StateMr v. P. Golewar

Legal Reasoning

corrected-CriWP64-23.odtIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYBENCH AT AURANGABADCRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 64 OF 2023Arun s/o Hastimal FirodiyaAge: 77 years, Occu: BusinessR/o Kinetic Engineering Ltd.,D-1 Block, Plot No. 18/2MIDC, Chinchwad, Pune 411 019… Petitioner(Ori. Accused No.3)VERSUS1.The State of Maharashtra2.Ramrao Hanumantrao KandekarAge 77 years, Occu: Agri.R/o Nepti,Tq. & Dist. Ahmednagar… Respondents(R-2/employee)Mr. Rajendrraa Deshmukkh, Senior Advocate a/w Ms. Rakshanda Rajan Jaiswal i/by Mr. Vishal Chavan, Advocate for the Petitioner,Mr. S. M. Ganachari, APP for Respondent No.1 StateMr. V. P. Golewar, Advocate for Respondent No.2CORAM :Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J.RESERVED ON :10.03.2025PRONOUNCED ON: 27.03.2025JUDGMENT:-1.At the outset it is to be mentioned that, on 06.02.2025, duringthe course of argument, Mr. Rajendrraa Deshmukkh, the learned seniorcounsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr. V. P. Golewar, learned counselfor respondent No.2 jointly made the statement about amicable settlementof dispute between the parties. In pursuance of said statement, thePetitioner/Chairman of the Industrial Establishment and employer ofPage 1 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtRespondent i.e. Kinetic Engineering Ltd., tendered offer at Exh. ‘X’. TheRespondent No.2/ Employee tendered his offer at Exh. ‘Y’. As per offerExh. ‘X’ submitted by the petitioner, the respondent No.2 employee isentitled for monetary benefits arising out of his service to Rs.10,30,000/-,whereas, the respondent No.2/ employee submitted his offer Exh. ‘Y’ andclaimed that, he is entitled for monetary benefits of Rs.29,81,686/-. Onenquiry, both the parties declined to negotiate the offers and fairly statedthat they do not wish to settle the dispute. As such, matter is heard onmerit.2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and by consent of theparties, heard both sides finally at the admission stage.3. By the present Petition, the Petitioner takes exception to theorder dated 17.11.2022 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court,Ahmednagar, in Revision (ULP) No.5 of 2022, thereby upheld the order ofissuance of process passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court,Ahmednagar, on 06.08.2022, in Criminal Complaint (ULP) No. 9 of 2020for non implementation of Judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by thelearned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998.4. In nutshell, facts giving rise to present petition are that,Page 2 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtrespondent No.2/complainant was in service of Kinetic Engineering Ltd.,(for short, hereinafter it would be referred to as “IndustrialEstablishment”) as Machinist. The Respondent No.2 was served withcharge sheet on 30.01.1997 for his alleged misconduct. After domesticenquiry, the respondent No.2 was dismissed from service vide order dated08.05.1998. Being aggrieved by order of dismissal, respondent No.2 filedComplaint (ULP) No. 57/1998 before the learned Labour Court,Ahmednagar. On 29.11.2019, the learned Judge, Labour Court passed theJudgment in Complaint (ULP) No. 57/1998 and allowed said complaintdeclaring that, the order of dismissal passed on 08.05.1998 by theemployer amounts to unfair labour practice contemplated under Item1(a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the MaharashtraRecognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour PracticesAct, 1971 ( for short, the MRTU & PULP Act).5.Being aggrieved by said Judgment, the employer/Industrialestablishment had filed Revision Petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020 before theIndustrial Court. On 14.12.2021, the learned Member, Industrial Court,passed the Judgment in Revision petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020 and upheldJudgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by the learned Labour Court inComplaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998. Being aggrieved by both the Judgments,the Employer/Industrial Establishment filed Writ Petition No.11899 ofPage 3 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odt2022 before this Court. On 12.01.2022, this Court passed an order inWrit Petition No.11899 of 2022 and issued “Rule”. However, this Courtdeclined to grant interim stay to the effect and operation of Judgmentdated 14.12.2021 passed by the learned Industrial Court. The said petitionis pending for final decision. Thereafter, the respondent No.2 filed theCriminal Complaint (ULP) No. 9 of 2020 under section 48(1) of the MRTU& PULP Act and prayed for taking criminal action against the Respondentsfor non implementation of Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court. 