ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution

Judgment

1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgement and order dated 3rd August 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Arbitration Petition No.374 of 2004. By the impugned judgement and order, the arbitration petition filed by the first and second respondents herein against the appellant and third respondent herein, has been allowed and the arbitration award which was impugned in the said arbitration petition came to be set aside. The appellant herein has been further directed to pay costs of the arbitration petition to the petitioners therein as incurred by the petitioners. 3

2. The aforesaid Arbitration Petition No.374 of 2004 was filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “t he Act” for the sake of brevity”) challenging an award made by the Arbitral Tribunal dated 18th June 2004. The Arbitral Tribunal by the said award has directed first respondent herein to pay to the appellant herein a sum of Rs.185,97,86,399/- (One hundred eight five crores ninety seven lakhs eighty six thousand three hundred ninety nine only) as damages in respect of the work order dated 27th March 1997. The award further directs the first respondent herein to pay interest @ 10% p.a. on the sum of Rs.179,15,87,009/- and also to pay an amount of Rs.1.00 crore towards costs of the proceedings.

3. This appeal has been field on 17th August 2005 and was admitted by this Court on 26th August 2005. When the same was placed before us for final hearing, we have heard all the parties at length.

4. At the final hearing of this appeal, on behalf of the appellant, two basic submissions were made, apart from the 4 submissions that were advanced as to the intricacies of factual and legal issues involved in the matter. On behalf of the second respondent these arguments were repelled with, if not more, with equal vehemence. Both sides have relied on various judgements in support of their legal submissions.

5. Before entering into the web of factual and legal controversies raised on behalf of both the contesting parties in the

present case, we will first deal with two basic contentions raised on behalf of the appellant giving rise to the following issues :- (a) Whether the second respondent– Maharashtra State Distribution Company Limited could have legally continued to represent first respondent Maharashtra State Electricity Board in the present litigation and as to whether the second respondent had locus- standi to continue with the arbitration petition before the learned Single Judge ? (b) Whether the judgement and order dated 3rd August 2005 delivered by the learned Single Judge could have been delivered considering the scope and limitations of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ? 5

6. In order to appreciate the controversy giving rise to the aforesaid two basic issues it will be necessary to understand some factual background with relevant chronology of events wherever necessary. The same is set out hereunder, of course, in nut shell. Use of electrical pump sets and other electrical equipments in rural areas cause current to log behind the voltage in the electricity distribution system. This causes a low power factor indicating that the electrical energy is being lost for unproductive process. This causes repeated grid failures to voltage collapse. The Rural Electrification Corporation of India under the Ministry of Power, Government of India, therefore, strongly recommended implementation of a scheme to reduce the reactive burden on the generators of the electricity system in the State of Maharashtra. This project involved introduction or installation of electrical panels into the rural electricity distribution network for saving electrical energy. These electrical panels comprise of sophisticated and computerized measurement and control system to inject required positive, reactive power compensation to meet out the negative reactive power interest by ineffective loads. Such 6 equipment comprises of Capacitors, Thyrister Switches, Electric Numerical Controls, Productive Devices, a specialisd software etc. installed therein for reactive power management. These panels continuously monitor the efficiency of the system and maintain it at optimum unit power factor and eliminate the distribution losses. These panels were to be installed at Distribution Transformer Centers (hereinafter referredto as DTCs for short) from where the consumers are supplied energy. These DTCs are connected to a network of high voltage feeders from a sub station which, in turn, receives the extra high voltage supply from the generating stations.

7. The appellant was awarded a contract for installation of 12555 Low Tension Capacitors in the year 1993-94, in pursuance of which the appellant appears to have installed these capacitors in the electricity distribution network of the first respondent. Of course we are not concerned with the same in the present matter.

