The High Court · 2025

Judgment

This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State, aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Special Judge for Trial of Cases under Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act-Cum-l Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal, hereinafter hled brevity as

trial Court in Spl.S.C.No.1 I of 2016 dated 12.08.2016 where under the respondent/accused acquitted for the offence punishable under Sections 37 6(2l,{1) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPCJ and Section 5(n) read with 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2OI2 (for short 'POCSOJ.

2. The case of the prosecution briefly stated as that the victim is a minor aged only 16 years. That, the accused is resident of same village. That, prior to the date of incident, the accused was harassing the victim by following in the name of love and marriage, but the victim has refused his proposal. That, prior to the date of incident, the mother of the accused and the accused approached the mother of the victim and proposed for the marriage of the accused with the victim, for which, the mother of the victim did not agree. Thereby-the accused developed Iust to have sexual intercourse with the victim. That, about three months prior to the date of complaint, 2 I at about l:00 PM the victim went to bushes to attend ca-lls of nature. Taking advantage of it, the accused followed her, caught hold ofher, dragged into bushes, removed her clothes and forcibly committed rape on her. As the victim could not reach the house, the mother of the victim went in search of the victim and found the accused committing rape on the victim and when she raised cries, the accused left her and fled away.Later, both the victim and her mother approached the elders and informed that the accused was following and harassing the victim in the name of love and marriage while she was going to the school. The elders secured the presence of the accused and warned him. But, due to family reputation and reputation of the victim, they did not inform abou! committing rape by the accused. The accused taking advantage of the said incident, he continued to harass the victim and demanding to fulfill his sexual desire. Having vexed with the attitude of the accused, the victim and her mother took courage and lodged a complaint on 26.08.2015. During the course of investigation, the Investigation Officer examined all the witnesses including the victim and sent the victim to the Government Hospital for medicat examination, arrested the accused on 22.09.2015. Upon questioning, he confessed to have committed the offence and the medical examination also reveals sexual intercourse having held on the victim. T 3

3. Heard Mr.M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for appeilant/ State and Mr. Elavanatt Rajesh, learned counsel appearing for respondent-accused

4. karned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently contended that the trial Court without properiy considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, erroneously acquitted the accused. He further submitted tl,at prosecution had proved the case beyond the reasonable doubt that the accused No. 1 committed the offences. He further submitted that the P.W. 1 in her testimony specifically stated that the accused No.1 committed the crime. P.W.2, who is the mother of the victim, also deposed that the accused has committed the offence. The trial Court disbelieved the version of the prosecution and acquitted the accused on the ground that there is delay in lodging the complaint and also the prosecution has not produced any medical evidence to prove the offence. The judgment passed by the learned trial Court is contrary to the settled principles of law on the ground that the delay in lodging the complaint in the case of sexual assault is not a fatal to ttre case of the prosecution. Hence, the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside and the respondent-accused is liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 376(2)(i) of Indian Penal Code, 186O (for short 'lPC,) and Section 5(n) read with 4 I I I 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2Ol2 (for short'POCSOJ.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused-respondent submitted that the trial Court after of evaluating the oral and documentary evidence on record rightly came to a conclusion that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the offences levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted that even according to the P.W.1 and P.W.2, the alleged incident was occurred in the month of May 2O15 at no point of time neither the P.W. 1 or P.W.2 have not lodged any complaint. Even according to the P.W.2, they have not informed about the alleged offence only they informed the elders that the accused is harassing P.W. 1 . The same does not attracted the ingredients for the offence under section 376(21(l of Indian Penal Code. The evidence of the P.W. 12 (Doctor) who conducted the examination of the victim his evidence aiso not suppofted the prosecution. He further submitted that the trial Court rightly acquitted the accused by giving cogent hndings. There are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court and the appeal filed by the State is liable to be dismissed.

6. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and after perusal of the impugned judgment it 5 reveals that the P.W. 1 lodged the complaint through Ex.Pl. In the said complaint also P.W.1 does not mention the date when the said atleged offence was taken place only she stated that in the month of May 2015 at 1:0O PM. The P.W. 1 lodged the complaint on