6.The Respondent no. 2 alleged that, his employer/IndustrialEstablishment failed to comply with Judgment dated 29.11.2019 passedby the learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57/1998 despite nostay is in operation for implementing judgment dated 29.11.2019 andissued notice on 06.01.2020 calling upon the accused i.e. GeneralManager/Manager/Vice President/Managing Director/President forcomplying with Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court. TheAccused No.1 General Manager, the Industrial Establishment served withthe notice but failed to comply with notice. The Notice of Accused No.2Vice President/Managing Director and Accused No. 3 President returnedback with postal endorsement ‘unclaimed’. Therefore, the Accused No.2and Accused No.3 are deemed to be served within the meaning of Sec. 27of the General Clauses Act,1897. Page 4 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odt7.On 11.02.2021, the learned Judge, Labour Court recordedverification and testified contents of the complainant under Section 48(1)of the MRTU & PULP Act. On 06.08.2022, the learned Labour Courtpassed the order and issued process against Accused No.1 DattatrayMarutrao Nawale, the General Manager, Accused No.2 Mr. Ajinkya ArunFirodiya, the Vice President/Managing Director and Accused No.3 Mr. ArunHastimal Firodiya, the Chairman /President (present petitioner) for theoffence under Section 48(1) of the MRTU & PULP Act.8. Being aggrieved by order of issuance of process, thePetitioner/accused No.3 filed Revision (ULP) No. 5 of 2022 questioningorder of issuance of process. On 17.11.2022, the learned Member,Industrial Court, Ahmednagar, passed the impugned judgment anddismissed said Revision. Being aggrieved by said judgment, thePetitioner/Accused No.3 Arun Hastimal Firodiya, the President ofIndustrial Establishment has instituted the present petition and set outfollowing grounds:(i) The learned Member, Industrial Court could have held that thereis nothing on record to show the present petitioner is responsiblefor a compliance of the order dated 29.11.2019 passed by thelearned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP)No.57/ 1998.(ii) The learned Member Industrial Court could have observed thatPage 5 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtsince 1998 till institution of the petition, several proceedings wereinitiated by the respective parties against each other and to noneof the petition or proceeding, the present petitioner is party also,nothing has been brought on record to show the bonafideintention of respondent No.2 to implead the petitioner as anaccused.(iii) The learned Member Industrial Court could have observed thatrespondent No.2 also lodged complaint against the ManagingDirector of the Industrial Establishment therefore, it ought to haveheld that as per provisions of Section 2(n) of the Factories Act,1948, the occupier is responsible for day to day affairs of theIndustrial Establishment. Therefore, the order for issuance ofprocess against the Chairman of the Industrial establishment isnot legal and proper.(iv) There is no averment in the complaint that the present petitioneris responsible for the compliance of the order passed by thelearned Labour Court, which is essential ingredient for issuance ofprocess under section 48(1) of the MRTU & PULP Act. However,the learned Courts below have failed to consider the legalprepositions of law.(v) The learned Member, Industrial Court ought to have observed thatthe Industrial Establishment had filed Writ Petition No.11899/2022 challenging the judgment and order dated14.12.2021 passed in Revision petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020arising out of judgment and order dated 29.11.2019 passed inComplaint (ULP) No. 57/1998 and the fact of pendency of thesaid petition is well within the knowledge of respondent No.2,Page 6 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odthowever, respondent No.2 employee has filed criminalproceedings under Section 48 (1) of the MRTU & PULP Act, justto harass the Petitioner/accused No.3 President of the IndustrialEstablishment who is old aged person and suffering from variousailments.9.Mr. Rajendrraa Deshmukkh, the learned Senior counselappearing for the petitioner canvassed that, the petitioner was not partybefore the learned labour Court in complaint (ULP) No. No. 57/1998,however, the Accused no. 2 is the occupier of Industrial Establishmentwithin the meaning of Section 2(n) of the Factories Act, 1948, therefore,he is responsible for day to day affairs of the Industrial Establishment.Therefore, order for issuance of process against the petitioner/accusedChairman of the Industrial establishment is not legal and proper.10.In support of these submissions, the learned Senior Counselappearing for the Petitioner relied on the following case laws:(I)Judgment dated 29.10.2021 passed in SLP (Cri.)No.3913/2020, Dyale Desouza Vs. Government of India, wherein theHon’ble Supreme Court held that a company being a juristic personcannot be imprisoned and it can be subjected to a fine which, in itself is apunishment. Every punishment has an adverse consequence and therefore,the prosecution of the Company is mandatory. The exception wouldPage 7 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtpossibly be when the company has itself been ceased to exist or cannot beprosecuted due to a statutory bar. However, such exceptions are of norelevance in the present case. Thus, the present prosecution must fail forthis reason as well.