8. Thereafter the first respondent decided to install technically improved electrical panels into its electricity distribution network 7 for the aforesaid purpose. These are technically known as “L ow Tension Mode Management Systems”. The first respondent Board awarded to the appellant herein this work also for installation of these panels in thirteen circles/districts falling in three zones all over the State of Maharashtra. . Initially a contract was awarded to the appellant for installation of such 11760 technically improved panels which are referred to as “B-1”. This contract was awarded by way of Letter of Intent, dated 15th January, 1997. . Another Letter of Intent dated 18th February, 1997 was issued to the appellant by the first respondent for the replacement of existing 12555 Low Tension System Capacitors with the aforesaid improved panels, which have been referred to as “B -2”. . Additional quantities of such panels to the extent of 23,672 were ordered by the first respondent for being installed by the appellant, which are referred to as the “B -3”. . Thus, the work order dated 27th March 1997 has been issued in favour of the appellant by the first respondent for installation of these panels as under- 8 a) 11,760 - B-1 b) 12,555 - B-2 c) 23,672 - B-3 ----------- 47,987 - Total -----------

9. The work order accordingly was issued comprising of 47,987 such panels. The appellant installed 17,294 panels. The appellant prepared 14,206 panels but these panels were not installed. Admittedly, the appellant did not prepare/manufacture 16,487 panels though, according to the appellant, all the raw material for its preparation was ready and available with the appellant. The appellant terminated the contract firstly on 19th February 1999 and secondly on 21st April 1999 and initiated arbitration proceedings before a panel of three arbitrators. As aforesaid, an award was made by the Arbitral Tribunal on 18th June 2004 which has been set aside by the judgement and order impugned in this appeal. 9

10. We have set out hereinabove with some detail, though not all, the subject matter of the contract between the parties, its purpose, the location where the electrical panels were decided to be installed and their utility purposely, as the same would make it abundantly clear that the panels in issue were to be installed in the electricity distribution network and were to form a part and parcel of the “distribution” activity in sharp contrast to the “ge neration” and “transmission” of the electricity. This aspect of the matter is of some importance and is required to be considered in its proper perspective while answering the first issue framed by us hereinabove.

11. With the aforesaid background we may now set out herein relevant chronology of events about which there is no dispute between the parties.

27.3.1997 : Work order issued to the appellant by the first respondent for manufacture, installation and maintenance of 47,987 panels to be installed in the electricity distribution network; 10 -------- Huge correspondence has taken place between the parties which may not be listed out herein and may be considered if and when required hereunder. Most of it is in respect of non-supply of DTCs locations by the first respondent to the appellant ;

19.2.1999 : The appellant terminated the contract alleging various breaches committed by the first respondent and its officers. By this time, the appellant had installed 17,294 panels. By this communication the appellant offered to maintain these installed panels on certain conditions set out therein. The appellant made other claims also in regard to the remaining un-installed panels covered by the original contract;

21.4.1999 : The appellant sent the communication to the first respondent alleging breaches on the part of first respondent by contending that the appellant was entirely absolved of all its obligations under the contract;

5.5.1999 / April 2001 : An Arbitral Tribunal of three arbitrators was constituted;

17.5.1999 : Appellant submitted statement of claims before the Arbitral Tribunal; 11

20.9.1999 : The First respondent submitted its written statement; --------- Oral and documentary evidence was led before the Arbitrators by both the parties. Written Submissions were also filed in addition to the oral submissions made before the Arbitral Tribunal.

27.1.2004 : The Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act” for the sake of brevity) came into force. By the operation of the Section 172 thereof, the first respondent is deemed to be the “S tate Transmission Utility” and a “Licensee” under its provisions for a period of one year. This period was extended up to 4th June 2005;

18.6.2004 : The Arbitral Tribunal declared its unanimous award;

26.8.2004 : First respondent filed Arbitration Petition No.374 of 2004 in this Court, before the learned Single Judge u/s 34 of the Act impugning the aforesaid Award;

14.12.2004 : Arbitration petition was admitted by the learned Single Judge; 12

4.6.2005 : The State Government, third respondent herein issued three separate Notifications as contemplated by Section 131 of the said Act. Notification for vesting; Notification for transfer of assets & liabilities i.e dicesting ; Notification for declaration of scheme.

7.6.2005 : The third respondent State Government issued notification in accordance with which four following registered companies came into existence viz. : (a) Maharashtra State Electricity Board Holding Company; (b) Maharashtra State Power Generation Company; (c) Maharashtra State Transmission Company; (d) Maharashtra State Distribution Company.

