Vijay Pravin Kachalia v. Parag Ramesh Mehta

Mr. H.V. Chande, Advocate for appellant. Mr. Vaibhav Mehta with Ms. A. Nityananthi Nadar i/by Divyakant Mehta & Associates for respondents. Coram : V.C. Daga & Smt. R.P.SondurBaldota, JJ. Date : 18th August 2009. PC :

Heard learned counsel for the appellant. Perused appeals. We were also taken through the order of the learned Single Judge.

Three contentions, one relating to the limitation, second relating to applicability of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, and third relating to absence of consideration are raised. None of these contentions carry conviction. 2

So far as the first question concerning limitation is concerned, the plaint pleadings in paragraph (16) have amply explained how the suit was within limitation. The allegations made in this behalf were not controverted in the counter affidavit wherein periodical payment of interest by the appellant are pleaded, as such it amounts to an implied admission on the part of the appellant. The reliance placed on Section 19 of the Limitation Act to demonstrate that suit is barred by Law of Limitation is mis- conceived. The payment of interest by cheque is a sufficient compliance of proviso to Section 19 of the Limitation Act. It would sufficiently extend the period of limitation. The contention raised in this behalf therefore has no force, hence rejected.

So fas as another defence raised contending that the transaction is a money lending transaction, hit by the provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 is concerned, it also holds no water in view of specific provision of Section 2(9)(f) of The Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946, since the payments were admittedly made by cheque, a negotiable instrument. The subject transaction is thus beyond the per view of the said Act. The submission made in this behalf is thus misconceived and liable to be rejected.

So fas as the third question leading to absence of consideration is concerned, the payment of interest itself is an 3 acknowledgment of loan on the part of the appellant, sufficient to infer consideration.

In the above of the matter, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned order. The appeals are liable to be dismissed with no order as to costs. Order accordingly.

At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant made a request for extension of time to deposit the amount as ordered in the impugned order. The period is extended by another two weeks from today, failing which necessary consequences to follow.

In view of the dismissal of the Appeal No.1099 of 2005, the Notice of Motion No.994 of 2006 does not survive. (Smt. R.P. SondurBaldota, J) ( V.C. Daga, J.)