Public Prosccutor, High Court at llyd. vs This Court rnade the tbllorving

performed with the appellant herein. They led the marital lile happily for some period. Out of their wedlock, they were blessed with lernale and male child i.e., Priyanka and Prem respectively. The appellant herein addicted to alcohol and used to quarrel and harass the deceased, both mentally and physically without any reasons. The same was narrated to her maternal uncles, PWs.3 and 4, who in turn approached the village elders, LW. I 2 and PW. I 6, who conducte d a panchq,at and admonished the appellant to change his attitude towards the deceased and lead a normal life with her and children. The appellant did not I -) KL,J & VRKR,J Crl A \o I162 ot20 i8 change his attitude and continued his harassment towards the deceased. On 06.04.1018 at about 22:00 hours, while the deceased and the appellant hercin were having meals, the appellant picked up quaffel with the deceased and beat her rvith a pestle on her forehead and caused injury. On hearing the cries of the deceased, PW.2 went and found her in a pool of blood with head injury. By that time, the appellar.rt herein fled arvay rvith pestle from there. The same was informed to PW.l . PWs.3 and 4 came there and shifted the deceased to Govemrnent Hospital, Khammam fbr treatment at 10.30 PM by an Auto-rickshau, of PW.l0. The duty doctor on examination of the deceased declared her brought dead.

5. On receipt ol'Ex.Pl - report given by PW. 1, brother of the deceased on 07.04.2018 at 02000 hcurs. PW.20, Sub-lnspector of Police, Raghunadhapalem Police Station, registered a case in Crime No.67 of20l8 under Section - 302 oflPC and issued express FIR and handed over thr: samc to PW.22, Inspector of Police, Singareni/ln Charge of Khammarn Rural Circle, lor investigation. PW.22 accordingly took up investigation. ) ) ) 4 KL,J & VRKR,J Crl A. No.ll62 of20l8

6. On completion olinvestigation, Pttl .22 fied a charge sheet against thc appellant herein. The same was committed to the trial Court, which was taken on file as S.C. No.l82 of 2018 for the ollences under Sectior.rs - 302 and 4984. of IPC.

7. The trial Court framed charges for the aforesaid olfences against the accused and then proceeded with trial.

8. During trial, PWs. I to 22 were examined, Exs.Pl to Pl7 u,cre marked and MOs.l to 6 were exhibited. No evidence either oral or documentary was let in on behallolthe accused.

9. After completion of evidence on behalf of the prosecution, the accused was examined under Section - 313 of Cr.P.C. Thereafter. up6n hearing both sides, the trial Court recorded conviction against the appellant herein fbr the aloresaid ollences and accordingly irnposed sentences ol imprisonment in the manner stated above. Challenging the said conviction and sentences of imprisonment, the appellant preferred the present appeal.

10. Leamed counsel for the appellant - accused contended as lollows: I 5 KL.J & VRKR,J Crl A No.3l62 ot20l8 The prosecution lailed to prove the commission of offence under Section - i02 of IPC beyond reasonable doubt. ll. The prosecution also failed to prove harassment said to have meted out bv the accused. lll. There are contradictions and omissions in prosecution witnesses which disproves lhe case ol prosecution. iv. There is no direct evidence and the entire case rests on circumstantial evidence. 1'he prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. With the aforesaid submissions, he sought to set aside the impugned judgment recording conviction and imposition of sentences against the appellant herein. 1 1 . On the other-hand, leamed Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit as under: i. Though there is no direct evidence and eye-witness to the occurrence, there is circurnstantial evidence which proves the guilt of the accused. Il. All the circumstances form a complete chain to connect the accused in commission of offence. ) ) \ \ 6 KL,J & VRKR,J Crl.A- No.3l62 of20l8 iii. The trial Court relying on the evidence, both oral and documentary, recorded conviction against the appellant herein. There is no error in it waranting interference by this Court With the aforesaid subrnissions, he sought to dismiss the present appeal.

12. In view above rival submissions, the point that falls for consideration by this Court is: Whether the conviction and sentences of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court for the olfences under Sections - 302 and 4984. of IPC against the appellant herein - accused are sustainable. both on f'acts and in law?