(II). Madhav Ramkrishna Chitniss Vs. State of Maharashtra LAWS(BOM) 1998-9-100, wherein issue was under consideration that, whetherthe accused Nos. 1 to 14 therein could be attributed with knowledge ofthe interim order when they were not parties to the first complaint? Underthese circumstances, this Court observed in paragraph Nos. 17, 25 and 32as under:"(17.) UNLESS, therefore, it can be established that Accused Nos. 1to 14 are to be held liable because they are the Directors of theCompany of that the orders were against them, in my opinion, therecannot be any question of being held responsible criminally.(25) IN this background, so far as the petitioners are concerned,except for the fact that they happened to be the Directors of thecompany, there is no question of they having the knowledge of theorder passed by way of interim relief in the first compliant and,therefore, the act on their part can not be related to the so calledknowledge when it was sought to be imputed only on the strength ofthey being Directors. Certainly this can not be accepted.(32) THE net result is, therefore, that the complaint of breach can befiled against the person to whom the order is served. Unless it isshown that the persons, who were allegedly committed breach of anorder, were served with the order or whether they are made aware ofPage 8 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtthe order and, therefore, are said to be made answerable for thewilful disobedience thereof, there can not be a compliant on the basisof deeming fictions which is sought to be raised on the basis of theybeing directors."(III) Indian Tourism Development Corporation & others Vs.Presiding Officer, 9th Labour Court, Mumbai and another,2009(5) Mh.L.J.493, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court held that, unless interimorders are served personally, no action for contempt can be initiatedagainst persons concerned. So, the order for issuance of process has to bepassed after proper application of mind as laid down in case of State ofHaryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 andM/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate andothers, 1998 (1) Mh. L.J (SC) 599.(IV)S. S. Industries and Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Rajendra N. Gurav,Mumbai, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court considered Rule96(a) of the Labour Courts (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 1975 andSection 39 of the MRTU and PULP Act and observed as under:“(6) Section 39 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions andPrevention of Unfair labour Practices Act, 1971 provides threecategories of persons who are competent to file criminal complaintagainst the persons who commit offence under section 48(1) of thesaid Act. The person affected would be category No. 1. The personmeans a body of individual, also unrecognised union can becomplainant under the cover of body of individual and as said, it has aPage 9 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtright to institute a criminal complaint taking recourse to section 39 ofthe said Act. In the present proceedings, the respondent No. 2, byvirtue of application made by 16 employees under Order I, Rule 8 ofC.P.C. has made an application to the Industrial Court. Thecomplainant did not satisfy his role in the matter nor he figured inthose employees, complaint could not have been attended to withoutother employees being informed or specific leave of the Court isobtained. Explanation in complaint by respondent No. 1 is withoutlegal base. Personal execution can only be taken by party on record.(7) In the criminal complaint by respondent No. 1 in paragraph 1he refers of Noel Monteiro, being authorised person to file theproceedings in representative capacity. In paragraph 9, it is informedthat the petitioners stopped appearing in complaint (ULP) No. 741 of2000 and did not file written statement and consequently, the orderdated 20th October, 2007 was recorded by the Industrial Court. Thelearned Judge had examined various facts but he was not informeddeliberately of restoration and the complainant therein (respondentNo. 1) was not a party to the original proceedings. Taking survey ofthe above facts, the order of process issued by the learned Judge,Labour Court dated 6th January, 2009 is set aside. Petition is allowedin the above terms.”(V)United Helichapters Pvt. Ltd. and others Vs. S. P. Apsingekar,LAWS (BOM)- 2014-2-360, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Courtdealt with the order of issuance of process against the petitioners thereinby the learned Metropolitan Magistrate for the offence punishable underClause 13(1)(c) of the Private Security Guards (Regulation of Employmentand Welfare) Scheme 2022 read with section 3(3) of the MaharashtraPage 10 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtPrivate Security Guards (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act,1981. Petitioner No.2 therein was Chairman-cum-Managing Director andPetitioner No.2 was the Head of HR Department of the company. Underthe facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment in the case of ICICIBank Ltd. & others Vs. State of Maharashtra and another , 2011-II-LLJ-46(Bom) was relied on, wherein it is observed as under:"8. While dealing with a similar issue in Writ Petition No.1773/2009 Tops Security Ltd. and Another Vs. S.P. Aspingekar,Inspector, Security Guard Board for Greater Mumbai & ThaneDistrict and Another relying on the judgment of the Apex Courtin the case of S.K. Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradsh and Others(2008) 5 SCC 662: (2008) 1 MLJ (Cri) 1360, I have held thatunless a statute specifically provides for vicarious liability of adirector or any other employee for an offence committed by theemplo"8. While dealing with a similar issue in Writ Petition No.1773/2009 Tops Security Ltd. and Another Vs. S.P. Aspingekar,Inspector, Security Guard Board for Greater Mumbai & ThaneDistrict and Another relying on the judgment of the Apex Courtin the case of S.K. Alagh Vs. State of Uttar Pradsh and Others(2008) 5 SCC 662: (2008) 1 MLJ (Cri) 1360, I have held thatunless a statute specifically provides for vicarious liability of adirector or any other employee for an offence committed by theemployer such a director or employee cannot be vicariously heldliable. While considering the provisions of the Act along withprovisions of 2002 Scheme, specifically Clause 42(2) of the saidScheme, I have held that unless the conditions specified in subclause 2 of Clause 42 are satisfied, a director or an officer of anemployee cannot be made liable for offences committed by anemployer."yer such a director or employee cannot be vicariouslyPage 11 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtheld liable. While considering the provisions of the Act alongwith provisions of 2002 Scheme, specifically Clause 42(2) of thesaid Scheme, I have held that unless the conditions specified insub clause 2 of Clause 42 are satisfied, a director or an officer ofan employee cannot be made liable for offences committed by anemployer."11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for RespondentNo.2 employee canvassed that, on 29.11.2019, the learned Labour Courtpassed judgment in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998 and set aside orderof dismissal passed on 08.05.1998 holding that the Employer of theRespondent no. 2 indulged into unfair labour practice contemplated underItem 1 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act,1971 and the Respondentno. 2 employer is deemed to be in service w.e.f. 08.05.1998 and he isentitled for full back wages with consequential benefits till date of hissuperannuation. Further, on 14.12.2022, the learned Member, IndustrialCourt passed the Judgment in Revision (ULP) No.4 of 2020 and affirmedthe Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court. Though the EmployerIndustrial Establishment filed Writ Petition No. 11899 of 2022 before thisCourt, however, on 12.01.2023, this Court issued Rule and declined togrant stay to the operation of the judgment and order dated 14.12.2021passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, in Revision (ULP) No. 4of 2020. Therefore, it is obligatory on the part of the IndustrialEstablishment, its General Manager, Chairman/President/Vice President,Page 12 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtManaging Director to comply with said Judgment, however, the Petitionerand other Accused failed to comply the same.12.The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 furthercanvassed that, on 06.01.2020, Respondent No.2 issued notice with boththe Judgments and had called upon the accused persons to comply withthe Judgments, however, notice of present Petitioner returned back withpostal endorsement “unclaimed”. Respondent No.2 has specifically madeaverment in complaint that, present Petitioner/accused No. 3 is President/Chairman of the Industrial Establishment and he is responsible for day today affairs of the Industrial Establishment. Not only this, but the GeneralManager of the Industrial Establishment was duly served with the noticeand fact of passing of the Judgment by learned Labour Court is withinknowledge of the present Petitioner/Accused No.3. Therefore, merely thepetitioner is old aged person and may be suffering from various ailmentscannot be the substantial ground for quashment of order of issuanceprocess passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court under Section 48(1) ofthe MRTU & PULP Act, hence, prayed for dismissal of the Petition.13.The learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 furthercanvassed that, Mr. Arun Hastimal Firodia, the Chairman of the IndustrialEstablishment had assailed order dated 06.08.2022 in RevisionPage 13 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtPetition(ULP) No. 5 of 2022 challenging order of issuance of process,however, on 17.11.2022, the learned Member, Industrial Court passed theimpugned judgment and dismissed the Revision. Therefore, the accusedNo.3/ the Chairman of the Industrial Establishment is responsible for theday to day affairs of the Industrial Establishment and is under obligationto comply with the Judgment passed by the Labour Court. However, thepetitioner failed to comply with said Judgment intentionally anddeliberately. Therefore, order of issuance of process under Section 48(1) ofthe MRTU & PULP Act is just and proper, hence, prayed for dismissal ofthe Petition.14.In support of this submission, the learned counsel appearingfor Respondent No.2 relied on the following case laws as under:(i) Sonu Gopta Vs. Deepak Gupta and others, (2015) 3 SupremeCorut Cases 424, wherein it is held that at the stage of cognizance andsummoning, the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind only witha view to take cognizance of offence or in other words, to find outwhether prima facie case has been made out for summoning the accusedperson. At this stage, the Magistrate is not required to consider thedefence version or material or argument nor he required to evaluate themerits of the material or evidence of the complainant, because theMagistrate must not undertake the exercise to find out at this stagePage 14 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtwhether these materials will lead to conviction or not.