The High Court · 2025

Crl.lV.P. No.'l 51 of 2014 before the trial court and the same was dismissed vide order dated 11.01 .2017. Against the said dismissal order, a revision was preferred before the high Court and the high court has passed the following order: 'the cflrnrnal revision case is allowed while setting aside the impugned dismissal order on the discharge application of petitioner/A2, remanded the same to the lower Court with a direction lo hear afresh and if at all even any charge framed, for same rs not barred to alter or amend or delete any charge or lo frame appropflale charges invokrng Section 2'16 CrPC so to decide on own nrerits and with reasons."

5. Pursuant to the said orders in the revision petition, again the trial court has heard both the parties and dismissed the petition filed under Section 239 Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the said orders, the present revision is filed.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner-AO2 has submitted that the demand is a pre-requisite to prove any offence under the PC Act and that no such demand is made in the present case and the prosecution has not collected any material to prove such 7 EfD,J C.I.R.C. No.J25O ot 2013 demand by the petitioner. He further pointed out thzr' accused No.'l has never said that he gave any amount to the pettticr er and that the petitioner herein is not the licencing authority and he annot process the applicatrons of the applrcants who seek licen'; ;. He further submitted that the petitioner himself has booked several cases against the persons alleged to have obtained fake li,: rnces and that he is not the person, who has granted the licence. So, he is not supposed to have been roped into this set of alleg: :ions. lf at all there is any dereliction in his duty, separate 1r oceedings on administrative side have to be launched against thr: petitioner, but the offences under PC Act do not get attracted all rinst him. He further submitted that the allegations made against tr 3 petitioner do not contain the element of either demand or tt- r quantum so demanded and favour if any that was satisf r d. Thus, no presumption can be drawn to prove the demand. The statements of witnesses recorded by the prosecution during inves t gation reveals that out of all the witnesses only LWs.B and 9 spc,l e against him stating that they used to pay monthly mamools trr the petitioner herein and all other witnesses have not stated anytlr rg against the petitioner. ln the Notification issued by the Governrrr nt for granting licences to liquor shops, the terms and conditions to r; ant licence do not lay any bar with regard to granting licence to ti e white ration 8 EfO,J C.l.R.C No-3250 o12018 card holders. lt does not lay down any pre-requisite as to the income of the applicant. He further submitted that no details would be furnished by the applicants in the forms under Form No.A2 and A3. So, the petitioner has no obligation to verify the same. Therefore, the petitioner is not entrusted with any such duty of granting the licence or verifying the details of the documents submitted by the applicants and he is not the person who had processed the applications, therefore, he cannot be alleged to have demanded any bribe or accepted any such favour while allotting the wine shops. Therefore, no prima facie case exists against the petitioner herein. Thus, he filed the discharge petition before the trial court which ought to have been allowed, but the trial court has dismissed the same, against which a revision was preferred before this court and this court remanded the case to the trial court for a fresh consideration and again the trial court has dismissed the same. Aggrieved by the said orders, the present revision is filed.

7. The learned Special Standing Counsel for ACB has submitted that the order passed by the trial court is a well reasoned order and that under Section 13(1)(a) of the PC Act whoever habitually accepts the consideration is said to have committed the offence of corruption. The prosecution could collect voluminous I EfD,J C -R.C- No.3250o12018 documents in this regard. All the queries raised by lte counsel are triable issues and that the trial court has passed z very reasoned order. The witnesses from LWs.2O to 42 have stzr':d against lhe petitioner herein, who is the AO2. lt was observr-'l by the Apex Court in Neeraj Datta v. State Government of NCT ( f Delhil that in an economic offence, a lenient view cannot be ta < rn and hence, prayed to dismiss the petition. B. Perused the record