26.Oa.2OI5 after lapse of more than three (03) months. Even according to the evidence of the P.W. 1 and P.W.2 that they did not informed the sexual assault committed by the accused No. 1 and PWl at the first instance to the elders. They only informed that the accused is harassing the P.W. 1. Even according to the evidence of P.W. 1, the alleged scene of offence is just 100 meters of the house of the P.W. i, the said incident took place in the day time and it would not have gone unnoticed by any of the villagers., Even according to the P.W.2, she witnessed the said alleged scene of offence but she has not informed to anyone or lodged the complaint. Except the I evidence of the P.W. 1, the prosecution failed to produce any other evidence. The P.W. 12 who is a doctor in his evidence also not supported the prosecution. The learned trial Court after evaluating the evidence of the P.W. 1 to P.W. 15 and Exs.Pl to P13 and MOs. 1 to 4 rightly come to conclusion that the prosecution miserably faiied to prove the offences levelled against the accused beyond the reasonable doubt. 6

7. Io VlJagan u. Stdte of Kera.lal, the Honble Supreme Court held that when a prosecution is based solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, an unexplained or excessive delay in lodging the F.l.R such as the seven-month delay in that case renders it unsafe to convict, as it also deprives the prosecution of vital corroborative evidence like medical hndings or DNA analysis ald leaves the accused defenseless. The Honble Supreme Court noted that where the prosecutrix voluntarily remained silent for months, conviction solely on her oral testimony becomes hazardous, and accordingly set aside the conviction under Section 376 of IPC. Similarly, in lllahendra Slngh and Athers a. State of Madhga Pra.deslP, reaffriming the principle in Vadluelu Th.evar a. State of Madra€, the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorised oral testimony as wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or partly reliable, and emphasized that in the third category, courts must seek corroboration in material particulars. These principles collectively guide the assessment of solitary-witness evidence, especially in sexual offence cases, where reliability and corroboration become crucial in the presence of delay or inconsistencies.

8. The case on hand suffers from material infirmities and lacks the corroboration of medical evidence required in law, particulariy 1 (2008) 14 scc 763 2 (2022) 7 *c t57 3 AIR 1957 sc 614 I where the sole witness does not inspire full confidence. The trial Court's assessment that the evidence fell short of proving the charges beyond reasonable doubt is a possible and well-founded view. As the acquittal on a proper appreciation of evidence and does not suffer from perversity or illegality.

9. In cases of acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Shanna a. Sto.te (Gouernment of I,ICT of Delh,l) and. anothey', held that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellant Court has to consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal."

10. ln Ghurey La.l a, State of Uttar Pradeshs the Hon''lcle Supreme Court after referring to several Judgments regarding the settled principies of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70, as follows: "70 In the light of the above, the High Court and other appellate Courts should follow the well-settled pinciples a 1zozz1 e supreme court Cases s36 s (2OO8) 1O Supreme Court Cases 45 8 (1, crysrallized by number of Judgnents d it is going to overrule or olherwise dislurb the trial court's acquittol." l. The appellate court nn)) ottl.t, ttverrule or olherwise disturb thc tial court's ucquittul if it hat "very substantktl and compelling reusons for doing v, A number of instances arisc in u'hich the dppellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard. the trial court's decision- "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist 'when: i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to lhe facts is palpably wrong: ii) The fial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of bw; iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to resuh in "grave miscarriage ofi ustice " : iv) The entire approach of the tial cont in dealing with the evidence urs patently illega l,' v) The trial court's judgment was nwnfestly unjust dnd unreasonable; vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the balli:;tic expert, etc. vii) This list is inlended to be illustrative, not exhaustive

2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration o the findings ofthe trial court.

3. If two reasonable views cun be reqched one thot leads to acquittal, the other to conviction the High Courts/uppellate courls must rule in favour ofthe uccused. "

11. For the foregoing reasons as well as principles laid down by the Apex Court Supra, the learncd Sessions Court rightly acquitted 9 the respondent-accused for the offences under Sections Section 37 6(2],(11 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short IPCJ and Section 5(n) read with 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2Ol2 (for short 'POCSO'). Hence, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the well considered judgment passed by the trial Court.

12. The Criminal Appeal filed by the State is accordingly dismissed. Miscelianeous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed SD/. P.GOWRI SHANKAR DEPUTY REGISTRAR //TRUE COPY' SECTION OFFICER To, I DL

1. The Special Judge for Trial of cases under protection of children from Sexual Offences Act-Cum-l Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal. (With records)

2. The Station House Officer, Jangaon Police Station. 3. Two CCs to the Public Prosecutor, State of Telangana, High Court Buildings, at Hyderabad (OUT)

4. One CC to Mr. Elavanatt Rajesh, Advocate [OPUC] 5. Two CD Copies I i t HIGH COURT JSR, J DATED:2711112025 JUDGMENT CRLA.No.1569 of 2017 DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL APPEAL q $ o- .f tJ 2 4 JAN 2026 llPiirc z.a}. t