(ii)Satish J. Mehta and others Vs. The State of Maharashtra andothers, 1991 II CLR 547, wherein, it is held that Section 48 of the Act iswide enough to cover the persons who are not parties to the complaintprovided they were bound to comply the order of the Industrial Court andfailed to comply the same. Therefore, the blanket proposition that ineach and every case, company is must in the array of the accused need notbe accepted.(iii)Judgment dated 11th April,2016 passed by this Court inCriminal Writ Petition No. 586 of 2014, Gulabrao Bhadu Pawar Vs.Ajinkya Arun Firodya, Managing Director, Kinetic Engineering Ltd., andobserved in Paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 as under:“6. In the present case, what is noticed is, the Industrial Court hasaccepted the statement of accused person made in the applicationwhich was without any legal foundation but for pleadings, and hasdischarged the accused Ajinkya Firodiya. The least that was expectedof the Industrial Court was to consider the pleadings of the petitioner-complainant in an application under Section 48(1) of M.R.T.U. &P.U.L.P. Act, showing the respondent to be accused person in the same,and proceeded after ascertaining liability and responsibility inmanaging affairs of the Company, particularly in the matter ofcompliance of the Judicial verdicts given by the learned Court infavour of the petitioner to which respondent was party.7. The order which is impugned in the present petition prima faciePage 15 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtcould be inferred as the one passed by the learned Industrial Courtwithout considering above referred parameters and hence not in tunewith the provisions of Section 48(1) of the Act. As a consequence ofabove, even if original accused No. 1 Hemant Dike is convicted underSection 48(1) of the Act, still in my opinion, the order of issuance ofprocess and the discharge order would not merged with the finalorder passed against other accused Hemant. The role of the presentrespondent Ajinkya has to be analysed. so as to find out whether he isentitled for discharge.”(iv)Vijay Laxmanrao Vahadne Vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodiya, 218 AllM.R. (Cri) 499, wherein, the proceeding was initiated against the GeneralManager who was convicted but the complainant did not get execution ofthe order of reinstatement. Therefore, the Board of Directors andManaging Director were expected to execute the orders of the Court.(v)Judgment dated 20.04.2021 passed by this Court in CriminalWrit Petition No. 1893 of 2019, Dilip Bhikaji Londhe Vs. Ajinkya ArunFirodiya & another, wherein this court considered various case laws citedtherein as well scope of Section 48(1) of the MRTU & PULP Act and heldthat, the offences made punishable thereunder would be continuous act ofa person of failing to comply with the order of the Industrial or LabourCourts. There is no question of any double jeopardy. The order directingthe petitioner to be reinstated has reached finality and it is the obligationof the company and the person managing its affairs to obey it. Therefore,Page 16 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtso long as the order is not implemented/obeyed, it would always be openfor the person like the petitioner to seek to proceed against the personswho according to him are responsible for execution and to obey the orderbut have failed to do so. In para 13, this Court further observed that,whether and if he would be able to establish the charge is a matter whichcannot be gone into at this stage. By sending a letter by Registered PostAD and calling upon the respondents to obey the order of the IndustrialCourt but fail to comply the same, would be entitled to insist forimplementation of the order which has been reached finality.15. In the case in hand it is not in dispute that, the respondentNo. 2 filed Criminal Complaint (ULP) No. 9 of 2020 and specificallyalleged that, on 29.11.2019, the learned Labour Court passed judgment inComplaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998 and set aside the order of his dismissaldated 08.05.1998. So also, on 14.12.2021, the learned Member IndustrialCourt passed the judgment and order in Revision Petition (ULP) No 4 of2020 and affirmed the judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by the learnedLabour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998.16.It is a matter of record that, the Industrial Establishment filedWrit Petition No. 11899 of 2022 challenging the judgment and order dated14.12.2021 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court in RevisionPage 17 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odt(ULP) NO. 4 of 2020 arising out of judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed bythe learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998. However,on 12.01.2023, this Court simply issued Rule but declined to grant interimrelief. 