13. In view of the aloresaid rival submissions, before delving into the factual matrix, it is necessary to briefly advert to the purport olthe oflences alleged. Section - 302 ofIPC contemplates the gravest form of culpable homicide amounting to murder, requiring proof of an act done with the intention or knowledge that it would cause death. Section - 498,4 of IPC, on the other hand, is a social-welfare provision aimed at safeguarding married women from cruelty at the hands of the husband or his relatives, including wiltul conduct causing grave injury or harassment connected with unlawful demands for dowry. These / 7 KL.J & VRKR.J Crl.A No-l162 of20l8 provisions, though distinct in scope, often arise together in cases where a pattern of cruelty culminates in the death of a married wol.Ilan

1.1. As already stated above, to prove the case olprosecution, it examined PWs. I to 22 and got marked Exs.P I to P I 7 and MOs. I to 6. l)W. I is not only the complainant, but also brother o[ the deceased. l{e deposed with regard to the disputes between the accused, addiction of accused to alcohol and the deceased and harassment meted out bv the accused towards deceased. He fufther deposed that he received a phone call from PW.2, co-sister of the deceased that the accused beat the deceased with pestle and ran away liom the scene of offence. Thereafter, he and his uncle went to the house of the deceased and shified her to Govemment Hospital, Khammam, where the doctors declared her died. He gave Ex.P I - report to the police. During cross- examination, he admitted that the house of deceased is about 200 yards fiorn his house. Except that, nothing useful was elicited by learned counsel for the accused. I 5. PW.2, co-sister of the deceased, deposed that the accused is the younger brother of her husband. Since she did not support the ) ) 8 KL,J & VRKR,J Crl.A. No.l162 of20l8 prosecution case, she was declared hostile. During cross-examination by leamed Public Prosecutor, she adrnitted that panchayars were held relating to the disputcs in between accused and the deceased.

16. PW.3, rnatemal uncle of the deceased, deposed with regard to the disputes between the accused and the deceased and also harassment meted out by the accused towards deceased. He also deposed on the lines of PW. t. During cross-exarnination, he admitted that he received the inlormation frorn PW.2, then he went to the house of accused. By that time, he found the father of the accused, PW.2, PW.8, PW.9 and some other persons

17. PW.4, maternal uncle of the deceased, deposed that after the marriage, the deceased and the accused lived happily for few days and thereafter disputes arose between them. The accused addicted to alcohol and used to torture anci harass the deceased. Villagers also held panchayals not to harass the deceased. Despite the same, the accused did not stop harassing the deceased. About four (04) months back from the date ol incident, the accused beat the deceased with a pestle at his house due to which the deceased died. During cross- / 9 KL.J & VRKR.J CrlA No i I62 ol20l8 examination, he admitted that his house is situated at a distance of 400-500 yards fiom the house olthe accused

18. P\\r.5. a circumstantial witness, dcposed that he married the sister of the deceased. There were disputes between the accused and the deceased and panchayars were held. The accused translered his propertr- in the name of his children and thereafter she joined the accused. On 06.04.2018 at about 10.30 P.M., he received a phone call lrom l)W.3 that the deceased was beaten by the accused. He was exarnined by the police. During cross-examination, nothing was elicited by the accused.

19. P\\/.6 is a photographer. He deposed with regard to taking photographs at the scene of of'fence as in Ex.P3.

10. PW.7 is also a photographer. He deposed with regard to taking photographs over the dead body ol'the deceased at Morluary, Government l-lospital, Hyderabad, as in Ex.P4. ll. PW.S is the neighbour of the accused. He also deposed with regard to the disputes between the accused and the deceased. At about 9.30 p.nr. and 10.00 p.m., while he was in his house, he heard some shouting lrom the house of the deceased. pW.2 made shouting \ \ \ \ i I I I I l0 KI-,J & VRKR..I Crl A No I162 oi20l8 while the accused ran away lrom his house. On that, he went to the house of the accused and found that she was lying on the floor in the house olthe accused. I-ater thev shilted the deceased to the Hospital, where the doctors declared her dead. He was also examined by the police. During cross-examination, he admitted that his house is abutting the house of the accused.

22. PW.9, another neighbor of the accused, deposed that his house and the house ol the accused are separate by a road. Since he did not support the case of the prosecution, he was declared hostile.

23. PW. 10, villager, deposed on the sarne lines as deposed by PW. l. During cross-examination, he admitted that he does not know about the disputes between the accused and the deceased.