27.6.2005 : Chamber Summons No.789 of 2005 taken out by the aforesaid Distribution Company, which is the second respondent herein seeking to join as a co-petitioner in the aforesaid Arbitration Petition No.374 of 2004 which was pending before the learned Single Judge of this Court ;

4.7.2005 : The appellant herein filed affidavit in reply opposing the aforesaid Chamber Summons contending that the 13 State Government – third respondent herein, itself was liable to comply with the award and not the Distribution Company;

4.7.2005 : The learned Single Judge passed an order granting the Chamber Summons by consent of the petitioner i.e. first respondent herein. The learned Judge also by the same order permitted the petitioner therein i.e. the first respondent herein to join the State of Maharashtra as a party respondent to the aforesaid Arbitration Petition ;

5.7.2005 : The appellant herein filed a further affidavit in the arbitration petition seeking rejection of the petition on the ground that the State Government has not taken steps to prosecute the aforesaid Arbitration Petition and that the second respondent herein had no locus to prosecute the petition;

3.8.2005 : The learned Single Judge of this Court delivered the impugned judgement and order;

17.8.2005 : The present appeal came to be filed;

26.8.2005 : The present appeal came to be admitted; ---------- : The appellant received various documents from the State Government under Right to Information Act ; 14 June 2007 : The appellant took out Notice of Motion No.225 of 2007 seeking leave of this Court to place on record certain documents and facts which according to the appellant, the appellant became aware after the impugned judgement and order was delivered;

17.8.2007 : By an order passed in Notice of Motion No.225 of 2007, the appellant was allowed to bring on record these documents disclosed to the appellant by the second and third respondents herein; -------- : The appellant also took out Notice of Motion Nos.3288 of 2007 and 2141 of 2008 in this regard.

12. The appellant has sought to place on record certain documents which according to the appellant, the appellant received after filing of this appeal, under the Right to Information Act. We have our own doubts as to whether at this stage such documents can be considered and especially read in evidence in support of the case that is being tried to be made out by the appellant in regard to the first issue framed by us hereinabove for consideration. Be that as it may. 15

13. It is the contention of the appellant that the second respondent Distribution Company had no locus to prosecute the arbitration petition which was filed by the first respondent herein i.e. the erstwhile Electricity Board, before the learned Single Judge u/s 34 of the Act. In the submission of the appellant, it is only and only the State Government – the third respondent herein, which had and has locus to prosecute the said petition and that since the State Government did not prosecute the petition, the same ought to have been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The contention of the appellant in this regard can be summarized as under. The liability in respect of the appellant i.e. the amounts due under the award of the arbitral tribunal was never transferred to the second respondent nor was it ever recognized as a contingent liability at any stage by either the first or the second respondent. Even the Cabinet Resolution dated 20th May 2005 published on 7th June 2005 and the balance sheets of the second respondent after the date of award, do not reflect this liability. The official notings 16 of the authorities of the State Government (the copies of which have been obtained by the appellant under the Right to Information Act) who had power to take a decision in this regard, support the contention of the appellant. The first notification dated 4th June 2004 transfers all liabilities of the Board to the State but the subsequent notification of the same date transfers only specified liabilities to the respective transferees, including the Distribution Company and that the liability under the award is not specified and, therefore, the same does not stand transferred to the second respondent but continues to remain with the State. Even the balance sheets of the Board for the period 1998 to 2004 do not recognize or reflect the liability under the award. The balance sheets of the Distribution Company also do not reflect the liability under the award. Only such contingent liabilities which are recognized are vested in the Distribution Company. The liability under the award having not been recognized, will not vest in the Distribution Company. The learned Single Judge erred in holding that it was not necessary to join the State Government as the petitioner before him in the arbitration petition. 17

14. As against the aforesaid contentions of the appellant on behalf of the respondents it is submitted that the second respondent had locus not only to continue the arbitration petition before the learned Single Judge but also to contest the present appeal of the appellant and that it is the second respondent alone who, in law, and in view of the facts of the case, is liable to discharge all the liabilities, if any, arising out of the arbitration proceedings initiated by the appellant. In the submission of the second respondent, the State Government is not at all liable in this regard. The second respondent relies on the provisions of the said Act as also the notifications issued there under by the State Government in support of its contentions. In short, in the submission of the second respondent, by operation of law, the liabilities, if any, under the impugned proceedings will visit the doors of second respondent alone and not the State Government.

15. Apart from anything else, it is rather surprising that the appellant and the second respondent have got themselves involved into such a strange dispute where the second respondent is strenuously contending that it will be liable to discharge the 18 liabilities under the arbitration proceedings, if any, of the appellant, whereas, though the appellant has got second respondent who is acknowledging and accepting its obligation to discharge the liabilities of the appellant, if any, the appellant is contending that the second respondent should not take upon itself such liabilities but the State Government should be held liable. Be that as it may.