9. The petitioner IS facing charges under li:ctions 7 and 13(1)(a)(d) read with 123(2) o'f the Prevention of Corrt ption Act '1988 (for short 'PC Act) and 120-B and 34 lPC. The di:;;harge petition filed by the petitioner in the earlier occasion was d r missed by the trail court v/de orders dated 11.01 .2017 and the said r rders were set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial cot rt by the High Court in Crl.R.C. No. 666 of 2017. lt was observed tv tile remanding the matter that: "No doubt as pointed out, there is nothing to show r ruch less with any specific date and time and amount as to who ,aid what amount. Practically there is no demand and acceptance gratification much less at any particular date of an! amount within the meaning of Section 13(1Xd) read w t 13(2) of PC Act, though no demand required for offe r of illegal )articular rSection ;e under ' c rt.A N o. i 669 of 20 og dated '1s.12.2022 10 EfD,J Crl-R-C. No.325O or ?O13 Section 7 of the PC Act. Therefrom, whether he is privy to accommodate A.1 -Ra1u Yadav in granting licenses to the benefit of A '1-Raju Yadav in the name of his benamidars concerned, it is not a case of he is the licensing authority or the controlling authority. Even the counter fr ed by ACB lnspector speaks that the petitioner/A.2 is not the licensing authority or authority to issue tenders or finalize tenders or to issue licenses. The only allegation is he could have been diligent and should not have been negligent by dereliction of his responsibility to verify. ln fact as per Rules there is no prohibition on white card holders to apply and participate. Once such is the case, there is nothing to sustain the charge. However from the statements of nowkarnamadars, it is showing A.1-Raju Yadav is the benamidar and beneficiary and they were appointed by A.1-Raju Yadav and liquor shop license holders in whose favour highest bids knocked are not real beneficiaries of license, but for namelenders of A.1-Ralu Yadav. Whether it attracts any other offence against A.1-Raju Yadav is a matter for consideration by hearing afresh on the discharge application and in framing charge if necessary for any IPC offence or other PC Act offence as the case may be. Having regard to the above and in the result, the criminal revision case is allowed while setting aside the impugned dismissal order on the discharge application of petitioner/A2, remanded the same to the lower Court with a direction to hear afresh and if at all even any charge framed, for same is not barred to alter or amend or delete any charge or to frame appropriate charges invoking Section 216 CrPC so to decide on own merits and with reasons.'

10. The grounds raised before the trial court under Section 239 Cr.P.C. are that as per the Gazette Notification by the District Collector for allotment of lease of right to sell the lndian made Foreign Liquor for the period from 01 .O7.2010 to 30.06.201 1, the petitioner has no power to allot the shops to anybody. It is further ]l EfD,J C.lR.C. No.3250 o12018 contended by the petitioner that the Government of I ndhra Pradesh has not insisted for the financial capacity of the appl ;ants in Rule 5 of the Notification dated 27.05.2010 and that every ) tizen is eligible to apply, irrespective of their financial status. He f -l1her submitted that there was a delay in issuing the FIR and that r c malerial was seized or the movable or immovable assets were s =ized possession of the AO2 who is the petitioner herr: n. He further from the contended that the ingredients of Sections 7,13 (1) (j) read with 13 (2) of PC Act do not get attracted against the petitiorr :r as there was no element of demand in this case. Sections 7, 13 (' ) (d) of the PC Act are extracted hereunder for the sake of reference Section 7 of the PC Act: "7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed - - servant who, (a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtair person, an undue advantage, with the rl perform or cause performance of publrc duty or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forb€ \nY PUblic 'rom any gntion to n properly trance to (b) (c) perform such duty either by himself or by anl) rer public servant; or obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, advantage from any person as a rewal improper or dishonest performance of a pu ) rn undue for the c duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either b\ rimsell or another public servant; or performs or induces another public servant t improperly or dishonestly a public duty or performance of such duty in anticipatior ' penorm r forbear of or rn t2 EfD,J C.t R. C. No.3250 of 2018 consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but wh ch may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine " Section 13 (1) (d) ofthe PC Act: "13. Criminal misconduct by a public seryant - (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,- (a) xxxx (b) xxxx (c) xxxx (d) if he:- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iri) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public inlerest; or

11. lt is further contended that in the absence of any ingredients to attract the offences against the petitioner, it is a fit case to discharge the petitioner of the alleged offences. ln A Subair v. State of Kerala2, it was held that the primary requisite for an offence under Section 13(1 Xd) of PC Act is proof of demand or request of valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the public (2009) 6 scc s87 'z 1i EfO,J cn R.c. No.1250 012013 servant must be established. ln the absence of any trr oof of demand or request from the public servant the offence under r: --ction 13(1)(d) of the PC Act cannot be held to be established. Learr ed counsel for the petitioner relied heavily upon the said decision. l- the said case, the decision was delivered after a full-fledged tr i I wherein the prosecution failed to prove the demand and acceptarr e made by the accused therein.