24. PW.11, son of the accused and the deceased, aged nine (09) years, was examined by the trial Court and having found him to be a competent to give evidence, recorded his evidence. l'his witness deposed that at the time of incident, he was staying in the Hostel. His brother (son of PW.2) informed him that the deceased by consuming alcohol, went to the upstairs of the buitding and fell down.

25. PW. 12 is only a panch witness lor Ex.P6 inquest panchanama. PW. I 3 is also a panch witness for crime details form as / I KL.J & VRKR,J Crl A No I162 of20l8 in Ex.P7. PW.l4 is another panch witness lor inquest conducted over the dead body of the deceased. In his presence, the police seized MO. I - blood stained nighty, MO.2 - petty coat and MO.3 - blouse.

26. P W. I 5, a panchal,o.t elder, deposed . abor-rt the panco.rot held ri,ith regard to the disputes between the accused and the deceased. During the said panchayat, the accused executed an Undertaking (Ex.P8), dated 12.02.2007 and he is one of the signatory to Ex.P8. During cross-examination, he admitted that after pancha.t,ur. the accused and the deceased lived happily without any dispLrtes. :7. PW.l6 is also another panchayat elder deposed on the very same lincs as deposed by PW. 15. However, during cross- examination, this rvitness adrnitted that he does not know what was happened after the panchayat was held as he is not the resident of the Jinkala l'handa.

28. PW.l7 said to be a panch u,itness for conlession and selzure as in E;<.P9 did not support the case of prosecution and, therefore, he was declared hostile, and so also PW. 18, another panch w rtness. 12 KI,.I& VRKR,J Crl A. No.3l62 oi20l8

29. PW.19, the doctor, deposed with regard to autopsy conducted over the dead body of the deceased on 07.04.2018 at about l0.l 5 A.M. He found the follorving external injuries: I. Lacerated injury of frontal bone 5"x6" cms.

2. Depressed fracture of 3"x 4" cms. of frontal bone. IJe tbund the lollou,ing internal iniuries: l. Fracture of frontal bone

2. [ntra-cerebral bleed.

30. He also issued Ex.Pl3 - post-mortem examination report. According to him, the injuries referred to by him might have caused with the Pestle shown to him. 3 l. During cross-examination, he admitted that iniury No. I might have caused when the person forcibly lallen down on the hard surlace. He denied the suggestion that injury No.2 might have caused when a person fallen down in a hard rock. However, this witness says that there is no such possibility to cause such an injury when a person fallen down.

32. PW.20, the then Sub-Inspector of Police, Raghunathapalem Police Station. deposed with regard to his receiving Telugu written l3 KL,J & \'RKR,J Crl.A. No.ll62 of20lE report lrorn PW.l and thereafter his registering a case in Crime No.67 ol 20 I 8 under Section - 302 of IPC yide Ex.P 14 - FIR ll. I)W.ll, then In-Charge Circle Inspector, deposed that on reccipt of l'lll in Clr.No.67 ol20l8, he recorded the statement of PW.2 and thercalicr he visited the scene of offence in the presence of panch rvitnesses. I{e prepared Ex.P7 crime details form and collected MO.4 - piece ol floor, MO.5 blood stained earth. He took steps for conducting autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. He also exanrined othr-r' rvitnesses and recorded their staternents. Therealler, he handcd over the CD trte to the regular Circle Inspector for further lnvestlgatlorl.

14. PW.22, the then Circle Inspector of Police, deposed with regard to recording of voluntary confessional statement of accused as in E,x. P I 5 and seizure ol MO.6 - pestle under the cover of seizure panchavat, Ex.P!6. He arrested the accused and produced before the Magistrate. Atter receipt of post-mortem examination report and Ex.Pl7 - RFSI- report, he laid charge sheet against the accused. 3 5. On the analysis of the entire evidence of prosecution witnesses, it is clear that there are no eye-witnesses to the incident. Though it is contended by the prosecution that pW.2 was present at \ \ I I, \ t4 KL,] & VRKR,,' Crl.A No.l162 of20lE the time of incident, she (PW.2) did not support the case of prosecution. lvioreover, the prosecution witnesses deposed with regard to general domestic disputes and habitual quarrels between the pafiles