16. We have given anxious thoughts to the rival contentions of the parties relating to the first issue framed by us hereinabove for our consideration and our observations in that regard are as under.

17. The first respondent has been constituted u/s 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. This Act was in force till it was repealed by the said Act w.e.f. 27th January 2004. Section 185 of the said Act deals with repeal and saving clause of the said Act. The said Act has come into force w.e.f. 27th January 2004.

18. Section 172 of the said Act deals with transitional provisions. By virtue of this provision, the first respondent is 19 deemed to be the State Transmission Utility and a Licensee under the provisions of the said Act for a period of one year from 27th January 2004. In pursuance of the proviso of sub section (a) of section 172, this period of one year has been extended up to 4th June 2005.

19. The third respondent State of Maharashtra has taken appropriate action u/s 131 of the said Act by issuing three different notifications but on the same date i.e. 4th June 2005. These three notifications are as under :- (a) A notification is issued in exercise of powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 131 of the said Act directing that with effect from 4th June 2005, all property, interest in property, rights and liabilities which immediately before 4th June 2005 vest in the first respondent herein, the Board, shall vest with the State Government; (b) A notification is issued for the re-vesting of the properties vested in the State Government into four Government Companies with effect from 6th 20 June 2005 in accordance with the transfer scheme prepared in that behalf. Appropriate directions have been issued by this notification by the State Government in exercise of its powers conferred by sub section (2) of section 131 of the said Act. The relevant clause thereof reads thus :- “… … (a) In consideration of transfer of all properties, interest in properties, rights and liabilities to the respective Transmission Company, Generating Company and Distribution Company, as specified in Parts A, B and C of the Transfer Scheme appended to the Schedule hereto, the said respective company shall issue their shares, debentures or any other acceptable securities of the equivalent value to the MSEB Holding Company Limited and as specified in Part-D of that scheme… …” ( c) The scheme prepared in exercise of powers under sections 131, 133 and 134 of the said Act was notified. The scheme is titled as “M aharashtra Electricity Reforms Transfers Scheme, 2005” (hereinafter referred to as “the said Scheme” fo r the sake of brevity”). 21

20. A perusal of section 131 of the said Act makes it clear that with effect from the date of publication of the said scheme, it will be for all purposes considered as “the effective date”. It lays down that from the effective date, the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities which immediately before the effective date belonged to the first respondent Board, shall vest in the State Government. Sub section (2) of Section 131 provides that any such property etc. and liabilities vested in the state Government under sub section (1) thereof, shall be re-vested by the State Government in the Government Company(ies) such as the second respondent company, in accordance with the transfer scheme so published along with such other liabilities of the State Government as may be stipulated in the scheme.

21. In view of the aforesaid provisions we will have to consider the scheme and it’s effect to answer the aforesaid issue framed by us. The said scheme opens with the following paragraph :- “In exercise of powers under sections 131, 133 and 134 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Government of Maharashtra hereby makes the 22 following scheme for providing and giving effect to the transfer of properties, interests, rights, liabilities, obligations, proceedings and personnel of Maharashtra State Electricity Board to the Transferees and for matters incidental and ancillary thereto.” Clause-3 of the scheme states that undertakings of the Board are classified in various schedules. The Distribution undertakings with which we are concerned, is set out in Schedule-C of the scheme. The term “undertaking” is defined by the scheme to mean the functions, business etc. and includes liabilities, obligations, proceedings. Schedule-C of the scheme is in three parts. In the first part itself it is stated as under :- “The Distribution Undertaking shall also comprise generally all the assets, liabilities and proceedings, including the following but not limited them, belonging to the Board, concerning the distribution of electricity in the area of supply consisting of Amravati, Aurangabad… … … and Pune in the State of Maharashtra. I. II. Distribution assets … … …; General assets … …; 23 (f) interest agreements, III. Miscellaneous : Contracts, (e) arrangements to the extent they are associated with or related to distribution activities or to the undertakings or assets referred to in Part-I and Part-II above; The contingent liabilities to the extent they are recognized and are associated with or related to distribution activities or to the undertakings or assets referred to in Part-I and Part-II above; Proceedings to the extent they are associated with or related to distribution activities or to the undertakings or assets referred to in Part-I and Part-II above; (g) d) … … … … IV. General................