12. Another contention of the learned counsel 1c r the petitioner is that none of the witnesses, but for those LWs i and 9, have spoken that they paid mamools to the petitionr r herein. His contention is that not even a single witness has sp< ken about the demand made by the petitioner. But, the main al :gation in the present case is that there were irregularities c: nmitted while allotting the wine shops in the auction process. The Auction Conditions No.lV, XIV and XVll mentioned in ( iazette No.18 27 .05.2010 are extracted hereunder for the sake of re' 3 rence: "lV. Benami tenders not allowed Rule I Tender shall be filed by the tenderer himself o- rolder of power of attorney but not by any other person. XlV. Occasion for reiection for tender even if it is tl! hiqhest amoud: (Rule 14) (i) lt shall be open to the auctioning authority lo 'efuse to knock down the auction in favour of the highest tend,r 3r if such authority is satisfied after a perusal of the affidavlt rr on the l4 EfD,J C.l.R.C. No.3250 of ?01 8 basis of any other information that such tenderer cannot reasonably be expected to discharge his/her liabilities in terms of the lease. (ii) The auctioning authority, may by order reiect any tender on the ground that the tender is of Benami nalure or that there is collusion among the tenderers who participated in the auction for the lease of any shop. (iii) Where the highest tender is not accepted the auctioning authority shall record the reasons thereof. XVll. One person cannot obtain the lease of more than one shop:-(Rule l4) No person shall be entitled to obtain the lease of more than one shop. ln the event of a person being successful auction purchaser of a shop, all the other tenders filed by him in respect of any other shop/ shops shall automatically become invalid." '13. Under the said Rule, one person should not possess more than one shop and that no person shall submit tender on behalf of any other person unless he holds a power of attorney from such person. ln this case, it is revealed that a group of persons formed into an informal association to set the major stake in the business and got engaged Benamidars to obtain licence on their behalf and got them participated in the auction though they were not financially sound and most of them were found to be the white ration card holders purported to have income less than 75,OO0l- per annum. The case of the prosecution is that Form 41 and A3 were submitted in the names of licence holders and the said forms were attested by the accused officials without any proper verification inspite of the 15 EfD,J C R.C. No 3250 of2013 adequate opportunity to the Excise Officials for irspecting and monitoring the functions of Wine Shops. lt is ll- t case of the prosecution that most of the wine shops are Benami :-rd the officials should have initiated action in accordance with la I and that the petitioner AO2 being the Prohibition and Excise lnsp,: :tor, conspired with accused No.'t and did not verify the documents f - nished by him and allowed accused No.1 to establish Benami liqu r r shops. lt is further alleged that out of 390 licence holders of wirr; shops in the District 90 of them possessed white ration cards. Ti t s, it is evident that a group of persons conspired and attained the ct ject of gaining control over more than 4Oo/o of the wine shops a' J are running business with the active support of the excise officials

14. During the course of investigation, the pr,r ;ecution could record the statements of the witnesses wherein LWr; 20 to 41 have stated that accused No.1 was a Benami of 19 liquor rhops and that the said licences were obtained in their names o r the date of auction, they were taken to the Excise office and they submitted the tender forms and after being declared as succ:;sful bidders, accused No.1 made arrangements for payment rr the required amount by way of demand drafts to the Excise departr ent and again their signatures were obtained for taking PAN cards r their names t6 EfD,J Cd.R.C. No 72s0 ol20'to and also bank accounts were opened in their names for doing business but they never went to APBCL Depots for lifting the liquor stocks at any time. The investigation further revealed that huge amounts were transferred from accused No 1 to the accounts of LWs.5 to 14. lt is further elicited from LWs.20 to 41 that they were paying mamools to the excise officials including the petitioner herein' The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that only two witnesses i.e. LWs.B and 9 stated that they give monthly mamools to the Petitioner.

