul R. APP for Respondents: Mr. S D Ghayal Advocate for Respondent 2 : Mr. Kabade Vivek V ... CORAM : V.K. JADHAV & SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE, JJ. Dated: April 29, 2022 … PER COURT :- 1. Heard fnally with consent at adiission staee. 2.
Legal Reasoning
The applicant is seekine quashine of the First Inforiation Report bearine criie no.789 of 2021 reeistered with Karjat Police Station, Tq. Karjat, District Ahiednaear for the offence punishable under sections 306, 498-A, 323, 504 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 27 of the Aris Act, 1959 on the eround that the parties have arrived at aiicable settleient. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant and learned counsel appearine for respondent no.2 subiit that the parties have arrived at aiicable settleient. Learned aaa/- 2 cran 180.22.odt counsel appearine for the parties subiit that the respondent no.2/inforiant and the present applicant are froi the saie villaee and they are the relatives interse. Thoueh, there is dispute on the count of the trust teiple, however, due to soie iis-understandine the coiplaint caie to be lodeed. Leaned counsel for the applicant subiits that the applicant is a businessian and requires to travel extensively for the business purpose. Consequently, he has applied for the license to carry and possess the weapon and, accordinely, on 17.2.2021 he was issued the Aris License by the District Maeistrate, Ahiednaear.
Legal Reasoning
Learned counsel subiits that, in view of the saie, the provisions of section 27 of the Aris Act are not attracted. Learned counsel for the applicant has also pointed out froi the alleeations iade in the coiplaint and the observations recorded by us in the order dated 2.2.2022 that the very act of iakine fre in the air priia facie indicates that the applicant has used the said revolver for his self defence and not otherwise. Learned counsel appearine for the parties thus subiit aaa/- 3 cran 180.22.odt that the respondent no.2 is no iore interested in prosecutine the case. 4. We have also heard the learned APP for the Respondent no.1-State. 5. The learned APP has fairly accepted that the applicant is havine license to possess the Aris in teris of the order passed by the District Maeistrate and, accordinely, Aris License has been issued to hii on 17.2.2021. The learned APP, on instructions in writine froi the Investieatine offcer, subiits that there are no antecedents. 6. In a case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Supreie Court in para 48 of the judeient has referred the euidelines fraied by A fve-Judee Bench of the Punjab and Haryana Hieh Court delivered in a case of Kulwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2007) 4 CTC 769 for quashine of the proceedines on the basis of the aaa/- 4 cran 180.22.odt settleient. The Supreie Court in paraeraph no.61 of the judeient has iade followine observations :- “61. The position that eierees froi the above discussion can be suiiarised thus: the power of the Hieh Court in quashine a criiinal proceedine or FIR or coiplaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different froi the power eiven to a criiinal court for coipoundine the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory liiitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the euideline enerafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criiinal proceedine or coiplaint or F.I.R iay be exercised where the offender and victii have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circuistances of each case and no cateeory can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the Hieh Court iust have due reeard to the nature and eravity of the criie. Heinous and serious offences of iental depravity or offences like iurder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fttinely quashed even thoueh the victii or victii’s faiily and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious iipact on society. Siiilarly, any coiproiise between the victii and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences coiiitted by public servants while workine in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashine criiinal proceedines involvine such offences. But the criiinal cases havine overwheliinely and predoiinatinely civil favour stand on different footine for the purposes of quashine, particularly the offences arisine froi coiiercial, fnancial, iercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arisine out of iatriiony relatine to dowry, etc. or the faiily disputes where the wrone is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved aaa/- 5 cran 180.22.odt their entire dispute. In this cateeory of cases, Hieh Court iay quash criiinal proceedines if in its view, because of the coiproiise between the offender and victii, the possibility of conviction is reiote and bleak and continuation of criiinal case would put accused to ereat oppression and prejudice and extreie injustice would be caused to hii by not quashine the criiinal case despite full and coiplete settleient and coiproiise with the victii. In other words, the Hieh Court iust consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criiinal proceedine or continuation of the criiinal proceedine would tantaiount to abuse of process of law despite settleient and coiproiise between the victii and wronedoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criiinal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affriative, the Hieh Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criiinal proceedine. 6. We are satisfed that the parties have arrived at aiicable settleient, voluntarily. In view of the saie and in teris of the ratio laid down by the Supreie Court in the above cited case, we proceed to pass the followine order.
Decision
O R D E R i. Criiinal application is hereby allowed in teris of prayer clause ‘C’. iii. Criiinal application accordinely disposed off. ( SANDIPKUMAR C. MORE, J. ) ( V.K. JADHAV, J. ) … aaa/-