22. Clause-10 of the said scheme is very relevant in this regard and reads thus :- “10. Transfer by operation of law :- The transfer under this scheme shall operate and be effective pursuant to the action of the State Government by publishing the scheme and orders issued in terms of this scheme and without any further act, deed or anything to be done by the State Government, Board, Transferee or any other person, subject to the terms and conditions of the scheme.”

23. A close scrutiny of all the aforesaid viz. provisions of Section 131 of the said Act, various notifications issued there 24 under by the State Government and contents of the said scheme, leave no manner of doubt that all the liabilities of the first respondent which were related to the distribution activities of the first respondent, by operation of law, have statutorily been conferred on the second respondent. It is pertinent to note that such liabilities also specifically include contingent liabilities. In addition thereto, even the proceedings which are related to the distribution activity of the first respondent, have also to be statutorily continued by the second respondent. The term “p roceedings” also has been defined by the said scheme to mean even the arbitration proceedings and include even appeals. In our view, therefore, by operation of law itself, the second respondent has got locus and is obliged not only to discharge all the liabilities of the first respondent relating to the distribution activity of the first respondent but is also entitled to continue the proceedings initiated by or against first respondent in that regard.

24. In our view, the entire structure of the said Act ( in this regard) if considered in its proper perspective, leaves no manner of doubt that all the assets and liabilities, whether existing or 25 contingent, are to be first vested in the State Government and are then to be divested in favour of the respective Government Companies. As the vesting is complete so is the divesting. The Act does not contemplate that though vesting in full takes place the divesting may or may not be in full or that it may be in part only, resultantly the Government retaining with it either some property or right, let alone liability. At the end of the exercise performed as contemplated by various provisions of the said Act, in our view, nothing remains with the State Government, neither any property nor asset nor even liability, whether existing or contingent as also whether recognised or non-recognised.

25. Reliance placed by the appellant on the alleged official notings and/or cabinet decision of the State Government, in our view, cannot take away the effect of operation of law. Once notifications are issued as contemplated by the provisions of the said Act and once it is found that in the said scheme there is nothing to the contrary, vesting and divesting in full automatically takes place. Neither the cabinet resolution nor the interpretation of the provisions of the said Act and/or notifications by the 26 officers of the State Government, howsoever highly placed thee officer(s) may be, can bring about a change in the aforesaid statutory consequences and/or effect.

26. We also do not find any force in the contention of the appellant that the second respondent cannot take upon itself the liability in issue because the same is not reflected in the balance sheets of either the first respondent or that of the second respondent. Non mention of such liabilities in these balance sheets cannot take away the statutory vesting and divesting of the liabilities. It will be too dangerous to accept the contention that only because the balance sheets do not reflect a statutorily enforceable liability, there will not exist any such liability at all. Acceptance of such submission will irreparably and adversely affect third parties whose liability may not be deliberately reflected by either the first or the second respondent to get away with it. We cannot permit such an interpretation.

27. So far as the proceedings before the learned Single Judge are concerned, it appears that the second respondent took out 27 Chamber Summons No.789 of 2005 when the arbitration petition was pending before the learned Single Judge and sought to join itself as co-petitioner. Though the appellant herein opposed the said Chamber Summons, the learned Single Judge was pleased to allow the same with the following order :- “Date : 04.07.2005 By consent, the petitioner’s Chamber Summons is granted in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). The petitioner is also permitted to join State of Maharashtra a party respondent in the petition. Amendment to be carried out within a period of three days from today.” Prayer clauses (a) and (b) aforesaid read thus :- “(a) The applicants be joined as petitioners in the present petition; (b) That the applicants be permitted to amend the petition as per the details contained in the Schedule annexed hereto and for consequential amendments.”

28. Insofar as the impugned judgement is concerned, the learned Single Judge has observed there under as under :- “43. There were submissions made before me that this petition could have been prosecuted only by the State Government, because it is not clear from the notification 28 dated 4.6.2005 issued by the Government of Maharashtra under sections 131, 133 and 134 of the Electricity Act, 2003 that the contingent liabilities of the MSEB have been taken over by the petitioner no.2. In my opinion, however, in view of the clear statement made in the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner no.2 that all the contingent liabilities including the liability under the impugned award is taken over by the petitioner no.2, it was not necessary to join the State Government as the petitioner in this petition.” This is the only observation we have found in the impugned judgement dealing with the aforesaid controversy.

