High Court
Legal Reasoning
1 cri appln 170.25IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADCRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 170 OF 2025Avdesh Mukutbihari Sharma.. ApplicantVersusThe State of Maharashtra and another.. RespondentsWITHCRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 172 OF 2025Avdesh Mukutbihari Sharma.. ApplicantVersusThe State of Maharashtra and another.. RespondentsShri V. D. Sapkal, Senior Advocate i/by Shri Sandip R. Sapkal, Advocate for the Applicant in both matters.Mrs. Chaitali Choudhari-Kutti, A.P.P. for the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in both matters.CORAM :SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. DATE :11TH MARCH, 2025.FINAL ORDER :.Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor tenders on recordcopy of reply in both matters.2.Heard both sides finally at the admission stage. There arecommon questions of facts and law involved in both the criminalapplications and, therefore, I propose to decide them by thiscommon order. 2 cri appln 170.253.The applicant is original accused in R.C.C. No. 01/2018 aswell as R.C.C. No. 40 of 2018 pending before the JudicialMagistrate First Class (Corporation Court) Aurangabad andfacing trial for offence punishable U/Sec. 18(a)(i) r/w Sec. 16 andSec. 17(b) p/u Sec. 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. He isseeking quashment of both the proceedings under shield ofdoctrine of double jeopardy as per Article 20 of the Constitutionof India and Sec. 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short‘Cr. P. C.’)4.Few relevant facts necessary for adjudication of theseapplications are that the applicant is facing criminal action forfollowing offences :(i)Cr. No. 718/2015 registered with Shipra Path PoliceStation, Jaipur for the offences punishable U/Sec. 27(b)(ii), 27(c)of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act r/w Sec. 420 and 487 of theIndian Penal Code which culminated into Sessions Case No. 45 of2016 and lateron ended in conviction.(ii)Cr. No. 334/2016 registered on 14.05.2016 with PoliceStation CIDCO, Aurangabad for the offences punishable U/Sec.27(c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 r/w Sec. 420 and 487of the Indian Penal Code, which is lateron quashed by theDivision Bench of this Court by judgment and order dated02.05.2019 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1355 of 2017. 3 cri appln 170.25(iii)R.C.C. No. 367 of 2018, which culminated into order dated24.03.2022 passed by the learned Additional Chief MetropolitanMagistrate No. 4, Jaipur, State of Rajasthan, dropping theproceedings.(iv)Impugned R.C.C. No. 01 of 2018 pending before theJudicial Magistrate First Class (Corporation Court) Aurangabadfor the offence punishable U/Sec. 18(a)(i) r/w Sec. 16 and Sec.17(b) p/u Sec. 27(d) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.(v)Impugned R.C.C. No. 40 of 2018 for the offences punishableU/Sec. 18(a)(i) r/w Sec. 16 and Sec. 17(b) p/u Sec. 27(d) of theDrugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 pending before the JudicialMagistrate First Class (Corporation Court) Aurangabad.5.Undisputedly, the offence registered against the applicantin the State of Rajasthan bearing Cr. No. 718/2015 was ended inconviction by judgment and order dated 18.07.2018. Beingaggrieved, applicant preferred appeal before the High Court ofRajasthan, which is pending. Cr. No. 334/2016 was quashed bythe Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated02.05.2019 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1355 of 2017. Thirdoffence referred above i. e. R.C.C. No. 367 of 2018 was concludedby order dated 24.03.2022 by the Additional Chief MetropolitanMagistrate No. 4, Jaipur (Rajasthan) dropping the proceedingson the principles of double jeopardy as contemplated by Sec. 300 4 cri appln 170.25of the Cr. P. C. read with Article 20 of the Constitution of India.Last two proceedings are under challenge in the present matters.Those are sought to be quashed by invoking powers U/Sec. 300 ofthe Cr. P. C. read with Article 20 of the Constitution of India. 6.It is relevant to notice that first offence was registeredagainst the applicant bearing Cr. No. 718/2015 on 03.11.2015.The applicant was arrested on or about 03.11.2015. Thereafter,he was in jail continuously till the orders suspending hissentence were passed by the High Court in his appeal on02.02.2019. During his incarceration subsequent offences cameto be registered against him, three at Aurangabad and one atJaipur (Rajasthan). The applicant was found to be involved inillegal manufacturing and selling of spurious drugs. The raidwas conducted at House No. 974, Shanti Nagar, infront ofDurgapura Railway Station, Durgapura at Jaipur (Rajasthan)and spurious drugs with certain material were found. Theformalities were completed and the matter was referred to theconcern police station.7.The spurious drugs were distributed from that place tovarious places. A letter was addressed by the Drug Controller,Jaipur (Rajasthan) on 04.11.2015 to Drug Controller General ofIndia, New Delhi referring illegal manufacturing of fictitious andspurious drugs. The copy of the said letter was forwarded tovarious drug controllers in different states. Along with the letterlist of the firms to whom drugs were supplied containing drug 5 cri appln 170.25licence, invoice number and date of supply was also circulated. 