15. ln a discharge petition, the court need not conduct a roving enquiry into the material available on records, but has to see whether any prima facie case exists against the accused'

16. The prima facie case against the petitioner-AO2 is disclosed from the said allegations, that he has abused his official position by omitting his lawful duties and accepted illegal gratification towards monthly mamools from accused No.1 and others to facilitate 19 wine shops on auction and run them in the name of Binamies. Since the prima facie allegations point out the alleged offences against the AO2, the trial court has rightly dismissed the discharge petition. n EfO,J CtIRC No 1250ol2O1a

17. The contention of the learned counsel for .l e petitioner is that in the absence of any proof of demand, the >ffence under Section 7 or 13 of the PC Act cannot be proverl and that the prosecution ahs not collected any material to prov: the demand' made by the petitioner and thus, he has to be discr lrged. Now, it has to be seen whether demand is sine qua non to prc ve the offence under Section 7 and Section 13 (1)(d) (i) (iii) of the Pt- Act

18. ln Satyanarayana Murthy v. Districl lnspector of Police, State of A.P.,3 it was held lhat: "25. ln our estimate, to hold on the basis of the evidenc( In record that the culpability oF the appellant under Sections 7 and 3(1XdXi) and (ir) has been proved, would be an inferential dedu(t )n which is impermissible in law. Noticeably, the High Court ha( the appellant of the charge under Section 7 of the Al State had accepted the verdict and has not preferred ;rr against the same. The analysis undertaken as herern l Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, thus, hi( underscore the indispensability of the proof of demanj lcquitted and the y appeal ove qua been lo of illegal gratification.

26. ln reiteration of the golden principle which runs tlr web of administration of justice in criminal cases, this C()r )ugh the d in Sujrt Biswas v. State of Assam had held that suspicion, ho!v(r cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cann l rest its case in the realm of "may be" true but has to u1,1 the domain of "must be" true in order to steer clear of all surmise or conjecture. lt was held, that the court must or miscarnage of justice is avoided and if in the f g(ave, =t afford to -ade it in possible sure that cts and '(2015) 1o scc 152 18 EfD,J C -R.C. No.i2,Ool2018 circumstances, two views are plausible, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused "

19. ln Jayaraj v. State of A.P.4, it was held that "7. lnsofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned. it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused volunlarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of rllustration reference may be made to the decision in C.l\4. Sharma v. State of A.P.2 and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBB." 20 ln M. Narsinga Rao vs. State of A.P.5, it was held that "18. ln the complainant turned 'hostile". But, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this Court concluded that even in the absence of direct evidence, the rest of the evidence adduced and the circumstances were sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused. Reliance was placed on the following observation in support of the submission: "But the other circumstance which have been proved in this case and those preceding and succeeding the searching out of the tarnted burrency notes, are relevant and useful to help the court to draw a factual presumption that the appellant had willingly received the currency notes."

21. Learned Standing Counsel for ACB has relied on Neeraj Datta's case (1 supra). The question that fell for consideration o (2014) r3 scc '(2001) 1 SCC 691 19 EfO,J Cn.R C No.3250 ol2Ato before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in I e said case is as under '1) Whether in the absence of evidence of complain?r /direct or prlmary evidence of demand of illegal gratification is it not permissrble to draw an inferential deduction of culpabil , guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1Xd) ead wlth Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 bas ) on other evidence adduced by the prosecution?"

22. Afler a thorough discussion of the law and he precedents available on the subject, the Constitution Bench has l; tmmarized as "(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gra i cation by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution s : non in order to establish the guilt of the accused put)l sine qua ) servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1 Xd) (i) and(ii) of the Act. (b) ln order to bring home the guilt of the acl prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratilir the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fir< can be proved either by direct evidence which can be ir of oral evidence or documentary evidence. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of d ) acceptance of illegal gratification can also be ) circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct documentary evidence. (d) ln order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the d l acceptance of illegal gratification by the public s(,r following aspects have to be borne in mind: sed, the 3tion and :in issue re nature rand and lved by )ral and land and ,ant, the 20 ErD,J Crl R.C. No.3250o1201A I (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. ln such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. ln the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (l XdXi) and (ii) of the Act. (iii) ln both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1Xd), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer vvhich emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and inturn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1Xd) of the Act. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and nol in the absence thereof- On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved. by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. 21 EfD,J C.I.R.C. No.3250 ol 2018 (f) ln the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or ha: unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demanr gratificat on can be proved by lettrng in the evidence ol witness who can again let in evidence, either oril documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove tl € circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor doe in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant." (g) ln so far as Section 7 of the Act is concern,:' proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates th -' raise a presumption that the illegal gratification wr purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in Section. The said presumption has to be raised by I as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of cl said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Sectior not apply to Section 13 (1 ) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. lied or is rf illegal ny other /otbY case by , it result , on the court to for the he said re court rrse, the 20 does (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Se: the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred k, point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption whilr on 20 of lbove in .he latter rs discretionary in nature."