29. For the reasons noted by us hereinabove, we confirm the aforesaid finding and/or conclusion of the learned Single Judge. We, therefore, answer the aforesaid first issue in the affirmative and hold that the second respondent herein had locus to continue the arbitration petition before the learned Single Judge and that the second respondent was also entitled to oppose the present appeal filed by the appellant before us.

30. Before dealing with the second issue with which we are concerned with and which has been set out hereinabove, it will be 29 necessary to set out in nut shell the controversy between the parties and crystalise the findings of the learned Single Judge, recorded in the impugned judgment. . Though the work order dated 27th March, 1997 is in respect of the total 47,987 panels to be installed and though the same are categorised as “B-I”, “B-II” and “B -III” as set out hereinabove, the termination of the contract in issue and the claim of the appellant arising out of it, has resulted into trifurcation of these panels as under- . 17,294 - Installed, 14,206 - Stranded, 16,487 - Not manufactured 47,987 - Total . Thus, out of the total 47,987 panels which were required to be installed by the appellant in terms of the work order dated 27th March 2007 the appellant has admittedly installed 17294 panels. Out of the remaining panels to be installed, the appellant manufactured 14206 panels which were even inspected and found 30 in order by the first respondent. However, the same were not installed though were ready for installation. In as much as the remaining 16,487 panels are concerned, the same were not even manufactured by the appellant, though it is the case of the appellant that all the raw material necessary, some of which was imported, was ready and available with the appellant for manufacturing these 16487 panels and that the appellant did not manufacture the same as already 14206 panels which were manufactured and ready for installation were stranded. Be that as it may.

31. The most important clause of the aforesaid work order dated 27th March, 1997 which appears to be the root cause of the entire dispute reads thus- “5.0 Supply & Installation

5.1 The supply and installation of L.M. System shall commence within four months from the date of this work order or opening of Letter of Credit or receipt of complete list of locations of DTCs whichever is later. The entire supply and installation of L.M. System covered 31 under schedules at Annexure B-I, at Annexure B-II, and Annexure B-III shall be completed within twenty months thereafter.”

32. It is the case of the appellant that the first respondent was to provide to the appellant a complete list of locations of the DTCs where the electrical panels manufactured by the appellant were to be installed and that such complete list was not supplied by the first respondent. It is therefore, the case of the appellant that the appellant could not complete the installation the panels under the work order only and only because the appellant did not have with him the locations where the same were to be installed by the appellant. The appellant further contends that tireless efforts were made, numerous written requests were made by the appellant requiring the first respondent to provide to the appellant these lists and that all these efforts and/or correspondence was in vain. It is thus, the contention of the appellant that by not giving the list of DTCs locations in terms of the work order the first respondent has committed a fundamental breach of the contract. 32

33. In addition to the aforesaid ground of breach of the fundamental term of the contract, which according to the appellant goes to the root of the contract, the appellant contends that the first respondent has also committed a second breach of the terms of the contract on account of non-renewal of the letter of credit beyond 28th April, 1999.

34. In as much as the aforesaid second grounds of non-renewal of Letter of Credit by the first respondent is concerned, in the award of the Arbitral Tribunal itself it is held that the contract in issue was terminated on 19th February, 1999, hence the first respondent was justified in not renewing the Letter of Credit. We do not find any reason to take any different view of the matter in this regard. As admittedly, even according to the appellant, appellant terminated the contract in issue before 28th April, 1999, and therefore, there was no question of the first respondent renewing letter of Credit beyond 28th April, 1999 when the contract was already terminated by that time. 33

35. There is a dispute the between the contesting parties as to whether the contract in issue was entirely terminated on 19th February, 1999 or was it only partly terminated on 19th February, 1999 in relation to the uninstalled panels and as to whether it was finally terminated on 21st April, 1999 in respect of even installed panels. Be that as it may. The fact still remains that in any event admittedly the contract in issue did not survive after 21st April

1999. If the contract was terminated by the appellant completely, on whatever date it may be, but certainly before the date on which the first respondent was to renew the Letter of Credit, obviously, on account of such termination by appellant, the first respondent was fully justified in not renewing the Letter of Credit thereafter.