8.After investigation, charge sheet was filed and theapplicant was tried for the offences punishable U/Sec. 27(b)(ii),27(c) of the Drugs and Comestics Act, 1940 r/w Sec. 420 and 487of the Indian Penal Code. He was convicted vide judgment andorder dated 18.07.2018. He was also sentenced for the distinctoffences after the conviction. Being aggrieved, he preferredappeal, which is pending before the High Court of Rajasthan. 9.Learned senior counsel Mr. V. D. Sapkal appearing for theapplicant submits that offence is the same and there should nothave been separate registration of subsequent offences. Hewould submit that it is chain of events flowing from incidentoccurred on 02.11.2015. Subsequent, registration of offenceincluding impugned proceedings are part and parcel of theoffence which was first in time. He would rely on the judgmentof the Division Bench of this Court passed on 02nd May, 2019 inCriminal Writ Petition No. 1355 of 2017, by which subsequentlyregistered Cr. No. 334/2015 was quashed.10.Learned senior counsel further adverted my attention tothe order passed by the Additional Chief MetropolitanMagistrate No. 4, Jaipur (Rajasthan) on 24.03.2024 in R.C.C. No.367 of 2018 quashing/dropping those proceedings in view of Sec.300 of the Cr. P. C. read with Article 20 of the Constitution ofIndia. It is submitted that there is only one transaction of 6 cri appln 170.25manufacturing and distribution of spurious drugs to variousfirms that would not give rise to independent cause of action toinitiate criminal action against the perpetrator. He would relyon letter dated 04.11.2015 to demonstrate that how theinformation was circulated and would also place reliance on theconduct of the Drug Inspector Mr. M. N. Ayya, Drug Controllerand informant in the impugned proceedings Mr. Vachan SinghMeena, Drug Control Officer from Jaipur. Learned seniorcounsel also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in thematter of T. P. Gopalkrishan Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2022)14 SCC 323 to buttress the submission that impugnedproceedings are unsustainable due to principle of doublejeopardy.11.Per contra, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor Ms.Chaitali Choudhari-Kutti would vehemently oppose thesubmissions of the learned senior counsel. She would refer to theaffidavit in reply filed in both the applications. She wouldsubmit that the offence in which the applicant was convicted isaltogether different than the offences involved in the impugnedproceedings because different drugs were seized. She would alsoadvert my attention to panchanama prepared at Aurangabad toshow that the material found with the applicant was different. Itis vehemently submitted that offences were different, overt actswere different and, therefore, the impugned proceedings are notcontinuation of the earlier offences. My attention is invited toorder dated 24.03.2022 passed in R.C.C. No. 367 of 2018 to 7 cri appln 170.25buttress the submission that criminal court at Jaipur haddropped the proceedings because identical drugs were involvedand that is not the case in the present matter. It is vehementlysubmitted that Sec. 300 of the Cr. P. C. cannot be involved toquash the present proceedings. Rather, the applicant is habitualoffender and needs to be tried.12.Having considered rival submissions of the parties, itreveals that applicant has already suffered conviction andsentence for the offence bearing Cr. No. 718/2015 by thecompetent Court at Jaipur (Rajasthan) and appeal against thatis pending before the High Court of Rajasthan. Next offenceregistered against him bearing Cr. No. 334/2015 was quashed bythe Division Bench of this Court holding that it would amount todouble jeopardy by implication of Sec. 300 of the Cr. P. C. readwith Article 20 of the Constitution. R.C.C. No. 367 of 2018 wasdropped by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate atJaipur (Rajasthan) vide order dated 24.03.2022. The impugnedproceedings are sought to be challenged in the wake of decision ofDivision Bench.13.The sequence of events commenced from 02.11.2015 andoffence bearing No. 718/2015 was registered at Jaipur(Rajasthan). Various spurious drugs were found, which wereillegally manufactured and distributed by the applicant. It isevident from the conduct of the Drugs