36. The material on record shows that the accused was addicted to alcohol, and the incident occurred when he was under the influence olalcohol. While intoxication does not excuse the act. it is relevant to deterrnine presence or absence of intention. It supports the inlerence that the act was comrnitted without the mental state required under Section - 300 of IPC. There is no evidence of premeditation or any deliberate plan of the accused to kill the deceased. The incident appears to have occurred in the heat of the moment, during a sudden quanel between the accused and the deceased. Using pestle indicates the assault occurred impulsively, without preparation or selection of a deadly weapon beforehand. Although a pestle is capable of causing fatal injuries, it is not a weapon ordinarily associated with intentional homicide. The prosecution has not proved the accused inflicted repeated blows with a deliberate intention to ensure death. The circumstances suggest that the accused acted in a fit of anger, and the death resulted from the assault rather than any calculated act. Even l5 KL,J & VRKR,J Crl.A. No.ll62 of20l8 PW.19, thc doctor, deposed that the injuries might have caused with the pestle shou'n to hin.r J7. However', during cross-examination, the doctor adrnits that injury No.l rright have caused when the person f,orcibly fallen down on the hard surface. Thus, the circumstances proved by the prosecution do not unerringty point to a homicidal intention. While it is established that the accused caused the injuries leading to death, the chain of e.,'idence does not rneet the standard necessary for conviction under Section - ,j02 of IPCI. The lacts indicate that the accused had knowledge that his act ol-hitting the deceased with a pestle was likely to cause death. However. the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonablc doubt that the accused intendcd to cause death or such bodily inlury as was sulficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Thcrcfore, thc rnental state aligns with Section - 299 IPC (culpable hornicide not anrounting to murder) falling within Part-ll because only kno*,ledge ond without intention is established

38. Given the abscnce of intention, lack of premeditation, the impulsive nature of the act, absence of motive, and the fact that the death occurred due to injuries inflicted in a sudden quarrel, the conviction irncier Section - 302 oi IPC is unsustainable. However, \ l6 KL,J & VRKR.J CrlA. No.3l62 of20l8 since the accused had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death. conviction under Section - 304 Part-II of IPC is appropriate.

39. "Culpable llomicide" is a genus and "murder" is its species and all "rnurders" are "culpable homicides; 'but all "culpable hornicides" are not "murders" as held by the Apex Court in Rampal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradeshr. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that accused No. I then accompanied the deceased on the date ol death. Horvei,er, there is nothing on record to suggest that all the accused had come prepared to commit the offence or there wa; premeditation/prior meeting of minds of the accused for commission ol- offence.

40. Scction 302 of IPC is important in many ways. Persons accused of rnurder are tried under this section only. Further, if in case, an accused of murder is found guilty of an offence, Section - 302 provides lor punishntent to such offenders. It states that whoever commits murder shall be punished with either life imprisonment or death (depending on the gravity of the mdrder) along with fine. The (20r2) 8 SCC 289 t7 I.I..J & VRKR,J Crl A No.ll62 of20l8 pdmary point 01' considelation for the Court in matters relating to murder is the intent and purpose ol the accused. That is why, it is important that the object and intention of the accused is proved in cases under this section. The required materials lor murder include intention (n'rust be intendcd to cause death), cause ofdeath (the act has to be done with the, knowledge that the act may cause the death of another and bodili injurl, (Lhel.c must be intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death). 4l . [n Bastlev v, State of Pepsu2 the Apex Court held as under: "Of course. rve have to distinguish botween motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is sorltcthing which prompts a man to fonn an intention and knorvledgc is an arvareness of the consequences o[ the act. [n many cases intention and knou,ledge lnerge into each other and mean the same thing rnore or less and intention can be presumed lrom knowledge. 'lhe demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficull to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion." t. Atn l9s6 sc qs8 \ \ \ t8 KL,J & VRKR,J Crl.A No 3152 of20l8

42. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the lact that the legislature has used two dilfcrent terminologies, 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments arc provided for an act committed with an intent to causc bodily injury which is likely to cause death and lor an act committed with a knorvledge that his act is liketi,to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsale to treat 'intent' and 'knoivledge' in equal terms. They are not different things. Knou,ledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration rn'hile deterrnining or inlerring the requisite rntent. Where the evidence rvould not disclose that there was hnv intention to cause death of tl.re dcceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty undcr second part of Section - 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely "intention" and "knoivledge" has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section - 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to I I l9 KL.J & VRKR,J Crl.A. No I162 of20l8 bring a case within Part 3 of Section - 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury lbund to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