17.No doubt, the Writ Petition No. 11899 of 2022 filed by theEmployer of Respondent NO.2 is subjudice before this Court. However,merely the Petition is admitted without granting stay to the effect andoperation of the judgment and order dated 14.12.2021 passed by thelearned Member, Industrial Court in Revision Petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020arising out of judgment dated 29.11.2019 passed by the learned LabourCourt in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998, said judgment does notautomatically loose it’s operation. Therefore, the Respondent No.2/Employee has every right to get implemented the judgment and orderdated 29.11.2019 passed by the learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP)No. 57 of 1998.18. Needless to say that, on 29.11.2019, the learned Labour Courtpassed the judgment and order declaring that, the act of employer whileissuing order of dismissal of the Respondent’s service on 08.05.1998amounts to unfair labour practice under item 1(a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and(g) of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act. It is further declared that,Page 18 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtthe order of dismissal of service of respondent is illegal, improper and badin law, hence, quashed and set aside the same. It is further held that, thecomplainant superannuated during pendency of the complaint, therefore,he is deemed to be in the service w.e.f. 08.05.1998 till the date of hissuperannuation and he would be entitled for continuity in service withfull back wages and all consequential benefits.19.The present petitioner is the Chairman of the IndustrialEstablishment in which the respondent No.2 was employed. Therefore, thepetitioner/accused No.3 is responsible for day to day affairs of theIndustrial Establishment. It is not the case of the Petitioner/accused No.3that, he was not having knowledge of passing judgment dated 29.11.2019passed by the learned Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No. 57 of 1998and upheld by the learned Member, Industrial Court in Revision Petition(ULP) No. 4 of 2020 on 14.02.2021. No doubt, the IndustrialEstablishment filed Writ Petition No.11899 of 2022 before this Courtchallenging Judgment dated 14.02.2021 passed in Revision Petition (ULP)No. 4 of 2020. On 12.01.2023, this Court issued Rule in said Petition anddeclined to stay to the judgment passed by the learned Industrial Court inRevision Petition (ULP) No. 4 of 2020.20. The Petitioner has not denied about issuance of notice datedPage 19 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odt06.01.2020 by the Respondent no. 2 alongwith Judgments passed by thelearned Revision and Labour Court calling for compliance of saidjudgments, however, the envelope containing notice of petitioner returnedback with postal endorsement ‘unclaimed’. Therefore, it is deemed to beserved within the meaning of Sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act.21.Since this Court passed an order on 12.01.2023 in WritPetition No.11899 of 2022 and issued Rule but declined to stay effect andoperation of Judgment passed by the learned Labour Court in Complaint(ULP) No. 57/1998, therefore, it is obligatory on part of the petitioneraccused to comply with said Judgment, which is upheld by the learnedIndustrial Court. The petitioner/accused has not brought anycircumstances to show about making effort for compliance of saidJudgment. Therefore, considering the averments made in the complaint aswell verification statement, the learned Labour Court satisfied that, theRespondent No.2 has made out case for issuance of process under Sec.48(1)of the MRTU & PULP Act, which is upheld by the learned Member,Industrial Court, on 17.11.2022. 22. The Petitioner/accused No.3 being the Chairman of theIndustrial Establishment having control and supervision over affairs andday to day transaction of the said establishment, therefore, he isPage 20 of 21 corrected-CriWP64-23.odtresponsible to obey the judgment passed the Labour Court but inspite ofservice of notice with judgment, the petitioner failed to implement thejudgment passed by the competent Court. Therefore, considering thescope of Section 48(1) of the MRTU & PULP Act as well as law laid downin the above cited cases, I am of view that, the findings recorded by boththe Courts below are just and proper, hence, no interference is called atthe hands of this Court.23. In view of the above discussion, this Petition is dismissed. Rule isdischarged.( Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. )At this stage, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeksextension of interim order granted on 27.02.2023, however, no substantialground is found to extend the same. Hence the prayer is hereby rejected.( Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. )JPChavanPage 21 of 21