Controller and theconcerned officers that the information was circulated to the 8 cri appln 170.25higher authorities along with necessary details as the spuriousdrugs were noticed to be distributed to various states. The DrugsControllers were in contact with each others and by coordinationthe activities of the applicant were circulated and informed.When Cr. No. 334/2016 was registered with Police StationCIDCO, Aurangabad, it was again a case of spurious drugs foundat Shop No. 2, Plot No. 36 of Ganesh Housing Society, N-8,Aurangabad. The charge sheet was filed in the offence aftercompletion of the investigation. That was sought to bechallenged by preferring Criminal Writ Petition No. 1355 of2017. Identical grounds of objections were raised by theapplicant before the Division Bench. By elaborate and wellreasoned order, criminal writ petition was allowed and theproceedings were quashed. It is relevant to refer to followingparagraphs.“7. Let us first consider the legal aspects raised by thepetitioner relating to filing of the second F.I.R. The ApexCourt in Amit Shah's case (supra), observed :-“32. This Court has consistently laid down the lawon the issue interpreting the Code, that a secondF.I.R. in respect of an offence or different offencescommitted in the course of the same transaction isnot only impermissible but it violates Article 21 ofthe Constitution. In T.T. Anthony (AIR 2001 SC2637) (supra), this Court has categorically held thatregistration of second F.I.R. (which is not a crosscase) is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution.The following conclusion in paragraph nos.19, 20 9 cri appln 170.25and 27 of that judgment are relevant which read asunder : “19. The scheme of Cr.P.C. is that an officer incharge of a police station has to commenceinvestigation as provided in Section 156 or 157Cr.P.C. on the basis of entry of the first informationreport, on coming to know of the commission of acognizable offence. On completion of investigationand on the basis of the evidence collected, he has toform an opinion under Section 169 or 170 Cr.P.C.,as the case may be, and forward his report to theMagistrate concerned under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.However, even after filing such a report, if hecomes into possession of further information ormaterial, he need not register a fresh F.I.R.; he isempowered to make further investigation, normallywith the leave of the Court, and where duringfurther investigation he collects further evidenceoral or documentary, he is obliged to forward thesame with one or more further reports; this is theimport of subsection (8) of Section 173, Cr.P.C. 20.From the above discussion it follows that under thescheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156,157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 Cr.P.C. only the earliestor the first information in regard to the commissionof a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements ofSection 154 Cr.P.C. Thus there can be no secondF.I.R. and consequently there can be no freshinvestigation on receipt of every subsequentinformation in respect of the same cognizableoffence or the same occurrence or incident givingrise to one or more cognizable offences. On receiptof information about a cognizable offence or an 10 cri appln 170.25incident giving rise to a cognizable offence oroffences and on entering the F.I.R. in the stationhouse diary, the officer in charge of a police stationhas to investigate not merely the cognizable offencereported in the F.I.R. but also other connectedoffences found to have been committed in thecourse of the same transaction or the sameoccurrence and file one or more reports as providedin Section 173. 27. A just balance between the fundamentalrights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of theConstitution and the expansive power of the policeto investigate a cognizable offence has to be struckby the court. There cannot be any controversy thatsub-section (8) of Section 173, Cr.P.C. empowersthe police to make further investigation, obtainfurther evidence (both oral and documentary) andforward a further report or reports to theMagistrate. In Narang case (AIR 1979 SC 1791) itwas, however, observed that it would beappropriate to conduct further investigation withthe permission of the court. However, the sweepingpower of investigation does not warrant subjectinga citizen each time to fresh investigation by thepolice in respect of the same incident, giving rise toone or more cognizable offences, consequent uponfiling of successive F.I.Rs. whether before or afterfiling the final report under Section 173(2), Cr.P.C.It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections154 and 156, Cr.P.C., nay, a case of abuse of thestatutory power of investigation in a given case. Inour view a case of fresh investigation based on thesecond or successive F.I.Rs., not being a counter 11 cri appln 170.25case, filed in connection with the same orconnected cognizable offence alleged to have beencommitted in the course of the same transaction andin respect of which pursuant to the first F.I.R. eitherinvestigation is under way or final report underSection 173(2) has been forwarded to theMagistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of powerunder Section 482, Cr.P.C. or under Articles226/227 of the Constitution”The above referred declaration of law by this Courthas never been diluted in any subsequent judicialpronouncements even while carving out exceptions. 33. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In C. Maniappan (supra),this Court explained “consequence test”, i.e., if anoffence forming part of the second F.I.R. arises as aconsequence of the offence alleged in the first F.I.R.then offences covered by both the F.I.Rs. are thesame and, accordingly, the second F.I.R. will beimpermissible in law. In other words, the offencescovered in both the F.I.Rs. shall have to be treated asa part of the first F.I.R.. . . . . . . .36. In Babulal (supra), the Privy Council has heldthat if several persons conspire to commit offences,and commit overt acts in pursuance of theconspiracy (a circumstance which makes the act ofone the act of each and all the conspirators), theseacts are committed in the course of the sametransaction, which embraces the conspiracy and theacts done under it. The common concert andagreement which constitute the conspiracy, serve to 12 cri appln 170.25unify the acts done in pursuance of it.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42. In the case of Babubhai (2010 AIR SCW5126) (supra), the very same Bench considered thepermissibility of more than one F.I.R. and the test ofsameness. After explaining F.I.R. under Section 154of the Code, commencement of the investigation,formation of opinion under Section 169 or 170 of theCode, police report under Section 173 of the Codeand statements under Section 162 of the Code, thisCourt, has held that the Court has to examine thefacts and circumstances giving rise to both theF.I.Rs. and the test of sameness is to be applied tofind out whether both the F.I.Rs. relate to the sameincident in respect of the same occurrence or are inregard to the incidents having two or more parts ofthe same transaction. This Court further held that ifthe answer is in affirmative, the second F.I.R. isliable to be quashed. It was further held that, in casethe contrary is proved, where the version of thesecond F.I.R. is different and is in respect of the twodifferent incidents/ crimes, the second F.I.R. ispermissible. This Court further explained that incase in respect of the same incident the accused inthe first F.I.R. comes forward with a differentversion or counterclaim, investigation on both theF.I.Rs. has to be conducted. It is clear from thedecision that if two F.I.Rs. pertain to two differentincidents crimes, second F.I.R. is permissible. In thelight of the factual position in the case on hand, theratio in that decision is not helpful to the case of theC.B.I.” 13 cri appln 170.258. The F.I.R. registered at Shipra Path Police Station,Jaipur records that the officials of the Controller of Drugs,Rajasthan searched the premises. It was noticed that,number of drugs were stored on the ground floor, besidesthe machinery like Mixer, bottling machine, sealingmachine, blister packing machine and packing material etc.It was also found that the drugs were manufactured on thevery premises. Labels on the containers of the drugs,however, showed it to have been manufactured by M/sAvya Health Care, Rudrapur, District Mandi. On enquirywith the concerned authority, it was found that, no suchfirm by name Avya Health Care did exist. The drugs andmedicines found during the raid came to be seized.Samples thereof were taken. It was further found that thedrugs manufactured there, were supplied and sold atAurangabad, Sangli in the State of Maharashtra and insome other States as well.10. Admittedly, the Controller of Drugs, Rajasthaninformed about the raid to his counterpart in Maharashtra.Consequently, the office of Joint Commissioner, Food &Drugs Administration, Aurangabad Division came to beinformed on 9.11.2016. Shri Manoj Ayya, Drug Inspector,therefore, paid visit and inspected visited RichmondLaboratory, Shop No.2, Ganesh Housing Society, CIDCO,Aurangabad on 21.11.2015 and inspected the same. Duringthe inspection, it was found that, the drugs manufacturedon the premises at Jaipur, however, were stocked/ stored inthe Shop No.2. Samples of TFLOX-OZ Tab,B.No.AAH0947 and Coldbee Suspension, B.No.AAH0981were obtained for analysis. Purchase bills and sale invoicesavailable at the shop came to be seized. The samples ofboth the drugs have been analysed by the Public Analyst tofind that both the drugs