43. The Apex Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State ofAndhra Pradeshr, held as under: "Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, *'ith care and caution, as that rvill deoide rvhether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Parl Ior 304 I'art II. Many petty or insignificant matters - plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quaneI of children. utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance. may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact. there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum. there may be cases of nrurder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to '. elR 2006 sc aolo \ I \ 20 KL,J & VRKR.J Crl A No.l162 oll0l8 ensure that thc cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are rlot convefted into offences punishablc under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable horricide not amounting to murder, are treated as rnurder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause dcath can be l6 gathcred generally from a combination of a few or several ol the follou ine,. among other, circumstances: (i) nature ol the \\'eapon use dl (ii) r.r,hether the rveapon was carricd bt the accused or rvas pickcd up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of' the body; (iv) the amount ol force employed in causing iniury; (v) whether the act was in thc course olsudden quarrel or sudden fight or lree for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premcditation; (vii) whethcr therc was any prior enmity or rvhether the deceased was a stranger: (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation. and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether thc person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accuscd dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with relerence to individual cases I I 21 KL,J & VRKR.J Crl.A. No.3l62 of20l8 r,vhich nral' throw light on the question of intention. []e that as it mar."

44. 'l he Apex Court in Anbazhagan r'. "I'he State represcnted by the Inspcctor of Policea, held as under: "60. Ferv important principles of larv discernible lrom thc aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (l ) When the court is confionted with the question, rvhat ollcnce the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to lrnd out the intention or knowledge olthe accused in doing thc act. llthc intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses ( l) to (a) ol Section 300 of the [PC, the act will be murder evcn though onlv a single injury rvas caused. To illustrate: 'A' is bound hand and fbot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the heaci oi'A'. shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Hcre, thcrc rvill be no dilficulty in holding that the intention of''B' in shooting'A' rvas to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case rvould, therefore, be of murder falling within Ctause (l) of Section 300 of the IPC. 1-aking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' lorcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' r. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 857 \ \ \ 22 KL,J & VRKR,J Crl.A. No.3l62 of20lE 1\ and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to'A'was found to be sufficient in 21 ordinary coursc ol nature to cause death. There may be no dif{icultf in holding that 'B' intentionally inflictcd the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sulficient in the ordinary course ol nature to cause death. This r.vould bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) ol Section 100 of thc IPC and rcnder him guilty of thc olfence ol murder although only single injurv was caused. (2) Even rvhcn the intention or knowledge ol'the accuscd may fa[[ within Clauscs ( I ) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. the act of the accused which would otherwise bc murder, will be thken out of the puniew olmurder, ilthe accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event ol the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part I of Scction 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the iPC. It wouid be offence unticr Part I[ ol Section 304 il the case is such as to lall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be i /- KL.I & VRKR,.] Crl.A. No I162 of20l8 attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the lPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the lPC. It would be an oflence under Part I of that section, if the case fall ivithin 2nd part of Section 299. rvhile it would hc an oflcnce under Part II ol Section 304 il the casc f'all within 3rd part of Section 299 ol thc IPC. (3) 1'o put it in other rvords, if the act of an accused person falls within thc first two clauses ol cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is 22 punishable under thc first part of Section 304. If, however, it lalts within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In eff-ect, therefore, the first part ol this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part rvould apply when there is no such intention, but thcre is 'guilty knowledge'. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, il that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was suflicient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of thc IPC, arc fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 ol the IPC will apply to the lollowing classes of cases : (i) when thc case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section \ \ t \ \ 24 KLJ & VRKR,J Crl.A. No 3162 of20l8 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degrce of likelihood rvhich is covered by the cxpression 'sufficient in the ordinary course ol nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) ol Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctl,v, the diflercnce betrveen the two parts ol Section 304 ol thc IPC is that under the first part, the crimc ol rnurder is first established and thc accused is thcn given' the benefit of one of the exceptions to Scction 300 ol the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. 'Iherefore, for the purpose ol holding an accused guilty of 23 the offencc punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 olthe IPC. (6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. ln reaching the conclusion, the \ 25 KL,I & VRKR,J Crl A No.3162 ol'2018 court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the kno'"vlcdge that by the act he lvas likely to cause death. (7) 'fhe distinction between culpable- homicide (Scction 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 ol' the IPC) has alivays to be carefully borne in mind rvhile dealing with a charge under Section 102 ol the IPC. Under the category of unlawful hornicides. both, the cases ol culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to rnurder ,..iould lbll. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the llvc exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima lacie established on the evidence on rccord, the prosecution must still be required under the larv to bring the case under any of the fbur clauses ol Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one ol the lour clauses of Section 300 ol the IPC, namcly. lstly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable honricide not amounting to murder as describcd under Section 299 olthe IPC. (8) -fhe court must address itself to the question ol mcns rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be ') I \ \ 26 KL,J & VRKR.J Crl A No I162 of20,8 \ applied, the assailant 24 must intcnd the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingledient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a mattcr of infercnce to bc drarvn from the proved circumstances ol the casc. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured. extent of the injury, degree of lorce used in causing thc iniury. the manncr of attack, the circumstanccs preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only rntention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from thc act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. ( l0) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference. as a general principle, can be drawn that thc accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. ( I I ) Where the prosecution proves that the accuscd had the intention to cause death olany person or to 21 KL.J & VRKR,J Crl.A. No.3l62 of20l8 sause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury rrhich results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely talls under Clause thirdly ol Section 100 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. ( I 2 ) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case rvhere only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinarv course of nature to cause death, the lact that the act is done rvithout premeditation in a sudden fight or quarre[, or that the circumstanccs justiI that the injurv rvas accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead .to the inference ol guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."