36. In as much as the first ground of termination is concerned, i.e. non supply of list of DTCs locations by the first respondent to the appellant, the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal is that such a failure of the first respondent is a breach of contract committed by the first respondent. The learned Single judge in his impugned judgement (paragraph 34) has observed that this finding of the 34 Arbitral Tribunal is a finding of fact and that it was not challenged before the learned Single judge by the first respondent. Even with this observation the learned Single judge observed that it was required to consider the question as to whether the Tribunal was justified in terminating such a breach committed by the first respondent, as a fundamental breach which vitiates the entire contract. The learned Single Judge has proceeded to consider this question in the background of the issue raised by the learned Single judge as to whether the appellant terminated the contract only partly on 19th February, 1999 in respect of the uninstalled panels and wholly on 24th February, 1999 even with regard to the installed panels. A perusal of the entire judgment of the learned Single Judge shows that the learned Single Judge considered the case to find out as to whether failure of the first respondent to supply list of DTCs locations in terms of the work order amounts to fundamental breach of the contract, vitiating the entire contract. The learned Single judge interpreted the aforesaid two letters of termination dated 19th February, 1999 and 21st April, 1999 issued by the appellant herein by holding that 35 the appellant only partially terminated the contract of 19th February, 1999 in respect of only uninstalled panels (30693) and held that the appellant continued to maintain the panels which by that time were already installed (17294). It is further held that consequently, on 21st April, 1999 when it became clear to the appellant that the first respondent was not in mood to redress the breach, nor was it in a position to make payments in terms of the offer made by the appellant vide communication dated 19th February, 1999, the appellant terminated the contract even in respect of the installed panels, by further action of 21st April,

37. The learned Single Judge has recorded certain other findings as well, including that the appellant herein has adopted two mutually destructive/in-consistent pleas and that in absence of election of one at the trial the court has to reject both. We may not set out all the findings herein, in view of the course of action that we are proposing to adopt, set out hereunder. 36

38. In view of the various findings of the learned Single Judge, it was strenuously urged by the appellant before us that the exercise performed by th learned Single Judge was beyond the scope and parameters of section 34 of the Act. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that as reflected in paragraph 8 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, it was argued on behalf of the appellants before the learned Single Judge that the grounds taken up by the first respondent herein, the original petitioner before the learned Single Judge do not fall within section 34 of the Act, and therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the award of the Tribunal.

39. On the contrary, on behalf of the second respondent, it was strenuously contended that the findings and conclusions drawn by the learned Single Judge are within parameters of section 34 of the Act. In the submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent the Arbitral Award was in conflict with the public policy of India, and therefore the learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the same, in view of the provisions of subsection (12) (b)(iii) of section 34 of the Act. 37

40. In this regard both the sides have relied upon various reported decisions to buttress their respective but conflicting contentions. We need not also refer to the same i view of what is stated hereunder.

41. A perusal of the entire judgment of the learned Single Judge which is impugned in the present appeal demonstrates that the learned Single Judge has not at all set out any specific ground, contemplated by aforesaid provisions of section 34 of the Act for interfering with the award of the Arbitral Tribunal. The entire impugned judgment is silent not only as to the parameters within which the jurisdiction is to be exercised under section 34 of the Act, but also has to how and why on the touch-stone of section 34 of the Act, the learned Single Judge was interfering with the award of the Arbitral Tribunal.

42. It is thus established that an application for setting aside the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not an appeal. Even in case of an appeal there is no right to any 38 aggrieved party to file an appeal unless it is provided by the statute and if the sta tute provides an appeal with limitations those limitations will have also be adhered to. On the rother hand Section 34 of the 1996 Act envisages an application for setting aside the arbitral award on grouands mentioned in Section 34. Section 34 mainly gives five grounds on which an award can be set aside. Therefore, it is incumbent upon courts while deciding application under Section 34 to decide and reach to conclusion as to on what of the grounds mentioned in Section 34 the award required to be set aside. Though it may not be necessary for the court to frame issues as required to be framed in a civil suit but the judgment of the Court passed in an application under Section 34 should lead to a conclusion as to on which of the ground mentioned in Section 34 the award has been set aside. With respect, we have not been able to find it from the judgment impugned. We have repeatedly asked the question to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents to show us from the judgment impugned as to on what grounds the award has been set aside and relate those grounds to section 34. But we were not able 39 to find an answer to this question from the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents.