did not conform to the standards 14 cri appln 170.25and thus were spurious. While the F.I.R. was lodged, thePublic Analyst’s report regarding TFLOX-OZ Tab wasavailable. The report regarding “Coldbee Suspension” wasreceived later on. The Drug Inspector, therefore, lodged theF.I.R. on 14.5.2016, alleging the respondent RichmondLaboratory/ Shop owner, Shri Abhijeet Wagdalkar (co-accused) and the petitioner herein, in furtherance of theirconspiracy, manufactured, stored and sold spurious drugs.12. Since the offence covered by the second F.I.R. formspart of the same transaction of the offence covered by thefirst F.I.R., the second F.I.R., so far as regards thepetitioner is concerned, is unsustainable in law in view ofthe dictum of the Apex Court in Amit Shah’s case (supra).The impugned F.I.R. is, therefore, liable to be quashed sofar as regards the petitioner is concerned. The proprietor ofRichmond Laboratory is not before us. His case would,therefore, not be governed by this order.20. The Public Analyst’s report indicates the two drugsseized from Richmond Laboratory were found to bespurious. There is record to prima facie indicatecompliance of Section 25(2) of the Act. Copy of the reportwas sought to be delivered to the petitioner in jail. He,however refused to receive the same. The charge sheet(now supplementary) came to be filed after shelf life of thedrugs was over. The petitioner may, therefore, be justifiedto contend to have suffered prejudice in his right to havethe sample tested by Central Laboratory. We do notpropose to give any positive finding in view of the fact thatthe Drug Inspector has launched prosecution against thepetitioner and the proprietor of Richmond Laboratory,Aurangabad by filing complaint before the Court ofJudicial Magistrate, First Class. The petitioner is at liberty
Decision
15 cri appln 170.25to agitate his grievance since the prosecution launchedpursuant to the said complaint is not under challenge in thisWrit Petition.23. In the result, the petition partly succeeds in terms ofthe following order :O R D E R (i) The Criminal Writ Petition is partly allowed.(ii) F.I.R., being Crime No.334/2016, registered withCIDCO, Aurangabad Police Station is quashed so far asregards the present petitioner is concerned.(iii) Charge Sheet No.301/2017 is treated assupplementary charge sheet, lodged pursuant to the furtherinvestigation and the same, therefore, be sent to ShipraPath Police Station, for further course of action regardingprosecution of the petitioner for offence punishable underSection 420 read with Section 120-B of the Indian PenalCode and any other offence, but not any offence under theDrugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, since the prosecution hasbeen launched by filing a complaint.(iv) We hope that the Police Station Incharge of ShipraPath Police Station, Jaipur would do the needful to ensurethat the petitioner is tried for the offence/s disclosed tohave been committed by him during the furtherinvestigation.”14.Ultimately, the charge sheet bearing No. 301/2017 filed inthat offence was directed to be treated as supplementary chargesheet and directed to be transmitted to the Police Station 16 cri appln 170.25Incharge Kshiprapat Police Station, Jaipur (Rajasthan) andobviously criminal case was quashed. I propose to adopt thesame course and reasons.15.Another reason to accept the submissions of the learnedsenior counsel is that the Additional Chief MetropolitanMagistrate No. 4, Jaipur in collateral proceedings bearing R.C.C.No. 367 of 2018 dropped the proceedings on almost identical linevide order dated 24.03.2022. Thus not only the Division Bench ofour High Court held that it was double jeopardy, but competentCourt at Jaipur (Rajasthan) also concluded in the same manner.16.I find that the drugs seized from the applicant atAurangabad might not be the same, from those seized in the firstoffence. However, fact remains that in the first offence there wasallegation of illegal manufacturing and distribution/sell ofspurious drugs to various dealers and distributors in India. TheDivision Bench also concluded that these are the sequence ofsame offences or rather it is chain of events and the independentinstances cannot be treated as separate offences giving separatecause of action.17.Learned A. P. P. has vehemently pointed out that thesamples, panchanama, place of offence and hence there areseparate offences. It is not the case of the prosecution that beforeregistering offences at Aurangabad the applicant was found tohave illegally manufacturing and distributing the spurious 17 cri appln 170.25drugs. The overt act alleged against the applicant in theimpugned proceedings have a nexus to his earlier overt act,which was part of the prosecution conducted against him inRajasthan. The applicant was in jail from 03.11.2015 till02.02.2019. It was not possible for him in normal course ofcircumstances to indulge in the illegal activity. It is also not caseof the prosecution that after releasing on bail, he indulged in theactivities of illegal manufacturing and distribution of spuriousdrugs. I am unable to concur with the submissions of the learnedA. P. P.18.It would be useful to refer to judgment cited by the learnedsenior counsel of the Supreme Court in the matter of T. P.Gopalkrishan Vs. State of Kerala (supra). Relevant extracts inpara Nos. 24, 25, 27, 31 and 32 of the judgment are givenhereinbelow.