45. The Apex Court in a recent judgment in N. Ramkumar v. The State, rep.by Inspectors also reiterated the aforesaid principle. 46 In State of M.P. v. Udham6, the Apex Court held as under: ''12. Sentencing for crimes has to be analyzed on the touoh stone ol three tests viz., crime test, criminal test and comparative proportionality test. Crime test involves factors Iike extent ol planning, choice of

5. Crl.a. No.2006 of2023, decided on 06.09.2023 u. 20i9 scc onLine sc 1378 ) )! I I I J 28 KL,J & VRKR,J Crl.A No 3162 of 2018 i) weapon. modus of crime, disposal modus (if any), rote of the accused, anti-social or abhorrent character oi the crime. state ol victim. Criminal test involves assessmcnt of factors such as age of the criminal, gendcr oi the crimina[, econc''mic conditions or social background of the criminal, mo(ivation lor crime, availability ofdefense. state of mind. instigation by the deceased or any one from the deceased group, adequately represented in the trial, disagreement by a judge in the appeal process. repentance, possibility of reformation, prior criminal rccord (not to take pending cases) and any other relevant factor (not an exhaustive list). "

47. In the light of the aforesaid discussion and the principle laid down in the above decisions, coming to the case on hand, the entire commission ol olfence had resulted without any premeditation. [n such circumstances, we are of the opinion that it was a case rvhere an act was committed by the accused with knowledge but without intention. The trial Court did not consider all the aloresaid aspects while convicting the appellant - accused for the oflence under Section - 302 of IPC and imposing life imprisorunent. Therefore, this Court while upholding the finding of learned trial Courl holding the appellant herein guilty of the offenee altered the conviction and sentcnce of the appellant - accused imposed to that ofSection 104 Part / I 29 KL,J & VRKRJ Crl.A No.ll62 of20l8 II of IPC lrom Section 302 of IPC, and the appellant - accused is imposed sentence of imprisonment to theperiod already undergone. The appellant - accused was in jail from26.09.2018 and thereafter he was granted ball vide order dated 02.01.2024 by this Couft. His bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. 48 The present Criminal Appeal is accordingly allowed in part in the above terms. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed. //TRUE COPY// SD/. K.SHYLESHI JO1NT REGISTRAR SECTION OFFICER To, DL

1. The Judge, Family Court-cum-Vl Additional Sessions Judge, Khammam.(With records, if any)

2. The lllAdditional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Khammam

3. The Station House Officer,, Raghunadhapalem Police Station, Khammam 4. Two CCs to the Public Prosecutor, State of Telangana, High Court Buildings, at Hyderabad (OUT)

5. One CC to Sri. P Prabhakar Reddy, Advocate [OPUCI 6. Two CD Copies l : HIGH COURT DATED:1 51121202s JUDGMENT CRLA.No.3162 of 2018 a\ HE SIA r: o 2 { IAN ?i126 * I ,7 a-! $ t CRIMINAL APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART o q '0 \ or{- 1?\,a