23. Accordingly, the question referred for consiieration of the Constitution Bench was answered as under: "ln the absence of evidence of the complainant (dir€c oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an rferential deduction of culpabiiity/guilt of a public servant under . ection 7 and Sechon 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Ac ,ased on other evidence adduced by the prosecution." /primary,

24. Thus, the law laid down by the Apex Cott t clarifies that "under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home th: offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe liver which is accepted by the public servant which would mak€ it an offence. 22 ETO,J Ctl-R C No. J250 ol 2018 Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and inturn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1Xd) and (i) and (ii) of the Act."

25. While parting with the judgment, the Bench has reiterated the quote in A.B. Bhaskara Rao vs. CBI K2011) 10 SCC 2591, which was taken from the case of Stafe of M.P. vs. Shambhu Dayal [(2006) 8 SCC 693r, wherein it was held thus "32. lt is difficult to accept the prayer of the respondent that a lenient view be taken in this case- The corruption by public servants has become a gigantic problem. lt has spread everywhere. No facet of public activity has been left unaffected by the stink of corruption. lt has deep and pervasive impact on the functioning of the entire country. Large-scale corruption retards the nation-building activities and everyone has to suffer on that count."

26. ln the present case, there is prima facie material to show that the petitioner accepted monthly mamools and that he facilitated the accused No.1 to run'Benami Liquor Shops'. Therefore, it is held that the petitioner cannot be discharged of the alleged offences

27. ln the light of the above said decisions and in view of the above held discussion, it is held that there is no infirmity in the order ETD,J crt R.c. No.3250 012013 passed by the trial court dismissrng the discharge a6r ,lication filed by the petitioner herein. Therefore the same is confirrr rd and revision case is liable to be dismissed. The trial court shall ; 'oceed with the matter and decide the same on its own merit; without being influenced by any of the observations made by this c r u 11.

28. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Cas: is dismissed confirming the order dated 29.10.2018 passed in Crl M.P. No.151 of 2O14 in CC No.4B ot 2013 by l-Additional Special . r dge for SPE & ACB Cases cum V Additional Chief Judge, C t ' Civil Courts, Hyderabad. Miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, shall t;t lnd closed. ^sdr- P. GowRl SHANKAR ,TRUE COPY// SECTION OFFICER One Fair Copy to the onourable Smt Justice (Fdr her Ladyship's kind P firr-\" erusal)'. De vi Eada To,

1. The l-Addl. Spbcial Judge for SPE and ACB cirs ( s cum V Addl. Chief I Judoe, City CiVil Courts Hyderabad. I Affairs, New Delhi.

2. 11 L.R.Copies.P 3. The Under Secrbtary, Union of lndia, Ministry of Lav'. Justice and Company 4. The Secretary, I Telangana Advocates Associatiorr Library, High Court 5. One CC to Sri Jl Prabhakar, Advocate [oPUC] 6. one CC to Sri t. Bala Mohan Reddy Standing ( ounsel cum Special Buildings, Hyderbbad. Public ProsecJtor [oPUC]

7. Two CD Copies DUSA ,\,r HIGH COURT DATED:2811112025 / ORDER CRLRC.No.3250 of 2018 t{ l'i.9 .) ITHES 14 4]j '']n1c l.),]] 2! * .Or e^ ---:4 * DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL REVISION ]ASE .of,"4 tl,6 -- fl(eu