43. There are scores of judgments shown to us at the Bar by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants with regard to the scope of section 34 and they include Olympus Superstructure v/s Meena Khaitan, reported in (1999) 5 SCC 651; Superintending Engineer v/s Dega, reported in 2005 (1) ARBLR 486 AP; McDermott International Inc. v/s Burn Standard Co. Ltd.& Ors., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181; ONGC v/s Comex, reported in 2003(5) Bom.C.R. 146; Vastu Invest v/s Gujarat Lease, reported in 2002 (Supp.) BCR 246 (DB); Union of India v/s Kamal Construction, unreported judgment of this Court in Arbitration Petition No. 281 of 2003 decided on 19th July, 2005; Union of India v/s K. H. Rao, reported in (1977) 1 SCC 583; Jajodia v/s Industrial Development , reported in 1993 (2) SCC 106; Trustees v/s Engineering Construction, reported in 1995 (5) SCC 531; Bhagwati Oxygen Ltd. V/s Hindustan Copper Ltd. , reported in 2005(6) SCC 462; Suisse Atlantic v/s N. 40 V.Rotterdamsche, reported in 1966 A.C. 361; Prakash Khandre v/s Dr. Vijay Kumar, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 568; Citibank v/s Standard Chartered Bank, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 12; Sarup Singh v/s S. Jagdish, reported in 2006(4) SCC 205; S. Munishamappa v/s B. Venkatarayappa, reported in 1981(3) SCC 260; Umesh v/s. The State, reported in AIR 1956 Patna 425; 20 th Century Finance v/s Khanna Rayon, reported in 1991 (4) Bom.C.R.301; Firm Sriniwas v/s Mahabir Prasad, reported in AIR 1951 SC 177; G. Nagamma v/s Siromanamma, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 25 and Prem Raj v/s D.L.F. Housing, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1355. We are not going to deal with each of the judgments but reference is being made to some of the important judgments. One such important judgment is in the case of McDermott International Inc. (Supra), on which both the sides have placed reliance. While considering the scope of Section 34 in paragraph 46 of the Judgment the Court noted the difference between the old Act of 1940 and new Act of 1996 particularly with reference to Sections 30 and 33 of the old Act and Section 34 of the new Act and noted that in terms of the 1996 Act, a 41 departure was made so far as the jurisdiction of the court to set aside the arbitral award is concerned vis-a-vis the earlier Act. Whereas under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act, the power of the court was wide, Section 34 of the 1996 Act brings about certain changes envisaged thereunder. Then in paragraph 49 the Court noted, “The 1996 Act makes a radical departure from 1940 Act. It has embodied the relevant rules of the modern law but does not contain all the provisions thereof. The 1996 Act, however, is not as extensive as the English Arbitration Act.” Then in paragraphs 52 and 65 the Court noted as under: proviso "52. The 1996 Act makes for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud of bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, the scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as parties tot he agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitrations they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it.

65. We may consider the submission of the learned counsel for the parties on the basis of the broad 42 principles which may be attracted in the instant case i.e. (i) whether the award is contrary to the terms of the contract and, therefore, no arbitrable dispute arose between the parties; (ii) whether the award is in any way violative of the public policy; (iii) whether the award is contrary to the substantive law in India viz., Sections 55 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act; (iv) whether the reasons are vitiated by perversity in evidence in contract; (v) whether adjudication of a claim has been made in respect whereof there was no dispute or difference; or (vi) whether the award is vitiated by internal contradiction.”

44. The Court if decides an application under Section 34 should either expressly or impliedly say that the award was being set aside because it was contrary to the terms of the contract or the Award was in any way violative of the public policy or the award was contrary to the substantive law in India, viz., Sections 55 and 73 of the Indian Contract Act or the Award was vitiated by perversity in evidence in contract or the adjudication of a claim has been made in respect whereof there was no dispute or difference or the award was vitiated by internal contradictions. In the present judgment which is under challenge, we have not found any such findings either expressly or impliedly though in the pleadings the issues were raised which could be the subject matter of a petition under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Therefore, we 43 find that it will be necessary for this Court to set aside the judgment impugned and remand the case back for adjudication afresh in accordance with the para meters set out by Section 34 of the 1996 Act.

45. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. Impugned Judgment and order dated 3rd August 2005 passed by the learned Judge of this Court in Arbitration Petition No. 374 of 2004 is set aside. The case is remanded back for adjudication afresh in accordance with the para meters set out by Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

46. No order as to costs. (A.A.KUMBHAKONI, J.) (BILAL NAZKI, J.)