“24. Section 300 of the CrPC embodies the general rulewhich affirms the validity of the pleas of autrefois acquit(previously acquitted) and autrefois convict (previouslyconvicted). Sub-section (1) of Section 300 lays down therule of double jeopardy and sub-sections (2) to (5) deal withthe exceptions. Accordingly, so long as an order of acquittalor conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction remainsin force, the person cannot be tried for the same offence forwhich he was tried earlier or for any other offence arisingfrom the same fact situation, except the cases dealt in withunder sub-sections (2) to (5) of the section. 25. Section 300 of the CrPC is based on the maxim nemo 18 cri appln 170.25deber bis vexari, si costest curiae quod sit pro una et eademcausa which means that a person cannot be tried a secondtime for an offence which is involved in an offence withwhich he was previously charged. As per the decision ofthis Court in Vijayalakshmi vs. Vasudevan (1994) 4 SCC656 in order to bar the trial of any person already tried, itmust be shown that :(i) he has been tried by a competent court forthe same offence or one for which he might have beencharged or convicted at a trial, on the same facts,(ii) he has been convicted or acquitted at thetrial, and(iii) such conviction or acquittal is in force.27. Section 300 of the CrPC bars the trial of a person notonly for the same offence but also for any other offence onthe same facts, vide Thakur Ram vs. State of Bihar AIR1966 SC 911.31.Before dealing with the issue at hand, it is necessaryto understand what the term ‘same offence’ means andincludes. The term ‘same offence’ in simple languagemeans, where the offences are not distinct and theingredients of the offences are identical. Where there aretwo distinct offences made up of different ingredients, theembargo under Article 20 of the Constitution of India, hasno application, though the offences may have someoverlapping features. The crucial requirement of Article 20is that the offences are the same and identical in allrespects, vide State (N.C.T. of Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu(2005) 11 SCC 600. 19 cri appln 170.2532. The concept of double jeopardy can also beunderstood in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution ofIndia which states that no person shall be deprived of hislife or personal liberty except according to procedureestablished by law. ‘Life’ under Article 21 of theConstitution is not merely the physical act of breathing. Itdoes not connote mere animal existence or continueddrudgery through life. It has a much wider connotation; itincludes the right to live with human dignity. In thecelebrated judgment in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs.Union of India 1978 AIR 597, this Court gave a newdimension to Article 21, wherein it stated that the right tolive includes within its ambit the right to live with dignity.Under the umbrella of Article 21, various rights like right tofree legal aid, right to speedy trial, right to fair trial, etc.have been included. Similarly, protection against doublejeopardy is also included under the scope of Article 21 ofthe Constitution of India. Prosecuting a person for the sameoffence in same series of facts, for which he has previouslyeither been acquitted or has been convicted and undergonethe punishment, affects the person’s right to live withdignity. 19.I find that it is an abuse of process of law to ask theapplicant to face the impugned proceedings for the alleged overtact, which is part and parcel of the first offence or emanatingfrom the first offence. In the peculiar facts and circumstances ofthe case, I am of the considered view that case is made out tocause interference in the impugned proceedings. I, therefore,pass following order : 20 cri appln 170.25O R D E RA.The criminal applications are allowed.B.R.C.C. No. 01 of 2018 and R.C.C. No. 40 of 2018 pendingbefore the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (CorporationCourt) Aurangabad are quashed and set aside to the extent ofthe applicant.C.This will not preclude the respondents or its counter partfrom State of Rajasthan to utilize the material collected againstthe applicant in the proceedings which are pending before theHigh Court of Rajasthan.[SHAILESH P. BRAHME J.] bsb/March 25